German tanks-not good enough?

[Priest]

Jeff you had me with you until you said that Monty was an advantage to the British in Normandy. Please tell me you were joking.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Priest:

Jeff you had me with you until you said that Monty was an advantage to the British in Normandy. Please tell me you were joking.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jeff has gone uber British on us, quick, get the shock paddles. ..

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Um, that is laughable. A StuG is certainly not superior to T-34/85s etc. They may well have been used better, but as technical equipment, but gun and armor specs, they aren't even close to what the Russians had.

The Finnish army used both Stugs and captured T-34's (both /76 and /85). Both the Stugs and the T-34's were used the same way as they were in the same formation. In the opinion of the Finnish tankers the Stug was better when it came to optics and performance of the gun. The T-34 got better marks for protective armour and mobility but these were not sufficient to make them think the T-34 was better. It did them no good to be a bit safer and to be able to go places if you could not see anything and take out your opponent reliably.

Which only furthers my point - having technically superior tanks didn't make any difference, because other factors were more important.

Stug (30-50 vehicles available) vs latest Soviet armour including IS-2's and ISU-152's: 80+ kills vs 8 losses in the favour of the Stug.

T-34 (up to 10+ vehicles available, some of them were captured while the fighting was going on so the exact number of available vehicles during the campaign is hard to determine) vs T-34: 3 kills vs 0 losses

The whole point is that such differences, while often important tactically were not important operationally.

What your logic fails to take into account is the fact that these tank groc factors influenced the operations in a fundamental way because the execution of these operations were designed to utilize to the fullest (if talking about your own assets) or to overcome (if talking about the opponents assets) these factors with resources available.

That is why it would seem these factors are irrelevant when in fact they were the driving force behind the planning and execution of the operations.

As for the "but how expensive was it?" question, I have already pointed out that losses in western tank units - among the most outmatched in gun and armor terms - were 1/3rd those in infantry units. In a typical armor battalion, you see 75 KIA for the entire war. Lost vehicles from all causes generally run 1 to 2 times the initial strength. Overall loss figures run about 100% for the average western armor division, but that reflects the infantry battalions turning over 3-4 times.

Isn't that apples and oranges ?

How many infantry soldiers equal 1 tank ?

Also, are you looking at the number of total losses (write offs) reported at the end of the operation or the number of day to day combat losses and serviceable vehicles ? Over a period of 7 days the number or total losses can be 20 times the amount of write offs.

In case anybody forgot, the western Allies had a replacement crisis in riflemen, not in tanks.

So why the remarks that state that at least the US Army was running low on medium tanks at various points in the campaing ? They were losing them faster than they could bring them up from replacement depots.

Problem is, if you believe such claims the Russian fleet is dead several times over, and the Russian AFV fleet at the end of the war should have been a negative number with six digits, instead of a positive one with five. Such ratios are mostly the result of apples to oranges comparisons of known own-side total write-offs, against mere claims about the other side.

These comparisons are not apples and oranges because at the operational level it is not the number of write off's at the end of the operation that counts, it is the number of vehicles available for day-to-day operations.

Overall it was preferable to see the opponents tank brew up instead of leave it sitting there available for recovery and use the next day. But in dire situations a kill was a kill that helped you along.

Finnish AT guns used up to 20 (PAK40) or 40 (PAK38) shots to kill a tank dead.

[RMC]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

The wheel mafia engineered a flunk for it anyway by setting the weight requirement just below a stripped down cavalry Brad. They were slightly embarassed to then find that the 105mm gun version didn't make their own weight limit. They decided to go with it anyway, because standardizing on one chassis was also written in stone.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I can believe that the tests were not objective. Sometimes people know what the results are supposed to be and they fudge to get the boss what he wants.

BTW I tend to favor tracks, but no one asked me.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The logistic types are firmly in command and they have sided with the procurement dons and the friends of congressmen who will get the new vehicle orders, which they wouldn't get with Brads. They want wheels to save gas. As though every future fight will be on a wonderful road net.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is not a project being driven by the preferences of the logisticians. If anything it is the embodiment of anti-logisticianism. The guiding principle is reducing the "Log footprint." Killers dream of a world in which combat vehicles can carry a week's worth of rations and ammo, requires no fuel and produces its own water. They want logisticians off of the battlefield and out of the deployment plans. It is greatly offensive to them that 83% of current deployment requirements are support elements Signal, MP, Supply, Maintenance etc. Only 17% is combat arms.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Everyone up at the pointy end will tell you the lessons of combat are uniformly in favor of fully tracked. The LAVs are so light only a portion with have ATGMs at all, and only another portion guns. Divide the combat power by three to save 50% on the weight.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Lessons of combat are in favor of tracks, but the lessons of deployment favor wheels.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It was completely stacked. Rear echelon idiots always think the grunts are supposed to solve the rear echelon idiot's problems - in peacetime. They only wake up to the fact that instead, they exist to solve the grunts' problems, *after* they get flack for dead grunts and lost battles.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ain't no REMF tellin' a killer how to organize the army. The killers are doin' it all by themselves. I'm sure a lot of them believe that we are headed down the wrong path, but there are believers at the Armor and Infantry schools. The CSA is the man with the Vision, not the CG, Army Materiel Command or the DADCSLOG.

