shermans

[Jeff Duquette]

Jason Said: I was indeed referring to Eisenhower's request, which was for British built guns. You are right that it was too late to make 17s in the U.S.; that one had already been "blown". Eisenhower took the reports of the inferiority of the Sherman very seriously.

10,000 in-Theatre upgrades? That was what I was curious about. You sure you didn’t add a zero.

Jason Said:Incidentally, one fellow speculated that maybe the issue was APHE stuff. I hardly think so. The U.S. short 75mm shells would take out Pz IVs and StuGs, but against 110mm at 60 degrees, it is not even close. It was not a matter of shell deficiencies. A gun that weak was just never going to punch through armor that strong.

I recall you saying somewhere that you were in the artillery? Don’t they teach you guys about tanks also having 2 sides and a rear as well as the front . Tigers and Panthers were KO’d by Shermans with 75mm’s...side and rear shots. Common tactic used by the Brits, Americans and Soviets was to engage\distract from the front while a flanking element manuvered for a killing side or rear shot. I can even lay my hands on an AAR detailing a Greyhound KO’ing a Tiger with a close-in ass shot from its 37mm.

British stats would suggest that Panthers and Tigers examined in Normandy were taking on average in excess of three perforations for a brew-up. I would contend that this was partially attributable to the Brit’s not employing APCBC.

Regarding the APCBC fuse issue, there is some historical basis to my speculation.

From: David Honner, Guns vs. Armour

A projectile containing HE requires a reliable and fast acting fuse which would operate even after the tremendous forces encountered while penetrating the target. Several countries found this difficult to develop. Only Germany used HE filled shells exclusively in preference to solid shot for calibres of 20mm and greater during World War II.

From: Thomas L. Jentz, Tank Combat in North Africa.

“The German projectiles which have caused the greatest amount of damage to Allied tanks in the Western desert campaigns have been the AP–HE type … …penetration and the explosive charge can complete the destruction of at least the tank crew. At closer ranges the destructive effect is very great, where in many cases destruction of the tank is permanent.”

“Each German AP–HE round fired may safely be presumed to have put the tank out of action. In this connection it was noted that the fuse functioned perfectly, that is to say it functioned only after penetration and then always in the fighting compartment where the most damage is done. Parts also frequently penetrated into the engine compartment.”

Jason Said: The front protection on a Panther is better than that on the other common German types, by more than a factor of 2. Better caps and such do-dads might help a 76mm AP against a Tiger I, but 75s weren't going to do anything from the front, and even 76mm tungsten rounds can't reliably get through the Panther front hull (unless they get some down-angle from terrain, or something).

Again tanks have four sides which can typically be engaged by another tank. So employment of 75mm APCBC in side and rear shots could have only acted to increase the probability of a brew-up within Panthers and Tigers.

Battle of Singling, 6 December 1944 (see Historical Division US War Department, “Small Unit Actions” 4, April, 1946) Sgt. Robert Fitzgerald’s M4(76) KO’s two PzKw Mk V’s...one from frontal shots.

First KO was at a range of approx. 150m. One round @ approximately 20 to 30 degree obliquity on angle of attack based upon the photo taken from Fitzgerald’s firing position toward KO’d Panther (i.e. combined angles of obliquity and inherent armour slope…apparent frontal armour thickness is approximately 10% greater than actual armour thickness from only inherent armour slope). Panther Brews up from one hit. Fitzgerald fires two more rounds into the Panther (even after it had already brewed-up). Only one crewmen was seen to escape. By the Photo it would appear that the killing penetration was through the turret mantlet.

Second Mk V kill was @ approx 800m. Two hits...two penetrations...second round brews up Panther. The account indicates these were both side shots. No indication by Fitzgearld as to weather the crew was observed to escape or not.

The description is taken from the book. “Freineux and Lamormenil” by George Winter. This is a great AAR as it demonstrates two things:

1) The M4(76) was capable of mixing it up Panthers, and with a bit of luck could KO Panthers with frontal shots.

2) Its yet another example of accurate WWII tank gunnery at ranges in excess of 1000m. Two KO’s at 2000 yrds with 3 rnds.

“Standing in the turret, of D-31, parked behind the stone wall, Jim Vance recalled “All at once I observed an infantryman running toward my tank. He jumped up on my tank and told me that 4 German tanks were coming up over the hill to our left front. I alerted the driver to start the engine and I traversed the turret to the left so I could take the tanks under fire as soon as they came in view”. As the Panthers approached across a rising snow covered slope and reached its crest the Americans opened fire and Erich Heller’s panzergrenadiers jumped from the tank decks, seeking cover in a nearby ditch. The gunfire was coming from the Sherman of Corporal Vance, hidden behind the church wall. Vance standing in the turret recalled “Shortly I observed the 4 German tanks coming across the hill with their flank to my position.”

Without Lieutenant Myers, who was at this moment was attending the officer’s meeting, to call down firing directions, gunner Vance was on his own. Firing his shell found the mark, striking oberscharfuhrer Pippert’s Panther and forcing the Germans to bail out.

