Facts and Myths of the Eastern Front: What the heck did happen?

[kunstler]

Ok, I’ve been following some of the discussion threads on the board for a while (being a dedicated lurker), and I’m getting confused by all the point/counterpoints about the Eastern Front. It’s like watching Jane Curtin and Chevy argue all over again.

I’ve read a little bit about WWII, but I’d say most of what I know falls into the category this Gantz fellow decries as mythical. I’m interested in the latest, post-Soviet Union, historical view of the war. I’ve been very impressed by the knowledge possessed by the ‘grogs’ of the board. If I might pick your brains . . . .

I’ve read that the Soviet army was purged in the thirties, and lost more officers than in the entire war. 25,000 seems to be a popularly cited figure. Voroshilov and Budenny are called outdated incompetents at the head of the army when the Germans invade. Stalin ordered the army not to fire back at the Germans and only gave permission several hours later. True? Bogus? Nobody really knows?

Peace feelers were extended by the Soviets in 1941 and as late as 1943. True or another bogus rumour?

I have even read that the Russian officers during the purge were set up by German intelligence in an effort to cripple the Russian military. I gather this is bogus?

The figures for casualties in the war also seem a little odd. 20 or 29 million Russians, a large percentage soldiers, died, opposed to 2 million Germans. Is this including all the Germans who died in Russian captivity between 1941 and 1950, and among civilians being deported West?

I am not sure what the 1939 population of Germany and the Soviet Union was, but if the Russians could lose almost 30 million people, how is it the Germans were putting children and old men into the front line after 2 million losses? Surely the Soviet population wasn’t 15 times that of Germany. Is it because Hitler wouldn’t allow women in the factories? But didn’t the Germans have access to millions of slave labourers?

After the war, the Americans painted the Russian army as a giant unstoppable juggernaut. It sure seemed like one from looking at the postwar map of Europe.

At the same time I have had more knowledgable people on the topic of WWII claim that the Russian army in 1945 was running on fumes and might easily have failed to capture Berlin. I find that hard to believe, but then people are now saying the Russian purges didn’t really have any effect on the Red Army. There was also a prominent Canadian documentary called the Valour and the Horror that claimed the allied bombing campaign had no effect on German industry (and then there is James Braques with his Untold Losses or something like that that claims the Western powers systematically slaughtered Germans after the war). On the other hand, Speer and German generals seemed to believe the bombing campaign had a definite effect on their industries.

How bad a shape was the Red Army in in 1945? Why did the German line collapse so completely after Kursk? Were the loses so severe in that battle that Germany’s experienced troops were lost? Was it the fortress thing? Was it all Hitlers fault or were his generals to blame for mistakes as well?

There is even a book on the shelf at the local bookstore that claims Martin Borman was really a Soviet spy. Another book claims the body dug up in Berlin is fake and that there is a Brazilian passport with his picture on it.

I’m just waiting for a book to claim Hitler was a Soviet spy or British agent or something.

Below is a section cropped from Gantz’s article, cited in another thread (the one about turret speed):

The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows:

- Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

- Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

- Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

- Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

- Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

- Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

- The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes.

- Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

- Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).

- The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.

A majority of Americans probably accept these judgments as realities . In doing so they display a warped impression of the war which belittles the role played by the Red Army. As a consequence, they have a lower than justified appreciation for the Red Army as a fighting force, a tendency which extends, as well, to the postwar Soviet Army. Until the American public (and historians) perception of Soviet source material changes, this overall perception of the war in the East and the Soviet (Red) Army is likely to persist.

Close examination of Soviet sources as well as German archival materials cast many of these judgments into the realm of myth. Recent work done on Eastern Front operations has begun to surface the required evidence to challenge those judgments.45 Continued work on the part of American historians, additional work by Soviet historians, joint work by both parties, and more extensive efforts to make public Soviet archival materials is necessary for that challenging process to bear fruit.

It is clear that no really objective or more complete picture of operations on the Eastern Front is possible without extensive use of Soviet source material. Thus definitive accounts of operations in the East have yet to be written. How definitive they will ultimately be depends in large part on the future candor and scope of Soviet historical efforts.

In the interim it is the task of American historians, drawing upon all sources, Soviet and German alike, to challenge those judgments and misperceptions which are a produce of past historical work. It is clear that the American (Western) perspective regarding war on the Eastern Front needs broadening, in the more superficial public context and in the realm of more serious historical study. Scholarly cooperation among Soviet and American historians, research exchange programs involving both parties, and expanded conferences to share the fruits of historical research would further this end and foster more widespread understanding on both sides.

So what I’m wondering is, can any of the so-called ‘Grogs’ here shed any light on this morass? ARE there definitive, modern answers to these questions or is it still all in the realm of state of tug of war between different groups of idealogue historians?

I realize some of these questions are pretty basic. I’m not coming at this from a military background, just general knowledge. Thnx for any info in advance!

"Jane, you stupid *** . . ." --- Chevy Chase’s opening line of argument.

[Forever Babra]

Here's a definitive clarification of ONE of them...

It's "Jane, you ignorant s***"

[M. Bates]

With regards to one of your inquiries, I would be surprised if Martin Borman did escape to another continent.

He was last seen during the Berlin bunker breakout with Stumpfegger. Years later workmen uncovered two bodies side by side, and the were successfully identified by dental records. One of them may have been injured during a duel between the Russian tanks and Tigers of the SS Nordland Division. Apparently they both took cyanide when it looked as if their escape attempt would fail.

BTW don't forget it's also the Western viewpoint which is influenced by subsequent WW2 accounts not just the US view.

[This message has been edited by M. Bates (edited 02-11-2001).]

[PeterNZer]

I'd recommend reading 'Stalingrad' by Antony Bevor, lots of post-soviet stuff in there about that battle and the war in general. Very interesting, goes into how the soviets portrayed stuff and what happened, should give you a good feel for a lot of your queries.

PeterNZ

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"Patriotism is the virtue of the viscious" - Oscar Wilde

"Don't F*CK with Johnny Cash!" - Chupacabra

[Henri]

There are too many questions in your post for me to reply (at least not today).

But just let me point out that the Western view of the Soviet WW2 is still much influenced by the Cold War, where it was politically expedient to depict the soviets as incompetent robots who only knew how to win by human wave attacks. Just a couple of corrections. Even today, people who point this out are liable to be labeled as commie-lovers by diehard cold warriors (yes, it has happened to me). If the Soviets were so incompetent, it would be hard to understand how they won the two most decisive battles of WW2 (Stalingrad and Kursk) with forces that were about equal in numbers to those of the Germans (about 1 milion men inthe case of Stalingrad).