[M Hofbauer]

Jeff,

1) it seems the bunny is right now right in the middle of doing the intestines for GIC. You know, armor models, hit formulae, basic behavior and features and such stuff. If you want to make your voice heard you should head over to the GIC forum, *now* is the best time to ask for features and they way things are handled, and maybe have some sort of input before things are "set in stone" scriptwise (and I know that you know very well just like me how impossible it is to change any of these basic things lateron)

2) as to Al-'Alamayn: I do not oppose your statement on that battle. I wanted to point out that it seemed to me it would not meet the criteria set by JasonC in his original statement.Alöas, it seems one has to differentiate between technical superiority in a general, current level of technology - way, and concrete technical superiority in the local circumstances which could even be achieved (to take it to the extreme for illustration) by obsolete tanks when facing tanks which are even more obsolete.

In retrospect I think you are right that the issue should be actual technical superiority in the local situation, and not measured against the current state of science in the field of armor (as JasonC put it: "Who had the better tanks? The British, going by weight in the mix.").

yours sincerely,

M.Hofbauer

[M Hofbauer]

tero,

well the finnish tankers obviously never played CM and apparently didn't know that such irrelevant things as superior optics have no effect on combat effectiveness accuracy is only a function of muzzle velocity, which is why the WW II M8 Greyhounds were so famous for their 2-km kills of german tanks ...uh...or - weren't they??

[M Hofbauer]

JasonC,

just wanted to emphasize that I fully agree with your Brad-LAV statement.

I hope RMC reads this. I think he is the culprit behind all this. Maybe he will give us his view on the matter

[ooops, writing it offline I see that RMC has already responded. Little weasel he is, no doubt ]

[JasonC]

"influenced the operations in a fundamental way"

They didn't change operational outcomes. Yes, part of the reason for that is that armies have lots of ways of adapting to whatever tactical situations they face. This hardly means grog tank specs "influenced operatons in a fundamental way". What it means instead is that operations are big enough and armies flexible enough that such tactical details don't amount to a hill of beans on a scale of fronts and months.

There is a definite school of contemporary thought about armor in WW II that regards technical armor dominance as a central issue in the whole outcome of the war. And that school of thought is just plain wrong. You can see loads of that sort of talk on this board. The truth of the matter is such things mattered to tank drivers, to armor company commanders, at the outside to task force or KG commanders in some situations. But that is all. It did not matter at the level of strategy, or even of operational campaigns (a little, rarely, in the latter case).

Pretending it mattered horribly when in fact it didn't make any difference at the operational scale is just plain silly. Pretending StuGs are technically superior to IS-2s is a side splitting screamer. Pretending the imaginary technical superiority of StuGs over IS-2s makes the point instead of contradicting it, is certifiable. Exactly what that shows is that the tech specs of the vehicle don't matter much at all, because plain jane, average vanilla AFVs can be as effective as just about anything else, when other factors help.

As for how many infantry equals one tank, generally the crew is five. I am responding to a definite, common statement often made about tank specs and their importance, on this board and elsewhere. Some concede that at the operational scale, the tank specs don't matter very much. But then they allege that it sure mattered a boatload to the line tankers, because everybody in an inferior tank was as good as dead. They call them "deathtraps". They want people to believe that plain jane, vanilla AFVs (which would, incidentally, include your StuGs), because not uparmored, killed everybody who rode in them.

This is not remotely the case. It was safer by far to be a tanker, even in inferior tanks, to being an infantrymen. Now, you can't all die and have the infantry die three times as much. Three times as much as "all" makes nonsense of the pretence of "all". Tankers as such, in vanilla tanks, were far safer than most combat troops, because their armor protects them from the number one killer, HE fragments.

As for the losses I am reporting for typical western tank battalions, it is based on unit histories that record every tank lost in action, and on replacement reports on tanks drawn. As in, on March 12 we lost 1 Sherman to a faust at a roadblock. Another unit says, we drew 80 replacement and upgrade tanks from all causes over the whole war. And no, tanks did not get knocked out 20 times over.

