Question about PzIII

[Keith]

Just as an interesting aside, the 6th Panzer Division was equipped mostly with obsolete 35(t) tanks during Barbarossa. The problem was the Germany army vastly expanded the number of Panzer divisions prior to the invasion, so there was a shortage of tanks.

The most common way to take out heavy Russian tanks in 1941 was to use artillery or 88s in a direct fire role or try to demobilize the tanks. Fortunately for the Germans the Russians did not use the KVs and T34s effectively in mass early in the war.

[Mr. Johnson--]

Keith said, "Fortunately for the Germans the Russians did not use the KVs and T34s effectively in mass early in the war."

You mean the Russians did not have very many to mass.

JasonC Said, "They made the great gains of 1941 with mixed 20mm, 37mm, short 50mm, and short 75mm guns. Then they spent most of 1942 fighting T-34/76s in 50mm Pz IIIs mixed longs with shorts and winning (which is also what Rommel had by the way, while he was winning), and most of 1943 fighting the same Russian threat vehicles in larger numbers with the above mix, and losing."

Not excatly winning, the German tank fleet in Russia was decimated in 1942 due to lack of decent guns and decent armor.

Take these 2 examples from Jentz's PanzerTruppen...Panzer-Regiment 24 went from 141 operation panzers in mid July to 12 operation panzers in early November.

Panzer-Regiment 4 went from 130 operational panzers in late october to 27 panzers in mid november.

This prompted Hitler to hire Guderian as Inspecter-General of the Armored Troops. And Guderian rebuilt the PanzerTruppen along tactical defensive lines from then on.

[Skipper]

> You mean the Russians did not have very

> many to mass.

Initially, RKKA had quite many tanks - more than Wehrmacht, in fact. But because of incomplete soviet deployment, these tanks went to battle without proper infantry and artillery support and were nearly all lost very quickly.

[Mr. Johnson--]

I meant the Russian's did not have many KV-1s or T-34s in 1941. What about 600 KV-1s and KV-2s and I think about 3000 T-34s manufactured through 1941. I think thats almost even to the German tanks of all types. Of course the Russians had lots of other types to slow the Germans down.

[JasonC]

Some German panzer divisions were wholly equipped with the Czech 37mm tanks as late as Stalingrad. One of them in particular was right in the path of the north wing of the Russian counterattack (in addition to the Hungarian one, which was similarly equipped), and evaporated in about 48 hours.

It was not a matter of some expansion and a stop gap to meet it temporarily. The Czech chassis was as much a part of the German force mix for the entire war as the Pz II chassis was - more so, in fact. The early versions were the prewar 35t, the 38ts were made until mid 42, then Marders, then Hetzers.

[JasonC]

The moral of it all is merely that the technological dominance thesis is quite completely wrong. It simply was not true that the side with the better tanks won and the side with the worse tanks lost. Almost the direct contrary, in fact.

France and Britain had heavier tanks with better armament and armor in 1940, and lost decisively. Russia had a larger fleet and more capable tanks in 1941 and lost decisively. In 1942 the Russians on the whole had the superior type, as the Germans scrambled to upgrade to something as good as the T-34, and by the end of the year they basically had such a vehicle in the uparmored Pz IV long. They won until late in the year and then started losing. In 1943 then rolled out Panthers and Tigers in some numbers, and everything they were producing had 75 long, and they lost all of Army Group South and the decisive battles of the war. In 1944 they had better tanks in the west and lost decisively.

The decisive factor simply was not the tech specs of top end deployed AFVs. Operational usage of armor, i.e. *doctrine*, was far more important than types fielded. And numbers were more important than anything after sound vs. unsound tank doctrine and operational usage.

If one wanted to make a case for AFV technical specs mattering, the only period in which it would be even half true is from around Stalingrad until mid to late 43, with that tech edge going to the -Russians-, and including the weighting of types in the fielded force mix. That is the only period in the war when a side with arguably better tanks (among the great powers, not counted Poland and what-not) won, operationally.

This ought to be trivially obvious to those that continually argue the superiority of various German types, since after all they lost. And specifically, lost after they had those types and did not have them when they were winning. The entire idea that tank warfare was dominated by tech racing is a simplistic myth and empirically false.

It was also, incidentally, the tank design philosophy of the losing power and of its leader in particular. Everyone else focused far more on mass production of a single capable medium tank design, whatever was the best type available at the moment the decision to mobilize the economy for war was made.

