Air power is much too strong....

[Brian Rock]

Bruce70 - that's an interesting compromise. It still makes it possible, but would require a massive concentration of resouces.

John di Fool - your point about the units being "air fleets" as opposed to fighters is quite right.

[ September 20, 2002, 01:23 AM: Message edited by: Brian Rock ]

[Archibald]

Quick Robin to the Grogcave... Look on the bright side, at least we've reached the magic 100-post level. Where's your hurtful taunts now Russ Benning? Eh? EH!?

I'm afraid I'm going to have to disagree with you again husky65. Anyone interested in how the game's playability could be improved should skip the rest of this thread as it's time for the grogs to get down and RUMBLE!

Brian Rock:

"Scale: I can destroy a platoon with one well-placed bomb. It doesn't follow that I can just as easily take out a company with three well-placed bombs, a battallion with ten well-placed bombs, and so on."

Your reply:

"Actually it does follow that you can."

By that logic if a badly placed bomb can miss a platoon then three badly placed bombs can miss a company and so on... That's a lot of pressure on poor young Dwayne from Idaho at the Norden Sight of his B24.

In reality each unit and sub unit under attack would face a probability rather than a certainty of taking that well placed bomb. Many would succumb to it, but not everyone.

I'm reminded of a rather callow subordinate of mine who was espousing the "if you can make no mistakes for one minute, you can make no mistakes for one hour" line so beloved of poor leaders. I took him aside and gently asked him that if he could urinate for one minute did it necessarily follow that he could do so for an hour? Thankfully, he replied in the negative.

Brian Rock:

"A larger formation not only means more targets, it means a much larger footprint. They are vulnerable, but not to the same degree."

Your reply:

"A battalion is more vulnerable to scaled up air attack than a platoon, it and its supporting echelon are easier to find than a platoon."

It's ironic that someone whose initial post contained the comment "Yet again someone forgets the scale of the game" is now arguing about the relative densities of the TAOR of a platoon and a battalion.

Being easier to find makes them more liable to attack, but not necessarily more vulnerable. WWII iron bombs were not smart weapons capable of riding a laser beam down onto Panzer Lehr's "goulash cannons" and thereby rendering the division instantly useless. Having said that, maybe they would be at tech 5! Lars made a very good post to this effect.

Everyone caught under an allied bomb carpet faced much the same chance of getting hit as bombs rained down indiscriminately. If anything, first and second echelon troops are generally much more spread out than platoons, as the latter's TAOR is constrained by the need to provide mutual support between sections. A good QM fearing air attack would disperse his echelons as much as possible to avoid that most feared of allied weapons; the well placed bomb!

Yourself again:

"Also you seem to be of the opinion that you need to kill all the troops to destroy a unit, a destroyed unit is one that is combat ineffective."

Go back to your sources. In his initial post in this thread Brian Rock stated the complete opposite:

"I am not aware of any units that were destroyed (by which I mean made combat incapable, as opposed to annihilated) by air power alone."

He shares your own opinion. Your inability to realise this does not demonstrate a rigorous knowledge of what Brian Rock has actually been saying.

Brian Rock:

"Circumstances: All of the examples put forward have involved air in conjunction with ground forces:

[1]Cobra: air and ground forces

[2]Montelier: air and ground forces

[3]Falaise: air and ground forces"

Yourself:

"Again your confusion between unit destruction and occupation of land - infantry are of course needed to occupy ground, however airpower is quite capable of destroying units (as it did historically)."

He's not confused between unit destruction and occupation of land, in fact he's demonstrated he understands the distinction.

Brian Rock:

"History: It never happened. I'm still waiting for an example of a corps or army destroyed by air power alone."

Yourself:

"Examples have been provided already, the fact that you don't understand the difference between destroying a unit and occupying the ground it held does not change the fact that airpower did it."

Your argument again contradicts Brian Rock's demonstrating in a previous post that he does understand the difference. The impression this gives to a dispassionate reader is that an understanding of the facts (in this case Brian Rock's actual posts) comes second to the need to validate your own opinion.

Yourself again:

"The fact that entire columns of troops attempted to surrender to ground attack a/c in Falaise suggests that the airpower had destroyed the units."

This is the "well placed bomb" argument again. Airpower had destroyed those units surrendering, not necessarily the whole division. No one has ever disputed that Panzer Lehr was so badly shaken that many units surrendered. As I stated in a previous post, elements of Panzer Lehr were still capable of providing resistance. Rather than quoting Zaloga again, I'll refer to another source. This is from Roger Edwards's "Panzer - A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945" (ISBN 1-85409-208-1):

"Despite this debacle, Panzer Lehr faced US First Army with unexpected opposition, but with no reserves to call upon, Seventh Army was about to collapse..."