As for the idea that the western Allies globally ran out of medium tanks for replacements, it is a silly notion. The US was adding fresh, newly formed armor formations up to the last months of the war, in addition to covering losses. Certainly a given unit could be low, because tanks had been lost and replacements had not come forward. That is a side effect of the "lumpiness" of armor losses, which as I said can be as concentrated as half the whole war's losses for a given unit, in the peak week of fighting. After such an episode that formation would not be at full strength again until after a spell out of the line to take replacements. And continuing losses would keep the formations somewhat below TOE, just from the lag. At the time of the Bulge, the average for independent US armor battalions was around 80% of TOE, while it was more like 90% in most of the armored divisions.

By comparison, what one sees on the German side (in the west, understand) is more like "use it until you lose it". They send a wave of tanks in some set of formations, and they fight themselves out. Only when reduced to small groups is the unit taken out of the line and built back up from new vehicles. Thus, 4/5 of the AFVs sent to Normandy were in the initial TOE strength of the units sent. By mid July the number of runners was halved; by Cobra halved again; after Mortain halved again. There simply isn't a regular replacement stream. As a result, the formations vary from full TOE on commitment to 1/10th of TOE after burning out, or anywhere in between. New tanks are sent east, or used to form new Panzer brigades, and later to rebuild the mobile divisions in spells off the line - especially preparation for the Bulge, which was the second big wave of armor in the west (Normandy was the first).

You missed my point about the difference between own total write offs and enemy kills claimed. The point is that the former understates battlefield KOs somewhat, and the latter overstates enemy battlefield KOs substantially - often by a factor of 2. The result is that ratios between them skew the actual, apples to apples results by a factor of 2-3 in favor of the side whose figures are used for both categories.

There are German claims as high as 5-10 kills for just about every AT weapon they fielded, AFV mounted or not. And we know there simply weren't that many Allied AFVs lost, by a huge factor. The ratio claims are thus meaningless. A more realistic accounting gives around 2 to 1, perhaps as low as 1.7:1 in the west, perhaps as high as 2.5:1 in the east. The difference between those realistic figures, consistent with known production data, and the German claims, simply reflect the known differences in the meaning of the two categories "own total losses" and "enemy field KO claims". There are a half-dozen intervening categories that make the two very different (overkill, multiple claims, false claims, repaired tanks, breakdowns, cannabilized vehicles carried as "under repair", yada yada).

Any way you slice it, Russia did not have negative 200,000 tanks remaining at the end of the war, instead of positive 30,000. And they didn't make 330,000 tanks during the war, either. So the 5-10 times kill claims for everything just don't add up. All weapons are not above average. For each type or period above the overall average, something else has to be below it. That is sort of what "average" means. And we know the averages from the production data and changes in vehicle fleet size (positive for all the allies, therefore all losses were less than production).

[RMC]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by M Hofbauer:

JasonC,

I hope RMC reads this. I think he is the culprit behind all this. Maybe he will give us his view on the matter

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, I am not the culprit. I was as surprised as else when the Chief made the announcments. Basically what he and every other killer wants is a doctrine that works like a game of CM. The battlefield contains only friendly combat units and targets. No support units in sight, no requirements for fuel, possibility for complete situational awareness (FOW off), no need to feed the men etc etc. The first thing they'd do in CM is up the ammo numbers for everything.

BTW much of this development in lighter vehicles is based on wht they call "enablers." Unmanned aerial vehicles that report enemy movements, special sensors (thermal, EMF, and even heartbeat detectors) data fed across a tactical internet so that commanders at all levels have the complete picture and can take the appropriate actions. Non LOS precision weapons that are called in like arty on known positions are supposed to be the great equalizer. They know that without this stuff the LAVs are toast. They've wargamed this all out and seen what enablers they need to do what.

[Mark IV]

I am just trying to understand the flash of insight here which sweeps all our chess pieces from the table. We got from:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Armor grog differences are a tactical factor. They are important indeed at a small enough scale. But armies have enough ways of dealing with events on a small scale (reinforcement, echelon effects giving local odds, attrition and more rapid replacement, local or operational maneuver, concentration of fire support, etc) that they simply do not amplify upward to higher echelon effects. Instead, they are strongly damped as the scale of analysis increases. By the time you are at the level of operational, month-long campaigns, tactical gun and armor effects have evaporated - lost in the noise of other factors at that level. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

...to a summary of inflated kill ratios from line units.