I have been explaining to anyone who will listen for months now, that the German successes in use of armor in WW II had nothing to do with the CM player's crutch of invunerable front armor plates. Of course those are useful, but they were never decisive. What was decisive was how tanks meshed their fighting with other arms, and how they were ordered around on the map, and how many of them there were.

Which are things mostly masked by game scale in CM, incidentally. The tactical game scale and relatively even fights on that scale, puts a premium on things that historically were quite secondary. Because armor fights actually occurred on a larger scale and were usually much more lopsided, locally, than they are in CM. And when they weren't lopsided, they were "noisy" and "random" enough, and involved enough input from other arms or factors, that the average result was relatively even attrition trades. Which in themselves simply favor the side that can replace the losses.

A secondary point of it all, is that those who think they anything about what German tankers actually accomplished in 1940 through 1942, but actually rely themselves, in wargames, on later war superior tech (actually limited to a portion of even the late war German vehicle fleet, incidentally), don't have a clue what the historical tankers actually did accomplish, facing what hurdles and odds.

[Mr. Johnson--]

I suppose your probably right JasonC. You could make the arugument that what decimated the German Panzer Divisions was Hitler sending Army Group south past the Don River into terrian that was next to impossible to defend with the small numbers of German AFVs.

The Germans still could have used a 1000 more PZ-IV langs at the start of 1942. Plus proper winter clothing for the winter of 1941-42.

[sturmtiger101]

Michael, your welcome, happy to have been of service. I looked through some reference books at home and the tauchpanzer wading tanks were of 118 pz abt of 18 Pz Div. There were Ausf F, G, and H types. Some were also issued to 6th Pz Div. I also did find one very fuzzy photo of a regular ( non - wading ) Ausf F with the 37mm gun supposedlly employed on the eastern front, but still feel that this was an exception to standard. There were early versions of the Mk III converted to command tank roles that still retained the original 37mm armament and served in the east and in North Africa. Just as often, however, these command tanks mounted a dummy gun in place of the main armament and the turrets were fixed and could not rotate.

Cheers,

Eric

[sturmtiger101]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Schrullenhaft:

My guess is that they should be. The Ausf. F and Ausf. J were produced in large numbers (to my limited knowledge) and are very representative of the Pzkw III series.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sir, the Ausf F was actually not very numerous as only about 300 - 500 units were produced (I'll have to check the exact #s at home. ) until the introduction of the Ausf G. The Ausf J, however, does appear to be the most numerous turreted version of the Mk III with ~ 1600+ L/42 and ~ 1000+ L/60 50mm equipped units produced.

Respectfully,

Eric Tuggle

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

The moral of it all is merely that the technological dominance thesis is quite completely wrong. It simply was not true that the side with the better tanks won and the side with the worse tanks lost. Almost the direct contrary, in fact.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree with the basic point you make. It's true that Germany enjoyed it's greatest success while facing tanks with generally better armor and armament, but there is more to a tank than armor and a gun. A three man turret and a radio go a long way towards evening the odds. So I guess it comes down to how you define a tank as "better".

[Username]

I am not sure what JasonC is getting at since CM focuses on the microscopic where the play is about gun vs armor and hopefully things like 3 man turrets, radios, rates of fire, etc MATTER.

Its my belief that successful ops like the early bltzkrieg and the US/Anglo invasion of europe depended on a firepower advantage that airpower/artillery gives. Taking large portions of enemy ground with sustainable losses is the key. Having a decisive firepower advantage (it could be ships guns against an island by the way) leads to a low cost victory. In cases like the Bulge, where the US air force couldnt operate, it becomes a blood bath. luckily in the bulge, the US fired its artillery till the breaking point. It suffered the rest of the war due to shortages by the way.

The sovs paid a big price on the eastern front. They used sledgehammer tactics to get victorys/stalemates at very great costs. The US and the Anglos would not have been capable of using these tactics.

So the early german tank victorys were a function of the tanks engine and tranny as much as the tanks gun. They drove through the rubble and smoke that the stukas and artillery created. A 37mm armed tank was as terrify as any other as long as it had MGs and was roaming through the rear. Infantry were defenseless in many cases and rightfully melted before the tanks.

Later in the war, the US practised a modified form of this once it could break out. There wasnt the early war tank fright but there was similar opportunitys. Any holdup could get the air treatment to allow some hardcore defender to really see how hardcore they were. The US artillery, with its optimised techniques, also made many defenders think twice.

But the armored war in the later years did depend alot on guns and armor. A stubborn superior vehicle could hold up an armored onslaught till defensive measures could arrive. The will of an attacker could be sapped (perhaps beyond all reason) by superior weapons. The use of infantry AT weapons made tank roaming a dangerous affair and combined arms became the mobile prosecuter.