Panzer Lehr itself lacked reserves to counter Seventh Corps not because of the bombing but because they had been depleted by several weeks of ground combat and FGA. I covered this in another post, so I won't labour the point.

Brian Rock:

1) We know there was ground fighting after the bombing.

Yourself:

"The div was destroyed, the fact that sub units were able to fight does not suggest that it was not"

Panzer Lehr had been effectively destroyed as a division long before July 25th, a point which I will return to later. The point is not that it had been destroyed as a division, but that elements were still fighting.

A division is considered to have lost combat effectiveness when it has lost the ability to control it's units and divisional support assets. This certainly happened to Panzer Lehr when most of it's comms were destroyed.

In effect this is the "well placed bomb" argument in reverse. Panzer Lehr's loss of cohesion as a division does not necessarily imply that every unit under it's command lost their own cohesion also. Kampfgruppe Heintz, for instance, was unscathed by the bombing. What was lost rather was Panzer Lehr's ability to command and support them.

For Seventh Corps this meant that their objectives were now contested by individual kampfgruppen unable to call on support from division. This made them a much easier proposition to attack, but a ground assault still had to go in.

Brian Rock:

2) Elsewhere Bayerlein puts losses due to air at 50%:

Yourself:

Bayerlein to Wilmott 70%

I presume you're referring to Chester Wilmott's "Struggle in Europe", which was published in 1952. Wilmott wrote superbly, but was also a journalist rather than a trained historian. I've no doubt that Bayerlein said to him that Panzer Lehr took 70% casualties on 25th July. I would assess that Wilmott inferred incorrectly that this was all caused by the bombing.

More detailed analyses that have been carried out in the fifty years since Wilmott's book estimate that Panzer Lehr took 50% casualties to the bombing. Both Brian Rock and I cited references to support this in previous posts, indeed Brian Rock gave an excellent breakdown of the percentage of casualties Panzer Lehr suffered from artillery, air and ground attack.

Brian Rock:

"It was sufficient to limit American advances until the following day."

Yourself:

"ie it was not a significant force on a Div scale (and since SC runs on a minimum 1 week turn would not be noticeable in game) - the allies were renowned for their lack of boldness in advance, any opposition tended to make them halt."

An SC corps written down to 2-3 strengh is not a significant force either, but it is still physically in existence. This was also the case with Panzer Lehr. I've laboured this point already however.

There is a fundamental contradiction in your statement. Your whole thesis hinges on the argument that what happened to Panzer Lehr in a day could be applied to an SC army in a week. You have conceded Brian Rock's argument that Panzer Lehr limited the American advance. Extrapolating this to an SC scale means an army limiting advance into it's hex even after devastating bombing. It effectively contradicts everything you've been saying up to now.

I loved the blaming of the limited advance on allied timidity rather than Panzer Lehr's resistance. Does this mean that in the game allied advances into bombed hexes should be forbidden?

I especially loved the phrase "any opposition tended to make them halt". You stated earlier in the thread:

"The div was destroyed, the fact that sub units were able to fight does not suggest that it was not."

In effect you admit that Panzer Lehr had sub units still able to offer resistance to an advancing army which tended to halt in the face of any opposition. This flatly contradicts your argument that Panzer Lehr could not have stopped Seventh Corps.

Brian Rock:

"]Husky65, the Panzer Lehr was not destroyed. It stayed in the line for almost two weeks before being reorganisation and refitting."

Yourself:

"PL was destroyed, the fact that sub units remanined in the line just meant that the Germans were grabbing at straws, PL was combat ineffective - the Germans were still using Div names but the units deployed were not Divs in anything but name."

"If I call a surviving Rifle Squad the 2nd SS 'Das Riech' Panzer Div that does not mean Das Reich survived, it just means I am kidding myself."

I've already discussed the faulty logic behind ascribing a loss of cohesion at divisional level to every unit under it's command.

I referred in an earlier post to Panzer Lehr's battered state on 25th July. By this time Panzer Lehr had been in action since 8th June, or almost seven turns in SC, and in that time they had received no significant reinforcements. Panzer Lehr had entered Normandy with 188 tanks and just prior to the allied bombing attacks was down to 31 operational tanks. This represented 16% of their original tank strengh.

husky65 is adamant that the battered remnants of a division can no longer be regarded as a division in any meaningful sense. I agree with this wholeheartedly, by 25th July Panzer Lehr was a division in name only.

