German Armour development during WWII

[Enoch]

I haven't read a great deal on the development of German Tanks druing WWII but it seems to me that somewhere along the line someone (many ones?) modified the philosophy of the tank.

Let me lay this out and see if people think I am on track or simply full of it (what "it" is remains to be seen).

Before the war and during the early stages the tank was seen as a weapon to exploit break throughs and wreck havoc in the rear areas of the enemy. Most of the tanks built during this period were lighter and faster.

The french tanks of the period were generally superior but mishandled.

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union again the tanks took on the role of exploitation and offense in the rear echelons. Also, many soviet tanks (not all) had better armor and larger guns then the german tanks.

Now, somewhere along the line someone in Germany must have realized that not only were German tanks outdated but also needed more armor and larger guns. This led to larger, higher muzzle velocity guns being put into the Mark IV and the development of the Tiger. The Panther was also in development.

These newer tanks like the panther and tiger were larger, heavier, and slower. The King Tiger was even more so. The tanks in development at the end of the war took this to an extreme (the Maus).

I suppose that my question has to do with why the push for larger heavier tanks.

As I see it there are at least 3 possible explanations.

1) The germans wanted heavier tanks that were more survivable against, mainly, Russian tanks.

2) The Germans no longer saw the tank as the sxploitive weapon it was earlier in the war. It's new role was to serve as a largely anti-tank platform for destroying enemy armour.

3) By 1943-44, the germans were no longer on the offensive and as such no longer needed tanks that had to operate at high speeds. Instead they needed tanks more suitable for a defensive operations. This is probably similar to #2.

I would tend to discount #3 and suggest that #1 was the most important aspect. But I have no idead if changes in doctrine within the German Armed Forces dictated changes in tank development.

Thoughts?

[ 04-27-2001: Message edited by: Enoch ]

[RenoFlame 36]

The Tiger tank began development early in the war as a heavy tank to support the infantry. At the time, there wasn't a need for an 88mm gun to defeat existing armor. Even the German General Staff felt there was no call for such a large gun. It was only a coincidence that it arrived on the scene in time to be used against the "new" T34's that began showing up in numbers by late '41.

As Germany went over to defence after 1942, they needed heavier tanks to stand against the greater numbers of the allies. Speed took a back seat to armor protection and better, longer range guns. Eventually, they arrived at the extremes such as the "Maus".

It seems ironic that the allies actually used the Blitzkrieg tactics of the germans to defeat them.

[Redwolf]

I disagree with most of your major points, and -surprise- come to the opposite conclusion.

1) The Pz IV, which was meant to be a heavy tank from start, had to be upgraded until it was much too slow. The Panther is the attempt to put speed back into the tank units, it is much faster than the later Pz IV.

You got it right that they had to do continuous upgrades, since too weak tanks are simply useless. However, you miss the great effort to solve the speed problem in 1943. The Panther is not a heavier/more-gun Pz IV.

2) True heavy tanks are irrelevant here, since they are used from strategically controlled units that support "normal" units. The true doctrine-conformant breakthroughs and exploits are usually done with medium tanks, where the heavies may help in the initial stages, if they are not busy conducting other tasks.

3) If there is a sign of changing doctrine, it is the continued development of the StuG and Hetzer (fine) to the Jagdpanzer IV (and /70). The latter is not a cost-effective bodyguard for infantry units, it is confession to a loss of initiative. Plug holes instead of creating them, react, not act. Did I mention that I like turreted tanks

Overall, I think the tank doctrine is dictated by the mass-produced Pz IV and Panther and here is early line continued. StuG is not a tank and heavies are outside doctrine.

[Robert Mayer]

Interesting question.

I don't think any of the major armies of the period envisioned the tank becoming the primary anti-tank platform. Tanks were, as noted, breakthrough and exploitation weapons, designed to move rapidly, and have considerable "shock" value against troops and rear echelon targets. Killing tanks was the job of tank destroyers, panzerjaegers, or however you'd call them--specialist units armed with tank-killing guns of various sorts.

As the war progressed, it became inevitable that tanks would meet their opposite numbers. The same qualities that make a tank good for the attack make it great for the counterattack and active defense. And tanks were generally quite usefull in most aspects of warfare--infantry units liked to have tanks around to support them, as mobile MG and arty bunkers if nothing else.