Soviet military doctrine was much influenced by Lobashevsky's theories of maneuver warfare, but in early WW2 they were generally unable to put them into effect due to the earlier purges of some 40,000 Soviet officers. This theory included deep penetrations hundreds of miles behind enemy lines which were being carried out to a limited extent as early as 1941.

The Germans did not lose 2 million men (which was the size of the German army that invaded the USSR), but some 13 million men, most of whom were lost on the Eastern Front. Official Soviet numbers were never published as far as I know, but are generally estimated at some 20 million (which probably includes a lot of civilians).

The Soviet soldiers before Barbarossa were not ordered not to shoot back but to avoid provoking the Germans into a shooting war. Stalin apparently did not believe that the Germans would attack Russia in 1941, and when they did, he compounded the disaster by ordering not to give any ground.He eventually realized his mistake and eventually left the military decisions to his generals.

Despite the purges, some of the most competent generals of WW2 were Soviets. Zhukov was in a class by himself on the Soviet side, but there were other excellent officers.

Henri

[lassner.1]

In English I think that, as a start, you should read two books:

1). David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler"

2). D. M. Glantz "Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War."

These give a good basic overview of what problems the Red Army going into the war and what it got right. "When Titans Clashed" also does an excellent job at highlighting what the Germans got wrong.

You might also begin with The Journal of Slavic Military Studies (great articles in Dec 1993 on technological surprise in the Russo-German war, and in 1995 on the Soviet pact with Germany and ideas on Offensive war), the 1996 Yale Ph.D. dissertation by Mary Ruth Habeck "Imagining War: German and Soviet Armored Doctrine 1919-1939," Williamson Murray's book "German Military Effectiveness," and Alexander Lassner's article in Contemporary Studies Studies, vol. 8, "The Invasion of Austria in 1938: Blitzkrieg or Pfusch."

Good Bibliographies in all sources for further reading.

Good Luck

[Skipper]

Just posted some stuff on that "other thread" that does represent the modern point of view of russian archival worms.

I do not say that those purges had no effect, just that their effect cannot be definitely painted as gross reduction of RKKA fighting ability, and that these purges were far from being a primary cause of 1941 disaster. Basically speaking, any army of that period in the similar situation would find themselves in deepest sh...t, including Wehrmacht, British Forces and US Army.

You are pretty much correct to question those stereotypes you mentioned.

[Guest machineman]

Originally posted by kunstler:

Close examination of Soviet sources as well as German archival materials cast many of these judgments into the realm of myth. Recent work done on Eastern Front operations has begun to surface the required evidence to challenge those judgments.45 Continued work on the part of American historians, additional work by Soviet historians, joint work by both parties, and more extensive efforts to make public Soviet archival materials is necessary for that challenging process to bear fruit.

Althought you may also notice that while Glantz does insinuate that 'many of these judgements are in the realm of myth', he then carefully backs away from trying to prove anything. Just a 'these things are wrong, but I won't exactly say how' type of argument.

New information coming out does not have to automatically make the Soviets look better, as he implies, it can also make them look worse:

http://www.geocities.com/TimesSquare/Cave/1761/kursk.html

I would argue that until fairly recently the Soviet were assumed to be MORE effective in many ways than they actually were, because of the long standing Soviet habit of overblowing their victories and hiding their defeats and problems. This was backed up by hawks in the US administration that could use the myth of the Soviet steamroller post war to inflate their own procurement budgets.

[Skipper]

That's a funny article you referred to here. Basically, the author quotes one myth (german total defeat) and then carefully paints another myth (Manstein's total victory, conveniently undone by Hitler). The reallife outcome was neither/nor.

[Tiger]

about that article:

...the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers

There were not 100's of Tiger tanks at Kursk (this is the old propaganda the article's author seems to be using).

"The s.Pz-Abt.503 and 505 each lost 3 Tiger tanks during operation Zitadelle. 13 others were lost during the Soviet offensive. A total of 19 lost during the fifty-day Battle of Kursk."

I think if you replace "Tiger" with "Panzer IV" in the article it would be more accurate.

jmtcw,

-Tiger

[Guest machineman]

Another example of new information putting the Red Army in a worse light from before, from Glantz himself, the debacle of operation Mars:

http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/countrpt/countrpt.htm

[Freak]

Tiger, I am not quite sure I follow your post's position, so I will try to follow up with further correction.

You need to reread the entire article. The author was using that as an example of the myth(s) that have been told about the battle of Kursk, and goes on to dispell this myth in the article.

"Taken from the article: "While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is essentially myth."

....Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps--available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle."

[Skipper]

> (this is the old propaganda the article's

> author seems to be using)

LOL Exactly!

> Another example of new information putting

> the Red Army in a worse light from before

Worse than "multiple human waves, rigid tactics, dumb soldiers, rookie officers"? Cannot be. Look, every army in the world makes big blunders, achieves miraculous victories and doesn't really care about bodycounts. This is so by definition. And we all know who won the war in the end of the day. This is the only argument I really need to qualify RKKA combat record as OUTSTANDING.

REDS WON.

The rest is details.

[This message has been edited by Skipper (edited 02-11-2001).]

[Skipper]

deleted OT post

[This message has been edited by Skipper (edited 02-11-2001).]

[kunstler]

Thnx for the replies, guys. I'll try taking a look at the books y'all mentioned. I have perused a copy of Stalingrad, but not read the entire book as of yet.

I find the number of German casualties pegged at 13 million sounds much more realistic.

And most of all, thnx for the correction to the Chase lead in. I was certain it was 'stupid s***.' I stand corrected.

Once again this board has set the facts straight. =)

[Skipper]

I think, that 13 million people figure includes civilians. Probably the victims of concentation camps, too.

[Wolfpack]

Originally posted by kunstler:

I’ve read that the Soviet army was purged in the thirties, and lost more officers than in the entire war. 25,000 seems to be a popularly cited figure. Voroshilov and Budenny are called outdated incompetents at the head of the army when the Germans invade

Peace feelers were extended by the Soviets in 1941 and as late as 1943. True or another bogus rumour?

After the war, the Americans painted the Russian army as a giant unstoppable juggernaut. It sure seemed like one from looking at the postwar map of Europe.