With one score, Vance maintained his poise. “When I saw I had hit one of the attacking tanks, I came up from my sights and fire controls to locate another tank. I picked up the second tank and immediately went back to my sights and fired. Again the round hit and I saw the tank become enveloped in fire and smoke.” Fritz Langanke, standing in the open hatch of his panzer approached Freineux, looked back to see Pippert’s tank abandoned and now watched as Untersturmfuhrer Kurt Seeger’s Panther burst into flames. Although struck in the front, where the PzKpwf.V was most heavily armored, Fritz Nolte, Seeger’s gunner realized, “We received the hit in the underside plating at the front of our panzer. Due to the slope of the terrain we presented our weak spot.” This was exactly where Vance’s shell struck. Langanke saw Seeger leap from the burning Panther but he did not notice that it was Nolte who “pushed Seeger out of the turret and sprang out behind.” Vance after disposing of the Panthers of Pippert and Seeger, had located Kirchner’s vehicle and went back to his sight but before he could pull the trigger, saw that the German was hit. “By the time I cam up looking for the fourth tank, I was not able to locate it. About this time he located my tank or the vicinity where the fire was coming. The 4th German tank fired and hit the wall just to my right front but didn’t hit us. Since I had not been able to the remaining German tank, I had the driver back behind the church out of the line of fire.”…

…Langanke’s gunner continue to fire, shells striking close to where Sergeant Reece Graham’s Sherman was position behind a stone wall. Graham’s memory of this is clear, “I saw a flash from the panzer, the shell hitting the building near the eve of the house, sending debris all over us. The panzer then fired another round and missed, hitting the same area. Returning fire, Graham’s gunner got off two or three rounds but was unable to score a hit since the German was in a depression … “I then looked to the right across the valley and saw a flash from another panzer about 2000 yards away. I then gave the gunner orders. “Right front! Right front! Range 2000! Fire! After firing I saw the AP with tracers in direct line, but short. I then ordered the gunner, ‘Up 2! Fire!’ The second shell went straight into the back of the panzer and it started burning. I was watching it with field glasses and to my surprise saw another panzer move from right to left behind the burning tank. I then gave the gunner orders. ‘Left! Up 2! Fire!’ The shell went straight in to the rear.””(Winter 34-35)

The advance of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment along this route was halted partially by the Shermans of Vance and Graham.

The 2 M4A1(76)Ws stood their ground and stopped a superior force from advancing into the town of Freineux. At the end of the battle 8 Shermans and 8 Panthers were totally disabled or destroyed.

long-winded

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 04-01-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Of course they KOed Panthers from the sides. APHE vs. solid AP issues were hardly going to stop them from doing so.

[Harry Yeide]

In brief (har har har):

Standardized in 1941, the Sherman represented the cutting edge in tank technology of its day. Critics argue, however, the by 1944 the Sherman was effectively obsolete when compared to the tanks being fielded in Western Europe by the Germans. Others argue that the M4 was a remarkably versatile and reliable tank well suited to the US combined-arms approach to war. The extensive literature on the Sherman tends to emphasize the quotes from tankers who were frustrated with the shortcomings of their vehicles, but tankers saw both sides of the argument.

The tank battalions landing in Normandy were initially equipped mostly with M4 or M4A1 Shermans, the difference between the two being that the former had a welded hull and the latter a cast hull with rounded contours. The 34-ton vehicle had a crew of five (commander, gunner, cannoneer/loader, driver, and assistant driver/bow gunner). Its main armament consisted of a 75mm gun in a fully traversing turret, supplemented by a coaxial 30 caliber machine gun, a second 30 caliber mounted in the hull at the assistant driver’s position, and a 50 caliber machine gun mounted outside the commander’s hatch on the turret. The front plate (glacis) of the Sherman had 2 inches of armor (later increased to 2-1/2 inches), while the sides and rear were 1.5 inches thick; the front of the turret was 3.5 inches at its thickest. The powerplant was a Wright Whirlwind aircraft engine that could push the vehicle close to 30 miles per hour under optimal conditions; M4A3’s using a Ford engine entered the battalions as well, and the records of some units indicate that they became the preferred alternative.

The Sherman was undeniably a compromise to the realities of US production capabilities and shipping capacity--a compromise that arguably lasted longer than it had to. The Sherman, for example, inherited the chassis and engine of its predecessor, the M3 (referred to as both the Mae West--informally--and General Lee in US service and the General Grant in British service)--which itself had been a massive compromise, mounting its main gun in a side sponson with limited traverse. Army regulations, moreover, prohibited vehicles wider than 124 inches because of shipping constraints. These restrictions affected how wide the turret could be--which in turn limited the size of the main gun--and how wide the tracks could be--which in turn helped determine the vehicles “flotation” or ability to spread its weight out for maximum maneuverability on soft surfaces such as mud. The need to mount the Wright Whirlwind engine forced a relatively tall design in relationship to the vehicle’s other dimensions.

The Sherman also initially fell victim to official US Army doctrine, which saw the roles of the tank as infantry support and fast, deep penetrations of the enemy’s rear once the infantry had cracked the main line of resistance. Tank destroyers--not tanks--were supposed to deal with enemy tanks. The Army gave little emphasis to giving the Sherman the kind of armament it needed to kill the latest generation of German tanks until it became clear that, in the real world, US tanks were running into German tanks with some regularity. And often with unhappy results.