Lewis

[Skipper]

> But the armored war in the later years did

> depend alot on guns and armor. A stubborn

> superior vehicle could hold up an armored

> onslaught till defensive measures could

> arrive. The will of an attacker could be

> sapped (perhaps beyond all reason) by

> superior weapons.

Somehow, it didnt help germans in 1944-45 on eastern front. Soviet advances were very rapid.

> They used sledgehammer tactics to get

> victorys/stalemates at very great costs.

Korsun-Shevchenko, Umansk-Botoshansk, Lvov-Sandomir - rings any bells? RKKA went from Moscow to Belorussia to Berlin in 2 years, cutting through a fully mobilised and battle-hardened german army, taking several lines of permanent fortifications and fording several major rivers in the process. It was done by aplication of superior operational art, not by sledgehammer tactics.

> The US and the Anglos would not have been

> capable of using these tactics.

US and Anglos had 3 (three) years to get ready to D-Day. By the time of landing, they built such an overwhelming superiority in artillery and tanks that they never have any need for what you call "sledgehammer tactics". They had no need for too much operational finesse, either.

> The use of infantry AT

> weapons made tank roaming a dangerous

> affair and combined arms became the mobile

> prosecuter.

I dont think development of infantry AT weapons throughout the war changed much of anything in that respect. Tanks needed infantry and artillery support in 1941 practically as much as in 1945.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> The US and the Anglos would not have been

> capable of using these tactics.

US and Anglos had 3 (three) years to get ready to D-Day. By the time of landing, they built such an overwhelming superiority in artillery and tanks that they never have any need for what you call "sledgehammer tactics". They had no need for too much operational finesse, either.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Uh..it was sure nice of the germans to allow the allies to land all that stuff... Thanks for completely missing my point.

How many Operational lives did the soviets lose? yeah real finesse there. The soviet union is one of the few nations to actually have its population substantionally decrease during and after the war.

The Anglo-Americans used logistics as well. In fact, the lack of german logistics as well as lack of resources allowed such catastrophes to happen to the wermacht. The soviets would operationally run out of steam and have to stockpile more ammo and soon-to-be-dead men also.

My point is that the sovs lost an unacceptable amount of human lives in their nations defense and in the winning of the war on their front. No free people would have put up with it. The US certainly wouldnt and the war would not go on (long)without the US. Since the russians kept little records and arent the most reliable source of their own failings; where are these decimal point numbers of loss ratios that people are coming up with?

The early Blitzkrieg success and the US/anglo retaking of France had the same element of complete airpower. It was more a part of modern warfare than the tank. In the case of the US and Great Britian, the strategic, interdictive and close support airpower represented the high point of the airfront in WWII.

Lewis

[JasonC]

Yes, at the CM level armor specs matter, which is as it should be. It is simply that some on this board, or a general cloud of opinion here anyway, seen in various posts, seems to think that because such things matter on the scale of CM, their importance must scale up and be very important for the overall war. And there is simply no evidence of that whatever. This is not a criticism of CM - it gets a tactical detail basically right (although there are also artificialities of CM game situations that are also involved - like fixed edges, evenly balanced battles, small units, etc). It is a criticism of drawing false higher-level inferences from such tactical facts as CM brings out in sharp relief.

As for the Russian front, the Russians outplayed the Germans operationally from the fall of 1942 onward. Anyone who can read a map and looks at the actual campaigns can see that easily. The Russians started off with lousy doctrine, crippling bad at the outset, in addition to being strategically surprised and insufficiently deployed. They paid for it by losing the strength of their entire army in the first six months.

But after that, their doctrine steadily improved and by mid 43 it was good enough. They beat the Germans in war economy and production, primarily because the Germans did not mobilize their economy fully until after Stalingrad - the single biggest blunder of the war, and an "unforced error" caused by sheer arrogance, overconfidence, "victory disease" as strategy scholars call it today.

And German operational "play" on the Russian front from the time they reached the Volga until the time they patched something together in Poland in the second half of 1944, was quite abysmal. Relieved by occasional defensive successes, and occasional Russian mistakes, certainly. But on the whole, the Russians outplayed the Germans, not just in how many tanks they had or what losses they replaced, but in where they sent their tanks and spearheads vs. where the Germans sent theirs.