There was also a prominent Canadian documentary called the Valour and the Horror that claimed the allied bombing campaign had no effect on German industry (and then there is James Braques with his Untold Losses or something like that that claims the Western powers systematically slaughtered Germans after the war). On the other hand, Speer and German generals seemed to believe the bombing campaign had a definite effect on their industries.

How bad a shape was the Red Army in in 1945? Why did the German line collapse so completely after Kursk? Were the loses so severe in that battle that Germany’s experienced troops were lost? Was it the fortress thing? Was it all Hitlers fault or were his generals to blame for mistakes as well?

Below is a section cropped from Gantz’s article, cited in another thread (the one about turret speed):

The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows:

- Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

- Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

- Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

- Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

- Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

- Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

- The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.

It is clear that no really objective or more complete picture of operations on the Eastern Front is possible without extensive use of Soviet source material. Thus definitive accounts of operations in the East have yet to be written. How definitive they will ultimately be depends in large part on the future candor and scope of Soviet historical efforts.

"Jane, you stupid *** . . ." --- Chevy Chase’s opening line of argument.

Whew, I'll try to do a bit here, though I'm really not a grog (Unless you're talking about the late Roman Republic or American Civil War). I've snipped it down to what I think I can answer with a bit of confidence.

As for the purges, yes, that figure is a pretty generally accepted figure, but what people often mention but fail to take into account is that many of those same officers were returned to duty after Barbarossa began. Some gave good service, some didn't...you can't really say that the purges had a huge impact because Russian leadership was spotty before and after purged officers were returned to duty.

I'm not positive about the peace feelers, but knowing how paranoid Stalin was, it would not be a huge shock, since he could be expected to see that the Western powers were using his "inexhaustable" manpower to grind the Germans down. I would not be at all surprised to learn that he was looking to get out early. What better for him than to have the West fighting the Germans alone and beating the hell out of each other? (What he had planned in the beginning, although the Germans dashed those hopes with their quick, relatively painless wins in the west)

As for the Allied bombing campaign, it depends on how you look at it. Yes, the Germans drastically increased production of most of their armed forces equipment in the midst of the campaign, but this was due to the fact that efficiency was increased a great amount once the germans realized that they were in for a long war. Speer did an

incredable job in gearing up the german production for "total war" but it was too little too late. That said, without the bombing, production would have been even greater, and many of the critical subcomponants and much of the fuel would have been available for use. The bombing campaign had a huge impact in those areas.

After Kursk, the general idea is that the Germans had lost their mobile reserve. It was those "Fire Brigades" that sealed off many Russian breakthroughs and began counterattacks that kept the Russians off balance. In reality, the reserve wasn't really lost, it was however put out of action for a bit, many of the tanks that the Russians had claimed as total kills were in fact, back out fighting fairly quickly. having a great part of their mobile force did hamper the germans for a while, allowing the russians to force the lines back quite a bit. But remember, the war did still last nearly another 2 years, I wouldn't call that a complete collapse. As for who's to blame...you can blame whoever you want, but most people blame Hitler. It's an easy choice, and makes sense, but the General staff can't escape blame either, there's plenty to go around.

Now to that list of myths:

First, no, the Russians didn't have an overwhelming numerical superiority in every battle, what they did have in nearly all of them however was a huge RESERVE. That's the key. While the Germans were running forces around sealing gaps, the Russians could pick the point that looked most vulnerable and then attack. Like Stalingrad...hold with a roughly equal force, then cave in the flanks with your reserve.

Second, Russian manpower was nowhere near inexhaustable, toward the end of the war, they were scraping almost every bit as hard as Germany at that manpower barrel. And the Soviets were very touchy about the subject. They might not have cared much for the individuals that were fighting, but they couldn't exactly afford to be taking 20-1 and 15-1 losses like they did early in the war...if they could, then any general could have won for them...it doesn't take a whole lot of leadership ability to plan a human wave attack.

The next two are kind of together, I think that the lower levels of leadership did pretty well in the war considering what they were fighting against. The higher levels were where I see a lot of problems, they were consistantly wrong about German plans and operations, and tended to react rather slowly to what progressed. Of course, the high commanders were directly under Stalin's eyes, that would tend to make a differrence there. As for rigidity...well, when it's stand and die in battle, or disobey your last orders and get shot down by your own troops, that does tend to increase rigidity. Even units that pulled back, and stayed behind to fight the Germans as partisans were not trusted by leadership, as they showed "Too much independance"

Next, the Soviets were quite often trying to use encirclements, the problem is, that when the flanks failed to achieve their objectives, units were still funnelled into the fighting, so that the fights ended up as a head to head slugfest.

Lend lease WAS absolutely critical for shortening the war...it is highly doubtful that the Soviets would have been able to mount any kind of successful advance without what we supplied. It wasn't the tanks and direct combat material we supplied, rather the trucks and parts to keep them running. You could say that Detroit helped the Soviets win the war, because the Russian army would have been unable to keep supplies up with the troops without those vehicles.

As for the soldiers, it's a pretty broad generalization, but holds true for the most part...of course the same could be said of the soldiers of almost all of the combatants. I doubt you could find too many soldiers on any front that weren't terribly fatalistic in combat.

Whew, that is long...all said, now that more and more of the former Soviet documents are being released, it's the perfect time to study this part of the war, since there is more information than ever before on the subject. A lot of books in the past have said that the biggest German mistake was invading Russia, or that Hitler's decision to seal off the southern pocket was what lost the war...neither is true in itself. The Germans instead faced their greatest opportunity in taking Russia out in a quick strike, and even in the long run might have won despite mistakes.

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It is nearly always better to be beaten and learn, rather than to win and take no new knowledge from that victory.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

Here's a definitive clarification of ONE of them...

It's "Jane, you ignorant s***"

And it was Dan Akroyd who spoke the line.

Michael

[Henri]

Originally posted by Skipper:

I think, that 13 million people figure includes civilians. Probably the victims of concentation camps, too.

House and Glantz (When Titans Clashed) give a detailed breakdown of military casualties for both sides on the Eastern Front: Soviet casualties were about 30 million, and German casualties were about 13 million, including killed, wounded and captured, but not including civilians. For the Germans, this was close to 40% of the 1939 male population.

It is interesting to note that only 1/3 of the 30 milion Soviet casualties were killed in battle, the remainder dying of wounds or illness. Not many Soviet prisoners survived the war.

