The Platoon -- A Maneuverist Perspective

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

I hope you can respect my honesty when I say I don't have an extensive knowledge of Napoleon, and only a general knowledge of Verdun and more importantly the entire front situation at the time of Verdun.

No problem. I just hope you respect my honesty in not ambushing you with stuff not covered in "givens" of my questions.

In any case, I'll take a look at what you just wrote under your "givens" and I'll conjure up a very amateur response. In turn, and keeping in mind ALL the things I've mentioned before, don't treat it like a treatise on warfare.

Sure thing. This is an exercise in definitions more than anything else. The only one that looks for something other than an explanation of a definition is the one about von Falkenhayn's options, which is optional anyway

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Guest Pillar]

1. Napolean

Given that:

A) his primary strategic goal was the destruction of the main enemy army;

he sought to achieve this goal through decisive battle; and

C) he tried hard to make this battle happen on his terms by the use of huge, daring maneuvers to make the enemy fight him on ground of his choosing in strength of his choosing;

D) he is by Henri's definition an "attritionist" because he used maneuver to set up and enhance his fighting, despite his grand (and at that time, revolutionary) maneuvering.

Prove:

That Napolean was really a "maneuverist" despite this problem with definitions.

Was his primary strategic goal the direct destruction of the enemy army? Was it possible to defeat them indirectly?

That determines the answer to this question.

Points B,C, and D seem in accordance with manuever theory.

2. von Falkenhayn

Given that:

A) he deliberately set out to conduct a campaign of attrition pure and simple because he believed decisive maneuver under prevailing conditions was impossible; and

he thought that after sufficient attrition, he would be able to conduct decisive maneuvers;

C) he is by Henri's definition a "maneuverist" because he used fighting to set up and enhance maneuver, despite his express intention of conducting a campaign of attrition.

Prove:

That von Falkenhayn was really an "attritionist" despite this problem with definitions.

Using attrition at the tactical level to facilitate maneuver at the operational level seems in accordance with Maneuver theory to my knowledge. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Here's the kicker though, von Falkenhayn had WHICH operational goal here?

Extra Credit:

Given that:

A) von Falkenhayn's assessment was correct--decisive maneuver really was impossible at that time due to a continuous front offering no flanks to turn and frontal assaults only getting many people killed for no gain;

wars are won solely through offensive, not defensive, campaigns;

C) it was his job to win the war for Germany, so that he had to conduct a decisive, victorious offensive; and

D) there were more Germans than Frenchmen, and more Frenchmen than Germans would probably be killed in a 1-on-1 fight due to superior German firepower,

Prove:

That a campaign of pure attrition was not his best option.

First, because Germany could not win a war of attrition. The alliance had far more resources and industry and any "superior german firepower" was temporary at best on the strategic and ultimately operational and tactical levels. That means time is important in an attack. Attrition is slow.

Second, Verdun from my understanding had some sort of sentimental value to the French. This means the enemy will to fight is going to be FUELED by any attempt at "attrition" at Verdun. The harder the Germans press on Verdun, the harder the French will push back. Why attack into the enemy strength? If Germany had "superior firepower" to throw at France's strength, it logicall holds that they had "superior firepower" to throw at Frances weaker areas. Why go for enemy strength? Furthermore, if they did break through at Verdun or kill a lot of French, what good would that do their now tied up, committed and worn out "firepower"? The alliance would simply replace it's losses or even mount a counter attack somewhere else (Somme?)

What might have worked, is a deceptive operation (with lots of hate propoganda against the french) against Verdun with a main effort somewhere else, just going off the "Givens" here.

[ScoutPL]

I've been lurking for the past couple days, mainly because I just didnt feel like I had anything above what I'd already said to contribute. But I want to make an offer.

I think I have a very good example of what Bullethead, Cav Scout, and myself would characterize as a "realistic" combat approach to a problem in my Battalion Defense Tutorial. I welcome these two guys criticisms of my plan (both defense and attack) and challenge the so-called "maneuverists" to come up with their own.

They can either do this via a narrative or I will happily email them the scenario basics. I will then post the narrative or the scenario revision on my site and folks can compare the two schools of thought. This would avoid the immensely incensing prospect of an actual one on one fight that others on the board have wanted, but still get each others points across a little clearer I think.