The argument seems to be that tactics win battles, logistics win wars, etc. We are mostly familiar with that. But opposing an enemy with groggier tanks than your own requires greater logistical superiority and local effort, doesn't it?

The Allies had that when it mattered, and yes, they won the war (the Most Telling of All Points which cannot be debated). But would they have won as handily with worse tanks? Would it have been shorter or less costly with better tanks? Surely you're not arguing that armor quality doesn't matter, but that costly imbalances on the local level can be dealt with on the operational level, provided the resources are there?

If the guy with tactical superiority also had logistical superiority, his win would be far less costly. This is difficult to replicate, but Desert Storm does seem to fit the bill. If the guy with better tanks is at a logistical break-even, he's going to win. '67 and '73 Arab-Israeli Wars seem to bear that out.

If OPFOR has better tanks, I will need more tanks and other stuff to defeat him than if OPFOR does not have better tanks. Many of your examples are of numerically imbalanced situations, and you simply extend the validity window until the Germans lose the war, the final judgement. But what if the breakout from Normany had been with Allied Panthers and the Germans had been defending with short 75 Shermans? Would surrender have been in May '45? Would Allied losses be the same? How many unsheltered infantry were parked under German HE for how much extra time, because of tank inferiority fears?

Aren't better tanks, well, better? If the argument is that the Germans were doomed to lose by the sheer industrial logistics of the thing, no argument. But in CM terms tank quality certainly makes a difference, and the guy with lesser tanks certainly has to adapt his tactics to accommodate the difference. He should have higher losses, especially if he wins an attack. WWII was not composed of day-in, day-out CM level engagements, and some of your operational examples beg further analysis.

The US and USSR were REQUIRED to make up the early shortfalls in technology with numbers. The fact is that they could. Had it been closer, battlefield technical superiority might have made the difference, as wars don't occur in vacuums. Had the whole affair become too costly, the US might have said "not our war, anyway" and gone home to shore up the beaches. That was Hitler's pipe dream, anyway.

Perhaps you are arguing that tanks don't matter in the long run, as bombing/nuking/LRRPing/EWing/nonlethaling, etc., make the real difference. Maybe so, but I don't get it in the context of WWII CMBO. We had the logistics to get more metal across the Atlantic, but we needed to in order to make up the inequity on the actual battlefields. Overkill tank numbers at the end were the result of unchecked production running into the usual statistics of a disintegrating enemy in retreat with already-inferior home production methods in a shambles.

Better tanks are more better. I am a little puzzled about your point, here.

[Simon Fox]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>JasonC wrote:

El Alamein

Who had the better tanks? The British, going by weight in the mix. The best tank on the field was certainly the Pz IV long, but only a few were present. The second best was the Sherman. The Brits had more Shermans, and they had more tanks overall - by about 2 to 1. Their force was certainly not all Shermans. The main factor that led to British victory, though, was simply superior numbers.

....etc<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> What have tanks or their relative quality got to do with El Alamein or it's outcome?

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

What have tanks or their relative quality got to do with El Alamein or it's outcome?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's his point.

[Tero]

Originally posted by M Hofbauer:

well the finnish tankers obviously never played CM and apparently didn't know that such irrelevant things as superior optics have no effect on combat effectiveness

They were blizzfully unaware of these irrefutable facts. Or that eventhough the Stug gun traverse gearing was more precise compared to the T-34 gearing it had asbolutely no bearing on the accuracy.

accuracy is only a function of muzzle velocity, which is why the WW II M8 Greyhounds were so famous for their 2-km kills of german tanks ...uh...or - weren't they??

I wait with great anticipation CMBB to see the Finnish T-26's with their 45mm guns work wonders in 1944 against T-34's, IS-2's and ISU-152's.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

What have tanks or their relative quality got to do with El Alamein or it's outcome?

Did Monty or did he not take into account the quality and quantity of the German armour when he was designing his side of the battle ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

They didn't change operational outcomes.

Indirectly they did. Had the technical specs been ignored the design and preparations had been different.

This hardly means grog tank specs "influenced operatons in a fundamental way". What it means instead is that operations are big enough and armies flexible enough that such tactical details don't amount to a hill of beans on a scale of fronts and months.

This is the kind of thinking that has led to numerous spectacular operational failures in military history. Belittleling tactical minutae in the face of greater issues has been the downfall of many a general. From WWII such operations as the initial stages of the Winter War, Allied landings in Norway, several operations around Kharkov, Stalingrad, Monte Cassino, the failed Allied operations in Normandy spring to mind.