Tank armor tended to go up in response to the anti-tank weapons fielded against them, which in turn went up in power and size because of the effectiveness of tanks on the offensive. As tanks met other tanks in combat in increasing numbers, the need to penetrate that armor led to increased size and power in tank armament. That in turn led tanks to uparmor again, leading to upgunning, etc. This was true in all the armies, but some reacted more swiftly than others. The US, which got into the thick of things a bit later, and didn't pay that much attention to battlefield data from other sources, lagged behind, while the Germans and Russians, with the most extensive and immediate body of combat experience, reacted the fastest.

The Germans started the war with fairly light tanks with fairly modest armament. It was Russia (and to a lesser extent things like the Matilda) that drove them to field higher powered guns, and the natural evolution of AT weapons that drove the increase in armor. The irony was that you didn't need a super high velocity tank cannon and umpteen inches of armor to be an effective *tank*, but rather you needed those things to best *survive* against other tanks.

To the end, the Germans used lesser tanks (PzKw IVs, for instance) and especially assault guns in traditional tank roles, for breakthroughs, exploitations, and counterattacks. The AT job was also a big part of assault gun use. There simply weren't enough Panthers to go around, and Tigers were best suited for specific roles, being too heavy and unmaneuverable (and often unreliable) for regular use--and they were rather rare as well.

In short, I can't really comment much on specific decisions taken by the Germans regarding armored force development, but in general they followed the course that other nations did, only to a greater degree. The Russians were quick to realize the need to upgrade tanks, but less effective in actually doing it, until the later stages of the war--though he T-34 series was quite serviceable, and quite numerous. The Americans--well, we didn't react terribly well or swiftly, though again we did make a lot of tanks. The German system ended up fielding a bazillion different models--it's possible to argue that the Germans reacted too fast to battlefield developments, maybe.

[jgdpzr]

RenoFlame,

An interesting side note about the Tiger's development was that the initial Henschel plans called for the installation of the 75/L70 that eventually went into the Panther. The gun was not ready in time, however, so they used the modified 88 instead.

I'm a little fuzzy about the original doctrinal intentions of the Tiger, however, so I can't comment on that.

Personally (subjective opinion here), I think the Germans began to move toward heavier tanks for a variety of reasons(in no particular order): 1). Hitler's meddlesome intrusions into weapons development--he seemingly placed a high value on the psychological effects of weapons, particularly tanks, and simply put, bigger was scarier; 2.) A convoluted weapons development system in which rival firms competed to garner higher party (particularly Hitler's) favor (see 1); 3.) The general move toward maximizing resources 4.) The "tank race" with the Soviets in which both sides attempted to outdo the other in terms of armor and firepower; 5.) The shift toward the defensive, which lessened emphasis on speed, and increased the importance of armor protection; 6.) German propensity for engineering complexity-- as much as any combatant, the Germans seemed obsessed with engineering evolution and this hastened the move toward complexity, and to a certain extent, discounted design efficiency including size; 7.)The evolution of the entire range of anti-tank weapons. These steadily became more powerful and increased armor was seen as the best way to counter this progression.

In short, I think it is difficult to point toward one factor or another as the primary driving force behind tank evolution in WW2, particularly for the Germans.

[CombinedArms]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Robert Mayer:

Interesting question.

....The German system ended up fielding a bazillion different models--it's possible to argue that the Germans reacted too fast to battlefield developments, maybe.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think it helps, when you're considering any nation's tank policy, to recognize that given the time it takes to develop a tank, everyone was engaged in a MAD scramble, with tanks conceived of two years earlier arriving on a very different battlefield than they were designed to fight on. In that context, some models worked better than others.

As Jason Cawley pointed out a while ago, the US & USSR basically made centrally planned decisions in 1941 to focus their energies on producing as many tanks as they could of the best model they then had available--hence the focus on thousands of Shermans and T-34s. There were upgrades to guns, armor, radios, etc., but it was still essentially the same tank.

The Germans, despite an appearance of central control under Hitler, had a much more fragmented decision-making process and an industrial base that was far less fully integrated into the war effort. I think this was largely because Hitler favored a "divide and rule" approach, playing one faction off against the others. So you tend to get, with the Axis, a more reactive approach to the battlefield as well as dozens of competing programs all producing somewhat conflicting designs. These multiple designs are interesting for grognards, but they varied drastically in quality--and sometimes vast resources were put into bad designs at a time when Germany couldn't afford the luxury. I would say it's not that "they reacted too fast to battlefield developments"--in many ways that speed of reaction was their greatest strength--but that their reaction was often too fragmentary. They didn't recognize their best, most practical design and bet the farm on it, as both the US & USSR did.

What if Germany had dropped the Maus, Elephant and King Tiger like hot potatoes while still on the drawing board and pumped all available resources into buiding more Panthers? It might have been a better idea....But, I don't think it could ever have happened under Hitler.