The Sherman as Impotent Deathtrap

US tankers had been assured by the Army that they had the finest tank in the world, but it took only a few encounters--particularly with German Panther and Tiger tanks--in Normandy for them to realize they had problems. The Sherman’s 75mm gun could deal effectively with the still widely used Panzerkampfwagen IV (always referred to by tankers as the “Mark IV”), but it could not penetrate the glacis of the Panther (the Mark V) or Tiger (Mark VI) from any range. All of the tanks common in German service, meanwhile, could penetrate the thickest armor of the Sherman at all ordinary combat ranges and had superior optics, allowing accurate gunnery at longer ranges; indeed, the literature is rife with tales of rounds from the Panther’s long-barreled, high velocity 75mm cannon and the Tiger’s fiercesome 88 mm gun penetrating Shermans and exiting the other side of the tank. Major Welborn G. Dolvin, CO of the 191st, summarized the situation from the tanker’s point of view in August 1944:

"The Sherman tank, equipped with the 75mm gun, is no match for either the German Mark IV, V or VI. On numerous occasions, hits were obtained on German tanks with no noticable results. On the other hand, German high velocity tank guns never failed to penetrate the Sherman tank. This situation has a tremendous effect on the morale of the tank crews. This was evidenced by reluctance of crews to fire on German tanks, feeling that it would do no good and would result in their being promptly knocked out. Crews soon became ultra-cautious where German tanks were in the vicinity."

The Sherman also had a nasty tendency to catch fire and burn out completely when hit, which conditioned crews to abandon tank at the first sign of trouble. The 743rd Tank Battalion, for example, lost 96 medium tanks from 6 June to 8 May 1945, 65 of which burned. Crews believed that the use of a gasoline powered engine--vice diesel--was the reason for this, but investigation by the Army concluded that burning ammunition propellent from rounds in the Sherman itself was the main cause.

US tankers generally thought that German tanks, with their wide tracks on models subsequent to the Mark IV, had better mobility than they did in mud or snow. Tests showed that the Panther, meanwhile, was capable of speeds similar to that of the Sherman on surfaced roads.

The Sherman had some irritating mechanical peculiarities, as well. In order to prevent hydrostatic lock in tanks with the Whirlwind power plant, for example, a crewman had to handcrank the engine about 50 turns (which actually turned the engine over five times) before starting up. The engine also needed to be operated at above 1200 rpm to avoid fouling its 18 spark plugs; with advances in the hedgerows measured in yards, there was much engine idling and many fouled plugs. Nonetheless, particularly as compared with German tank engines, the Sherman’s engine variants were all reliable workhorses.

Sherman crews complained of one more characteristic--the Sherman’s high sillouette, which they said was inferior to that of the German tanks--but this gripe, at least, stands up poorly to examination. The Sherman was tall relative to its other dimensions--but not as compared with German tanks. The Sherman was 9 feet tall, while the Panther was 9 feet 8 inches high and the Tiger 9 feet 5 inches. Perhaps tankers should have actually been grateful that they presented relatively less target area in the other two dimensions than did their foes.

The Sherman as Effective War Machine

The Army was more than a little defensive about the qualities of the Sherman. Let us stipulate: the Sherman was not capable of going toe-to-toe with Panthers or Tigers on equal terms, particularly at long ranges. Yet, although this problem loomed large in the minds of tankers, doing so was not the typical daily activity of the infantry-supporting tank, and the Sherman would arguably have been no better at its other missions had it been a Panther. Moreover, the historical record shows that the Sherman was hardly helpless against German armor.

The Army offered a strategic-level defense of the Sherman that probably struck many tankers as a massive rationalization. Nonetheless, wars are won or lost in the big picture. General Patton offered the following observations in a 19 March 1945 letter to The Army and Navy Journal, published on 31 March:

"Since 1 August 1944, when the Third Army became operational, our total tank casualties have amounted to 1136 tanks. During the same period we have accounted for 2287 German tanks, of which 808 were the Tiger or Panther variety, and 851 on our side were the M4. These figures of themselves refute any inferiority of our tanks, but let me add that the Third Army has always attacked, and therefore better than 70 percent of our tank casualties have occured from dug-in antitank guns and not enemy tanks, whereas a majority of the enemy tanks have been put out by our tanks.

In the current operation, had the 4th Armored Division been equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks and been required to make the move from Saarguemines to Arlon, then through to Bastogne, from Bastogen to the Rhine, and now to Mainz, it would have been necessary to re-armor it twice; and furthermore, it would have had serious if not insurmountable difficulty in crossing rivers.

Finally, we must remember that all our tanks have to be transported on steamers and the difference between 40 tons and 70 tons is very marked. The 70-ton tank could never have been brought ashore in landing boats as many of our medium tanks were. Nor could they have marched from the Cotentin Peninsula to the Rhine as practically all of our tanks have been required to do."

[We might also all pause for a moment and try to picture a DD Tiger tank.]

The experiences of at least one independent tank battalion--which kept unusually good aggregate records--seem to support aspects of Patton’s case. The 743rd, while losing 96 medium tanks during the European campaign (many to antitank guns or bazookas) reported 41 Mark IV, 26 Mark V, 4 Mark VI, and 10 self-propelled guns (81 total) positively destroyed. The battalion also destroyed approximately 100 pill boxes and machine gun nests, 36 antitank guns, nine field pieces, four armored cars, and circa 125 miscellaneous wheeled vehicles--the targets expected of the infantry-support tank.

Moreover, tank loss rates suggest that one of the Sherman’s main weaknesses was inexperienced crews. Units tended to suffer a substantial portion of their total losses for the war in their first few days of combat, whereafter the tankers who survived evidently learned how to fight their tanks more effectively. For example:

-- The 16 tanks lost by the 743rd on D-day alone accounted for 17 percent of its total Sherman losses for the war.