It did not matter at the level of strategy, or even of operational campaigns (a little, rarely, in the latter case).

Were the startegies and operational level procedures drawn up to match the capabilities of the assets or were the assets built to match the strategies and operatiobal level procedures ?

Pretending it mattered horribly when in fact it didn't make any difference at the operational scale is just plain silly.

Pretending it did NOT matter eventhoug it was one of the corner stones the operations were designed on is just plain silly as well.

Pretending StuGs are technically superior to IS-2s is a side splitting screamer. Pretending the imaginary technical superiority of StuGs over IS-2s makes the point instead of contradicting it, is certifiable.

Care to ellaborate your criteria for determining technical superiority ?

Sure, the IS-2 had thicker armour. That is not all important, as you yourself have pointed out vehemently.

It carried only 28 rounds for the main gun (the IS-2 had multi-part loading shots which slowed reloading which translates into a low rate of fire) while the Stug carried 54 rounds for the main gun. Crew comfort in the IS-2 was non-exsitent. The optics and general visibilty was better from a buttoned up Stug.

The IS-2 was designed as a heavy breakthrough tank with great HE capacity gun. Its main target was infantry. The Stug was designed as an assault gun while it was later used also as a tank hunter.

Which was technically superior ? How does this apple taste compared to that grape fruit ?

Bottom line: the IS-2 was more than capable of taking out a Stug if it saw it and managed to get a fix on it for long enough to reload in case the first round missed. At the same time the Stug was capable of taking out an IS-2.

Exactly what that shows is that the tech specs of the vehicle don't matter much at all, because plain jane, average vanilla AFVs can be as effective as just about anything else, when other factors help.

Why, oh why then the race to build better and better tanks ? Why not churn out huge quantities of the M3 Lees and Crusaders and other adequate plain vanilla AFV's ? Or is that different sort of vanilla ? Plain vanilla is NOT plain vanilla ?

As for how many infantry equals one tank, generally the crew is five.

OK. How many tank crew members psyched out compared to infanry troops ? How did they show in the casualty figures determined by KIA, WIA and MIA ?

They call them "deathtraps".

I believe they are citing men who actually rode them. Early Shermans were dubbed Ronsons but few people remember that one of the contributing factors was that there was only one hatch in the turret for the 3 men to exit. Also the hatches for the driver and the co-driver were tight.

They want people to believe that plain jane, vanilla AFVs (which would, incidentally, include your StuGs), because not uparmored, killed everybody who rode in them.

I think that is not exactly true. They want people to believe because the opposing plain jane, vanilla AFV's did not remain plain jane vanilla.

This is not remotely the case. It was safer by far to be a tanker, even in inferior tanks, to being an infantrymen. Now, you can't all die and have the infantry die three times as much. Three times as much as "all" makes nonsense of the pretence of "all". Tankers as such, in vanilla tanks, were far safer than most combat troops, because their armor protects them from the number one killer, HE fragments.

That is true.

I do think you are overemphazising the "all" bit though. It does not necessarily refer to the men. A unit might go through numerous times the entire complement of its fleet because all the AFV's were KO'd and repaired, written off, cannibalized etc.

One must also consider the fact that being cooped up in a noisy iron coffing with near 0 visibility while anticipating the wall to cave in any second was not everybodys favourite past time. I have read many accounts which recount the number of times the crews had to bail out after being hit. None of them state any degree of joy when they received a new mount.

As for the losses I am reporting for typical western tank battalions, it is based on unit histories that record every tank lost in action, and on replacement reports on tanks drawn. As in, on March 12 we lost 1 Sherman to a faust at a roadblock. Another unit says, we drew 80 replacement and upgrade tanks from all causes over the whole war.

However these accounts were not what was sent to and ended up in the overall statistics.

And no, tanks did not get knocked out 20 times over.

That wasas in 1 written off, 20 separate vehicles damaged but repaired over a period of time. A single vehicle could be KO'd several times before being written off.

As for the idea that the western Allies globally ran out of medium tanks for replacements, it is a silly notion.

Running out of replacements is not the same as running low on serviceable vehicles.

In an operation it is the units on the spot and how many serviceable AFV's they have available for next days operation is what counts.

The US was adding fresh, newly formed armor formations up to the last months of the war, in addition to covering losses.

Makes one wonder where they needed all those armoured formations if they were not operationally important and they did not play a significant role in the operational level....

After such an episode that formation would not be at full strength again until after a spell out of the line to take replacements. And continuing losses would keep the formations somewhat below TOE, just from the lag. At the time of the Bulge, the average for independent US armor battalions was around 80% of TOE, while it was more like 90% in most of the armored divisions.