BTW, how would the Panther have worked is an exploitation tank? It had the requisite speed but my understanding is that to travel long distances it had to be transported by rail. That wouldn't work to support an armored thrust deep into enemy territory. Does that imply a tacit admission of being on the defensive, or at most on limited offensives like Kursk?

By contrast, the T-34s and Shermans rolled across Europe and into the heart of Germany on their own treads.

[Redwolf]

I think we need to split the discussion into two issues. I think we all agree that the true heavy tanks (Tiger) are not really connected to the main doctrine, but "something" else.

1) Did the Germans intentionally move the overall doctrine with the main-line (medium) tanks used for the normal roles to better armoured and armed *medium* tanks, at the cost of speed, and yes, why?

2) What are the heavy tank units for, what is that "something"?

As said, my answer to 1) is a clear "no", the Germans did not change doctrine, they put back the speed into their main line tanks as soon as it was practical.

I would like to see historical quotes on 2). As we all know, the heavy tanks were concentrated and then used -all together- for one specific task and then pulled out of line to be repolised (respecitivly rebuilt . The questions here are a) what were these tasks as planned? and what were tasks in practice.

The Jagdpanther battaltion usage orders posted here some time ago were exactly what I would like to see for Tiger units.

[Enoch]

Very interesting posts so far.

This is just a thought and you are welcome to dispute this: While the Panther as a medium tank may have been meant to serve in the same exploitation role as earlier medium tanks, heavy tanks must have played some sort of a role in this doctrine. Perhaps they were controlled by higher commands and sent to areas to create the point of breakthrough. Perhaps heavy tanks were seen as a more defensive tool and/or tank killer. This I don't know about and would like to see other's thoughts on this.

In any evenet the development of heavy tanks occured parallel to that of newer medium tanks. As such there must have been some thought or reason for why these heavy tanks were needed, what role they would fill, and whether this role was to be entirely seperate from the explotation role of the panther or not. I don't know the answer to that and I guess that is the same question that Martin is asking.

What is clear is that German tank development proceeded in response to many factors. I guess one of my original questions was whether there was a conscious realization among the German high command that by 1943 and later they were no longer fighting the same war they had started. And, as such, needed tanks to fill different roles.

[Blenheim]

BUMP !!!!

I love this discussion !!!

[RenoFlame 36]

Everyone that has responded has made valid points. My interest was in attempting to separate the German "Heavy Tank" doctrine from the Blitzkrieg strategy. Even the original Panzer IV's mounted a short 75mm gun intended to be used in assisting the infantry overcome strong points.

If you look at the German "fast tanks" of the early war period, they were quite lightly armored. As someone else pointed out, they were only concerned with the small caliber anti-tank weapons of the time.

I think another discussion almost as interesting would be; Without air power used as "mobile artillery", would the original Blitzkrieg tactics have been such a resounding success ?

[Redwolf]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by RenoFlame 36:

If you look at the German "fast tanks" of the early war period, they were quite lightly armored. As someone else pointed out, they were only concerned with the small caliber anti-tank weapons of the time. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't think you can gain assumptions from very early tanks. The Pz I was a training tank only and the Pz II was only a interim solution until the Pz III was available. The Pz III (and IV) is the only tank that was built as required by doctrine. It was certainly faster but less armoured that the other nations main battle tanks, but for its time it was exactly like the Panther later (armour and speed-wise, not gun wise).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

I think another discussion almost as interesting would be; Without air power used as "mobile artillery", would the original Blitzkrieg tactics have been such a resounding success ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, enough artillery could have done that, too, but not as effective. And as Germany didn't have plenty of resources any "not as effective" could mean "not".

Good point, anyway, I think that the air issue is one of the major differences between Poland/France and Soviet Union. The former opponents neglected camouflage of many units not in first line, the Soviets did not.

[Stormhouse]

My point of view is going to be quite different I think. Most of the change in doctrine would been because of Hitler. Now here is something that many of you may discount as stupid but hear me out.

Hitler was a small man he had a inferiority complex that’s why he enjoyed putting down other people to make him self feel better.

This physiological factor goes all the way to the tanks. He picked the biggest tank designs because he liked everything big. This goes across all over the German military like building the biggest battle ship to building the biggest siege guns.

All useless or at the very least very impractical. For one they would attract all the enemy guns and the resources invest for the return did not result in a gain.