This fact further dilutes the argument that Panzer Lehr's bombing be extrapolated to army scale. It took 1,800 bombers to inflict 50% casualties on a formation which probably had the effective power of at best a regiment.

To use the SC analogy again, Panzer Lehr would go into the line at full strength on D+2 and be reduced to 30% - 40% strength after 6-7 turns of combat. The allied bombing attack would knock at least half of this remaining strength off while a ground unit would polish off the rump.

I'd have no problems with this happening to me in SC. I certainly wouldn't use it as a justifcation for the current problem of fresh units succumbing immediately to the all conquering mega air assault that is affecting playability for me.

Brian Rock:

"I am not, ever have, and probably never will argue airpower has no combat effect. The point I've been arguing since my first post is that airpower alone - note the "alone" bit - did not destroy corps or armies."

Yourself:

"And you have been shown to be wrong - airpower has destroyed armies, what airpower cant do is occupy land - two very different things."

I certainly don't think he's wrong and feel my analysis of your arguments support this view. I welcome your constructive criticism.

Could you also please tell me which armies in WWII were destroyed solely by air attack and nothing else? The German armies in Normandy probably suffered as much from air attacks as anyone else, but air power was an important factor in this rather than the sole factor.

Seventh Army was destroyed by the end of Operation Cobra, but it was as a result of a combined arms offensive in which air played a vital part.

This is why people have posted in such numbers to this thread, as there is a general feeling that the preponderance of air power makes combined arms redundant.

I'd be happy to field your comments regarding this and my other two posts on the subject. If nothing else, your lively debating style has added a lot of spice to a very interesting thread.

[Bruce70]

Just feel the need to be pedantic here...

Originally posted by Archibald:

Brian Rock:

"Scale: I can destroy a platoon with one well-placed bomb. It doesn't follow that I can just as easily take out a company with three well-placed bombs, a battallion with ten well-placed bombs, and so on."

Your reply:

"Actually it does follow that you can."

By that logic if a badly placed bomb can miss a platoon then three badly placed bombs can miss a company and so on... That's a lot of pressure on poor young Dwayne from Idaho at the Norden Sight of his B24.

It *does* follow that if you can take out a platoon with one well placed bomb then you can take out three platoons with three well placed bombs. The contrapositive is that if three well placed bombs can miss a company then one well placed bomb can miss a platoon, which is also true (though irrevelant since the preposition is false). And while you can't derive your statement from any of the previous ones it is also true that three badly placed bombs can indeed miss a company.

No statement was made about the relative probabilities of the two occurences (regarding well placed bombs).

What Brian should have said is that it is less likely that three well placed bombs will fall, not that it is less likely that three well placed bombs will destroy a company.

[Archibald]

Is there a statistician in the house?

I just like the phrase "well placed bomb". It really rolls off the tongue.

The point that I was trying to make is that it is faulty logic to infer that if a bomb falls on one platoon then every single other platoon will necessarily get a bomb too. They might if you drop enough on them, but then we get into diminishing returns as we discussed in an earlier post.

Hope that made sense. Tired... Need Coffee...

[arby]

Originally posted by Archibald:

Quick Robin to the Grogcave... Look on the bright side, at least we've reached the magic 100-post level. Where's your hurtful taunts now Russ Benning? Eh? EH!?

It's Bensing, but never mind. Congratulations on getting to 100 posts, without any contribution of verbiage from mine own self.

That oversight is attributable to astonishment that this subject is even being debated. Is air power too strong? Does the Pope wear funny hats? Of course it's too strong. The standard tactic of the Germans in the east and the Allies in the west is to concentrate every single friggin' plane on the entire front on one solitary corps, bomb it into oblivion, and then jam your ground units through the gap. Whether this happened to Panzer Lehr is beside the point; the fact is that it was not the standard tactic on either front. Yes, air power was important, but not to the extent that this game makes it.

There have been any number of suggestions to remedy this, so I'll add one of my own: shorten the attack distance of air fleets to three, maybe four, and increase it by 1 for every two levels of research in L/R aircraft. It's much more historical. A Bf-109 flying escort for the London Blitz could dogfight no more than 10 minutes if it wanted to be able to return to base. The idea that fighter-bombers would take off from France, do a bunch of tactical bombing in the middle of England (or take off from Riga and strafe units near Leningrad) and then return to base is sheer fantasy. It would also break up the Eastern Front and allow the Russians to gain air superiority on some aspect of that front if they desired.