Any takers?

My site: www.geocities.com/fpd131

[Guest Germanboy]

Pillar, the Germans could have won a war of attrition, and they almost did. All the resources become irrelevant if you no longer have an army to fight with. The French army came perilously close to breaking in the 1917 mutinies. So, if you destroy the fighting spirit of the opposng army, in this case the French, since the Brits were a sideshow (somethin the Germans then did in France 1940), everything else is irrelevant. Ooops, there goes Paul Kennedy.

Verdun only assumed the sentimental value during the battle, AFAIK. But at that time it also had a 'sentimental' value for the Germans. It became difficult to abandon the battle for both sides, and up to 1.5million men (IIRC) perished.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Kitty]

<stumbles in drunk at 3:30 am>

Ok, I've seen you and ScoutPL argue and snipe at each other several times in a couple different forums. It got me to wondering, have you ever played each other? If not, why not?

Kitty

Ps - noticed a change in Pillar's "units out of command" opinions since he played Fionn.

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[Ksak]

Good idea ScoutPL. I'd like to see this theory, which has yet to be defined, applied to CM.

From Pillar's first post I thought he was developing a concept about splitting all the squads in a platoon so that instead of three squads you'd have three "fire" teams and three "movement" teams.

That would have been an interesting discussion.

[Henri]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

As for Henri, I've given up trying to discuss things with him. On the issues at bar at least, he's totally clueless, and he couldn't get a clue if he was standing in the middle of 40 acres of ripe clues, with a severe clue-storm falling, while armed with a belt-fed clue-harpoon gun with power winch and clue-seeking rounds, and doused in clue-in-rut pheromone.

Insult is substitute for argument. I'm not going to argue with you any more.I don't use personal insults in my arguments and I don't tolerate that others do it to me.

Fionn was kicked off this forum for behavior of this kind, and if BTS were even-handed, they would do the same to you.

My last comment to Bullethead is about when he explains how Napoleon's victory without firing a shot was a victory of pure maneuver, when in faact it was a victory by movement. Clearly Bullethead confuses the two.

As for the quotes by CavScout and Ksak of the Army Field Manuals, I never claimed that these manuals were advocating Maneuver Warfare.The Manuals I quoted were the USMC Warfighting Doctrine Manual MCDP-1.

I'll see the rest of you on other threads.

Henri

[This message has been edited by Henri (edited 02-22-2001).]

[This message has been edited by Henri (edited 02-23-2001).]

[Ksak]

Henri

The important point is that after 100 posts you and Pillar have yet to distinguish so-called Maneuver Warfare at the Company level from the Fire & Movement tactics set out in the Field Manuals.

Why is it different? Where is it different? Why is it a "better" approach to CM combat than moving your guys around to get fire superiority so you can destroy the enemy?

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Henri:

As for the quotes by CavScout and Ksak of the Army Field Manuals, I never claimed that these manuals were advocating Maneuver Warfare.

As a good "maneuverust" you and attempting to avoid battle....

You said, "BTW, it may be tempting as some have done to say that Maneuver Theory and Attrition are just two sides of the same coin. They are not, the MCDP manuals say they are not, and you and CavScout and other attritionists believe that they are not, otherwise you would not be attacking Maneuver Theory."

You seem to want to use the MCDP as you "book" of choice to prove that maneuver and attrition are not "two sides of the same coin" but you conveniently want to 'maneuver' away from the Army's manuals that say that they are.

"Maneuver is both an element of combat power and a principle of war. Forces undertake tactical maneuver to gain operational results. As the commander develops his concept of an operation and considers the maneuver of all his forces, he retains a balance when applying maneuver, firepower, and protection. Generating combat power on the battlefield requires combining the movement of combat forces and employment of their direct fires in combination with fire support. The brigade commander creates the conditions, largely through maneuver, that will allow his subordinate elements to accomplish the unit's purpose."--2-16 MANEUVER FM 7-30

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-22-2001).]

[L.Tankersley]

Originally posted by Henri:

Insult is substitute for argument. I'm not going to argue with you any more.I don't use personal insults in my arguments and I don't tolerate that others do it to me.

Fionn was kicked off this forum for behavior of this kind, and if BTS were even-handed, they would do the same to you.