So Hitler would always preferred bigger meaner looking tanks over a design that would have allowed to be built in huge numbers. The Maus tank was suppose to be indestructible and carry one hundred rounds, in the end it could barely move.

Hitler also preferred to always send in new tanks to replace broken tanks. I was watching a tank show last night and it was mentioned that spare parts for the Tiger and all other tanks was really hard to come by. Allot of the tanks could have been fixed in a few hours if the spare parts where available. Not all tanks ended up burning heaps of metal most of them would need there track replaced or the engine needed changed or the gear box.

This also goes with the idea that if Germans where better people (I’m not german) then they had to have better machine. At least on paper the machines looked better.

[sturmtiger101]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by RenoFlame 36:

I think another discussion almost as interesting would be; Without air power used as "mobile artillery", would the original Blitzkrieg tactics have been such a resounding success ?[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that it is hard to discuss the concept of "bltzkrieg " as it applies to WWII german military doctrine without including airpower. Blitzkrieg was one of the earliest practical applications, at the operational level, of the theory of combined arms. The Luftwaffe was designed and organized to be one of the elements necessary for the conduct of lightning war. Its' tactical employment was to facilitate the breakthrough effort by establishing air superiority above the battlefield, interdict enemy reinforcements and supply, disrupt communication routes and attack specific ground targets in coordination with the "schwerepunkt" of the attack. The german army combined the tactical / operational use of blitzkrieg with their longstanding strategic theory of conducting war which they called ' the battle of annilhation ', which focuses on defeating the opponent by destroying his field army in mass through a continuos cycle of double encirclement battles. The blitz style suited the German armed forces general staff doctrine of quickly defeating and forcing the capitulation of an opponent, thus avioding a protracted war of attrition. The Luftwaffe was an integral instrument of this concept and when it is removed from the mix, the blitz won't work to achieve decisive success.

Uh, that's my humble opinion, anyway...

Sheesh...

Eric

:eek:

Oh yea, you guys are posing and responding with some excellent questions and replies...

BRAVO!

[ 04-28-2001: Message edited by: sturmtiger101 ]

[Stalin's Organ]

Err...Blitzkreig wasn't an early development of combined arms doctrine - armour, in fantry, artillery and air power had all been successfully combined in the last year of WW1. Obviously there were differnt limits, but that's notreally relevant.

What Blitzkreig was was the application of mobility and firepower to a different type of warfare - the fast moving, penetration type we all know of now.

Also I'd siggest that hte Pz IV was NOT designed as a heavy tank - it was a close support tank providing heavier artillery support than the current medium tank (PzIII with 37mm) could provide. Almost every nation had the same type of tank.

When upgunning became necessary the Pz4 was used because it's turret ring was big enough to accomodate the increased forces. The smaller tanks (of all nations) couldn't manage this.

[JasonC]

"heavy tanks must have played some sort of a role in this doctrine. Perhaps they were controlled by higher commands and sent to areas to create the point of breakthrough."

That was doctrine, but it was not practice. Yes, they were called breakthrough tanks sometimes. The idea was certainly to duel their way through the defended zone. The only time that was the actual use they were put to, though, was Kursk, where they failed in that respect. (In the Bulge, the infantry made the holes, with limited tank support, contrary to plan, wherever they bunched up too close because the infantry took too long).

The Tiger battalion commanders are forever complaining that the role of the Tiger had been misunderstood. They are always trying to get their higher ups to use them en masse, as a whole battalion, at one important point and for one "battle". And this was done on some other occasions, in local counterattacks or defensively, rather than breakthrough fights.

But the higher, local commanders to which the battalions are attached, are doling them out among other units for "stiffening" instead, in company strength at most and often platoon strength. The Tiger commanders complaint reflects the fact that they thus lost effective control of their full unit, and its internal organization. The local higher commanders see the effect, that they win tank duels along the line, prevent holes or shut them, etc. And that seems more useful to them.

Thus you find 1 company kampgruppes of Tigers roaming behind lines like a football "safety", plugging holes. Not at all what they were originally intended to do. But there was a definite practicality to this revised role. For the urgency of the task, obviously. But also because it tended to maximize the operational life of a Tiger. The fights were more likely to take place in controlled territory. If the fight succeeded, partial wrecks could be recovered more easily (always extremely hard with such heavy tanks). Breakdowns were less likely to lead to loss. Running distances between maintenance were lower. Etc.

That is the sense I've gotten from reading about the independent Tiger battalions. Incidentally, it is close to the doctrinal role originally envisioned for anti-tank units. There were probably doctrinal overlaps. Thus, certain Allied tanks in the early war had to be killed by 88 FLAK. A commander used to doing that with Tigers attached, might naturally see them as more survivable and potent weapons that could do the same thing.

