Effectiveness of Late War Germans (LONGish post)......

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Originally Posted by Sgt Steiner:

Hi all

Just came across this interesting article on one of my Miniatures Rules Yahoo Group.

I quote it verbatim as some food for thought

(maybe this should be in General Forum though ?):-

"Subject: WW2 German infantry effectiveness

Hi guys

I recently came across the following article in a British Army house

magazine and I thought it might be of interest to the members of this

forum.

I casts some interesting light on the performance (or lack thereof)

of German infantry units during the later part of WW2. It should be

noted however that the author, Sydney Jary, is writing from personal

wartime experience, having fought against the Germans as an infantry

officer. His book "18 Platoon" is an excellent account of life in a

British infantry battalion in Normandy and the subsequent advance

into Germany.

I thought that his comments might add a bit to the recent debate on

small arms effectiveness, covering as it does the contentious areas

of WW2 German effectiveness and the effectiveness of modern small

arms fire.

A Matter of Vulnerabilities: German Infantry Weaknesses in WWII

Sydney Jary MC

In the course of working up material with Carbuncle for f 'The Wrap?'

(p 30), we identified some matters which did not fit with the main

thrust of that article but which we felt deserved an airing, as they

have a relevance going beyond their immediate context. They represent

realities from WWII experience which are very much in tune with the

manoeuvrist approach.

Key Dependencies

Many years ago, when I was writing 18 Platoon, I said that: 'in many

attacks the prisoners we took outnumbered our attacking force and

German units who would continue to resist at close quarters were few

indeed'. Stupidly I did not expand on this statement. Recently, while

dozing after Sunday lunch, my mind wandered around the extraordinary

change in the fighting performance of most of the German infantry

that occurred during the closing stages of a battle. German platoons,

companies and battalions which, early in the battle, had fought with

heartless ferocity, would surrender in aimless droves. This

phenomenon happened frequently. Why was this?

After pondering on this matter a factor, common to my experience in

many battles, emerged. The German infantry lost heart once we had

knocked out their MG42 detachments. There was undoubtedly an over

reliance on their MGs both in the attack and, more obviously, in

defence. I suspect that this was the consequence of the training they

received which certainly dated back to the Somme in 1916 and probably

before - certainly it was noted on many occasions in the 1918 battles

that ordinary German infantry did not seem to know how to use their

rifles. In 1944-45 their riflemen, not including their snipers, were

generally poor shots. They seemed to be primarily carriers of cases

and more cases of linked ammunition for their MGs.

Eliminating the MG42 was our first priority and, due to the gun's

high rate of firepower - has it ever been exceeded? - and well sited

mutually supporting positions, it could rarely be achieved by

physical assault, even using fire and movement. To knock them out we

required HE, fired directly by supporting armour or, indirectly by

Dennis Clarke or Bramley Hancock, our beloved F00s. It took me until

our assault on Mont Pincon on 6th August to realise what game the

Germans were playing. Clearly they did not like close combat and

chose to keep us at arm's length with a display of massive MG

firepower. Without HE support it was almost always impossible to get

close enough to assault with rifle and bayonet. Our infantry platoons

could not match the firepower of the MG42. This was recognised to

some extent in the training pamphlets of the time; The Infantry

Company 1942 states that two British platoons were required to win a

firefight against one German - and this was before the MG42 was on

general issue. Of one thing I am certain, a platoon armed with SA8O

and LSW would be stopped by MG42s well out of range of their own

platoon weapons.

But remember, there was always the perennial problem of locating well

camouflaged MG's. The Germans were very good indeed at concealment

and their tracer rounds, igniting two hundred yards from the muzzle

of the gun, assisted this. For instance, during the early stages of

our assault on Mont Pincon we were engaged by about a dozen MG 42s:

to this day I have no idea of their position. German reliance on the

MG was by no means restricted to defence. In the attack they rarely

finished with an assault with rifle and bayonet preferring to deluge

the opposition with a powerful display of MG firepower supplemented

by machine pistols and stick grenades.

A Matter of Balance

I tend to view past battles fought by my platoon as an artist would

judge his paintings or a composer his compositions. My favourites

are, first, the infiltration through the back lanes of Vernonnet

during Operation NEPTUNE, 43rd (Wessex) Division's assault crossing

of the Seine at Vernon in late August 1944. The next is an advance to

contact - and in contact too - from Cleve to Bedburg on 12 February

1945 in Operation VERITABLE.