Soviet casualties in the initial phases of deep penetrations were particularly high: according to one Soviet source quoted in the above, about 40% of the leading Soviet assault troops were killed in the initial stages of such operations.

Henri

[Guest machineman]

. And we all know who won the war in the end of the day. This is the only argument I really need to qualify RKKA combat record as OUTSTANDING.

REDS WON.

The rest is details.

No one is saying they did everything wrong. But to say the combat record of the Red Army is outstanding is pushing it. The fact that they did win in the end pushed a lot of things under the carpet, ie, from the Glantz article I posted above:

Soviet military history ignored other notable Soviet defeats during the later war years. Among those notable operations, which, like Mars, endured obscurity and silence, were the failed Soviet Central Front offensive of February-March 1943 in the region west of Kursk, the abortive Soviet Belorussian offensive of fall 1943, and futile Soviet attempts to invade Rumania in May 1944 and East Prussia in fall 1944. This silence was possible because each of these defeats occurred at the end of a major Soviet strategic advance, when victorious context masked the failure to vanquished Germans and history alike and shrouded the events in a cloak of anonymity, which has endured for more than fifty years. That cloak is finally being lifted.

And the details do have some relevance here:

A 15 December German Ninth Army report(after said operation Mars)judged that the Russian operation had sustained a heavy defeat and "bled itself out," adding:

The enemy leadership, which demonstrated skill and adaptability in the preparation and initial implementation of the offensive,..once again displayed its old weaknesses as the operation progressed. Indeed, the enemy has learned much, but he has again shown himself to be unable to exploit critical unfavorable situations. The picture repeats itself when operations which began with great intent and local successes degenerated into senseless, wild hammering at fixed front-line positions once they encounter initial heavy losses and unforeseen situations. This incomprehensible phenomenon appears again and again. But, even in extremis, the Russian is never logical; he falls back on his natural instinct, and the nature of the Russian is to use mass, steamroller tactics, andadherence to given objectives without regard to changing situations.

I would go so far as to say this has not only been a constant in the Soviet army post war, but was passed down to Soviet influenced armies since then, and did not work any better for the Syrians, the Egyptians or the Iraqis than it did for the Soviets in WWII.

[Gregory Deych]

Originally posted by kunstler:

Ok, I’ve been following some of the discussion threads on the board for a while (being a dedicated lurker), and I’m getting confused by all the point/counterpoints about the Eastern Front. It’s like watching Jane Curtin and Chevy argue all over again.

I’ve read a little bit about WWII, but I’d say most of what I know falls into the category this Gantz fellow decries as mythical. I’m interested in the latest, post-Soviet Union, historical view of the war. I’ve been very impressed by the knowledge possessed by the ‘grogs’ of the board. If I might pick your brains . . . .

I’ve read that the Soviet army was purged in the thirties, and lost more officers than in the entire war. 25,000 seems to be a popularly cited figure. Voroshilov and Budenny are called outdated incompetents at the head of the army when the Germans invade. Stalin ordered the army not to fire back at the Germans and only gave permission several hours later. True? Bogus? Nobody really knows?

That's fairly close to truth. The Army was given orders to expect (unspecified) provocations and not to respond to them. For several hours, while the matter was unresolved, division and Corps commanders innundated the higher levels with reports of their positions being shelled and requests for instructions of how to respond.

Peace feelers were extended by the Soviets in 1941 and as late as 1943. True or another bogus rumour?

Some people who should know assert that some attempts were made in 1941. It's difficult to judge the truth, since it was a very much "black" operation, possibly done without Stalin's knowledge.

I have even read that the Russian officers during the purge were set up by German intelligence in an effort to cripple the Russian military. I gather this is bogus?

I've read that as well. It's possible Germans leaked information to NKVD, but of course NKVD was perfectly capable of falsifying anything it needed.

After the war, the Americans painted the Russian army as a giant unstoppable juggernaut. It sure seemed like one from looking at the postwar map of Europe.

At the same time I have had more knowledgable people on the topic of WWII claim that the Russian army in 1945 was running on fumes and might easily have failed to capture Berlin. I find that hard to believe, but then people are now saying the Russian purges didn’t really have any effect on the Red Army. There was also a prominent Canadian documentary called the Valour and the Horror that claimed the allied bombing campaign had no effect on German industry (and then there is James Braques with his Untold Losses or something like that that claims the Western powers systematically slaughtered Germans after the war). On the other hand, Speer and German generals seemed to believe the bombing campaign had a definite effect on their industries.

How bad a shape was the Red Army in in 1945?

It was hurting for manpower, but not about to collapse by any means. Remember that Russian losses were a lot smaller in 1944/45, and that teenagers kept reaching adulthood. In 1945, Russia had another 2 million men available for induction into the armed forces, plus there were freed POWs etc. etc.

Why did the German line collapse so completely after Kursk? Were the loses so severe in that battle that Germany’s experienced troops were lost? Was it the fortress thing? Was it all Hitlers fault or were his generals to blame for mistakes as well?

Both. Part of the matter was the perception that the offensive had completely bogged down (which was substantially, but not fully true), part of it was allied invastion of Italy, etc. etc.

[Bullethead]

Kunstler said:

So what I’m wondering is, can any of the so-called ‘Grogs’ here shed any light on this morass? ARE there definitive, modern answers to these questions or is it still all in the realm of state of tug of war between different groups of idealogue historians?

There is no such thing as a "definitive" history. Yes, only 1 thing really happened, but WW2 was simply so huge that at this remove in time it's impossible for us to ever really know what that one thing was. The best we can do is get a good approximation.

For this, we have the works of all the historians digging into primary sources, plus the memoirs of participants. None of them tell the full story but taken together they at least all agree on the major points. After that, it's pretty much up to every reader to form his own opinion of the minor details. So read everything you can.

That said, from my various readings (including German memoirs and Glanz ), here's what I've learned about your various line items:

- Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

Weather frustrated everybody and all their foot, horse, guns, and boats, at various times. I don't think the Germans had it worse than anybody else after they got over the 1st Russian winter.

- Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

Depends on how you count. If you look at a theater or sector of the front as a whole, then this was usually true. OTOH, if you consider only the critical points, then this wasn't always true. How else could the Germans have made their big penetrations and encirclements if they had to assault vastly superior forces to get there?

- Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

Not true. In 1942, for example, the Russians were really scraping. This is one big reason the Germans got so far that year.

- Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

Not true, at least at first. For examples of very poor top-level command, check out the 1941 campaign and also the 1942 Kharkov battle.

- Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

I don't think so. Rather, it seems like they tried to adapt to unforeseen circumstances but were handicapped by their over-all command structure (rather unwieldy at first) and (especially) their unreliable means of communications. Thus, their HQs were sometimes in the dark and when they did know what was going on, they had a hard time passing new orders. Thus the whole show often defaulted to autopilot despite their best efforts.

- Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

I guess this depends on the scale you look at. The Russians were bigtime into envelopments at the operational and strategic scales. Look at the arrows on the maps showing the routes of their armies from the 1941 Moscow counterattack, through Kharkov 1942, Stalingrad, etc., to the end of the war.

- The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes.

Not true. They cross-attached units from the beginning, often had reserves (where possible) besides 2nd echelon forces, and did enveloping turning movements.

- Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

Subject to much argument, but I think it's pretty clear that without all the US trucks they got, they'd have been unable to move so much so far so fast.

- Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).

Depends on what you mean by "cause", proximate or contributing. The root of all German defeats was Hitler for starting the war in the first place, for doing so before the date he'd told his chiefs to plan for, and for structuring the German economy for a short war. As to the course of individual battles, it's true Hitler screwed up a good number of them, and the effects of such losses were felt in later battles. OTOH, there were times when the Germans were simply out-fought.

- The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.

Never having fought Russians, I can't comment. But the above description fits most troops of most nationalities I'm personally familiar with

------------------

-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Hussar]

An excellant post Bullet head, kept nodding in agreement with all your points.

On the subject of casualties;

2.5% of the British population was killed or injured in WWII.

American casualties were 0.6%.

Russian casualities were 25% (yes, twenty five percent). The figure was closer to 30 mill than 20 million.

ref; Ostfront by Charles Winchester. Osprey 2000. A good modern coverage of the East front war.

I think the Russkies carried more than their share of the carnage of WWII.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

On the purges, yes Stalin removed between 25,000 and 40,000 officers and had many of them shot to boot. This effected 2/3rds of the officers above the rank of colonel. The reason for it was sheer paranoia - Stalin was afraid that the army might prove a source of opposition. Stalin was also incredulous about the invasion. The British, using "Ultra" data, had been trying to warn him for months that an attack was about to occur. Russian trains were running west over the border with supplies under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact trade agreements, up until a few hours before the German attack.

Basically, Stalin thought he and Hitler already had a deal and were going to carve up the map between them. Molotov was in the middle of negotiations. The Germans were talking about dividing up the British Empire with the Russians, and Stalin assumed that Hitler wanted to finish that one before starting another. The political surprise was total. Some might argue the surprise was total because fighting on two fronts was a blunder, and Stalin did not expect Hitler to commit it, but however you slice it there it is.

And yes, Stalin was in a panic in the early hours of the attack. He tried to find out what concessions could buy the Germans off, but the answer was nothing. He recovered his nerve and loosened the reins on the military leaders pretty quickly, though, when the rest of the Party was still panicking, and bossing the officers around to no purpose (as though punishing them more would help them fight).

The real source of improvement in the officer corps during the war, was experience gained in battle and successful field officers being promoted rapidly. Since losses were high and the army was also expanding rapidly, anyone alive and doing anything sensible went up the ranks like a rocket. Russian losses in the first six months were equal to the size of their entire army at the outbreak, but at the end of that period the army was the same size, because it was taking in new men just as fast. Doubling the personnel going through the ranks meant green troops certainly, but it also meant rapid promotion, because somebohy had to command them all and the old officers were mostly dead or captured.

As for peace feelers in 1943, Stalin played that card and repeated it or threatened to in early 1944. But he was doing so largely to put pressure on the western allies to increase economic aid and especially to open a second front as rapidly as possible. Stalin thought the westerners might prefer the Germans and Russians to kill each other indefinitely without helping him much. He was quite suspicious of Churchill in particular. Whenever he made these sorts of noises, the predictable result would be an increase in FDR's "bid" to help him, and a quieting of Churchill pulling the other way.

It had at least as much to do with post-war jockying for position among the allies, as anything to do with the Germans. He would not have made peace in 1943 or after, without all his territory back, certainly. And he was perfectly capable of making such a deal, pocketing the territory, and starting the war back up again 2 months afterward. There was no way the Germans could trust or enforce such a deal, even if Hitler had been rational, which he wasn't.

As for Russian officers set up during the purge by German intelligence, it was all more paranoid and twisted than that. The removed officers were typically accused, yes, of treason and plotting with the Germans. The KGB and the Gestapo also collaborated on many matters. The Russians had even allowed German forces to train in Russia under the Weimar Republic, to evade the Treaty of Versailles. There was all kinds of Russian-German cooperation going on, that Stalin was hip-deep in personally. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact to divide up Poland was only the last, when the war started.

But Stalin was worried about two things - one, his own image among communists and patriots for working with the Germans, and two, the Germans actually penetrating his police and army apparatus with double agents. So he had the police level unsubstantiated allegations of spying against the officers and purged them, complete with show trials. This was a sort of general license to sack your boss and take his job.

Turning such forces loose to control an otherwise solid bureaucracy was Stalin's stock in trade, how he got where he was in the first place. He did not care what it did to the quality of the officer corps, he was only interested in its political effects. To wit, that every serving officer afterward was deathly afraid of him, and also usually owed their job to their own guilty use of the means he had provided to eliminate their career competitors. Plus nobody paid any attention to stories that he was working with the Germans - how could he be, when he was arresting "German spies" right and left?

Did the Germans use all of the above for their own ends? They probable tried, but Stalin was an old hand at this twisted stuff. He certainly didn't do their bidding rather than his own.

As for casualty figures, they are endlessly confused by such distinctions as *deaths* vs. mere wounds, and military or civilian, occupied areas or not, etc. The Germans lost 3 1/4 million military men *killed*, most on the Russian front, plus 1 million that remained alive in Russian captivity in 1945, most of whom never returned. They took another ~9 million *wounded*. Some were lightly wounded and returned to the front, some invalided home, some out for longer periods.

The Russian military also had about 3 million killed on the battlefield, plus 5 million taken prisonner, most of them in 1941. 3 million of these prisoners died in German captivity, many of them shortly after being taken prisoner, others later while working in Germany as slaves. I have seen no reliable figures on Russian *wounded*, but their portion of captured to dead was certainly higher than for the German, and their portion of wounded to dead was probably lower.