-- The 737th, attached to the 35th Infantry Division, entered combat on 14 July. It lost 23 Shermans in its first three days of fighting, 35 percent of its total losses for the war.

-- The 750th, attached to 104th “Timberwolf” Infantry Division near Aachen, endured its first real combat 16 November 1944. Companies A and C supported the 414th Infantry Regiment in attacks on pillboxes for three days. 17 tanks were knocked out, about 30 percent of the battalion’s total medium tank losses.

[A sidebar follows:]

"[On 17 December at 1450 hours] Lt. Miller reported that enemy tanks were approaching the positions where his tank and one other Co C were located. A fire fight developed between tanks and very soon thereafter, a report was received to the effect that Lt. Miller’s tank had been knocked out. S/Sgt. Crisler then assumed command of the remainder of the platoon and upon moving to the vicinity of the position that had been held by Lt. Miller, discovered the other tank with him had also been knocked out. He noted further that two enemy Tigers had been destroyed in the action...

[On 18 December at 0920 hours] Tiger tanks began to move into the town of ROCHERATH, on a street approximately 150 yds from the Bn CP. Two deadlined Co B tanks that had been placed in a lane just East of the CP for anti-tank defense opened fire on the Tigers’ flanks with devestating effect. When the smoke of battle had cleared these two “disabled tanks” had destroyed five of the Tigers in short order.These tanks were commanded by Sgt. Neidrich and Cpl. Hall. One enemy tank of the original group continued through town on the road to BILLINGEN and its destruction was caused in part by Sgt. Angelletti of Co. B. Sgt. Padgett of Co. B whose tank was located on a bank street carefully maneuvered up behind one of the Tigers and destroyed same...

In the fierce three-day action at ROCHERATH, tankers of the 741st Tank Battalion proved themselves adept at the art of way-laying and killing “TIGERS”. From well camouflaged positions, by expert maneuvering and stalking, tank after tank of the enemy forces were detroyed by flank and tail shots of the Bn’s gunners. Recapitulation at the end of the encounter showed the Bn as having knocked out twenty-seven (27) enemy tanks, (mostly Mark VI’s), one SP gun, two armored cars, two half-tracks and two trucks.

In contrast to the number of enemy vehicles destroyed, our tank losses were comparitively small. A total of eight (8) tanks were lost to enemy action.

[After Action Report, 741st Tank Battalion. The battalion at this time had not yet received its first Shermans with 76mm guns, nor did it have air cover during these initial days of the Battle of the Bulge. The by now battle-savvy crews fought base Shermans against Tigers and won.]"

[End sidebar.]

The tankers nonetheless made it clear that they wanted more armor, better maneuverability, and a more lethal main gun. The Army was working on it, which makes it difficult to compare “the Sherman” to a Tiger or Panther. The M4 of D-day was far outclassed in tank-to-tank terms. Late production Shermans offer a more ambiguous comparison. Moreover, the production of the improved models began before or slightly after D-day; it was a problem of deploying equipment in the pipeline rather than a failure to respond to the challenges posed by German tanks that accounted to a large extent for the fact that seemingly outmoded Shermans were left duking it out with Panthers, Tigers, King Tigers, and other deadly foes until the war’s end.

Protection. Where the Sherman initially offered 2 inches of steel up front, the Panther sported 80 mm (a bit more than 3 inches) of better-sloped armor and the Tiger 100mm or about 4 inches. Matching German armor would not have been a cure-all solution, however. Although tank crews would have preferred to be invulnerable, even some tankers acknowledged that this would be impossible against superb German weaponry. Tankers knew that German antitank rounds could punch through even 10 inches of armor in the corner where the Sherman’s turret was at its thickest. Moreover, consider two major threats to the US tanker:

-- The 88mm main gun used in the Tiger and several other tanks and self-propelled guns could penetrate the thick frontal armor of the Tiger--which weighed 55 tons--out to about 2000 yards.

-- Tests performed by the 17th Armored Engineer Battalion showed that the 81mm German bazooka reliably penetrated the front armor of the Panther--which weighed nearly 46 tons--at ranges up to 200 yards.

Tankers and the Army nevertheless had every incentive to take measures to reduce the danger of penetration. The Army welded on 1-inch thick steel plates to add protection to vulnerable ammunition storage bins and shot traps in front of the driver’s and bog gunner’s hatches on early model Shermans even before the invasion of France.

The crews acted next, turning to field solutions in hope of adding protection at least against Panzerfausts and light antitank weapons. The first expedient was sandbagging. The bags were initially held on with chickenwire or some other quick fix, but later service companies welded brackets intended for the purpose onto many tanks. The 743rd Tank Battalion, for example, sandbagged all of its tanks between 18 and 22 July 1944, and its records show the unit resandbagging old tanks and thus outfitting newly received tanks during down times for much of the rest of the war. There is considerable debate as to whether sandbagging was all that effective. Some fields tests suggested not. But some showed promising results; a day after test-firing a German bazooka and antitank grenade against a sandbagged Sherman on 28 July in the 3rd Armored Group, trucks started back to the beach to collect sand for bags for the tanks.

Later in the war, some units actually tried pouring concrete on the front plates of their Shermans. The 750th Tank Battalion, for example, at the end of hostilities had to use jackhammers to remove six inches of reinforced concrete it had added during combat.

