The Platoon -- A Maneuverist Perspective

[Henri]

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

But once again its all about scale. "Maneuver theory" doesnt apply to the rifle company or the rifle battalion, and I know you guys are going to insist you're not arguing that it does. The only reply I can make to that is to stop using platoons and companies in your examples.

As far as Capt.'s game, I'd love to partake, provided the playing field is even, etc, etc. How do I find out what the hell you guys are talking about? I cant find a reference to his post, unless you're talking about the brigade game he wants to run.

He announced his request for volunteers at a number of places on this forum. Just send the Capt. an email and say that you want to fight against the maneuverists and he will be very happy to take you and even to put you in command if you accept.

The argument that maneuver warfare does not apply to platoons and companies comes up often on this forum. In fact the very first section of chapter 3 of Lind's book dealikng with specifics begins with the role of the SQUAD, not the platoon or company, but the SQUAD, which he deems the most critical component for maneuver warfare.And as I have pointed out nuymerous times, all of the exercises at the end of Lind's book deal with decisions that must be made by a Company commander.

I agree somewhat with those who say that maneuver warfare has limited application in the game of Combat Mission, but this is not due to the non-applicability of maneuver theory to the scale of the units involved, but rather to the nature of the game (flag-oriented objectives, time-limited battles, single-person control, small maps, lack of mission-oriented orders, etc). Some scenarios allow more application of maneuver theory than others.

Henri

[Spook]

IIRC, Henri, two USMC divisions (the 1st & 2nd) were deployed next to each other along the Saudi/Kuwaiti border, and deployed so that their "axis of advance" was right towards Kuwait City. (I think they were the first ones to enter too.) The marines were further reinforced by the lone brigade of the US Army's 2nd Armored Division sent to the Mideast. All of this was a much larger force overall than the one or two marine expeditionary brigades (MEB's) used for the amphibious diversion.

[CavScout]

The argument that maneuver warfare does not apply to platoons and companies comes up often on this forum. In fact the very first section of chapter 3 of Lind's book dealikng with specifics begins with the role of the SQUAD, not the platoon or company, but the SQUAD, which he deems the most critical component for maneuver warfare.And as I have pointed out nuymerous times, all of the exercises at the end of Lind's book deal with decisions that must be made by a Company commander.

Sounds like maneuverists are trying to co-op the basic tenants of "fire an maneuver" as their own.

Before you know it, the simple act of deploying to the battlefield will be considered maneuver!

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Sounds like maneuverists are trying to co-op the basic tenants of "fire an maneuver" as their own.

Before you know it, the simple act of deploying to the battlefield will be considered maneuver!

Have you read Lind's book?

[Guest Pillar]

ScoutPL: "Maneuver theory" doesnt apply to the rifle company or the rifle battalion, and I know you guys are going to insist you're not arguing that it does. The only reply I can make to that is to stop using platoons and companies in your examples.

I doubt if Lind has anything significantly different to say about maneuver then Leonhard, and I know he was a major influence on the development of Marine Corps doctrine. So unless I'm wrong about that, please forgive me if I don't run out and purchase his book.

As Henri pointed out, Lind deals almost entirely with company level maneuver warfare. He even goes so far as to provide a few exercises and explanations for why and how a "manuever" solution would work.

I *highly* recommend you take a look at it if you can muster up the time. Even if you disagree with him, at least we'll all have some common ground to debate about.

For example, we could debate one of his exercises and solutions. Something a little more concrete than all this philosophic talk eh?

I might be inclined to reproduce one of his exercises and post it here if the interest is high.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-20-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

IOW - if Henri wants to continue making a credible argument, it may be a good idea for him to address Bullethead's points, particularly the one about the USMC doctrine.

Quick one: What does IOW stand for?

[Bullethead]

Henri said in misguided smugness:

Well my arrogant friend, you had better read the warfighting manual of your beloved USMC again again. Here are just a few quotes from the Marine Corps Warfighting Manual MCDP-1 that contradicts everything you wrote.

Not arrogance, just fact. I've done it, you haven't. You go look at the pointy end of bullets for a while with other men under your command. Then try out your pet theories and see how well you do. If you survive that, I'll take you seriously

Anyway, on to once again trying to show you how you are missing the forest for the trees, even using the very quotes you mistakenly think support your position:

MANEUVER WARFARE The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver...