Well. Let's not get too holier-than-thou, here; I think that some people could legitimately interpret some of Henri's comments as insulting. Certainly the tone is often grating.

And for my money, the person in this discussion whose forum personality most reminds me of Fionn's, is Henri.

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Leland J. Tankersley

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Pillar, the Germans could have won a war of attrition, and they almost did. All the resources become irrelevant if you no longer have an army to fight with. The French army came perilously close to breaking in the 1917 mutinies. So, if you destroy the fighting spirit of the opposng army, in this case the French, since the Brits were a sideshow (somethin the Germans then did in France 1940), everything else is irrelevant. Ooops, there goes Paul Kennedy.

Verdun only assumed the sentimental value during the battle, AFAIK. But at that time it also had a 'sentimental' value for the Germans. It became difficult to abandon the battle for both sides, and up to 1.5million men (IIRC) perished.

Is that a "for sure" thing or a "maybe"? I never knew that. Interesting point.

As for Verdun and 1.5 million men perished, I wonder if 1.5 million men could better have been used for other purposes?

[Guest Pillar]

Ksak,

From Pillar's first post I thought he was developing a concept about splitting all the squads in a platoon so that instead of three squads you'd have three "fire" teams and three "movement" teams.

That's the idea for the leading elements.

The important point is that after 100 posts you and Pillar have yet to distinguish so-called Maneuver Warfare at the Company level from the Fire & Movement tactics set out in the Field Manuals.

You haven't been listening. I'm trying to fully understand Bulletheads position first. Patience.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Pillar:

From Pillar's first post I thought he was developing a concept about splitting all the squads in a platoon so that instead of three squads you'd have three "fire" teams and three "movement" teams.

That's the idea for the leading elements.

What's this have to do with "maneuver" and "attrition"?

[Guest Pillar]

It doesn't, it was a technique.

Reread my original post.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Pillar:

Is that a "for sure" thing or a "maybe"? I never knew that. Interesting point.

As for Verdun and 1.5 million men perished, I wonder if 1.5 million men could better have been used for other purposes?

The breaking? You never know until you try. The mutinies were widespread, and while we can never know, a defeat at Verdun might just have demoralised the army enough to break. We will never know that.

As for 1.5million men - yes I think they could have done something else, tend to their families and go to nice 9-5 jobs comes to mind.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Pillar:

It doesn't, it was a technique.

Reread my original post.

I have read and reread the first post of this thread. I'll ask again, what does it have to do with "maneuver" or "attrition"?

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

The breaking? You never know until you try. The mutinies were widespread, and while we can never know, a defeat at Verdun might just have demoralised the army enough to break. We will never know that.

As for 1.5million men - yes I think they could have done something else, tend to their families and go to nice 9-5 jobs comes to mind.

Ironic that WWI started out as a war of maneuver, the Germans trying their best to "maneuver" into France to avoid a long war, but it failed.

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

The breaking? You never know until you try. The mutinies were widespread, and while we can never know, a defeat at Verdun might just have demoralised the army enough to break. We will never know that.

As for 1.5million men - yes I think they could have done something else, tend to their families and go to nice 9-5 jobs comes to mind.

hehe, now THAT's maneuver warfare.

(A joke folks)

[SirOscar]

Bullethead

Sorry to get into this late I have been reading this entire thread just this morning. Anyway I agree with you %100 on most of what you are saying, it seems to me that what Pillar and Henri are trying to argue is " If you take our Maneuver theory and use it right you don't have to fire a single bullet to win, you win just because of your brilliant maneuvers" I think this is total hog wash. You can NOT separate maneuver and attrition(NO matter how you define attrition) in warfare, they just go hand in hand.