The Army, meanwhile, produced 1-inch kits to be welded onto the front of mid-production Shermans with a 47-degree glacis, which had been introduced in 1943 to correct the shot trap caused by protruding hatches. Ordnance also in March 1944--even before the hard lessons of Normandy--ordered a limited production run of M4A3E2 assault tanks, nicknamed “Jumbos.” These tanks began reaching independant tank battalions in November 1944. The Jumbo carried about 6 inches of armor up front and, combining armor and the gun mantlet, 13 inches of protection on the turret front. The extra armor reduced the top speed slightly to 22 miles per hour. The records of the independent tank battalions demonstrate a certain futility in this armor race: although the Jumbos clearly took more punishment than stock Shermans, they regularly fell prey to guns of 75mm and higher, bazookas, and mines.

The Army also introduced “wet” storage for ammunition--racks surrounded by water--into newer models of the Sherman in order to reduce the probability of burning. A study conducted in 1945 showed that only 10-15 percent of Shermans so equipped burned when penetrated, as compared with 60-80 percent of those with the original stowage system. Wet storage was not a cure-all in part because of the tankers’ practice of carrying more ammunition than the official combat load (97 rounds for a 75mm Sherman with a welded hull type), with the excess often stacked on the floor.

Maneuverability. The tank battalions saw the first Army effort to improve mobility during the winter, when grouser kits--also known as “duck bills”--became available. The duck bills were attached to the edge of the tracks, making them wider and better distributing the weight. This expedient proved only somewhat successful, however, because the grousers were prone to snap off or bend.

The main step forward was the production of the M4A3E8, which began in August 1944. The final production model of the Sherman, the “Easy 8” had an improved horizontal volute suspension and wider tracks. General Isaac D. White, commanding general of the 2nd Armored Division, said of this vehicle, “The M4A3E8 has comparable speed and maneuverability to any German tank.” Unfortunately, the Easy 8 did not begin to reach the independent tank battalions--and then only in very small numbers--until early 1945.

Lethality. For the infantry support tank, machine guns were usually the most important weapon in the vehicle (indeed, the very first Shermans had two additional forward pointing fixed 30 caliber machine guns in the hull). Tankers were happy enough with their 30 calibers, which fired more slowly than the German counterpart but were more accurate. The 740th Tank Battalion went into combat with 50,000 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition per day--and spent them. The tanks had stowage space for only 15,000 rounds, and the tankers carried the rest in boxes fastened to the bustle and stacked on the floor. Tankers had more mixed feelings regarding the 50 caliber mounted on the turret top: German soldiers were afraid of it, but a tank could carry only 500 or 600 rounds of ammunition.

The main point of contention was the cannon. The Army began testing a 76mm tank gun with a much higher muzzle velocity than the 75mm in August 1942, and the results were so good that the weapon was standardized and accepted into inventory as the 76mm gun M1 in September 1942. The project languished until a new turret was developed in 1943, during which year the Army Ground Forces ordered production of 1,000 Shermans with the new weapon. Serial production began in January 1944 and expanded in May of that year. A few 76mm Shermans made it to England in time for D-day, but commanders were not enthused until stung my the bad experiences of tankers in France.

Like many equipment upgrades, the appearance of 76mm Shermans in the independent tank battalions varied tremendously. At one extreme, the 774th Tank Battalion entered combat in August fully equipped with 76mm-armed Shermans. The 737th on 19 October 1944 received a single tank with a 76mm gun, which it decided to use as an assault gun attached to Headquarters Company and shuttled among the line units as needed. The 741st drew its first 76mm Shermans on 1 January 1945, and the 743rd received its first five M4s with 76mm guns on 2 January. The 3rd Armored Group noted on 7 January 1945, “The issue of M4 medium tanks mounting 76mm cannon... was noteworthy only in the sense of promise, for separate tank battalions [have been] issued only a few of them.” It was not until February 1945 that the independent tank battalions moved to the front of the line ahead of armored divisions for allocation of 76mm tanks arriving in Theater.

Although better against armor than the 75mm, the 76mm gun was not the solution tankers had hoped for. It, too, proved to be generally ineffective against the front armor of the Panther and Tiger except at close ranges, thanks to a botched assessment of the gun’s penetration ability by the Ordnance Department during development. The gun proved ineffective, that is, until the introduction of tungsten-core High Velocity Armor Piercing (HVAP) rounds, with which the Sherman finally gained the ability to kill the Panther and Tiger from the front at more typical combat distances. Once again, deployment of equipment in the pipeline caused the Sherman to remain weaker than it had to be. HVAP rounds began to reach independent tank battalions by September 1944 at the latest, but the “souped-up” ammunition remained extremely scarce for the entire war. When the 9th US Army in late March 1945 notified the 3rd Armored Group that HVAP would henceforth be available as a standard issue, it indicated that 1/2 round per tube per month could be drawn. Nevertheless, as Lt. Col Fries of the 747th Tank Battalion observed in a “Battle Lessons” report on 1 January 1945, “The 76mm gun firing H.V.A.P. ammunition is a good step forward toward battlefield parity with the heaviest German armor.”

A drawback to the 76mm gun was that it fired a far less effective high explosive round than did the 75mm. For infantry support tanks, this was a major drawback. At least some infantry commanders seemed to want to keep a preponderance of 75mm guns around.