...in order to achieve a more advantageous position from which to kill the enemy, without doing which none of the desired effects happen. See below.

...Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope...

No screamin' eagle guano, Henri. You move your stuff around so you have superiority where you want it, then kick ass. Then do it again. This is "shattering" the enemy, making things go south for him faster than he can deal with.

...Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-consuming...

Very true, it's way better to kill a lot of enemy at once than it is to nickel-and-dime him. By killing a lot of people quickly, espeically if you can do this in several parts of the battlefield simultaneously, you make things appear to the enemy as worse than they really are. Plus you don't give him time to repair control systems, rally wavering troops, and bring up reinforcements. But note that this all involves killing the enemy.

Please explain how you "tear apart" the enemy position without serious combat. Don't bother--you can't. All the above is saying is that it's preferable to avoid walking into the enemy's prepared killzones and instead flank him or something. Then bring your assets to bear with superior force on the critical points. You don't have to destroy an enemy division in its entirity, but if you destroy the right parts of it quick enough, the rest falls apart. IOW, this is using maneuver to facilitate favorable attrition, which is what I've been saying all along.

...Nonetheless, the aim of such attrition is not merely to reduce incrementally the enemy’s physical strength. Rather, it is to contribute to the enemy’s systemic disruption. The greatest effect of firepower is generally not physical destruction— the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly— but the disruption it causes...

Just to make sure you at least understand the basics here, we're talking about firepower here, not moving units around. With me so far? OK then, here we go. Firepower is employed by shooting at the enemy. Shooting at the enemy means engaging in combat. Engaging in combat means killing enemy personnel and equipment and breaking everything else that's important to him, such as C^3I systems.

Obviously, you don't understand what disruption means when its applied by firepower. It means pinning enemy units down so they can't move, eliminating their assets (through death, destruction, or bullet-induced panic) so they can't deal with this situation themselves, and imposing an inability to communicate both within and without the unit, so that the unit itself and its higher command lose control of the situation. Just moving doesn't do this. It takes firepower, as all these quotes you posted demonstrate.

True, the majority of bullets and shells fired in combat miss. Hence, you have to mass fires on targets to get the desired "shattering" effect as opposed to "incremental attrition". Guess how you mass fire? Right! It's maneuver! Give Henri a gold star. But now don't you see how maneuver is just used to make combat more effective?

...If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function....

See above for the disruptive effects caused by firepower. Which is applied in combat. Which is arranged by maneuver.

...In combat this includes violence and shock effect, again not so much as a source of physical attrition, but as a source of disruption...

"Violence" and "shock effect" seem more fitting as descriptions of combat than of maneuver, wouldn't you say? Or maybe that's just me. In any case, see above description of the disruptive effects of firepower.

...In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer numerous courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose...

This is just common sense and has nothing to do with what "school" you belong to, or even the existence of such schools. If you want to survive, you have to be unpredictable. Being unpredictable means working from general principles instead of specific methods. You know the general principles of war, don't you? Mass, speed, momentum, etc., all basically saying "get there first with the most and then kick ass".

There is a lot more, but this should be enough to shatter your claim of what USMC official doctrine is.It is interesting to note that MCDP-1 is taken almost literally from Lind's book on Maneuver Warfare.

All the above does is show you have missed the whole point. It's like I've been saying all along--maneuver is simply an adjunct of attrition used to make combat go in your favor by allowing you to mass your firepower at the critical points while avoiding enemy firepower concentrations as much as possible. None of the "shattering" of enemy forces is possible without throwing considerable amounts of lead at them, but the ability to throw these amounts and living to fight another day is dependent on how well you maneuver. They go together; there is no separating attrition from maneuver if you want to have any real effect on the enemy.

"Maneuver warfare" is just a name for the most recent codification of what armies have been doing since Napolean's day--using maneuver to achieve decisive battle results. It is not some new, post-WW2 way of making war. It's just the same theory but written for forces equipped along modern lines. Nothing about it de-emphasizes killing the enemy--on the contrary, the whole point is to achieve a better position from which to kill the enemy.