However I think I have to point out what I think is a glaring error on your part. You stated

"To me, attrition mostly means fighting, but this is from the POV of an observation of cause and effect. Sure, you have some "attrition" just by moving units around due to breakdowns, stragglers, etc., but these causes are insignificant compared casualties inflicted by fire and the losses (in personnel, equipment, supplies, morale, cohesion, organization, control, territory, you name it) sustained in running away from fire" Also "I think it's safe to use the terms "fighting" and "attrition" interchangeably"

The reason this seems so untrue to me is just last night I finished reading Citizen Soldiers by Stephen E. Ambrose(very good book by the way, I highly recommend it) I always knew that non battle field attrition in WWII was bad but there was a table in the book that STUNNED me. It was a table listing all the U.S. Infantry Divisions in EOT WWII, what was amazing about the table was he broke down casualties by battle and non-battle causalities, most divisions had close to equal amounts of causalities and in fact some had more. Example 36th inf division, 227 days on the line 11,238 battle causalities 14,919 non-battle causalities. 45th inf division, 230 days on the line, 10,458 battle casualties, 15,991 non-battle causalities. This chart just blew me away.

By the way I served in the U.S. Army from 73 to 78 with 4 years in Europe, I was in the first all volunteer basic training company after Nam( back when I was considered a war mongering baby killer for joing up) After the Gulf War I can remember being so amazed at the light casualties the U.S. forces took, had the army of my time just took part in a "live fire" exercise of that size we would of had more causalities just from screw ups. Whenever I get a chance I like to tell those Gulf War Vets G R E A T job!!!!!!!!!!!

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Ironic that WWI started out as a war of maneuver, the Germans trying their best to "maneuver" into France to avoid a long war, but it failed.

Well, take a good plan, hand it to an idiot who has a spineless git as Emperor, see what you get.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Guest Pillar]

Cavscout,

First the context:

The platoon described in the article was meant to be part of a screening force. They are designed to find enemy "surfaces and gaps". This is a concept borrowed from Maneuver Theory.

Second, the idea that I might want to be able to bypass enemy strongpoints (and have adapted my technique to facilitate that) is borrowed from Maneuver Theory.

Remember, it was for fun while things were slow at work. I never expected you guys to turn this into a debate about "Maneuver Warfare vs. Attrition".

It's a fact that my playing style is influenced my Maneuver theory. Whatever my techniques, be they shared with the "attritionist" or not, are used in the context of Maneuver warfare.

That is a given. Don't try and argue that it has nothing to do with Maneuver Theory. That would be like saying art has nothing to do with personal values.

I never claimed the technique was limited to "Maneuver Theory". I was just saying it was compatible with it in the context of that situation. Yes, you could easily say it is "common sense", good battle philosophy, etc. I'd agree with you.

The article was actually written for newbies I'm surprised you guys have taken to it so much.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-22-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

it seems to me that what Pillar and Henri are trying to argue is " If you take our Maneuver theory and use it right you don't have to fire a single bullet to win, you win just because of your brilliant maneuvers"

Another person who isn't reading a word I say.

Why don't you back that claim up with some quotes? Sheesh.

Don't even bother.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Pillar:

It's a fact that my playing style is influenced my Maneuver theory. Whatever my techniques, be they shared with the "attritionist" or not, are used in the context of Maneuver warfare.

That is a given. Don't try and argue that it has nothing to do with Maneuver Theory. That would be like saying art has nothing to do with personal values.

I never claimed the technique was limited to "Maneuver Theory". I was just saying it was compatible with it in the context of that situation.

If the "technique" is not limited to maneiver theory why frame the post as "The Platoon -- A Maneuverist Perspective"? I would argue that what you have said is called "conventional warfare".

Besides, "Against a disorganized, ill-trained foe deployed ineptly accross terrain favorbale to the attack, plunging through gaps works. Against a determined enemy, what looks like a gap can often turn out to be a fire sack."--D. Bolger "Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered"

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-22-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by CavScout:

If the "technique" is not limited to maneiver theory why frame the post as "The Platoon -- A Maneuverist Perspective"? I would argue that what you have said is called "conventional warfare".

Besides, "Against a disorganized, ill-trained foe deployed ineptly accross terrain favorbale to the attack, plunging through gaps works. Against a determined enemy, what looks like a gap can often turn out to be a fire sack."--D. Bolger "Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered"

B]

A) Because it *is* - a - maneuverist's perspective. There's also a lot of talk about the philosophy of maneuver warfare in that post. What's the problem?

The quote is a good one. I wouldn't mind talking about the "firesack dillemma" and hearing your thoughts on how you avoid them.

I have my own ideas which I'll share once you explain your own solution.

[CavScout]

We should play a game Pillar.