The 76mm gun also produced a muzzle blast so large that crews had trouble tracking the rounds in order to correct their aim. It was not until the Easy 8 was delivered that a muzzle brake corrected the problem (although one tank battalion cut muzzle brakes off German guns and welded them on to Sherman 76mm cannons with good effect).

The Sherman had one key advantage over German tanks when mounting either the 75mm or 76mm cannon: a faster turret rotation speed. This factor could determine who got off the first shot.

Some observers have lamented that the Sherman was not provided with a 90mm gun. Lt. Col. George Rubel described his view on the subject, which he shared with the War Department in March 1945:

"My personal opinion is that tanks must fight tanks, and must be able to knock them out with their fire-power. Our 90mm gun could not do this for the reason that it lacked sufficient velocity. I would much rather have a 75mm tank gun with an extremely high velosity projectile than a 90mm or larger gun for several reasons: First, very few rounds of 90mm ammo can be caried in a tank; second, it lacked penetrating power; third, that the great weight of the gun prevented fast traverse; and fourth, that the extreme length of the barrel made it impossible to traverse to the side in narrow streets or on roads lined with trees or telephone poles. The present M26 tank has accumulated all of these disadvantages and is worthless in street fighting, fighting in woods, or in fact anywhere except wide open spaces."

Drawn from a first cut of a history I am writing on the independent tank battalions in the ETO. Cheers.

[russellmz]

Originally posted by Harry Yeide:

In brief (har har har):

awesome post dude...

------------------

russellmz,

Self-Proclaimed Keeper for Life of the Sacred Unofficial FAQ.

"They had their chance- they have not lead!" - GW Bush

"They had mechanical pencils- they have not...lead?" - Jon Stewart on The Daily Show

[Wolfcub]

blimmy thats the longest post iv ever read some nice ddeteail in there m8

[Guest machineman]

Originally posted by Harry Yeide:

Sherman crews complained of one more characteristic--the Sherman’s high sillouette, which they said was inferior to that of the German tanks--but this gripe, at least, stands up poorly to examination. The Sherman was tall relative to its other dimensions--but not as compared with German tanks. The Sherman was 9 feet tall, while the Panther was 9 feet 8 inches high and the Tiger 9 feet 5 inches. Perhaps tankers should have actually been grateful that they presented relatively less target area in the other two dimensions than did their foes.

Kind of wondering about that. My Janes guide gives the early M4 a height of 9.74 feet. This is considerably higher than the 8.79 ft for the similarly sized PzIVH. The later M4A3 with revised suspension comes in taller yet at 10.65 feet, which is about two feet taller than the PzIV, one foot taller than a Panther (9.78) or Tiger (9.61), and even somewhat taller than a Kingtiger (10.11).

[Jeff Duquette]

Great Post Harry. Just an added note: First U.S. Army firing test near Isigny, France, 19 August 1944 concluded:

“The 17pdr APCBC and the 76mm HVAP, T4 are considered the best antitank ammunitions available in these calibers for use against heavy armor. The 17pdr APCBC is somewhat superior to the 76mm HVAP, T4, against the Panther Tank. Neither one can be depended upon to penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther in one fair hit on average quality plate.”

Even with HVAP the M4(76) was still seemingly in a crap shoot against the Panther’s Glacis.

Regarding the advantages of the Duel-Purpose 75mm on the M4 you pointed to, I thought the following was interesting.

From: Peter Beale "Death by Design, British Tank Development in the Second World War”.

Comments from a tank crews is worth recording. Arthur Reddish was a hull gunner in a fighting squadron of the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry. In his book Normandy 1944 from the hull of a Sherman he writes: Reviewing the military situation at the end of July 1944 several of us crewmen came to the conclusion that our quick firing 75mm gun (medium velocity) was preferable to the 17-pdr when fighting in close country. The 75mm had a very good HE shell and this was the ammunition most in use in that type of fighting. We considered that the present mix - one 17-pdr tank in each troop - was the best we could have. The infantry had a towed 17-pdr, which could be quickly in action.

Presumably this is a relatively clear indication that tanks were more often than not engaging infantry and anti-tank targets in which the better the performing Sherman 75mm HE round would provide a distinct advantage over the 17-pdr’s marginal HE round.

Another note on British APCBC lacking an explosive charge: Apparently the motivation was experiences in North Africa in which the Brits were concerned about pre-detonation of AP-HE when engaging German tanks sporting spaced armor ala various incarnations of the MkIII.

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by machineman:

Kind of wondering about that. My Janes guide gives the early M4 a height of 9.74 feet. This is considerably higher than the 8.79 ft for the similarly sized PzIVH. The later M4A3 with revised suspension comes in taller yet at 10.65 feet, which is about two feet taller than the PzIV, one foot taller than a Panther (9.78) or Tiger (9.61), and even somewhat taller than a Kingtiger (10.11).

Dimensions are per Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, Tanks of the World 1915-45 (Stackpole Books). They list the Panzer IV at 8.9', Panther at 9.8', the Tiger at 9.5', the King Tiger at 10.26', the M4 at 9' even, and the various M4 models w/ 76mm gun turrets at 9' 9". I myself possess two feet, although I'm not sure that proves anything really. I assume the decimel point measurements for the German models are the result of conversions from the metric originals. Cheers.

[Claus B]

Originally posted by Sabu:

I am still wondering if any of the German tanks used wet storage for amo. If not, what was the reason for the better safty of the german tanks, was it just thicker armor, or was the German amo more likely to lite up the enemy.