As for your courageous fighting in the Gulf War, bravo! My understanding is that the main role of the Marines was to participate in a fake invasion sitting on ships

Nope, we only had 1 regiment out on the boats. We had 2 reinforced divisions do a frontal assault through all the mines, wire, bunkers, flame ditches, etc., then exploit up to Kuwait City from the south to be the anvil. The army was the hammer, swinging around more or less freely through southern Iraq and back south into northern Kuwait. We smashed the enemy between us along the Highway of Death.

Strange, huh? The Corps is your "maneuver school" star pupil but our most recent war involved a major frontal assault straight into prepared positions. Which is pretty much what we always end up doing, with beach landings and such.

So anyway, not only can you not comprehend military science books, you can't comprehend history books either.

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[CavScout]

Well said BulletHead.

[Bullethead]

CavScout said:

Sounds like maneuverists are trying to co-op the basic tenants of "fire an maneuver" as their own. Before you know it, the simple act of deploying to the battlefield will be considered maneuver!

Exactly. The "maneuverists" are taking all this theory out of context, misunderstaning it and thinking it's something it's not, and then misapplying it. Then telling those of us who've lived, breathed, and used "manuever warfare" all our professional lives, some of us even in real combat, that we've got it all wrong. It's really humorous

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[This message has been edited by Bullethead (edited 02-20-2001).]

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

Exactly. The "maneuverists" are taking all this theory out of context, misunderstaning it and thinking it's something it's not, and then misapplying it. Then telling those of us who've lived, breathed, and used "manuever warfare" all our professional lives, some of us even in real combat, that we've got it all wrong. It's really humorous

Another thing "maneuverists" are good at is picking "historical" examples as "proof" of the 'maneuver theory' yet anyone examining these examples will not find 'maneuver theory' discussed in contemporary works of that time. Nothing like saying, "they were great maneuverists even if they didn't know it."

Cav

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"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

Founder of the CMers who like playing the Allies Club

[Guest Pillar]

Why don't you all stop with the name calling. For once there's a thread where ScoutPL and I are being the most civil.

Now, to the facts.

Bullethead Said: "Maneuver warfare" is just a name for the most recent codification of what armies have been doing since Napolean's day--using maneuver to achieve decisive battle results. It is not some new, post-WW2 way of making war. It's just the same theory but written for forces equipped along modern lines. Nothing about it de-emphasizes killing the enemy--on the contrary, the whole point is to achieve a better position from which to kill the enemy.

It sounds to me like Bullethead has a VERY good idea of what Maneuver warfare is. I don't think that's the problem.

I think the problem is that nobody seems to understand what "Attrition" really is. Is it simply "fighting", or is it more than that?

It seems to me the root of all this disagreement lies in "attrition". When BH says "Manuever in order to conduct Attrition" I think he's really meaning "Manuever in order to conduct fighting". Am I correct BH?

We need to focus on defining "attrition" better here. I offered some descriptions earlier in this thread on my own take.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-20-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

The "maneuverists" are taking all this theory out of context, misunderstaning it and thinking it's something it's not, and then misapplying it.

I haven't seen any evidence of that. Could you elaborate? I assume you have the works of the prominent "Maneuver theorists" at hand for references.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Pillar:

I think the problem is that nobody seems to understand what "Attrition" really is. Is it simply "fighting", or is it more than that?

I don't know what the official definition of 'attrition' is, but I think of it as "reduction of enemy forces by whatever means, usually by fire."

I am tending to agree with those who say that maneuver and attrition are inseperable in practice. I get the feeling that the Maneuverists are seeking a way to win that involves the least amount of destruction, which I personally feel is a laudible goal. But I wonder if sometimes in their more elysian moments they aren't promising us pie in the sky.

As far as the practical applications of the doctrine go, I think Bullethead has it nearly right. If those who are arguing with him can demonstrate how he is wrong, I'd like to hear it.

Oh, by the way, I'd guess the doctrine goes back at least to Alexander the Great and the refused flank. It's modern reincarnation was the infiltration doctrine of the German Stosstruppen of WW I.

Michael

[JoePrivate]

Originally posted by Pillar:

It sounds to me like Bullethead has a VERY good idea of what Maneuver warfare is. I don't think that's the problem.

I think the problem is that nobody seems to understand what "Attrition" really is. Is it simply "fighting", or is it more than that?

