Soviet anti-tank rifles!

[Jasper]

For those that perhaps don't know about it - The Russian Battlefield has an article DESTROY FASCIST TANKS WITH THE ANTITANK RIFLE!

http://history.vif2.ru/library/archives/weapons/weapons9.html

I'm looking to see if the Soviets even used a shaped charge infantry weapon - ala 'zook or 'schreck.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

The Russian war-time light tank force and its development into the SU-76 was substantially the work of N.A. Astrov, who led the design team at No. 37 factory in Moscow. They had a little outside help on early SU-76 models. This factory, incidentally, was relocated to the Urals when the Germans neared the capital late in 1941.

The basis for all the designs was a pre-war amphibious light tank design, the T-40, first designed in 1940, of which only ~200 were made, most during the war.

The design team at No. 37 started the T-60 in July of 1941, less than a month after the invasion, and tanks were in action by December. The Podolsk machine works made the armored body, while the chassis were made in Gorki and at No. 138 factory, Kirov. No. 37, and No. 38-Kirov factories made the T-70, starting in January of 1942, with tanks in action by March.

Several teams worked on the development of the Su-76. The T-70 modification first accepted was the work of the bureaus of Generals Petrov and Grabin, starting in October 1942, though the vehicle was not designated the SU-76 until December.

Development was at No. 38 Kirov again, and at No. 92 Gorki. No. 38 also worked on the T-60 variant and built prototypes (OSU-76), but the T-70 version was preferred. Just 26 vehicles were produced by the end of 1942, so they were probably prototypes.

Astrov's team at No. 37 designed the SU-76M variant, based on the T-70M model, and the other SU-76 prototypes. Production of that type began in May 1943, and 1,900 SU-76 of all makes were produced by year's end. By 1945, 12,600 SU-76s had been built.

So they had a pre-war design to work off of, the T-40. Lead times were on the order of 3-8 months, and by the end of them substantial numbers of vehicles appeared rapidly, probably worked on in parallel. (E.g. T-60s produce in 1941, sources give 1800).

Designs were initiated quite early - e.g. T-60 design after seeing German light tanks in action for 1 month. Then the same team made a 45mm version almost immediately after the first type had been fielded.

The first Marders appeared in April 1942, the Marder II started in July. The Russians were designing the SU-76 by October of the same year, while full scale production was about 1 year after the Marders began.

Overall, there were 6 factories involved, 1 main design team and a few supplimental ones for the early SUs.

For comparison, the Czech model German chassis were produced by Skoda and CKD, while Pz IIs were made by Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, MIAG and FAMO, but only by FAMO still in the mid-war. Wespe were also made by FAMO, naturally enough. Marders were made by Alkett, Wegmann, FAMO, MAN, Daimler-Benz, and BMM of Prague. Hezters were made by BMM and Skoda.

The Russian process was vastly more centralized. And the production numbers overall are higher by about a factor of four.

They weren't playing a design war. They were perfectly willing to copy ideas and use whatever chassis came to hand. They were playing a production war. The result was 2-4 times as many items of comparable ability, 6-12 months after the Germans fielded something.

In heavier AFVs there was more learning from and competing with each other both ways, with potentially more at stake in technical differences. In the lighter "utility" stuff, they just mimicked and implimented Zhukov's maxim - "quantity has a quality all its own".

Russians ain't bad at chess either.

[Guest tero]

>This would not detract from the idea that Soviet experience with the noisy end of antitank rifles led them to produce their own, would it?

The only problem I see is the fact that the Finnish sources have always maintained there were too few ATR's to go around for them to have been a notable AT asset and that the ones that were in place were too weak in stopping power. Furthermore the list of Soviet tank losses (3 179 tanks total) at

http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/FINatTactics.htm

shows that of the ATR does not show, even indirectly, in the list of causes as determined by the Soviets themselves.