As for the silly statement about "unacceptable" Russian losses, like they had a choice. Presumably, calling them "unacceptable" means they ought to have rolled over and let themselves be exterminated. Most of the Russian losses were civilian, and most of those were in occupied territory. Civilian losses in Russian controlled territory were high because of the economic strain of the war, from limited territory - in the form of famine and diseases of malnutrition in seiges, and such.

Russian military losses were enourmous and lopsided in 1941 only, and mostly in the form of prisoners. After the first six months, Russian losses were comparable to German ones, though with a higher portion of killed compared to wounded. Certainly the Russian military after 1941 did not take losses more than twice what the Germans did. They had between 3:2 and 2:1 in population compared to Germany, and did not outnumber the Axis powers at all, with the minors included. They did mobilize a higher portion of that population, of course.

But the idea that the Russians were taking 3:1, 5:1, 10:1 losses and just "accepting them" and somehow making it up on volume, is simply poppycock. The Russians had a numerical superiority of only about 3:2 when the decisive battles of the war were fought.

The late war lopsided edge in fielded forces against the Germans, before Normandy, came not from addition by production, but by subtraction through attrition and large scale military victories. The Germans lost practically all of Army Group South twice, and of Army Group Center once. It was only because of losses on that scale that the initially limited Russian odds edge grew to decisive proportions. And it so grew, because the Russians did not lose in the victories involved, at the rate of the initial odds ratio (which was about 3:2, as mentioned).

The myth is continually repeated that the dumb Russians lost 5 and 10 times what the Germans did but won because they still outnumbered them afterward. This is the most transparent bilge. All you have to do is go through the actual campaigns, instead of this catch all, overarching abstraction, and ask whether it is so.

Did the Russians lose 5 times as much as the Germans in the push from the Volga to Rostov in the winter of 42-43? Hardly. Did they lose 5 times as much as the Germans in the push from Kursk to the Dniepr? Um, no. From the Dniepr to the Polish Border? Yeah, right. From the Ukraine to Belgrade? Hardly.

When you start with a 3:2 odds ratio and drive the loss rate on both sides to the moon, the odds ratio only moves in your favor if the ratio of those losses stays under 3:2. But you can end with 5:1 odds afterwards, even with equal losses, if only the loss rate is high enough. 300 vs. 200, subtract 175 losses from both sides and you will end with 125 vs. 25, which is 5:1. This is called attrition, and is one way a modest initial odds edge can be made decisive. In chess, it is like exchanging off material to make a one-piece advantage into a winning one.

Also, if you track the actual operations, you will find the German infantry commanders facing hopeless odds, even though the Russians have only a moderate overall edge, because they get ganged up on in sequence. Break out the 200 into 8 groups of 25. Put the excess 100 on the larger side opposite only one of them, and there the odds are 5:1, while being 1:1 everywhere else. Move that 5:1 point from place to place, and one after another groups of 25 on the weaker side will face overwhelming odds. This is called maneuver, and is another intelligent use of an initial odds advantages. In chess, it is like tying up the defending pieces guarding numerous threatened points, then overloading the attackers on one of them.

It was by such means that the Russians won the war in the east. Not by magically taking 5 times the losses and ending with 5:1 odds, even though they only out-mobilized and out-produced the Germans by 3:2 or 2:1. And German "counterplay" was generally poor - open flanks at Stalingrad, beating the head against a PAK front at Kursk, holding at infinite cost in the face of Bagration. Each is an obvious and largely unforced blunder. By comparison, Russian moves were sound to excellent in most of the decisive campaigns.

Russians are not bad at chess, either.

[JasonC]

Also incidentally, the Western allies used "sledgehammer" tactics at - El Alamein, Cassino and the rest of the Gustav line, Caen, St. Lo, Metz and the Lorraine generally, Aachen and the Hurtgen, and counterattacking the Bulge. About half of them were expensive battles of attrition and comparative failures, while the other half were expensive battles of attrition and comparative successes.

Overall, the Gustav, the Normandy period, and erasing the bulge were successful large-scale applications of attrition, with losses running from 50k to 250k on each side, and each ending in the exhaustion of the defenders and large scale breakthrough. The western Allies were quite able and willing to engage in such warfare. The only ones that aren't are maneuver theorists and their historians, in restrospect.

And it is quite obvious that the western Allies could have applied such tactics on far larger scales had they needed to. Thankfully they did not, because the Russians had already done so much of it. But the population of the USA alone in 1944 was closer to that of Russia than that of Germany, and the UK controlled 25% of the earth's surface, including India. There is no way the Allies, western or eastern, were going to run out of men. They might run low on trained soldiers for particular periods, but that is merely a matter of overall planning, and diverting manpower from one role to another.