They had much in common: both were essentially light infantry fast

infiltration operations. Both were unsupported by artillery or

armour. And, both were highly successful. The third, Mont Pincon, was

different in that we had effective artillery support and a spirited

modicum of armour. All three had a very important tactic in common,

which was infiltration leading to surprise, and catching the

opposition off-balance. In my view, the Germans did not generally

expect to be surprised by British tactics and as a result were that

much more vulnerable when it did happen.

'If at first you don't succeed, try something sneaky' is a maxim that

should appeal to a Light Infantry Platoon Commander. It always

requires brains, more often than not considerable sweat, but it does

save blood.

In recent years I have had a great deal of experience with today's

Army, particularly the Infantry and I find as little interest shown

in infiltration as there was in my time. My 18 Platoon became masters

of the tactic. In Vernonnet my Company penetrated to the escarpment

behind the town, outflanked the opposition and took all the

battalion's objectives. At Bedburg the platoon, as point platoon of

129 Brigade, advanced four miles, overran a company of

Fallschirmjager, killing thirteen and taking fifty seven prisoners.

We were twenty-two strong. This enabled the battalion to take ground

which allowed 43rd (Wessex) Division to wheel behind the Reichswald

Forest towards Goch.

At Mont PinCon on 6th August 1944, having been brought to a grinding

halt by overwhelming fire from MG42s, after dark the whole battalion

infiltrated through the German positions, thus becoming king of the

castle.

Admittedly infiltration is not for beginners, but it sits comfortably

within the concept of mission command - which itself is not for

beginners. It does seem to this old soldier that skill at

infiltration should be second nature to our light unarmoured infantry

battalions. In the kind of peace support operations now so

fashionable, it may well provide decisive results at low cost in

numbers required and, so importantly, in casualties too."

Cheers

--------------------

Sgt Steiner

Belfast

NI UK

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Good food for thought, Sgt Steiner, I thought it deserved to be reposted.

[argie]

For a second, I thought you pushed the wrong button in desperation

[Sgt Steiner]

Hi Michael et al

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Good food for thought, Sgt Steiner, I thought it deserved to be reposted.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes I thought so too especially the 'spotting' issues raised.

As a footnote S.Jary is still alive and kicking he was in fact on TV here in UK in a programme about Arnhem on BBC (part of Battlefields series with Dr Richard Holmes) I believe he still attends Normandy battlefield tours with Sandhurst cadets etc.

Just no keeping a good man down

Cheers

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sgt Steiner:

Hi Michael et al

Yes I thought so too especially the 'spotting' issues raised.

As a footnote S.Jary is still alive and kicking he was in fact on TV here in UK in a programme about Arnhem on BBC (part of Battlefields series with Dr Richard Holmes) I believe he still attends Normandy battlefield tours with Sandhurst cadets etc.

Just no keeping a good man down

Cheers<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sgt. Steiner, good to hear the man is still around. Do you know which battalion he was in? Unfortunately I missed the Tuesday Battlefield programme.

[Simon Fox]

4th Bn SLI I think.

He is a man who has given a lot of thought to infantry tactics based on his experience and has both written about it fairly extensively and lectured too. Great to see he is still going strong. Going by his book he was a cut above your average Plt sub and I would suggest his views hold a little more weight than your average veterans account, though of course still only one man's viewpoint.

He recalls coming across Horrocks at one stage who remembered his name. Pretty good for a corps commander to remember one of his Plt commanders names. Might have to ask him about captured MG42s and SMGs as he goes on about it a fair bit

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

4th Bn SLI I think.

He is a man who has given a lot of thought to infantry tactics based on his experience and has both written about it fairly extensively and lectured too. Great to see he is still going strong. Going by his book he was a cut above your average Plt sub and I would suggest his views hold a little more weight than your average veterans account, though of course still only one man's viewpoint.

He recalls coming across Horrocks at one stage who remembered his name. Pretty good for a corps commander to remember one of his Plt commanders names. Might have to ask him about captured MG42s and SMGs as he goes on about it a fair bit <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks for the info Simon. Maybe what Horrocks said was 'Oh you must be the guy who is still a platoon commander after the campaign - so who did you piss off to not get promoted with all those officer casualties'

But seriously, he must have been extremely lucky. Maybe I should contact him directly for a copy of his book... Good way to find out his attitude towards Germans too

[Andreas]

Grrrr!!! It seems to be unpossible to find his email or any other contact details. If someone here has them (even the address in the book would help, since it was privately published), can you please email it to me?

Ta.