I'm not sure if that really solves the problem, because I think it resides more in the synergy of the game mechanics. That is, I believe that air power is inordinately important not because it is inherently so in the game, but because players choose to make it so: it is the only viable strategy for breaking out of the trench warfare on the Eastern Front. Back when I wrote my opus on game play, one of the points I addressed was the game's lack of verisimilitude to what actually happened on that Front: rather than the ebb and flow of true armored combat, it quickly becomes Verdun Redux, except with airplanes. While all the other problems I mentioned have received ample comment (both before and since I made them), this one didn't.

And that's too bad, because I think that's one of the things I miss the most. The timing of a counterstroke is one of the key strategic decisions in warfare: done too early or too late, it can be catastrophic, but done just right, it can be catastrophic to one's opponent. The Russian player never gets to make that decision in this game. If the Allies win, it is invariably because the Russians manage to hang on for dear life while the Western Allies mount an offensive.

[Desert Dave]

Boy Howdy, the Shade of Freud...

Say hey Lads! this is no rude refutation, no, no, but more a sort of antidote -- for Big Media Inc. and satellite sensation! brought to you! by Three Cheers, to get those hard to clean clothes, so recently dirtied, so decently white...

Can't remember the movie, or perhaps it was a random, ether blown dream, but the camera obscura seems to be inside the belly of the flying beast, and these April Shower of bombs are slowly floating down --- looks as though a billowing thunder-cloud's squalling all apart,

(and there is a classical music score -- Bach? Beethoven? haunting along the background in soft but insistent white-key, black-key melody)

and the clouds drift & tatter but lazily re-cover, and way down below you can barely make out... these tiny little patchwork fields, and these tiny little grain silos, and some tiny little chickens, and so, as our antidote-story goes -- there is one tiny bantam rooster, duly be pecking at the hens...well,

at last count, roughly 16 chickens consumed in the swirling inferno (and 1 poor chicken soul, exhumed later, deemed to die from a brittle little heart)

and in the aftermath the Investigator -- a nice and polite neighbor next door, known to be ruthless but precise, asked the cockeyed rooster -- why he did? what he did what he did, no matter the mayhem be falling all about, and that rooster gathered up sore ruffled feathers,

and said:

"I thought it my sworn duty to -- keep on keeping on, pecking at the heads."

So. There is Logos, and there is thin twistings of smoke out of an Alchemist kiln, and one concerns Order out of Chaos, and the other -- gold out of lead...

One is Senor Picasso dripping sulfur, ochre & sweat (making... Guernica?), and the other is Herr Heinkel Heinz, safely landed, and now... O and now -- notice? the large white-coated men, be chasing with a net.

Is it Schadenfreude, as the Prosecutor (a few idly wondered if he was sensation seeking, preening for the cameras) wildly charged?

Or merely... two old scrawny sots in a movie-lot back-alley (beating enfeebled fists so awful slowly about the other's squawking head) and arguing, arguing, arguing over... a never quite decided -- what-came-first, chicken-or-the-egg kind of bet?

[Kuniworth]

I think we all should be prohibited to buy air fleets with bombs that can strike out platoons.

[Archibald]

I'm sorry for getting your name wrong Mr Benning. It won't happen again...

Immer Etwas, your post made many excellent points, but I have to take issue with your figures. Gugliemo Leghorn in his magisterial account of "Flying Feathers - Reflections on the Bombing Offensive" (ISBN 0-330-34019-0) states the following:

"The bombs floating down from a cerulean sky all but destroyed a coop already ravaged by fox attacks over the course of several days. 31 chickens had succumbed to the depredations of smooth talking anthropmorphic foxes and by time of the air attack it was a coop in name only..."

In line with then current bantam doctrine, the rooster had continued peck peck pecking throughout the fox attacks.

I hope this clarifies things. Iam the Alpha Grog! Hear me roar!!!

[husky65]

Your reply:

"Actually it does follow that you can."

By that logic if a badly placed bomb can miss a platoon then three badly placed bombs can miss a company and so on... That's a lot of pressure on poor young Dwayne from Idaho at the Norden Sight of his B24.

In reality each unit and sub unit under attack would face a probability rather than a certainty of taking that well placed bomb. Many would succumb to it, but not everyone.

Covered by Bruce70

It's ironic that someone whose initial post contained the comment "Yet again someone forgets the scale of the game" is now arguing about the relative densities of the TAOR of a platoon and a battalion.

Not really, the lower unit sizes were raised by someone else, I replied in the same currency.