I agree there may have been SOME influence from the Polish/Finnish ATR's but I am inclined to think the fact that they chose the understrenght caliber of 14,5mm would suggest they were more concerned about giving infantry units some sort of portable AT assest that could be used against faster and lighter assets (AC's, HT's etc) more than they were about ATR being powerfull enough to actually do some actual damage to heavier tanks. They already had the excellent (for the timeperiod) 45mm AT gun in widespread use that could deal with all tanks adequately before the arrival of the Tiger.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 03-23-2001).]

[John Kettler]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

OK, I have a theory. The information presented here has been valuable, and has revised a few of my previous views. I have put together a tactical picture of some of the strengths, weaknesses, and uses of the weapon. I present them for general comment.

There seems to be pretty general agreement about the penetrating power. On the order of 30mm at 100m, dropping to 25mm at 500m. While shots beyond that might be possible, with a non-automatic weapon and often moving targets, hits would probably become rare.

What do these penetrating numbers mean, for the tanks they faced in the early war period? Basically, it means they would not penetrate the front of a Pz III or Pz IV, unless they got lucky. But sides of any German AFV of the period, and fronts of the Pz II, armored cars, and halftracks, they could punch holes in.

If every penetration killed the target then that would be an enourmously effective weapon and we'd have heard a lot more about the wonders of it, and the trail of dead tanks it left. Instead, everybody who had a decent rocket AT weapons ditched them from HEAT rounds. Why?

I submit that the reason has to be the low amount of damage typically done by a single penetration, by one round. The Russian manual someone helpfully provided, stresses firing at vunerable areas of the tank, not in terms of areas with less armor, but in terms of places the bullet may do some effective damage when it penetrates.

A useful comparison was suggested by another fellow, a 50 cal. The energy of the ATR round is higher, by about a factor of 2 in his figures. But a 50 cal fires 8 rounds a second, not 8-16 rounds a minute. The Russian manual suggested firing 5-10 rounds from one location, before moving to another. That represents around 30 seconds of fire at max ROF. A 50 cal would deliver the same impact energy in a 1-2 second burst.

So the basic problem would seem to be getting a weapon that can indeed punch small holes, to add up to a dead tank, despite delivering an order of magnitude less energy per unit time. And having surmized this, then a couple of things come into focus.

First, the combat reports of the hits on particular spots. The vision block idea, and the main gun idea. Second, if you look at the manual on the site the fellow provided, the doctrine is to shoot from sides when possible. And the vunerable spots include - drive sprocket, fuel cells, engine. For halftracks, the spot to shoot for in the engine. Last,the concluding section is a somewhat sketchy bit about working with submachinegunners, grenade throwers, and molotov cocktail teams. What is that about? And it says, "if halted, disable the weapons first".

Here is my theory. The ATRs are suppose to fire with a view to getting a *mobility kill*. They shoot the drive sprocket, or they puncture the fuel and perhaps ignite it (though diesel burns poorly), certainly make it leak. They punch random holes through the engine block. If anyone knows anything about engine blocks, they are almost solid metal themselves, and telling someone to fire at them as "vunerable" means a definite focus on a mobility kill. The benefit is simply that it is a complicated thing that needs most of its parts in the right place to work.

So suppose the ATRs have light up the flanks of a tank for 10-40 hits, and the thing has holes in its side and is leaking fuel, and the engine is leaking oil, and seizing, etc. Kerchunk, kerchunk, bahhhhaaa. Stalled out tank. Right? What is the next thing it says. "If halted, disable the weapons first". First? It is already halted. My thesis here - the manual means, *before* trying to tackle it with the molotovs etc.

See the idea? First you stop it. The plan is to KO it with a close assault. But first, bang that hull MG, smash that sight, so they don't kill the close assaulters. The ATRs are doing this, maybe grenades or grenade-bundles are helping too by this point. The manual suggests that MGs fire at the vision slits. Get 'em hunkered down in that tank, in other words, blind and stopped and weapons not all there. They were already leaking fuel and oil. Somebody gets close enough to throw the gas-bomb, or the grenade-bundle. Whoosh, up she goes. And the submachinegunners are there to get the guys that bail out.