The Germans never used wet stowage and as Jeffs figures show, the Panzer IV was no less prone to catch fire than were the Sherman.

There seems to be a common logical short-circuit in play here, namely that because allied tankers complained about their (early) Shermans catching fire when hit, then German tanks must somehow have been less prone to do this. However, one does not follow logically from the other.

As a matter of fact, in the first combat reports on the German Panther it was commented that it caught fire very easily once penetrated. That "problem" persisted to the end of the war, it is just not publicized very much.....

The problem with the Sherman was not that it was gasoline powered. German and British tanks were gasoline powered as well. Most Soviet tanks drove on diesel but they burned or exploded just as well. The main problem was unprotected ammunition. This can be seen from the fact that dry-stowage Shermans burned in 60-80% of cases when hit while wet stowage vehicles burned in 10-15% of cases.

By the way, the mighty Tiger II also had problems with stowed ammo going up in flames. In an attack on 12/8 1944 in the Baranow-bridgehead in Poland, s.PzAbt 501 lost 3 Tigers to T34/85s. Hits set off the ammo in the rear turret causing catastrophic explosions. "In the future, gun ammunition will not be stowed in the turret".

Claus B

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Sabu:

Seems to me that they could have been welding more armor on those suckers, at leas on the front.

Unfortunately it's not quite that simple. Adding armor adds weight (unless you take something else off; so what do you vote to throw away?). This makes the tank less mobile, stresses the suspension (especially since by adding the armor to the front you are also upsetting the balance of the vehicle), and increases the probability of bogging. Anything more than a minor increase of the armor (which was done), you're better off designing an all-new vehicle.

Michael

[Padre]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

You're most likely correct about the Red Army being bigger. I think the US overall armed forces were more numerous though.

In May-June 1945, the Soviets had 264 divisions of battle-hardened veterans in Europe, including 36 armoured divisions, compared with 103 Allied divisions, 23 of which were armoured. America retained 64 divisions in Europe. The Soviet air force outnumbered the Allies by 11,802 in fighters and fighter-bombers, although American, British and Polish heavy bombers had a superiority of almost three to one.

You do the math.

[Major Tom]

You seem to forget the vast number of formations in the Pacific. Also, the US Navy was the largest in the world, with Britain, Canada and France being the next three largest. The US Mobilized around 10% of their population, however, did not suffer the same casualties as the Russian Army did. In reality, the number of troops and amount of equipment available at the end of the war was about equal. Remember, by the end of the war many Allied Infantry Divisions had enough AT guns, and attached TD battalions that they could independently take on an Armoured Division, while Russian Infantry formations were more or less on their own, with most tanks concentrated in Tank Corps (Divisions).

[This message has been edited by Major Tom (edited 04-02-2001).]

[Padre]

Originally posted by Major Tom:

You seem to forget the vast number of formations in the Pacific. Also, the US Navy was the largest in the world, with Britain, Canada and France being the next three largest. The US Mobilized around 10% of their population, however, did not suffer the same casualties as the Russian Army did. In reality, the number of troops and amount of equipment available at the end of the war was about equal. Remember, by the end of the war many Allied Infantry Divisions had enough AT guns, and attached TD battalions that they could independently take on an Armoured Division, while Russian Infantry formations were more or less on their own, with most tanks concentrated in Tank Corps (Divisions).

[This message has been edited by Major Tom (edited 04-02-2001).]

Now, let's not get carried away. An Allied Infantry Division independently taking on a Soviet Armoured Division? You gotta be kidding.

US Infantry Division would usually have a tank battalion and a TD battalion attached. That means, some 20 light tanks, 60 medium and 40 TD. At best!

Soviet Armored Division (Brigade) of 3 Battalions of 3 Companies each, will have over 90 medium tanks. This brigade will have as its integral component at least a medium AT Company with 4 45mm or 57mm AT guns and a light AT Company with 18 AT Rifles.

Don't forget that Soviet Armoured Brigade was only one of components of the larger parental unit, like Mechanized or Tank Corps. And such Corps will have some numerous other nifty stuff attached, like Armored Recon Battalion (10 45mm or 57mm AT guns), and (not "or") AT Regiment (24 76.2mm AT guns), and "Light" AT Battalion (12 45mm AT guns), and Medium Armoured Artillery Regiment (20 SU-85 or SU-100), and Heavy Armoured Artillery Regiment (20 ISU-122 or ISU-152). What if, God forbid, that Corps Commander like a good parent he is, decided to cross attach some of those goodies to that hypothetical Armoured Brigade? Without knowing that a US Infantry Division wanted to come and play?

Methinks, that Infantry Division is in for a good spanking. Besides, how many people in that Infantry Division really saw any actual combat by the end of war? Surely less then that hypothetical (I like this word) Soviet Armored Division (Brigade)?

[Simon Fox]

Jeff Duquette wrote

With respect to ammunition types being a factor?this is probably partly a factor. The BRITISH ARMY did not employ APCBC. The penetrator in APCBC contains a small high explosive charge which would therotically detonate in the interior of a tank following perforation. The detonation would increase the probability of secondary explosions from stowed ammunition exploding within the interior of the targeted tank. The British used only solid shot against armoured targets. I have even seen references suggesting that the Brits removed explosive filler from APCBC supplied to them by the yanks. I think this British policy of solid shot only had something to do with bad experiences with APCBC in North Africa.