As for the more general issue in the thread, I will address that seperately. Just thought I'd add my 2 cents on how the Tigers were really used.

[JasonC]

"largely because Hitler favored a "divide and rule"

There may be something to that, in that the whole political system avoided centralization anywhere except the top, in favor of competing side-by-side organizations. That limited the ability of any bureaucracy to question orders (with "slowdowns", offered resignations, all the political arsenal of the "technocratic" bureaucrat), since it would just be bypassed when it did.

And the Germans never abandoned a running production line. Which is a complete contrast to the practice of every other country. They also did not add a new running production line any time after the move to full mobilization of the economy, after Stalingrad - although they did make variants (e.g. TDs on the same chassis).

Each initial vehicle type has descendents throughout the war. The question for a *new* plant could be "what should we make?", but for old ones it was always "what *can* we make *out of this*?" The Tiger and Panther projects were the only new ones during the war on any scale. And both of them were developed during the window, after the war was fully underway, but before Germany went to full economic mobilization - when the economy lost flexibility (to plan inputs farther up the chain, etc).

It is useful to look at the chains of descendents to get a sense of this. I am sure many here know such things but some probably do not.

Pz I chassis made "goliath" demolition vehicles after the Pz I was discontinued, also some limited-runs of assault guns and such.

Pz II chassis made Marders and Wespes.

Pz 38(t) chassis made Marders and Hetzers.

Pz III chassis made StuGs.

Pz IVs were made throughout the war, but the chassis was also used for JgdPzers, Hummels, Brumbars, and Nashhorns.

Panther chassis made Jadgpanther.

Tiger chassis made Elephant (rival model not used for main Tigers), Jadgtiger, Sturmtiger.

Besides the divide and rule aspect of things, there is another obvious reason that older assembly lines were left running. They were the only source of spare parts for existing vehicles made on the same chassis. The Pz I chassis could certainly be dispensed with. But when Pz II chassis were used for Marders, a decision to shut down the line afterward would have meant every Marder II soon breaking down. Wespe production not only kept the line working, it kept Marder IIs running.

The definite imperative seen in the entire lot of them is to get a bigger gun. Armor was quite secondary. Upgraded, highly capable tanks like the Panther and Tiger, were only a portion of what was going on.

Consider the Pz III chassis, the most prevalent type in the early war, with its only serious rival for total number produced the Pz IV, even counting the whole war.

It started as an all purpose exploitation tank with a 37mm gun. Then it upgraded to short 50mm, then long 50mm, all the while as the main battle tank of the Pz. forces. Last it got a short 75mm, during the period in which the Pz. IV was supplanting it as the main tank. Then it did not die, but went to a 75L48 as the StuG - with a smaller number mounting 105mm howitzer for HE work. These were not a side-show; there were more StuGs built than Pz IVs let alone Panthers. They served in the infantry and in AT battalions of the mobile divisions.

The gun bore doubled (tripled for the late HE version). Was this driven purely by enemy armor plate? That certainly had much to do with it. But even the HE versions got much heavier. A more powerful gun was just seen as more useful than a pop-gun in a turret.

The Panzer IV started as a close support tank, with better HE meant to handle guns and infantry for the Pz regiments. It got a 75L43 by mid-war and soon after the 75L48 it kept to the end. The gun length doubled. Turretless versions carried howitzers with twice the bore of the original, for the HE job.

The Pz IV and the StuG were both also extensive uparmored. The benchmark was certainly the T-34/76. They were improved until their less sloped but heavier armor gave as good protection. Their guns improved until they were same bore and higher velocity.

To give an idea of the numbers of these things, there were 5800 Pz IIIs made, then another 10450 StuG, StuH, and other guns on III chassis in the late war. Total of that chassis 16250, about 2.5 times the production of Panthers.

The Pz IV was a minority type in the early war, with only 1125 of the short 75L24 model built. But ~7400 of the long 75s were as it became the main type, along with 4600 other types (about half JgdPz, the rest scattered among SPA, assault guns, StuG IVs, etc). That is 13125 of all types, about twice the production run of Panthers.

In addition, the production run of the Czech Pz 38 chassis was not insignificant or limited to the early war. There were 1400 of the actual 37mm armed tank. 400 were converted to Marders, plus another 1000 newly made ones, 400 150mm SiG assault guns, and 150 Flak panzers. Later, 2600 Hetzers from the same chassis. The total production run of Pz38 chassis comes to ~5600, almost as many as Panthers. The Pz II chassis adds another 3200, split roughly ~1/2 tanks, 1/4 Marders, 1/4 Wespes, making 8800 total from these two lighter types.