Now, that is the tactical doctrine I am seeing in that last section. That is what puts together the sorts of vunerable spots listed, with the idea of working as part of a team with SMGs and grenade and molotov men. The main role of the ATR in the whole piece, is to *stop* the beastie. Then the infantry can go after it with a will.

This would also, to me, fit with the general fact that most abandoned these weapons. I mean, if an infanryman could have a gun that reliably killed tanks outright from the flank at 500 yards, why would anyone want a bazooka or panzerschreck instead? These probably didn't kill tanks outright, then.

The point is, that on this theory the ATRs could indeed disable tanks, but it was a relatively slow process. Take 5 or 10 shots - then switch positions, it says. So 5-10 shots, with a number of hits, are not taking the thing out immediately, are they? I mean, you have to worry about it firing back, and switch positions. Not bang, it went in, tank is history. More like bangs repeated for 30 seconds, and maybe she is mobility dead. Or maybe you need to keep it up for another 30 seconds and punch a few more holes in her, before something essential breaks.

Make any sense?

This may not be the perfect place to say this, but I think it's important to note that in comparing the effectiveness of the .50 cal. MG with bolt action and semiautomatic ATRs only one out of six (or seven) rounds from the Ma Deuce was AP. The rest were ball, incendiary and tracer.

Source: Belton Cooper interview broadcast on the History Channel. Cooper was an Ordnance Officer in 3rd Armored Division during WWII and is the author of DEATH TRAPS: Survival in an American Armored Division.

Given this, the above comparison is inflated in favor of the Ma Deuce, when in fact the true comparison must be made on the basis of accurately placed AP shots delivered, not total shots fired with ammo of mixed natures.

The other thing that I wanted to say is that I've seen strength returns for a Tiger unit at Kursk, I believe a company. ATR casualties amounted to nearly a platoon sidelined, almost exclusively from smashed cupola blocks making it impossible to fight the tank properly until repairs were made outside of the battle. One got the impression that the repairs were more complex than simply replacing the blocks. There was also a comment about the number of vision block losses exceeding available supply, resulting in delays until spares could be shipped in.

Worse, as someone noted elsewhere in this thread, there were specific comments about TCs

being hospitalized with serious eye and face injuries after having vision blocks shattered and the fragments and framing driven into their faces.

I forget where I found the report, but I know it was on the Internet. If I can find the link again, I'll post it.

Taking the translated German report at its word, this means that a single well placed shot could take out of battle a German heavy tank and frequently the all-important TC as well. This seems to throw into serious question the whole "death of a thousand cuts" suggested above.

Granted, if one's gunnery were poor, that scenario might occur. A better description of what by Kursk the Russian ATR teams were trained to do would be a "wasp sting to the eye." A graphic description to be sure, but a fair one based on a contemporary German record. Food for thought in any event.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

No luck so far locating that Tiger company strength return. Can anyone here help. please?

Regards,

John Kettler

[c3k]

My post about adding armor skirts on Panthers primarily to defeat Soviet Anti-Tank Rifles was questioned by some. (not to mention ScoutPL by name --> )

From Jentz, "Germany's Panther Tank", Schiffer Publishing, 1995, p. 35:

"2.3.10 Schueren - Protective Skirts

Starting in April 1943, Schuerzen (protective skirts made from soft steel) were mounted to prevent penetration of the 40 mm thick lower hull side by rounds fired at close range from Russian anti-tank rifles. The Schuerzen were tested and proven to be effective against direct hits from 75 mm high-explosive shells as well as anti-tank rifles. The invention of Schuerzen saved the Panther I. If the Panther I hadn't been able to cope with anti-tank rifles, production would have been converted to the Panther II. The Schuerzen were not intended to defeat and were not initially tested against hollow charge rounds."

Seems pretty definitive. ATR's were a BIG factor on the East front. Yes, they could defeat late model tanks.

Ken.

[tss]

I wrote about 20mm Lahti ATR and Winter War:

Weren't there few prototypes that were used in combat?