Being easier to find makes them more liable to attack, but not necessarily more vulnerable. WWII iron bombs were not smart weapons capable of riding a laser beam down onto Panzer Lehr's "goulash cannons" and thereby rendering the division instantly useless. Having said that, maybe they would be at tech 5! Lars made a very good post to this effect.

Having worked in an Inf Bn (both at the pointy end and in the echelon) as well as a Field Supply company, the above is utterly wrong - a FSC (as one example) is far more vulnerable to air attack (BTW, I note you don't mention rockets, napalm or cannon attack - not all air attack is high altitude level bombing) as it is very difficult to dig in trucks and harder to conceal trucks and piles of supplies than foxholes - it is always situated near the MSR and has a heap of vehicular activity (or is as ineffective as if it had been destroyed), so it is relatively simple to locate.

Everyone caught under an allied bomb carpet faced much the same chance of getting hit as bombs rained down indiscriminately.

Right yet wrong and only applicable to indiscriminate bombing.

Wrong, in that the guy in the Tiger is much more likely to survive a near miss than the guy in a petrol tanker, or the guy in a foxhole - so the 'troop type' varies the effective lethal radius of the blast.

If anything, first and second echelon troops are generally much more spread out than platoons, as the latter's TAOR is constrained by the need to provide mutual support between sections. A good QM fearing air attack would disperse his echelons as much as possible to avoid that most feared of allied weapons; the well placed bomb!

Almost logical, but wrong - you can only spread a supporting unit so much because it must be able to protect itself against partisans, raiders etc - it must also be able to function, the more dispersed the less efficient the unit is.

The air threat is not the only threat.

Brian Rock:

"Circumstances: All of the examples put forward have involved air in conjunction with ground forces:

[1]Cobra: air and ground forces

[2]Montelier: air and ground forces

[3]Falaise: air and ground forces"

He's not confused between unit destruction and occupation of land, in fact he's demonstrated he understands the distinction.

He just ignores the fact that its been done.

Your argument again contradicts Brian Rock's demonstrating in a previous post that he does understand the difference.

Stating it and believing it are different - he has been given examples where units were destroyed by airpower and then pretended it never happened because some sub units survived.

I am arguing against the points he raises not the points he pretended to accept.

Yourself again:

This is the "well placed bomb" argument again. Airpower had destroyed those units surrendering, not necessarily the whole division. No one has ever disputed that Panzer Lehr was so badly shaken that many units surrendered.

So correct me if I'm wrong you are saying that entire units can be forced to surrender by airpower alone, but entire units cannot be?

And I hate to correct you yet again, but falaise was done almost entirely by 'well placed' bombs, rockets, cannon and mg fire as well as on one documented occaision, a well placed drop tank.

"Despite this debacle, Panzer Lehr faced US First Army with unexpected opposition, but with no reserves to call upon, Seventh Army was about to collapse..."

Any opposition was unexpected to the allies, they were notably timid in attack.

Panzer Lehr itself lacked reserves to counter Seventh Corps not because of the bombing but because they had been depleted by several weeks of ground combat and FGA. I covered this in another post, so I won't labour the point.

WTF do you think FGA is?

Whos side of this argument are you on? yours or mine?

Panzer Lehr had been effectively destroyed as a division long before July 25th, a point which I will return to later. The point is not that it had been destroyed as a division, but that elements were still fighting.

Nope, it is the point that it could no longer hold a divisional frontage - in a game with 50 mile hexes, if your units are reduced to the point that they can't hold a 50 mile frontage, then they are no longer effective.

A division is considered to have lost combat effectiveness when it has lost the ability to control it's units and divisional support assets. This certainly happened to Panzer Lehr when most of it's comms were destroyed.

Considered by whom?

By your definition as long as every sub unit has an unterofficer with a radio and a luger the Division is still combat effective?

Regardless of the fact that it has no combat power at all.

Do you see why your opinion is worth little to me?

In light of such monumental stupidity, I'll call it a day now, but I'll leave you with a few quotes re Falaise.

One strike by P47s on August 13 gives a graphic indication of the sizes of German forces open to attack at Falaise, Within an hour the Thunderbolts had blown up or burned out between 400 and 500 enemy vehicles. The fighter-bombers kept at it until they ran out of bombs and ammunition. One pilot, with empty gun chambers and bomb shackles, dropped his belly tank on 12 trucks and left them all in flames.

All told, on 13 August, XIX TAC fighter-bombers destroyed or damaged more than 1,000 road and rail vehicles, 45 tanks and armored vehicles, and 12 locomotives.