It seems to me the root of all this disagreement lies in "attrition". When BH says "Manuever in order to conduct Attrition" I think he's really meaning "Manuever in order to conduct fighting". Am I correct BH?

We need to focus on defining "attrition" better here. I offered some descriptions earlier in this thread on my own take.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-20-2001).]

I don't know Pillar, BH asked a question of you awhile back that went unanswered and may help clarify things.

BH wrote:

I see what you're saying, but it doesn't make any sense. I can't think of anybody except U.S. Grant and von Falkenhayn who deliberately set out to conduct attrition as an end unto itself, as the underlying philosophy of their campaigns. IOW, there doesn't seem to be a "school of attrition" against which a "school of maneuver" can be set up. So it seems to me that L&L misconstrued military history and science, invented a problem that doesn't really exist, and then provided a bogus "solution" to the equally bogus problem. Kinda like Hillary and health care.

OK, let's talk history. Napolean is widely credited with breaking the mold of "positional warfare" by targeting the enemy's main army instead of a spot of ground. He therefore conducted huge, daring maneuvers to bring about decisive battles in which he could inflict horrible attrition on the enemy while keeping his own force intact as much as possible in order to exploit battlefield success later. This is maneuver used to enhance battle. According to Henri, this makes Napolean an "attritionist". So is he or is he not an "attritionist" by your definition?

OTOH, there is von Falkenhayn, who caused Verdun to happen with attrition as the express intent of the campaign, rather than taking Verdun itself. He wanted to bleed France to death, figuring he could win in the end because there were more Germans than Frenchmen. His goal was either to cause France to surrender once a certain number of casualties had been inflicted, or to weaken them enough that breakthrough maneuver could be be achieved. This is battle used to enhance maneuver, which by Henri's definition makes von Falkenhayn a "maneuverist" despite his express intentions of attrition. So to which school does von Falkenhayn belong according to you?

As an aside, what do you think of von Falkenhayn's plan? Given the military realties of the time (continuous front with no flanks to turn, inability of frontal assaults to achieve breakthrough), can you think of a more logical goal for an offensive?

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

As far as the practical applications of the doctrine go, I think Bullethead has it nearly right. If those who are arguing with him can demonstrate how he is wrong, I'd like to hear it.

Ditto - so far it is Common Sense 1 : Maneuverists 0

Pillar - IOW = in other words.

If someone started BH's most interesting questions instead of e.g lecturing him on the USMC doctrine using false examples from the Gulf War, I think this discussion would be greatly advanced.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Guest Pillar]

I don't know Pillar, BH asked a question of you awhile back that went unanswered and may help clarify things.

Ah thanks for pointing that out. Looking back through the thread I see I didn't address my reply to him personally, so it probably got missed. My appologies. I'll reprint it:

Before I continue on any "Maneuver vs..." discussion I'd like to have an opportunity to finish reading "Manuever Warfare: An Anthology" edited by Richard D. Hooker Jr.

It has some arguments from both sides and I'd like a chance to weigh this on my own some more. Is this ok with everyone?

Would you be interested in returning afterward?

IOW (thanks germanboy ), I don't have enough background yet to give you a really solid answer that will help this discussion. I mean, I could try to bullsh*t bullethead and make this a "debate" rather than a "discussion", but I don't think that's what anyone is here for (maybe some).

Maybe Bullethead himself can answer his own question (presenting his own views) or someone else could tackle it.

But in any case, I think answering that post of his is definitely a step in the right direction for this thread.

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

I think the problem is that nobody seems to understand what "Attrition" really is. Is it simply "fighting", or is it more than that? It seems to me the root of all this disagreement lies in "attrition". When BH says "Manuever in order to conduct Attrition" I think he's really meaning "Manuever in order to conduct fighting". Am I correct BH?

To me, attrition mostly means fighting, but this is from the POV of an observation of cause and effect. Sure, you have some "attrition" just by moving units around due to breakdowns, stragglers, etc., but these causes are insignificant compared casualties inflicted by fire and the losses (in personnel, equipment, supplies, morale, cohesion, organization, control, territory, you name it) sustained in running away from fire.