Panthers were 6000 plus 400 Jgdpanther, while the Tigers were ~2000 all types, most Tiger I (1350), or Tiger II (500), the rest heavy TDs.

Those ~8400 heavier types compare with ~8200 from the light types, about the same, and 29400 from the "big two", the medium Pz III and Pz IV chassis.

Or, if you make a graph or histogram of weight of type, in the order Tiger-Panther-PzIV-PzIII-Pz38-PzII, then you'd see 2.0-6.4-13.1-16.3-5.6-3.2, practically a perfect bell curve, just slightly skewed toward the lighter end. The center types, the mean of the distribution, are right around the armor and armament of the allied rivals. By late war, all the types are carrying guns sufficiently powerful to kill Shermans and T-34s, or useful high-caliber artillery pieces. The weight changes armor protection most of all, and at the low end, crew space, ammo, etc.

Everybody needs a hammer, everything gets upgunned. Anything that can be upgunned still gets made. A hard shell is a normally distributed luxury item, from the design period between war and mobilization.

I submit this evidence suggests, that the constraints of war economy played more of a role in armored force mix than changing doctrine did. The tech race, and particularly the need to match or beat the T-34, did force a near-uniform upgunning. The rest doesn't look much like doctrine - it looks like variation and expediency.

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ:

Also I'd siggest that hte Pz IV was NOT designed as a heavy tank - it was a close support tank providing heavier artillery support than the current medium tank (PzIII with 37mm) could provide.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's also worth remembering that the Pz. IV was intended to support the Pz. III. Several posts have mentioned that it supported infantry, and no doubt on occasion it did do so. But phrasing that way suggests that platoons or companies of Mk. IVs were attached to infantry units, whereas it was more common for mixed groups of IIIs and IVs to be so attached. Indeed, if a pure group of one type were so tasked, it would more likely be a group of IIIs if for no other reason than there were more of them around.

Michael

[JasonC]

"the Pz. IV was intended to support the Pz. III."

Correct. The TOE pattern was 1 company of Pz IIs for scouting, 2 companies of Pz IIIs as the bulk of the force, and 1 company of Pz IVs for the HE arm. Not everyone had even that many.

As for infantry, the early war force had infantry in the Pz divisions, motorized, with 1 battalion in each division on motorcycles. They did not yet have flocks of halftracks - some, but the bulk of those came later.

If infantry formations kept up and were available, sure they might mix somewhat, but it was not a case of "infantry support" tanks at all. The British use of 3" howitzer tanks mixed in with formations equipped with 2 lbers had a similar rational. The point was that low-caliber tank guns (37mm, 50mm, 2 lbers didn't even have HE ammo) had limited HE ability, something that did not change until 75mm guns (and up) were standard on most AFVs.

Essentially all the armor was in the Panzer divisions. When they wanted to spread it more, they increased the infantry and decreased the tanks in the division mix - that didn't "settle down" until 1942, and not completely even then.

Later in the war, Marders and StuGs spread AFVs to the infantry divisions, in their divisional anti-tank battalions; but early war those were towed guns.

[Paul Lakowski]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Correct. The TOE pattern was 1 company of Pz IIs for scouting, 2 companies of Pz IIIs as the bulk of the force, and 1 company of Pz IVs for the HE arm. Not everyone had even that many.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually the structure was 2-3 Pz-III companies with 3-4 troops of 4 Pz-III with a troop of Pz-II plus a command unit.

Each Battalion had a Pz-IV company with Pz-IVs instead of Pz-IIIs and usually alot fewer of them.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

As for infantry, the early war force had infantry in the Pz divisions, motorized, with 1 battalion in each division on motorcycles. They did not yet have flocks of halftracks - some, but the bulk of those came later.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually the Pz Divisions never had much SPWs and usually had only 1 battalion with SPW and the Recon Battalion, while the other three infantry battalions were always motorized.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Essentially all the armor was in the Panzer divisions. When they wanted to spread it more, they increased the infantry and decreased the tanks in the division mix - that didn't "settle down" until 1942, and not completely even then.

Later in the war, Marders and StuGs spread AFVs to the infantry divisions, in their divisional anti-tank battalions; but early war those were towed guns. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Infantry division never had armor until the last few mionths of the war and then only 1 company of 10-14 Hetzers/StuG at the divisional level. The bulk of all AT capability was towed guns.