2 TAF launched a series of strikes that claimed almost 3,000 vehicles damaged or destroyed. On August 19, one Spitfire wing put in a claim for 500 vehicles destroyed or damaged in a single day; that same day, another Spitfire wing claimed 700.

2 TAF averaged 1,200 sorties per day. The air war was particularly violent from August 15 through the 21st. Typhoons and Spitfires attacked the roads leading from the gap to the Seine, strafing columns of densely packed vehicles and men. Under repeated attack, some of the columns actually displayed white flags of surrender, but the RAF took "no notice" of this since Allied ground forces were not in the vicinity, and "to cease fire would merely have allowed the enemy to move unmolested to the Seine." Typhoons typically would destroy the vehicles at the head of a road column, then leisurely shoot up the rest of the vehicles with their rockets and cannon. When they finished, Spitfires would dive down to strafe the remains.

Nope, airpower can't destroy units.

[ September 22, 2002, 10:31 PM: Message edited by: husky65 ]

[Scorpion_22]

Husky, I decided to read up one of your posts for the sheer hell of it.

Basically, you´re calling every argument by others "plain wrong" and the posters "stupid" in such a manner that it seems to me you´re trying to influence the "casual reader" to think *you´re* the only person in the right in here and everyone else is "wrong and stupid".

What a basis for an intelligent, mature discussion.....

A question: if a full-strength veteran-level Army (numbering say 100 000 combat troops) becomes the target of a bombing campaign by 5-6 Air Fleets.

Let´s say every one of them make an effort like in Operation Cobra (and do this for every week of the War thereafter).

Let´s imagine there´s no ground assault at all this turn, the target being behind the lines or out of reach.

Is it the best solution for the entire unit to disappear after its C&C, supply etc. have been bombed to oblivion (lets´assume they are)?

What about all the veteran combat troops, which are obviously shaken up and naturally cannot present a combat effective force at all?

Are they irredeemably lost, and the unit disappears from the face of the earth....?

Or, if the battered troops of the former Army can be prevented from being assaulted, can the troops be recovered at a later date, and the army rebuilt?

Gameplay-wise, should the unit drop from str 10 to 0 and disappear, or should it drop to 4-6 str, together with its readiness and supply dropping to 0, rendering the remains of the unit immobile and easily wiped out by an assault? (Readiness at 0)?

Let´s think about something else besides the "capability of massed air attacks of destroying an army" :

do you think the game plays out well at the moment, and do you enjoy the games where one side buys eighteen to two dozen air fleets, is able to rebase and operate them for free, is able to concentrate as many as he wants on a single point with impunity, and THEN do it with the results of these extreme examples we´ve talked about ?(Like Falaise, where I believe the target was completely pocketed)

At the same time the opponent cannot invest in developing improved anti-air units at all, and the fact that the bombers of the attacking airfleet greatly increases the air-to-air combat skills of the fighters at the same time (without them facing a single enemy aircraft during the operation), making it unable for him to resist your air power any more?

I don´t know if you´ve played multiple games of SC lately or whether you´re just an armchair general, but I do wonder that if you had played 6 games where your every battle consisted of you buying two dozen airfleets and demolishing the enemy, you might not argue so vigorously that "The game is perfect as it is and air power is not at all too strong".

[tabpub]

Wow. I knocked around with the Demo for a while, but I didn't find it quite the "thing" at the time. I did find the air/naval aspects to be played "way" up for me based on the purported scale of the game. After reading the posts on this thread, I think that I wasn't far off. I don't relish the thought of fighting the European campaign as hordes of air fleets protected by a screen of corps that will advance into the bomb cratered fields created by the former...

Thank you for your time. Now....

(back to the pissing contest)

[Bruce70]

Originally posted by Scorpion_22:

Is it the best solution for the entire unit to disappear after its C&C, supply etc. have been bombed to oblivion (lets´assume they are)?

What about all the veteran combat troops, which are obviously shaken up and naturally cannot present a combat effective force at all?

I understand this POV but I think it *is* the best solution with the current game system. The alternative is for that demoralised, non combat effective unit to hold up the advance of a fresh, full strength, in supply, veteran army for 2-4 weeks. It is a shame that you cannot recover somewhat if there is no ground assault after the air attack but no game system at this scale is going to be perfect.

[Brian Rock]

husky65, since you are either incapable or unwilling to accurately interpret other people's postings, it's pointless to debate this with you any further. The childish abuse in your posts just reinforces the pointlessness of the discussion.

It's a pity, because some of the points you raise, such as the relative vulnerability of different units, might have been interesting.