Answering to myself. Yes, there were. I didn't find exact figures, only one sentence from Järvinen's "Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa" where he mentioned about the experiences during the initial withdrawal phase of the war. At that point he was commenting a report written on 5.12.1939. Anyway, the whole sentence is:

"There were few 'elephant guns' in field tests and they were found to be adequate against Russian tanks up to 400 meter range."

- Tommi

[tss]

The following quote is from Sulo Vuorela who served as a Stug gunner in 3./Ryn.Tyk.P. The quote is from an extract where he describes the Tali-Ihantala battle, and the date is either 26th or 27th June 1944. At the time he was in Ps-531-25 that was commanded by Erkki Halonen.

"We had driven towards Ihantala for some time now. Another assault gun was at the point. [snip] We came on a small field opening and then the lead vehicle got a hit. We didn't have any idea that the Russkies had anti-tank rifles at Ihantala. They hit a lower drive wheel of the Sturm. I saw that the wheel came loose and rolled into a ditch. The boys accelerated to the maximum speed and got into cover of the forest. And we were coming to the same opening. When we got hit, it was on the gun. Luckily it hit the base and didn't do any damage. The point tank didn't know where it was hit, they only cared of getting into cover.

We were in a different situation. We realised that there were more than one rifle since the impacts happened so quickly. We hadn't reached even the midpoint of the opening when we realized that we would get killed if we made a wrong choice. Our commander, he was either Bagberg or Halonen at the time, commanded 'Stop' and 'Rotate to 3 o'clock'. We knew that they couldn't penetrate the front armor. Then it was my turn to find the gunners and I found them. There was a group of men with two rifles. We wasted 5 HE rounds on them and they didn't shoot anymore. I still think that if they had hit the flank armor, the rounds would have come through."

And a little later:

"On one place we noticed our own Vickers tanks [T-26]. A moment later we realized the horror of the situation. Those anti-tank rifles had had terrible effect on Vickerses. The fire was so intense that even we couldn't stay on road but we drived to a field that was on the back where we had some cover from direct fire. Now decades afterwards I have read that the Russians had piled Finnish dead on the road to stop our tanks. We saw Finnish corpses on the roadside, and they were piled. It was a painful place. Maybe Bagberg [more probably Halonen] contacted our superiors and received an order to evacuate the bodies. There were 8 altogether. Most of them were Vickers crewmen, and one of them was a second lieutenant."

They then had severe problems in evacuating the bodies under enemy fire and when the Stug bogged on a field. By that time Soviets had blocked all major roads in the area and they had to drive back to own lines along a small wagon trail through the forest.

- Tommi

[Mattias]

Well, taking this subject to other forums only reinforced my opinion that ATR’s was the threat that stimulated the development of Schürzen. The correlation of cause and effect is just to strong.

A great number of posts in this thread has already pointed it out but here it is in condensed form:

The ATR’s used by the Red Army were produced in 1942. They were thus definitely not a thing of the “past” at the time, regardless of their ultimate effectiveness.

These ATR’s presented a considerable nuisance at the very least.

A counter measure in the form of Schürtzen was designed and then presented in early 1943.

The concept was tested, both as solid plates and as mesh shields, and found effective against ATR fire from 100 meter and HE fire.

The Führer HQ approved of the developed solution and ordered it into production.

From April 1943 onward it was installed on all practically applicable armour surfaces which were not in themselves impervious to ATR fire.

It worked by either deforming the incoming projectile or produce yawing, either of which would result in decreased penetrative performance.

Based on the results obtained through the test firings and it’s subsequent wide spread use the Schürtzen no doubt did a lot to decrease the threat of ATR fire.

It is possible to retrospectively make case for the hollow charge rounds being the reason for this development. However, without any of the compelling facts and A-Z timeline accompanying the “ATR theory”. Granted, who knows, at some point the major benefit may have shifted from ATR AP rounds to hollow charge munitions. That, however, is a completely different story.

M.

[This message has been edited by Mattias (edited 03-26-2001).]