Michael Dorosh Posted October 18, 2001 Share Posted October 18, 2001 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Originally Posted by Sgt Steiner: Hi all Just came across this interesting article on one of my Miniatures Rules Yahoo Group. I quote it verbatim as some food for thought (maybe this should be in General Forum though ?):- "Subject: WW2 German infantry effectiveness Hi guys I recently came across the following article in a British Army house magazine and I thought it might be of interest to the members of this forum. I casts some interesting light on the performance (or lack thereof) of German infantry units during the later part of WW2. It should be noted however that the author, Sydney Jary, is writing from personal wartime experience, having fought against the Germans as an infantry officer. His book "18 Platoon" is an excellent account of life in a British infantry battalion in Normandy and the subsequent advance into Germany. I thought that his comments might add a bit to the recent debate on small arms effectiveness, covering as it does the contentious areas of WW2 German effectiveness and the effectiveness of modern small arms fire. A Matter of Vulnerabilities: German Infantry Weaknesses in WWII Sydney Jary MC In the course of working up material with Carbuncle for f 'The Wrap?' (p 30), we identified some matters which did not fit with the main thrust of that article but which we felt deserved an airing, as they have a relevance going beyond their immediate context. They represent realities from WWII experience which are very much in tune with the manoeuvrist approach. Key Dependencies Many years ago, when I was writing 18 Platoon, I said that: 'in many attacks the prisoners we took outnumbered our attacking force and German units who would continue to resist at close quarters were few indeed'. Stupidly I did not expand on this statement. Recently, while dozing after Sunday lunch, my mind wandered around the extraordinary change in the fighting performance of most of the German infantry that occurred during the closing stages of a battle. German platoons, companies and battalions which, early in the battle, had fought with heartless ferocity, would surrender in aimless droves. This phenomenon happened frequently. Why was this? After pondering on this matter a factor, common to my experience in many battles, emerged. The German infantry lost heart once we had knocked out their MG42 detachments. There was undoubtedly an over reliance on their MGs both in the attack and, more obviously, in defence. I suspect that this was the consequence of the training they received which certainly dated back to the Somme in 1916 and probably before - certainly it was noted on many occasions in the 1918 battles that ordinary German infantry did not seem to know how to use their rifles. In 1944-45 their riflemen, not including their snipers, were generally poor shots. They seemed to be primarily carriers of cases and more cases of linked ammunition for their MGs. Eliminating the MG42 was our first priority and, due to the gun's high rate of firepower - has it ever been exceeded? - and well sited mutually supporting positions, it could rarely be achieved by physical assault, even using fire and movement. To knock them out we required HE, fired directly by supporting armour or, indirectly by Dennis Clarke or Bramley Hancock, our beloved F00s. It took me until our assault on Mont Pincon on 6th August to realise what game the Germans were playing. Clearly they did not like close combat and chose to keep us at arm's length with a display of massive MG firepower. Without HE support it was almost always impossible to get close enough to assault with rifle and bayonet. Our infantry platoons could not match the firepower of the MG42. This was recognised to some extent in the training pamphlets of the time; The Infantry Company 1942 states that two British platoons were required to win a firefight against one German - and this was before the MG42 was on general issue. Of one thing I am certain, a platoon armed with SA8O and LSW would be stopped by MG42s well out of range of their own platoon weapons. But remember, there was always the perennial problem of locating well camouflaged MG's. The Germans were very good indeed at concealment and their tracer rounds, igniting two hundred yards from the muzzle of the gun, assisted this. For instance, during the early stages of our assault on Mont Pincon we were engaged by about a dozen MG 42s: to this day I have no idea of their position. German reliance on the MG was by no means restricted to defence. In the attack they rarely finished with an assault with rifle and bayonet preferring to deluge the opposition with a powerful display of MG firepower supplemented by machine pistols and stick grenades. A Matter of Balance I tend to view past battles fought by my platoon as an artist would judge his paintings or a composer his compositions. My favourites are, first, the infiltration through the back lanes of Vernonnet during Operation NEPTUNE, 43rd (Wessex) Division's assault crossing of the Seine at Vernon in late August 1944. The next is an advance to contact - and in contact too - from Cleve to Bedburg on 12 February 1945 in Operation VERITABLE. They had much in common: both were essentially light infantry fast infiltration operations. Both were unsupported by artillery or armour. And, both were highly successful. The third, Mont Pincon, was different in that we had effective artillery support and a spirited modicum of armour. All three had a very important tactic in common, which was infiltration leading to surprise, and catching the opposition off-balance. In my view, the Germans did not generally expect to be surprised by British tactics and as a result were that much more vulnerable when it did happen. 