In the meantime you might want to read this.

[Archibald]

Absolutely on the button Brian Rock.

[Immolator]

Thanks for the link, Brian Rock. As a teacher it has lots of potential in future lessons for my middle schoolers in their use of the internet.

[Otto]

Very interesting, (and lengthy), thread. I've been following this all along, and I must say, aside from a few areas of mindless banter, the points and debates put forward here are really interesting and thourough.

The concept of air power is very difficult to sim, especially in a game of this scale. I think Hubert tackled the issue very well. Especially when you consider what air superiority meant in terms of chances for success. One way or another complete air superiority, (with the accompanying support from ground units), is ultimately irresistable, and this is the case in the game.

[sogard]

Originally posted by Otto:

One way or another complete air superiority, (with the accompanying support from ground units), is ultimately irresistable, and this is the case in the game.

Tell that to North Vietnamese or the Chinese Army in Korea.

The notion that any country can produce airplanes to the exclusion of everything else and get a war winning strategy in WW II is completely unconvincing (even to an Air Force general).

Now if we are talking John Carter of Mars; maybe. But, I thought we were discussing a serious strategic level WW II game.

The reason WHY combined arms was the war winning doctrine in WW II was because there were limits on the total number of planes, tanks, trucks, etc. that any nation could produce and place into the field. This reality is something that some arm chair generals like to ignore and why their musings lack much substance.

[ October 05, 2002, 02:47 PM: Message edited by: sogard ]

[Otto]

Originally posted by sogard:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Otto:

One way or another complete air superiority, (with the accompanying support from ground units), is ultimately irresistable, and this is the case in the game.

Tell that to North Vietnamese or the Chinese Army in Korea.

The notion that any country can produce airplanes to the exclusion of everything else and get a war winning strategy in WW II is completely unconvincing (even to an Air Force general).</font>

[Randell Daigre]

Posted by Sogard:

arm chair generals

That's the third or fourth time I've seen you use that phrase, Sogard. WTF do you think *you* are? You are a *lawyer*, Sogard. A lawyer who likes to play strategic games. Do you seriously believe that, just because you've read a few history books about warfare and played a couple of games, you are qualified to lead armies on a real battlefield?

Let me tell you something about "simulations". People who are actually in the *real* military know what simulations are worth: they make pretty good practice before you go out and do *real* training (and they're pretty fun because of the air-conditioning and lack of bugs). If they were actually able to simulate wars realistically, armies wouldn't spend so much time, money, and lives on training excersises in the field.

Real generals spend years acquiring the knowledge of their craft. They practice their art in field maneuvers and in real wars, not just in video games. They go to schools which are not even open to civilians. Real generals don't get a whole lot of sleep during wars. When a real general gives an order, people die. If a real general screws up, his nation and entire way of life (or those of his allies) may be blotted from the face of the earth. These factors have a tendency to affect a real general's decision-making process. Can these things be simulated? Not realistically.

As I found out the last time I went off on a tear, there *are* some people on this forum with some real qualifications in this area (for example, there is at least one retired US Army Lieutant Colonel): you are not one of them. I can almost guarantee you that those people do not consider themselves to be fully qualified to be a theater commander in a real war. Even if they do, then they probably feel that their qualifications come from their military training, not from having played A3R or any other game, no matter how "realistic" it was.

All of these same factors apply if your stated aim is to do a "serious historical study" of warfare through gaming. Second-guessing qualified (or even not-so-qualified) political and military leaders 50, 30, or even 10 years after the fact, based on the results of a computer game, is the height of arrogance. If you weren't there, then you cannot say for certain what was and was not possible for them to do, no matter how accurate your economic model (or research engine or combat formula) is.

The fact Sogard, is that *everyone* is an "armchair general" when they are playing a war *game*: you included. For you to use the term derisively when referring to others only demonstrates how little you have actually learned about war from all the reading you've done.

[sogard]

Gee, I don't know there Randall. I always thought it was a fair critcisim of any game or simulation when what the gamer saw on his gaming table or on his computer screen failed to look much like what one sees in a good military history of the period.

That is what is happening in STRATEGIC COMMAND after about the first year in game terms. This is especially true when the players are quite familiar in HOW they can exploit the holes in the game design.

Terribly sorry to point this out. The game design does not require that this happen; just that it does with the current mix of design decisions. If you would like to explain how having 20 German Air Fleets in the game by 1942 or the unlimited ability of Germany and Italy to transport land units to invade Britian or even how it is accurate for the game to provide Italy with a war economy which is 90% of Britian, or even more hilariously, 80% of the USA, you will catch my attention.