[JasonC]

StuGs and Marders were certainly used in the divisional AT battalions of the infantry divisions, and not just in the last few months of the war. In Normandy, 6 infantry divisions - the 243, 326, 331, 346, 352, and 353, each had its AT battalion organized as follows -

1st company - 10 StuG

2nd company - 14 Marder

3rd company - 12 20mm or 9 37mm FLAK (motorized).

These divisions had a 14th company in each infantry regiment with 3 towed PAK, usually 75mm but sometimes 50mm. The 14th companies also manned Panzerschreck teams, in addition.

The 91st infantry had 21 StuG in 2 companies.

The 708, 709, and 716 "static" divisions each had 9-10 ersatz Marders in the first company of the divisional AT battalion. The guns were German 75mm PAK, and the vehicles were put together in the field. But it is unclear whether the chassis were German halftracks or capture French vehicle conversions, in the case of these units.

On StuGs in general - "Most often they were independent battalions and brigades (sic) that would be attached to corps or armies and most often use as fire brigades against armor breakthroughs". Actually there were 70 independent "brigades", which were battalion sized units but employed artillery designations for sub-unit sizes (thus battery rather than platoon e.g.)

Assigned to army or even army groups, they were attached to corps and divisions, and were the armor that infantry units were most likely to see. They were definitely meant to be parcelled out along the front for stiffening. The "brigade" level organization most likely handled mainly administrative, personnel, and supply tasks, since it is apparent that the vehicles themselves were often assigned to infantry formations a company or two at a time. Incidentally, that is one reason it is often hard to locate a given "brigade", and "it" is often reported in different places attached to different units, simultaneously or nearly so.

Smaller numbers of vehicles equipped Sturmartillerie battalions of SS divisions, and in the late war often filled in for missing JgdPz in Pz Division AT battalions (SS or Heer). One battalion sometimes filled in for missing tanks in Pz and PzGdr divisions, or independent Pz Brigades. Those are about the only occasions where one can find reports of a whole battalion (30+ AFVs I mean) going into action as a group. A company (~10 StuG) was a far more common tactical "commitment" size in the infantry divisions.

StuGs were used only in limited numbers in the early war. 16 battalions participated in Barbarossa, 4 with mobile armies or corps, 12 with infantry armies, compared to 70 over the whole war. They formed an increasing portion of the armor later on, as the Germans passed to the defensive. 1500 vehicles built through the end of 1942 (roughly half 75L24, half longer 75 in 1942), 3000 more in 1943, 6000 plus 1000 StuH in 1944.

On Marders - they equipped AT battalions exclusively. Originally (mid 42), these were mostly in the mobile divisions, Pz and PzGdr AT battalions. Late war they are found scattered in infantry AT battalions, after the mobile divisions got better TDs. 2600 all types, from mid-war on.

On Hetzers - they equipped AT battalions in infantry divisions from July 1944 on, as they became available. The 15th and 76th infantry divisions were the first to get them. 2600 all types, last year of the war.

On Jagdpanzer - they equipped AT battalions of Panzer divisions in the late war, starting in March 44. Also used in place of tanks in some independent Panzer Brigades (e.g. 105 and 106). 1900 all types, last year of the war.

As for the halftracks, I know the TOE was only 1 Pz Gdr battalion in each mobile division, plus the recon battalion. But they did not have even that in the early war. In the early war Pz Divs, the infantry component is mostly trucked and what isn't in trucks is on motorcycles. The recce battalion makes more use of armored cars and also of motorcycles. Halftracks are rare, not enough to fill out a TOE of "recce plus 1 battalion PzGdr".

From midwar on, the halftracks become much more common, equipping 1 Pz Gdr battalion per mobile division and by 1944 often 2 of them (over TOE, 1 per regiment), and the recce battalion is generally in halftracks plus 1-2 armored car companies. A portion of the pioneer battalion is also commonly halftracked.

Only 3000 halftracks were made from the start of the war until the end of 1942. 18000 were made in the second half of the war. Armored car production showed no increase. Light armor thus moved from AC heavy (plus motorcyles) to AC rare and haltrack common, over the course of the war.

[Paul Lakowski]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

StuGs and Marders were certainly used in the divisional AT battalions of the infantry divisions, and not just in the last few months of the war. In Normandy, 6 infantry divisions - the 243, 326, 331, 346, 352, and 353, each had its AT battalion organized as follows -

1st company - 10 StuG

2nd company - 14 Marder

3rd company - 12 20mm or 9 37mm FLAK (motorized).