For example the 1st Army had

16-22 Jul 1944 1 102 operational M4's

23-29 Jul 1944 748 operational M4's

For the 16-22 Jul 1944 period they reported 33 losses while there is 354 missing from the next periods operational list. I do not know how many armoured units were transferred out of the 1st Army during that period nor do I know any specific units reports from this period. Given these provisos I'd still say there was a lot of recovery activity going on.

By comparison, what one sees on the German side (in the west, understand)....

Concur. The units transfered from the Eastern front left their vehicles behind so they were in a way better off for a short time in terms of replacements eventhough they did not receive new formations.

You missed my point about the difference between own total write offs and enemy kills claimed. The point is that the former understates battlefield KOs somewhat, and the latter overstates enemy battlefield KOs substantially - often by a factor of 2.

Not necessarily. The enemy kill figures are almost always higher than the number of actual write offs. But the friendly figures for losses may not even list such things as mobility kills which had rendered the AFV inoperable when the crew bailed out.

From

http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/FINatTactics.htm

at the bottom of the page you can see that while over the period of 105 days the total Red Army AFV combat losses during Winter War in the Karelian Isthmus were 1 904 vehicles only 368 were write offs.

Contemporary Finnish estimate/claim was 1 200 KO'd Red Army tanks.

The result is that ratios between them skew the actual, apples to apples results by a factor of 2-3 in favor of the side whose figures are used for both categories.

This is why I am fascinated to see actual archival figures for western Allied AFV combat losses. German losses down to the last bicycle are listed but the Allied losses are scattered and never compiled to a list that would be comparable in terms of timeframe.

Any way you slice it, Russia did not have negative 200,000 tanks remaining at the end of the war, instead of positive 30,000. And they didn't make 330,000 tanks during the war, either. So the 5-10 times kill claims for everything just don't add up.

Well, Whitman was credited with 141 kills. That would make him worth 28,5 AT assets which they could afford to lose without killing a single vehicle while still maintaining the average of 5.

Seriously, while I do agree 5 for EVERY asset seems a bit much I must point out that from the überFinnish experiences against the Red Army I would have to say that the recovery of damaged vehicles was very effective and it did at least sustain the summer of 1944 offensive against us. Unless it was not a write off it was liable to come back to haunt you the next day. The Finnish claims for KO's AFV's ranges from 600 to 900 while the Soviets admitted to 294 (according to Glantz). If this 294 is the number of write off then the Finnish figure of 600 (or even 900) is not unreasonable if the ratio of write offs vs KO'd but recovered is 1:3

All weapons are not above average. For each type or period above the overall average, something else has to be below it. That is sort of what "average" means. And we know the averages from the production data and changes in vehicle fleet size (positive for all the allies, therefore all losses were less than production).

You mean all TOTAL (as in write offs) losses were less than production. Combat loss is not the same as a write off !

[ 09-28-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[tss]

tero wrote:

The Finnish army used both Stugs and captured T-34's (both /76 and /85). Both the Stugs and the T-34's were used the same way as they were in the same formation.

Umm. No. At least that part of being in the same formation. Stugs were in rynnäkkötykkipataljoona (Assault Gun Batallion) and T-34s were in panssaripataljoonas (Armored Batallions). Both assault gun and armored batallions belonged to the Panssaridivisioona (Armored Division).

There was also difference in crew backgrounds. Many Stug crews had originally been artillerymen who were transferred to assault guns when the batallion was formed in 1943.

Stug (30-50 vehicles available) vs latest Soviet armour including IS-2's and ISU-152's: 80+ kills vs 8 losses in the favour of the Stug.

The figure usually given is either 87:8 or 89:8 (I can't remember whether that 87 include those two Soviet tanks that went uncredited during war). However, that is comparing apples to oranges: the Finnish figure includes only total losses, not damaged vehicles. It is not know how many of the 87 KO Soviet vehicles could be later repaired.

In theory, a tank kill was only a tank kill if it burned, but in practice non-burning KOs were often also counted. Though, this depended on the military branch. Persons assessing kills by infantry and AT guns were usually more strict, and those assessing kills by tanks or assault guns more lenient.

For some time I've been planning to go through my sources to compile a list of total Finnish Stug losses, including mission-kills, but I haven't had time to do it, yet.

- Tommi

[tss]

See http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=014526 for an analysis of Finnish Stugs in one particular battle.

- Tommi

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jason Said: "influenced the operations in a fundamental way"<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh I’m sorry. I guess I missed all the provisos you attached to your original contention. My bad

[Roksovkiy]

Jason C about those average tank v tank ratios that your say is around 2.5:1.