Until then, I will give your views the appropriate weight they deserve. You might even pick up a book or two and learn some basic facts. I just love it when some folks don't like it when someone else uses some of that fancy book learning.

If a professional military officer wanted to weigh in on this discussion, it would carry some weight. I would truly love to hear how the study of logistics or industrial potential has been eliminated from from the War College. (Although I would fear for our country if this were indeed true.) If a professional military historian provided an opinion, I would take some notice. But, you gotta open a book there Randall -- ever so sorry about that.

Finally, and once again, I am not saying that SC, as it presently works, is not a fun little game in its own right. It is. It will be enhanced with the implementation of tcp/ip. But, it still won't be a very balanced or generally accurate model of WW II in the European Theater. SC has the potential to be alot more than what it presently is and that is the good news (along with tcp/ip).

[ October 06, 2002, 12:03 AM: Message edited by: sogard ]

[Desert Dave]

As originally posted by Otto:

First, there weren't military men leading the war effort

In America, only the citizens, through their elected Congress, can declare war and decide when and if it is finished. At least that's how it used to be, until craven cowardice became the general rule of the day.

The Commander is a civilian, as it should be. Or do you want another Sparta?

This canard that some! damn! body! -- usually yellow and conniving politicos or war-protestors, somehow "lost" that war is still making the rounds, and it is just as ludicrous now as it was then.

"The people" of the United States decided that it was the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. That simple.

[Randell Daigre]

Sogard:

I've read plenty of books on this subject, thank you very much. I have also been a combat arms soldier in the US military for over ten years. I have no problem with "fancy book learning", as you put it. In fact, if you bothered to read my post, you would find that I haven't raised any objection whatsoever to your aguments that the game should be more historically accurate. A more historically accurate game is, of course, more enjoyable to play (if such a game can avoid becoming hopelessly complex or unwieldy) than a less accurate game.

The thing I *do* object to (which you neglected to address), and the whole point of my post, was the derision you express toward other people on this forum by calling them "armchair generals". I object to this because it implies that you think you are something that you are not (as I explained in my post). It also implies that you think that strategy games are something that they are not (which I also explained in my post). Such an attitude loses sight of the real objective of wargaming, which is having fun. Is it more fun to play an accurate wargame than an inaccurate one? Yep. Is someone who knows a lot about military history and is good at accurate wargames is something other than a good and knowledgeable wargamer (AKA an "armchair general")? Not on that basis alone, he isn't.

Your rhetorical skills are good (if one can consider arrogance, condescension, and sarcasm to be rhetorical skills ), but your reading comprehension skills seem to need a little polishing.

[ October 06, 2002, 12:47 AM: Message edited by: Randell Daigre ]

[Randell Daigre]

Posted by Immer Etwas:

This canard that some! damn! body! -- usually yellow and conniving politicos or war-protestors, somehow "lost" that war is still making the rounds, and it is just as ludicrous now as it was then.

While I agree with your assertion that the American system is set up the way it is for very good reasons, and that the Vietnam War was ended due to political pressure arising from popular distaste for the war, that hardly refutes the fact that political interference hampered military efforts during the war.

I think Otto's point was that the air campaigns in both of Korea and Vietnam could not be fairly compared to the air war in WWII because there were constraints in the Korea and Vietnam which were not present in WWII. Things which could have been done by the USAF and USN in Vietnam, and which would have had dire consequences for the North Vietnamese were not allowed. For instance, the incredably constraining air-to-air "rules of engagement" which took away the main advantage of American fighter aircraft (advanced radar and missile systems), and LBJ insisting on personally approving specific targets on bombing raids. Let's not even talk about the bridges on the Yalu River (Korea).

Such direct interference in decisions which are usually (and should be) made by trained military personnel were much less present in WWII. The point is that the Army Air Corps of WWII was allowed to do the job it was formed to do, while the Air Force of Korea and Vietnam was not.

[iolo]

Hey while were off-topic about armchair generals and who among us is really qualified to lead a war effort, what about Adolf Hitler?

Did he not do exactly what we're doing now, in this game? An ordinary man (albeit with some WWI trench experience) trying to run a war.

I suppose he had some excellent and some not-so-excellent advisors. All I have is this stinkin discussion forum

(Disclaimer: Hitler is infamous for his atrocities against humanity. Let us never forget these, but also not allow them to prevent intelligent discussion, a virtue of humanity.)

[Randell Daigre]

Starting a new thread.