Russian civilian deaths amounted to around 11 million. 3 million of these occurred in non-occupied Russia. Economic conditions in the Russian rear areas got so bad in 1942 and the first half of 1943, that civliian laborers were on rations that contained as few as 1200 calories per day, in some areas only 1000. 650,000 civilians died in the seige of Leningrad alone, mostly through starvation or the diseases that follow it. Of the other civilian deaths, several million were shot purposefully in the first year of the war, as Jews or Communists or local officials. Others were killed in reprisals for partisan actions. The entire Ukraine was systematically starved, by planned requisitions of more grain from the area, exported, than it was calculated the population could afford without starvation. By a general order from before the invasion, no German soldier could be prosecuted or punished for anything he did to Russian civilians during the war.

German civilian deaths in the war amounted to around 3 million. The Allied bombing was probably the largest cause. A close second was the ravages in the eastern Germany and east Prussia once the Russians reached them. The civilian losses in both cases are at about the same rate, with the difference in scale - much higher Russian losses - primarily reflecting how long the Germans were in Russia, compared to how long the Russians were in Germany, before the end of the war. Several million German refugees fled from the Russians into what later became West Germany.

The German population in 1941 was around 80 million people or not much less. It was a much larger country, geographically, than it is today, with about the same total population. Then it included Austria and what is now the Czech Republic (but not Slovakia), plus portions of Poland, and east Prussia. The Russian population then was around 150 million, or a bit less. In industrial output, the two were quite close in 1941, but in population Russia was about twice the size (discounting some Czechs, etc). The military deaths to the two sides were in about the same ratio as the populations, 8 million to 4 million. Incidentally, it is reported that as late as 1959 there were 7 women for every 4 men in the 35-50 age group in Russia - the "class" that had been 20-35 years old during the war. That implies nearly half the young adult males died, either in the military or in the occupied areas, mostly.

You wonder how the Russians could lose so many men, while the Germans with comparable losses were at the bottom of the barrel in manpower terms. The Russians certainly did not have an inexhaustible supply of manpower. They achieved their force size and their tank production figures despite their huge losses, by the most complete focus on these essential tasks imaginable. As mentioned, to the point that famine was general throughout the Russian rear, because so many of the peasants were in the army.

Production of civilian items practically ceased, as all the factory workers were in the weapons plants or heavy industry to supply them. Lend Lease was important in three areas that helped this specialization - transport equipment like railroad track and locomotives, trucks and fuel for them, and an often underrated third, food. The U.S. and Britain supplied a large portion of the prepared food for the Russian army diet, so they did not have to starve like civilians often did. (A discrepency, incidentally, which was a powerful spur to recruitment, with work in a war plant the only other reliable source of adequate food).

By contrast, the German civilian standard of living was flat from the outbreak of the war until 1943. By delaying total economic mobilization, the German high command spared the people much sense of the home front costs of war. Thye considered this vital to their political goals, and to maintaining support for their war policies. In the course of 1943 that changed, as the economy shifted more exclusively to arms, and as Allied bombing became intense and regular.

Another reason for avoiding total economic mobilization is also commonly missed. Once an economy is set toward war output, it loses flexibility. It requires some planned production of definite types of equipment in definite ratios, and it can only ramp up the amounts of these, by sacrificing any ability to switch rapidly between them. To give some understanding of what I am talking about, German industry was ready to concentrate on aircraft and submarines to fight Britain, within a month of the breakthrough in France in 1940. When the Russian attack initially went well, some plants converted back to submarine equipment before the end of 1941. Fighting its sequence of rapid wars against different types of enemies (naval or land etc), Germany put the flexibility of the economy above the gross amount of armaments output. After Stalingrad, there was no point in this anymore. It was clear tanks and Russia were the number one priority, with fighter planes to defend Germany itself a distant second.

As for the idea that the labor difference was women, there is slight truth to this. The Germans were still employing millions of domestics as late as 1942. But mostly, women filled in for agricultural work in Germany, replacing the missing men. Most of the laborers sent to Germany did likewise - not all of whom were slaves, by the way. Many came from occupied Europe for the higher pay, compared to administered shortages in occupied countries. Slave labor is also notoriously inefficient, producing little output of low quality and often consuming as much in guards and administrative overhead as the output itself. The Buna plant at Auschwitz killed millions and inflicted incredible suffering, but did not produce a scrap of finished synthetic rubber in the entire war.

As for the power of the Russian army in 1945, it was easily the strongest army on the planet. The supply situation might not have met U.S. standards but it was abundant compared to what the Germans had in the second half of the war. They had the largest fleet of the most capable tanks in history, sound veteran officers, huge amounts of artillery and small arms, and a large and often overlooked air-force flying capable planes. They were not by any stretch of the imagination "on their last legs".

As for "failing" to capture Berlin, the obvious thing anyone saying that means is that it is possible the U.S. might have beaten them to the city. It was certainly doomed. It was also probably stupid to attack the place itself and fight for it house to house, instead of just surrounding it and blasting it with artillery. Or at least, before doing that for a few weeks. The Germans certainly did not have any force capable of defending the place against thousands of tanks.

The Allies had already agreed on the division of Germany, though, so there was not much of a real race involved. There was for Austria, because its post-war fate hadn't been agreed on yet, and the U.S. pushed to occupy it first. The Brits were also sent to the Danish border with a similar aim in view. But if the U.S. had taken areas east of the Elbe before the Russians got there, we would have given them back to meet the peace deals already made.

As for the Allied bombing, its impact was limited for many reasons. It caused a lot of hardship and diverted a lot of overall economic effort to cleaning up rubble, rehousing people, fighting fires, and supporting an air force and air defense infrastructure to try to defend against the attacks. It also disrupted transport considerably, especially by rail, What it did not do is destroy German industry and cause an economic collapse.

This was due to many factors. First was simply the fact that repairs are easily to accomplish than many people realize, and the plants were often put out of action for only a week and then bombed only once every two months. Second, when plants were hit the Germansa responded by decentralizing production to lots of little plants at widely spread locations, making much less useful targets, when they were known about at all. Third, there was a lot of slack in the German economy, since it didn't go to full mobilization until after Stalingrad, and taking up this slack more than compensated for the effects of the bombing. Fourth, the bombs often flat missed - the British thought an entire city was the smallest target that could be nit reliably in the first place and bombed whole areas at night. The Americans aimed at specific factories and during the day, but many of the bombs dropped hit just anywhere in the city involved, same as with the British.