'If at first you don't succeed, try something sneaky' is a maxim that should appeal to a Light Infantry Platoon Commander. It always requires brains, more often than not considerable sweat, but it does save blood. In recent years I have had a great deal of experience with today's Army, particularly the Infantry and I find as little interest shown in infiltration as there was in my time. My 18 Platoon became masters of the tactic. In Vernonnet my Company penetrated to the escarpment behind the town, outflanked the opposition and took all the battalion's objectives. At Bedburg the platoon, as point platoon of 129 Brigade, advanced four miles, overran a company of Fallschirmjager, killing thirteen and taking fifty seven prisoners. We were twenty-two strong. This enabled the battalion to take ground which allowed 43rd (Wessex) Division to wheel behind the Reichswald Forest towards Goch. At Mont PinCon on 6th August 1944, having been brought to a grinding halt by overwhelming fire from MG42s, after dark the whole battalion infiltrated through the German positions, thus becoming king of the castle. Admittedly infiltration is not for beginners, but it sits comfortably within the concept of mission command - which itself is not for beginners. It does seem to this old soldier that skill at infiltration should be second nature to our light unarmoured infantry battalions. In the kind of peace support operations now so fashionable, it may well provide decisive results at low cost in numbers required and, so importantly, in casualties too." Cheers -------------------- Sgt Steiner Belfast NI UK <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Good food for thought, Sgt Steiner, I thought it deserved to be reposted. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
argie Posted October 18, 2001 Share Posted October 18, 2001 For a second, I thought you pushed the wrong button in desperation Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Sgt Steiner Posted October 18, 2001 Share Posted October 18, 2001 Hi Michael et al <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Good food for thought, Sgt Steiner, I thought it deserved to be reposted.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Yes I thought so too especially the 'spotting' issues raised. As a footnote S.Jary is still alive and kicking he was in fact on TV here in UK in a programme about Arnhem on BBC (part of Battlefields series with Dr Richard Holmes) I believe he still attends Normandy battlefield tours with Sandhurst cadets etc. Just no keeping a good man down Cheers Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted October 18, 2001 Share Posted October 18, 2001 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sgt Steiner: Hi Michael et al Yes I thought so too especially the 'spotting' issues raised. As a footnote S.Jary is still alive and kicking he was in fact on TV here in UK in a programme about Arnhem on BBC (part of Battlefields series with Dr Richard Holmes) I believe he still attends Normandy battlefield tours with Sandhurst cadets etc. Just no keeping a good man down Cheers<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Sgt. Steiner, good to hear the man is still around. Do you know which battalion he was in? Unfortunately I missed the Tuesday Battlefield programme. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Simon Fox Posted October 18, 2001 Share Posted October 18, 2001 4th Bn SLI I think. He is a man who has given a lot of thought to infantry tactics based on his experience and has both written about it fairly extensively and lectured too. Great to see he is still going strong. Going by his book he was a cut above your average Plt sub and I would suggest his views hold a little more weight than your average veterans account, though of course still only one man's viewpoint. He recalls coming across Horrocks at one stage who remembered his name. Pretty good for a corps commander to remember one of his Plt commanders names. Might have to ask him about captured MG42s and SMGs as he goes on about it a fair bit Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted October 18, 2001 Share Posted October 18, 2001 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox: 4th Bn SLI I think. He is a man who has given a lot of thought to infantry tactics based on his experience and has both written about it fairly extensively and lectured too. Great to see he is still going strong. Going by his book he was a cut above your average Plt sub and I would suggest his views hold a little more weight than your average veterans account, though of course still only one man's viewpoint. He recalls coming across Horrocks at one stage who remembered his name. Pretty good for a corps commander to remember one of his Plt commanders names. Might have to ask him about captured MG42s and SMGs as he goes on about it a fair bit <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Thanks for the info Simon. Maybe what Horrocks said was 'Oh you must be the guy who is still a platoon commander after the campaign - so who did you piss off to not get promoted with all those officer casualties' But seriously, he must have been extremely lucky. Maybe I should contact him directly for a copy of his book... Good way to find out his attitude towards Germans too Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted October 18, 2001 Share Posted October 18, 2001 Grrrr!!! It seems to be unpossible to find his email or any other contact details. If someone here has them (even the address in the book would help, since it was privately published), can you please email it to me? Ta. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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