[Username]

How many russians died taking Berlin? Put that in your Katyusha launcher and smoke it!

[Skipper]

Another pre-cooked opinion, huh? I'd second Jason's advice: get yourself a map, read up some modern russian sources on soviet WWII operations and soviet WWII losses, and dont talk BS anymore. Thank you in advance.

By the way, I understood what your point was. And I disagreed with it.

> My point is that the sovs lost an

> unacceptable amount of human lives in

> their nations defense and in the winning

> of the war on their front.

When I think about what would happen if nazis won, to me those losses seem to be 'acceptable'.

> No free people would have put up with it.

Of course, they would rather let germans kill half of them and enslave the other half. You know, I have more faith in 'free people' than you. In brits, at least. Have you ever heard about british pikemen (sic!) units? Thankfully, they never saw combat, but if Hitler would choose to go for Sea Lion, they were ready for him.

> where are these decimal point numbers of

> loss ratios that people are coming up with?

From those "little records", that occupy absolutely enormous shelf areas in TsAMO and several other archives. They were all kept undisclosed until 1990s.

> The early Blitzkrieg success and the

> US/anglo retaking of France had the same

> element of complete airpower.

Trust me, RKKA had airplanes, too. In 1944-45 as well. Lots of them.

[Skipper]

> How many russians died taking Berlin?

Yeah, how many?

[Triumvir]

Why are you responding to Lewis? Isn't it obvious that he's a troll, and that the only way to handle him is steal the best of the ideas he comes up with, leaving them unattributed, while ignoring everything else? 8)

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

When I think about what would happen if nazis won, to me those losses seem to be 'acceptable'.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Get a history book Skippy. The russians caved in WWI. I guess thats why they call you skippy. In WWII, with an Iron handed dictator, they werent allowed the luxury of thinking otherwise.

If the russians had been a little less heavy handed, then thier losses wouldnt have been as tragic. But they were allowing unwanted types to get the chance to offer themselves up werent they? The communists were no blessing on Mother russia either so spare me and the others your glorious praise of the soviets. When the commisars were pulled back and the US supplied war essentials flowed, then the russian steam-roller could make its bones. The stupid germans were more responsible for the losses than the soviets leadership.

Lewis

[Schwarze]

Wow, thx guys.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

Why are you responding to Lewis? Isn't it obvious that he's a troll, and that the only way to handle him is steal the best of the ideas he comes up with, leaving them unattributed, while ignoring everything else? 8)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

(I was just trying to get JasonC to break his post-length record but this guy skippy is an un-hoped for find.)

Seriosly though, I think the panzer IIIs and StuG spawn of the III chassis might have been the greatest tank killers the germans had. If would be interesting to add up the total tank kills these vehicles had and compare them to panther kills, etc.

Lewis

[Triumvir]

I don't think you will ever get anyone else to break Jason's post length.

But it's terribly unsporting to fish in these waters; it's like finding an undiscovered lake with coelecanths all over the place and then happily grabbing them with a seine net.

(Course, you can't eat coelecanths, but that's part of the argument...)

I agree that the Pz III chassis based vehicles were probably the most effective tank killers of the war, but war's not about killing tanks...

[Username]

I often thought that the germans should have moved alot of the Panzer III/L60s into Normandy. They would have been very capable in the close in fighting amongst the bocage. I guess they only thought madmen would want to fight in that stuff.

[Skipper]

I am not skippy, I am Skipper. Okay?

> If the russians had been a little less

> heavy handed, then thier losses wouldnt

> have been as tragic.

With perfect strategic intelligence, hindsight and all those people lost in 1941 - definitely! Without - hmm, dont know...

OTOH, if french and brits were a bit more heavy-handed, who knows, maybe they would have a chance in 1940?

> But they were allowing unwanted types to

> get the chance to offer themselves up

> werent they?

They weren't.

> The communists were no blessing on Mother

> russia either so spare me and the others

> your glorious praise of the soviets.

What do you know about communists except that 'they were very evil and killed 100 million people'? I think, not much. Or what do you know about a situation in Russia between January and November of 1917? Or from 1875 to 1917? I think, nothing at all. Fair enough, we can have a meaningful discussion!

NB: since when saying "he is not dumber than the other guy" counts as a glorious praise?

> When the commisars were pulled back

They never were. They were withdrawn from tactical decision making in 1942, but they remained in the OOB and were tremendously important to the unit cohesion.

> The stupid germans were more

> responsible for the losses than the

> soviets leadership.

Drop the word 'stupid' from this phrase, and I'll agree with this one!