In addition to all of those factors, there was a problem that the Allies just didn't know accurately what the vunerable parts of the German economy were. They went after some - like ball bearings - that they thought were shortage situations, but that simply weren't. The Allies did have one noticable success in the economic bombing campaign, though. It just took them a while to find the right target set and to hit it relentlessly and heavily enough.

That target was oil production. The entire German war economy ran on synthetic oil (made from coal extracts), and a few importants from Rumania (Polesti). And high-octane aviation fuel, in particular, was dependent on special processes invented by the Germans and performed at only a half-dozen large, vunerable plants. Oil is an obviously good air target - you hit it, and the targeted item does half of the burning for you.

In the autumn of 1944, the Allies hit the German oil industry hard enough that the Luftwaffe could not fly for lack of av-gas. Tac-Air then went after the German planes on the ground, and the entire German railroad network, without any interference from German fighters. By the time of the Ardennes campaign, the Germans had enough trickling production from smaller dispersed plants and repairs and periods of poor flying weather, to launch the actual attack, but Allied fuel stores had to be made a prominent target. And the German spearheads that made it the furthest - 116th Panzer east of Bastogne, for instance - flat ran out of gas. The whole German army was hampered by lack of fuel from the Autumn ot 1944 on, which was directly the result of the bombing.

The last effect of the bombing was simply to call out the Luftwaffe and to bring it to battle, during the course of which it was basically destroyed. It had noticable successes against the U.S. bombers in 1943, and even in early 1944 it was still a significant force, on the defense. It had about as many top-quality fighter planes as it had ever had, still. But 6 months later, it was mostly spent. Once the Allies had long range fighters to escort the bombers into Germany, and more to send on "sweeps" and to cut loose looking for German fighters and strafing their airfields, they destroyed the Luftwaffe pretty quickly. And that had huge effects on the rest of the war. Normandy and the breakout campaign in France would not have been possible, or have gone the way they did anyway, without air supremacy, and that was a byproduct of the air battle over Germany.

But did dropping bombs break linkage A and B in the German war economy and send tank output plummeting? No. German tank output rose *six-fold* between Stalingrad and the fall of 1944, when it finally peaked.

Why did the German line collapse so comletely after Kursk? Because they were outmanuevered and outfought. When the Russian broke through, the German armor was on the wrong place, and in danger of being trapped in the huge Russian pincers from Orel and the Kharkov area. They ran because the alternative was to be surrounded. They did try to blunt these Russian breakthroughs, and they managed to avoid being surrounded themselves. But the slower German leg infantry was not so lucky. They got left behind. When the front line for the mobile forces fighting each other moves 100 miles west in a matter of days, and you are on foot and in contact, it is a pretty dicey situation. Being told to "hold at all costs" doesn't help, but nobody listened to such inanities anymore.

If you read the histories, you find the mobile divisions withdrawing again and again, fairly successfully but always with losses. You find the infantry divisions being overwhelmed. They often talk about those enourmous Russian odds, but if you look at the operational maps, you find those enourmous Russian odds are being achieved in sequence, just like manuever warfare manuals say. What do I mean?

These 4 German infantry divisions are overwhelmed by this Guards Shock Army. Then these other three are. Pretty soon a Russian formation has "overwhelmed" a force almost as big as itself, always having the local odds edge. That is what happens to less mobile elements left behind in a breakthrough. The enemy can send more after them, than they can call on to help. But once the enemy wins that fight, all the forces he sent are freed up to hit the next bunch.

The only way to stop this is to have a continuous front and reserves to send to the guy being hit "today". But that is just what the Germans did not have, because their mobile elements were off west fighting delaying actions against their Russian counterparts, trying to keep them from pushing even further. They never had the mass at one spot to truly smash these Russian mobile formations, in the post Kursk campaign. They fight off a brigade of tanks and fall back 5 miles before the rest of a tank corps reaches them. Which is what they needed to do in the existing situation, sure. It just doesn't help the infantry divisions left behind much, facing the Russian infantry, with is free to move all around them and gang up at will. This is pretty much the same thing the Germans did to the Russians in the south during the summer and fall of 1942.

Was this "all Hitler's fault"? He didn't help, but no. Plenty of generals were in favor of the Kursk operation, and plenty of independent mistakes were made in the course of the campaign even after they had decided to fight it, in arguable the wrong way and the wrong place. The generals who saw better courses of action were not numerous, and others argued against them. If they had had their druthers, it is not clear they would have succeeded in their proposed alternative courses of action. But it was enough of a debacle, that it is probably safe to say (with the benefit of hindsight obviously) that they were more nearly right and the decisions actually made were wrong.

As for Soviet source materials, my experience is that it is pretty easy to dissociate propaganda from military professionalism, if you've been exposed to both things and if you have a map and can read them - LOL. I mean, I have looked at the Soviet military campaign books, and they are perfectly cogent. Is there boilerplate? Sure. But if you show me where tank corps A was on day such-and-so and again on day so-n-so, I don't have to pay attention to your boilerplate to see whether it was a good move. I mean, I can read a map, I can see whether the position was good, I can see the next set of positions it led to.

I have no doubt whatever that the Russians out thought and out fought the Germans from the autumn of 1942 through the late summer of 1944, and that that was the decisive phase of the war as it actually occurred. The Russians started the period with barely parity in overall forces, and by the end of it 2/3rds of the German army has been trashed and the Russian led in fielded forces has become overwhelming. Stalingrad, Kursk, and Bagration won WW II. I know it strikes some as shocking news, but wars are often decided by battles, and this one was, by those three. And the last of them was really "nail in the coffin" or collecting the fruits of the previous successes, in terms of fielded forces remaining after them.

As for your particular myths, weather hurt the Germans in 1941 because they hadn't planned on a winter campaign, or in other words because they were arrogant and stupid. The Russians had no advantage in numbers until after the Stalingrad campaign. Where did those numbers come from?