So to me, fighting is where attrition happens. Does fighting equal attrition? Strictly speaking, no. Attrition is the loss of combat power from whatever cause. But fighting in all its phases (maneuver, attack, pursuit, mopping up, etc.) and subsidiary actions (interdiction of LOCs by arty or air, etc.) is where the vast bulk of attrition occurs. Therefore, I think it's safe to use the terms "fighting" and "attrition" interchangeably. Although this is not correct per the textbook, it's the correct answer on the practical exam

However, "attrition", both definitionally and as I use it, also includes a definite sense losses happening to both sides. IOW, engaging in fighting is going to get some of your guys killed more often than not. This is inevitable given that the enemy wants to win (i.e. survive) as badly as you do and is usually just as well-equipped and trained.

Thus, going 1-on-1 isn't going to do you any good. You need mass on your side to gang up on the selected target, so that when all the equalities cancel out, you still have superiority left over. Achieving this superior mass is the purpose of maneuver.

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Bullethead]

Originally posted by Pillar:

I haven't seen any evidence of that. Could you elaborate? I assume you have the works of the prominent "Maneuver theorists" at hand for references.

I'm talking about the problem you and Henri have of seeing maneuver and attrition as 2 parts of the same whole

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Guest Pillar]

So then for example, bypassing an enemy strongpoint and attacking into his supplies/artillery with your own company would be "maneuver" with intent of "attrition"? (by the practical definitions you set out above). This is all based on accomplishing the mission of course.

If that's the case, you and I are just using different words to describe the same thing and we agree.

What do you think of the "Maneuver School" views on officer education, initiative, etc.

?

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

I'm talking about the problem you and Henri have of seeing maneuver and attrition as 2 parts of the same whole

Perhaps I am just speaking a different language than you... (Using different terms for different things, etc.)

I've expressed my agreement with you in other areas, and I've said a few times that I think "Firepower" ("attrition", "fighting", etc.) are important to maneuver warfare.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Pillar:

So then for example, bypassing an enemy strongpoint and attacking into his supplies/artillery with your own company would be "maneuver" with intent of "attrition"? (by the practical definitions you set out above). This is all based on accomplishing the mission of course.

That is the break-out/exploitation of combat. It is not exactly a new thing.

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

I think that it's probably wise to keep CM out of the maneuverist/non-maneuverist discussions except to the extent that one is specifically talking about tactics in CM. As realistic as CM is, it's not real life, and it's very questionable to draw conclusions from CM and apply them to real life situations.

The biggest reason for this, of course, is the lack of relative spotting. Splitting into half squads takes advantage of the lack of relative spotting because everyone sees what one half-squad sees. This makes the tactic of splitting squads more valuable, IMO, than it actually was/is historically or realistically; it is particularly unrealistic when you send half squads on extensive flanking/reconnaisance mission in the woods and adjust your main body's actions accordingly. It becomes worse when you use sharpshooters..and think of the information you could gain if you could split a squad up into 9-12 individual men, all of whom could scout.

But the unrealism itself is not absolute; it, too is a matter of degree. There are *some* advantages to splitting squads into teams in real life, and armies do it. Armies do set up screens, have recon patrols, use sharpshooters as scouts...and they do this because it works. So it's not like the tactics are completely unrealistic. It's just that they don't work in real life nearly as well, or as quickly as it works in CM.

But as a matter of tactics in CM, these discussions are very useful; I'm not likely to fight in a war myself.

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by CavScout:

That is the break-out/exploitation of combat. It is not exactly a new thing.

Most Maneuverists agree. I haven't yet come across one (including myself) who thinks "Manuever Warfare" (as they've labelled it) is anything new.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Pillar:

Most Maneuverists agree. I haven't yet come across one (including myself) who thinks "Manuever Warfare" (as they've labelled it) is anything new.

Hence the problem. They have simply co-opted something that has exsisted and claimed that it is their invention. It is nothing new and is what has been practiced in war before. Maneuverist simply claim what has worked as "Maneuver Warfare" and what hasn't as "Attritionist Warfare".

[Simon Fox]

Currently, Bullethead, Cavscout and ScoutPL, while maintaining a constant position, have maneuvered Henri and Pillar into a deep hole

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"Stand to your glasses steady,

This world is a world of lies,

Here's a toast to the dead already,

And here's to the next man to die."

-hymn of the "Double Reds"