These divisions had a 14th company in each infantry regiment with 3 towed PAK, usually 75mm but sometimes 50mm. The 14th companies also manned Panzerschreck teams, in addition.

The 91st infantry had 21 StuG in 2 companies.

The 708, 709, and 716 "static" divisions each had 9-10 ersatz Marders in the first company of the divisional AT battalion. The guns were German 75mm PAK, and the vehicles were put together in the field. But it is unclear whether the chassis were German halftracks or capture French vehicle conversions, in the case of these units.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The fact that 10 months before the end of the war only a handful of infantry divisions had only a handful of SP guns shows how insignificant they were. At the same time in the east of ~ 30 infantry divisions listed all had towed AT guns [ usually 20-24 in total] , while only one division had 4 StuG-IIIs.

[MrWinterbottom]

*BUMP*

I am amazed at the knowledge that this board (sometimes ) represents. An extremely interesting discussion to say the least.

I for one, am all ears and eyes.

Mr.Winterbottom

Edit: Spelling

[ 04-29-2001: Message edited by: MrWinterbottom ]

[JasonC]

"only a handful of infantry divisions had only a handful of SP guns shows how insignificant they were."

Poppycock, those were half of the infantry divisions that fought in Normandy. And there were ~70 battalion-sized StuG units (perhaps 50 at once) with their component parts supporting the infantry divisions.

You cannot find a way to make the most common AFV types of the whole war "insignificant", however you want to parcel them out. It does not matter whether they were carried on the rolls of a "brigade" in an army or on those of a part of an AT battalion in several divisions. The result was still 3 10-StuG companies spread over the line to stiffen the infantry.

Of course the PAK were numerous, there were 2 75mm PAK for each StuG, Marder, Hezter or JgdPz over the whole war. But those types were 1 part out of 3 of the non-tank, heavy PAK weapons in the german force mix. (Otherwise put, 1/3 PAK 40 was an armored TD rather than towed). And there were twice as many of the TD types as there were Tigers and Panthers combined; about as many as Tigers, Panthers and Pz IVs combined. The tanks were just more concentrated, in the mobile divisions of course.

[JasonC]

StuG "brigades" (= battalions), by year

1941 - 16

1942 - 22 - 7 more formed, 1 reassigned to GD division as its StuG battalion

1943 - 37 - 16 more formed, 1 gets Elephants and becomes an AT battalion

1944 - 45 - 14 more formed, 4 become AT battalions, 2 become SturmPz Battalions

1945 - 47 - 2 more formed

June 1944 there were 48, distributed as follows -

East - AG North - 5

East - AG Center - 9

East - AG N. Ukraine - 9

East - AG S. Ukraine - 8

Italy - 3

France - 2

Germany/refit - 12

For comparison, in 1941 the total number of mobile divisons by year was

1941 - 24

1942 - 31

1943 - 44

1944 - 48

1945 - 54

Most had 2, the PzGdr divisions only had 1, regular armor battalion. So in 1941-42, the ratio of independent StuG battalions to armor battalions in the mobile divisions was around 1 to 3, from 1943 on more like 1 to 2.

Which does not count the AT battalions of the mobile divisions, which went from towed (41-42) to Marder (43) to Jadgpanzer (44-45) over time, with StuG often filling gaps during the second half of that. Counting those the number of TD type battalions was about the same as the number of Panzer battalions.

Not even counting the organic AT battalions of the infantry divisions, which got such Hetzers as were made in the final year, and already had Marder and StuG companies in several cases before those arrived, as noted in the Normandy details.

TOE and reality are two different things. When the home front supplies 17000 TD type AFVs compared to 14000 tanks (second half of the war), the armor at the front is going to reflect it, whatever doctrine says.

There has been a lot of talk on this board in the past about the "failed" TD idea. Well, everyone used the TD idea in WW II. There is often talk about the "error" of parcelling out armor to support the infantry. Well, everyone parcelled out a significant portion of their armor to support the infantry in the second half of WW II.

Why? Because both made a lot more sense than some here seem to think. Because combined arms is very useful, and sacrificing all the benefits of combined arms on the altar of the gospel of "mass", is not economy.

[Paul Lakowski]

StuG detachments were not parcelled out to the individual infantry divisions they where collected in reserve at the korps or Army level as a 'Alert units" [mobile reserve]. Front line infantry divisions didn't get them unless they where unluck enough to be on the recieveing end of a major assualt...in which case a hand full of StuGs were next to usless.

And while a few infantry divisions with Stugs in Normandy may be important to you thats simply a drop in the bucket compared to what was needed.