One, because in the 1942 campaign, unlike 1941, the Russians fell back rather than remaining inside pockets, and thus lost far less men and material in the German summer offensive than they had the previous year. The defense was not as rigid, and it saved lives. Two, because the Russians were at full war economy output and drafting new men as rapidly as they could be equipped, while the German army was cruising at a force-maintenance level. This difference, which lasted until after Stalingrad and where the Russians had a head start for about the first half of 1943 too, has been discussed repeatedly already. Third, because the Germans threw in reserve after reserve to Stalingrad, wearing them out in fortress fighting, and the Russians barely matched them while building up reserves for a counter-offensive. And four, because that counteroffensive worked, breaking the German minor allies and flanking formations outside the city, and capturing all of 6th Army inside the Stalingrad pocket after attempts to break through and relieved them, failed.

The Russian numerical edge in front of Kursk did not come from the country being bigger or something. It came from significant parts of the Germany army being killed, and significant parts of the Russian army being alive, because of differences in how the two sides had handled the other guys breakthrough, the Russians the German summer one (they fell back), and the Germans the Russian's winter one (they "held at all cost" and died). And because the Germans did not bother to panic and thrown everything into high gear until their lost the Stalingrad battle. Otherwise put, you do not exactly get a numbers edge by throwing away whole army groups, or opportunities to equip new ones.

As for Russian leadership, it was mostly very professional. There was definitely a curve upward, as the senior field commanders had generally not commanded forces of the size they were asked to, ever before, in the early fighting. Doctrine evolved gradually but uniformly in the right direction in the case of the critical issue, using tanks - though they also made doctrinal mistakes about things like artillery cooperation with other arms. It was common for successful commanders of smaller units to wind up commanding the bigger ones, maing the claim of good high command but poor low command laughable on its face. I mean, they are often the same people. Chukov was a general of division at the start of the battle for Stalingrad, the part inside the city, and he had only commanded a brigade in the earlier, summer 1942 campaign. Byt the end of it he commanded a corps, and later in the war he commanded an army.

What *is* true is that the Russians employed mass tactics and echelon tactics, which had a simpicity to them. They are straightforward sometimes to the point of elegance. Occasionally to the point of stupidity. Mostly what is being criticised is simply the fact that they are following another strategy than the critic regards as the standard of excellence.

In particular, Russian doctrine was not anti-attrition. Engage the enemy more closely was a signal they would understand. An officer was not reprimanded for fighting even if he did not win; he was reprimanded for not fighting. There was a definite emphasis on placing sufficient combat power next to the German army, with additional effects from manuever desirable, but pressure essential. This was strategically sound, as the Germans were having far greater trouble dealing with and replacing losses than the Russians were, one because of the economic difference down to mid 1943, and two because of the scale of their losses afterward.

Envelopment was not avoided, as the graves of Stalingrad ought to make clear to anyone. But the Russians did indeed place great stock in mass as they conceived it. As in, if he's got a division, bring a corps; if he's got a corps, bring an army, etc. This is eminently sound, and relying on it when attacking was not at all unreasonable. It very often worked, without further ado or complexity.

The Russians did less cross-attaching than the Germans did, certainly. But they adopted new organic formation types after the lessons of operations. This was effectively an attempt to multiply the impact of one lesson learned by standardized application, rather than relying on every field officer to learn it himself.

Thus, when it was found that infantry-armor cooperation needed to be improved, the Russians did not rely on field officers to cross-attach armor battalions to infantry units. Instead, they created a new mechanized brigade structure, with a motorized infantry brigade and an organic tank battalion and artillery battalion, and then deployed a number of these as independent formations under army-level control.

It was a more centralized system. It improved the "teaching" aspect of organizations, regarding that as more essential than the "flexibility" aspect of them (adapted to local conditions and variables). For the army they had, officered by newly promoted successful field commanders of smaller formations, rather than long-service schooled staffers, it worked better. Those needed guidance about what worked at which level, but could be counted on to operate the resulting formations practically. As for "straight lines" it is a silly notion.

Lend lease has been addressed. It helped the food situation, strategic mobility, and the tranport sector of the economy (where tons of rolling stock had been captured in 1941, etc). Without its aid, the Russians could not have fielded as many riflemen because they would have needed more peasants, and could not have built as many tanks because they would have needed more locomotives and trucks. But they could have built those and grown their food. Their army just would have been smaller and not as well equipped, in armor terms especially, so soon. Since the Germans didn't increase their own production until they thought they were going to lose, it is unlikely this difference alone would have been decisive, let alone have "caused 'collapse'" (whatever that means).

Do not overlook another important aspect of this whole equation. When the Germans behaved in Russia as awfully as they did, the Russian populace quickly got a very clear sense of what was at stake, and they did not confuse it with Stalin, communism, or politics of any sort. They were to be untermenschen slaves to overlords who planned to systematically starve them to death to cleanse the world of their presence, while first sweating them enough to build the conquerors new German cities clear to the Volga. When the wolf is at your throat, you do not debate half-measures. It was to them a clear case of win or die.

As for Hilter, he certainly contributed mightily to all German defeats, which contrary to the stipulation of the rest of your myth-line, does not mean the generals were uniformly successful and brilliant. The fact that Hitler's involvement in the conduct of the war was ruinous on its own account, however, can hardly be disputed by any dispassionate reader of the histories, including the Soviet ones. By comparison, Stalin and Churchill had the sense to rely more on their professional staffs, while FDR relied on Marshall almost exclusively (so much so that he veto'd him for command of "Overlord", as indispensible in Washington).

It is not any mystery why amateur politicians are worse generals than generals are. They aren't qualified. And it is no mystery why delusional and arrogant tyrants are particularly poor military leaders whenever they are dumb enough to meddle in such things, and full enough of themselves to consider themselves good at it. They mix political and military thinking in inappropriate ways. Thus Hitler's fetish about retreating. To say nothing of all the hours he spent ordering around troops that no longer existed on maps of areas long since lost. Why anyone would want to defend his supposed military acumen is beyond me; he obviously did not have any, and that is no "myth". (On the contrary, the reverse is).

My answers to your fine questions.

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by kunstler:

I’m just waiting for a book to claim Hitler was a Soviet spy or British agent or something.

OK, here ya go:

When Hitler first joined up with the fledgling German Workers Party back in 1919, he was in the pay of Weimar Intelligence (something equivalent to what an FBI informant is today).

His early reports describe what would later become the NSDAP, as basically a bunch of beer-hall poseurs without the motivation or leadership to be a threat to anything other than a full stein of beer.

'Dolf actually quit the Party in disgust at what a bunch of loosers they were --- only to come back in '21 and provide the leadership and direction the "Nazis" had lacked...