You seem to completely ignore the actual German tank losses DUE to enemy tank fire only, which is low at around 16,000.

For the total of the war around 49,000 German tanks and spg were built.

Soviets are credited with 12,500 German tank kills and allies 3,500 tanks according to the German loss records. These losses are the result tank losses to enemy tanks ONLY.

The rest of the 33,000 tanks and SPG Germany made are credited as being lost due to artillery, infantry, breakdown, abandoned from air attack, anti tank guns and other enemy action. None of these 33,000 tanks are cited as being lost to enemy tank action, In any form at all.

Soviet loss records credit just over 40,000 tanks out of 100,000+ that were made as being destroyed due to German tank fire, all other losses of tanks recorded by enemy artillery, infantry, ATG etc.

German tanks kill ratios were an average of 4:1 for the war against Russia in tanks v tank combat. The numbers do add up, you seems to just take all causes of losses and use production figures which is correct for all causes but not tank v tank kill ratios.

[Tero]

Originally posted by tss:

Umm. No. At least that part of being in the same formation.

But you do agree that the Stugs were being used as regular gun tanks. They were even detailed to spearhead the counter attacks. As to not being in the same formation: true. But they did take part in actions side by side.

There was also difference in crew backgrounds. Many Stug crews had originally been artillerymen who were transferred to assault guns when the batallion was formed in 1943.

Yes. They started out with the BT-42's.

The figure usually given is either 87:8 or 89:8 (I can't remember whether that 87 include those two Soviet tanks that went uncredited during war).

I know. But 80+ seems better to a casual reader. It also translates to 10-1 kill ratio better than 89-8.

However, that is comparing apples to oranges: the Finnish figure includes only total losses, not damaged vehicles. It is not know how many of the 87 KO Soviet vehicles could be later repaired.

It is not apples and oranges. It is smack in the middle of this furball. Were these 87 KO'd tanks out of the loop for long enough to matter and influence the outcome at the operational level ? Wether they were write offs or not does not pertain to this particular debate as such. The kill-loss ratio of Finnish Stugs does pertain to this debate. Can the (Finnish) Stugs be considered technically superior to T-34's, IS-2's and ISU-152's ? How much do tactics and doctrine affect the equation ? What about the contribution of other battlefield assets ? How much did the Stug specs affect the tactics and doctrine at operational level ?

The Finnish kill claims for that summer range from 600 to 900. I have even seen figures that state it was over 1000. Counter claims point out that the Red Army did not have those kinds of numbers deployed. Soviet sources (according to Glantz) admit to 294 AFV lost. If these 294 are write offs then the Finnish worst estimate gives 2:1 rate for claim/loss, the best estimate 3:1 rate for claim/loss. We (Finns) know for a fact the Red Army recovered repaired and sent forth tanks KO's once or more. We also know that after stand off infantry AT weapons became available the Red Army tactics changed. They no longer lead the attacks with the tanks, the tanks stayed behind giving fire support while the infantry attacked. It has been postulated that at that point the Red Army armoured units were starting to run low on vehicles.

In theory, a tank kill was only a tank kill if it burned, but in practice non-burning KOs were often also counted. Though, this depended on the military branch. Persons assessing kills by infantry and AT guns were usually more strict, and those assessing kills by tanks or assault guns more lenient.

Moreover, as counter attacks were common any enemy vehicles left sitting in or behind the positions was counted as a kill. IIRC 9 T-34/85's were captured during the summer and those that could not be recovered were blown up if at all possible.

For some time I've been planning to go through my sources to compile a list of total Finnish Stug losses, including mission-kills, but I haven't had time to do it, yet.

There is a comprehensive list of the write offs in Laguksen Rynnäkkötykit. As for other combat losses I have to look it up. I know there was a number of firing pin and other mechanical failures but the number of actual combat losses was not readily apparent.

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Well, Whitman was credited with 141 kills. That would make him worth 28,5 AT assets which they could afford to lose without killing a single vehicle while still maintaining the average of 5.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not true. Whitman bailed out of several tanks and also lost some crew man. Thus his kill ratio was NOT 141:1.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by killmore:

Not true. Whitman bailed out of several tanks and also lost some crew man. Thus his kill ratio was NOT 141:1.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Please read more carefully.

I do not even begin to maintain he had a 141:1 kill ratio. The number of kills attributed to him correspond the kills of ~28 AT assets if going with the German claim that each and every AT asset in the German arsenal killed 5 tanks.

I do not recall off hand the number of armour kills attributed to Rudel, 300 ? If it was he would have corresponded 60 AT assets.

This is the wonderful world of averages.

[ 09-29-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[tss]

tero wrote:

But you do agree that the Stugs were being used as regular gun tanks.

Basically, yes.

But they did take part in actions side by side.

Few times. Most notable was the counter attack from Portinhoikka to Leitimojärvi, on evening 25.6.1944.

89-8.

I checked my sources again and it turned out that 87 was the correct number for credited kills. However, there were probably 3-4 more that went uncredited.

Were these 87 KO'd tanks out of the loop for long enough to matter and influence the outcome at the operational level ?

I don't know. My sources don't mention that. However, by that criterion Finnish Stug losses were (at least) 9 vehicles, since Ps. 531-7 was so badly damaged at Kuuterselkä that it spent rest of the war in repairs. (Note that the gunner of -7, Lauri Leppänen, lists it among Kuuterselkä losses along with the 5 vehicles that couldn't be recovered).

Wether they were write offs or not does not pertain to this particular debate as such. The kill-loss ratio of Finnish Stugs does pertain to this debate.

Yesterday I started to go through my both sources on Finnish Sturms (Käkelä's "Marskin rynnäkkötykit", Leppänen's "Rynnäkkötykit isänmaan puolustajina") trying to find the number of Stugs that were knocked out but later evacuated so that they are not listed among the 8 losses. This far I've found only the above-mentioned number 7, though it is possible that one or two Stugs of 3.K at Kuuterselkä were also removed from combat. This is difficult to say since neither of my sources mentions, for example, the number of kers. Rastas's Sturm that was damaged by an AT gun. [i've gone through battles of Kuuterselkä (14-15.6.), Pertjärvi (16.6), Rokkalanjoki (18-19.6), Viipuri (21.6.), and the first battle of Portinhoikka (25.6.)]

Can the (Finnish) Stugs be considered technically superior to T-34's, IS-2's and ISU-152's ?

That comes back to difficulties comparing armored vehicles. Certainly, IS-2 and ISU-152 had better armor and gun, but Sturms knocked out several of them without losing own vehicles. One IS-2 was knocked out from front when the gunner hit an open driver's hatch (at range ~20m, IIRC), the others probably by side hits. Also, Stugs had problems on knocking out ISU-152s from front. For example, vänr. Jauhiainen's vehicle (Ps.531-2, gunner Anttila) hit an ISU once or twice with no effect. The ISU was then immobilized by a track hit (Ps.531-4, Nertamo, Piiroinen) and ~10 hours later finished by a side shot (Ps.531-25, Halonen, Vuorela). The credit went to Piiroinen.

How much do tactics and doctrine affect the equation ?

A lot, but in a way that is difficut to quantify.

What about the contribution of other battlefield assets ?

A lot, certainly.

We also know that after stand off infantry AT weapons became available the Red Army tactics changed.

As witnessed by first battles of Ihantala on late June. Soviets lost ~50 tanks to Panzershrecks on first two days, and afterwards they kept far away from infantry positions.

There is a comprehensive list of the write offs in Laguksen Rynnäkkötykit

Yes, but unfortunately it doesn't list all vehicles that participated in battles (though it lists most of them). There's also some confusion about battle damages. For example, Ps. 531-19 (Sartio and Haapamäki (?), Lagus) is reported as having been damaged by a hand grenade at Rokkalanjoki (commander's periscope was blown off), while Lagus's account in Leppänen's book mentions it happened at Portinhoikka.

- Tommi

[Ari Maenpaa]

Tommi,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Yesterday I started to go through my both sources on Finnish Sturms (Käkelä's "Marskin rynnäkkötykit", Leppänen's "Rynnäkkötykit isänmaan puolustajina")<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have already provided this link in some other thread, but you may want to check Andreas Lärka's summary about the Finnish Sturms in

The Sturmgeschütz in Finnish Service

After I left a note in the guest book, Andreas emailed me and it turned out that we are in fact colleagues in the same corporation Anyway he also wanted to point out that there might be slight inaccuracies on his page. That's because new information has surfaced since the last update.

Also I called to Lauri Leppänen to order his book and it turned out that a second edition of 'Rynnäkkötykit Isänmaan Puolustajina' is coming out soon. There were certain inaccuracies in the original which have now been corrected.

By no means should the new information has a major impact on the facts currently presented on these sources.

Ari

[tabpub]

All that I get from this is that I will REFUSE to play as a Soviet vs Finn in CMBB :eek: My ego couldn't stand it.