Actually the US ammunition was APCBCHE and the British ammo was APCBC. I disagree with your premise regarding the relative internal effects of an AP shot with a HE filler vs a solid shot. As pointed out above the Brits did dispense with the HE filler for smaller calibre APCBC due to concerns regarding spaced German armour. However, they persisted with this long after the spaced armour was off the scene because their testing showed that (A) For calibres of around 50mm and above the catastrophic internal damage caused by a penetration was quite sufficient without the HE filler and ( there was a marginal improvement in penetration. I beleive that the US also eventually dispensed with the HE filler, is that correct. You cite the 1.9(Sherman) vs 3.2 (MkV&VI)figure from your source (very interesting I might add) in support yet you ignore the 1.9 vs 1.5 (MkIV) which doesn't at all support your premise.

Like gunneroz I am suspicious of the wet stowage issue and the ammunition flammability problems. It doesn't coincide with my reading of British experience. After having been initially supplied with diesel Shermans they deplored the petrol versions since anecdotally they found them less reliable and prone to engine fires. There's somefink funny going on there and the chain of cause and effect isn't all that clear.

Some tanks are clearly more survivable than others. The Churchill for example seems to have been better in this regard.

------------------

"Stand to your glasses steady,

This world is a world of lies,

Here's a toast to the dead already,

And here's to the next man to die."

-hymn of the "Double Reds"

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

The armor component of a U.S. infantry division was about the same as a Russian tank brigade (which had 93 AFV at TOE). The armor component of a U.S. armor division was about the same as a Russian tank corps, which despite its name was the real division-level organization. The Russian tank corps had a heavier mix of AFV types, but then that is true generally. The vehicle numbers are comparable.

The previous fellow's point remains true, that the U.S. infantry division had a serious armor component, and Russian infanry did not. At most, they had a few SU-76s to fufill all the roles of assault guns, TDs, and SPA. TOE of a U.S. infantry division at the end of the war, would include 54 Sherman mixed 75 or 76mm, 6 Sherman 105mm, 36 Hellcat or Jackson TD, 17 Chaffee or Stuart, and 18 M-8 armored car, and 6 M8HMC-75mm SPA. When a full recon battalion was present instead of just a company, that would double the light tanks, armored cars and SP75mm howitzer. So overall there are 96 "heavy" and 41-82 "light" AFV.

A U.S. armored division, except for the earlier pattern 2nd and 3rd, had ~350 AFV, roughly 1/3rd of them light types, while those two had more like ~450, around 40% of them light. At least 2/3rds of the armor divisions had been fielded with uniform 76mm Sherman by the end of the war, though some had doubtless mixed in 75mm as replacements afterward.

The main differences were simply that #1 the Russians had much heavier tanks on average and #2, the Russians have more leg infantry. On the other side, the Western powers were fully motorized. The balance of those is certainly in favor of the Russians on the ground, primarily because of better tanks.

The comparison of the air forces is, however, a bad joke. The Russian air force was numerically large, but had relatively few truly first-line AC (some of the better late-model Yaks, etc), and by western standards nothing like the same sortie and readiness rates. Against the late war Germans, who by the end lacked air cover, the Sturmoviks were quite useful, certainly. But there is simply no comparison with western tac air - as any German vet who saw both places will tell you - let alone strategic air. That changed when Russia developed the MiG-15 after the war (from captured Me-262 plans, among other things), but the earlier Russian fighters were barely in the same league.

[Jeff Duquette]

As pointed out above the Brits did dispense with the HE filler for smaller calibre APCBC due to concerns regarding spaced German armour.

The Brit’s dispensed with HE filler in all APCBC…large and small caliber. The reasoning being that:

a) Perceived Problems with premature detonation of HE filler when engaging spaced armor.

The Brits found that losing the HE charge typically resulted in approximately 5% to 10% increased penetration ability of APCBC.

The premise however is the effect of the round following perforation. If you have been following the thread the original question was weather ammunition types employed by the Jerries some how contributed to the tendency of Allied tanks to Brew-up. APCBC with charge was evidently far more destructive than solid shot if perforation was achieved. To avoid redundancy see previous quotes from Jentz. The math is really quite simple for AP-HE…add hot splinters and fragmentation generated from armour spalling\failure during penetration to hot splinters of a shell exploding inside a confined space…now through a bunch of stowed ammunition into the fray. Conversely straight-up Solid shot…the equation simply becomes… hot splinters and fragmentation generated from armour spalling\failure during penetration.

As far as ignoring the Sherman and MkIV brew-up stats I’m afraid that you will have to elaborate on what your point is here. We are after all talking about two totally different vehicles with different ammunition storage layouts. Or are you implying that this stat seemingly contradicts Shermans being more susceptible to Brew-up than diesel powered Jerry MkIV’s?

[Simon Fox]

To avoid redundancy see previous quotes from Jentz.

Which refers to North Africa which is a quite different situation with regards to typical vehicles, gun calibre and ammunition. The importance of the additional bursting charge to disabling the vehicle following penetration may be greater in these circumstances.

The math is really quite simple for AP-HE?

It would be better that we left the maths out of this, thankfully you didn't go there, in all likelyhood it would only prove the intuitively obvious. To quote one of rexford's favourite sources: "In principle, penetrating shell with a bursting charge should have better behind-armour effect than solid shot, but whether this matters in calibres above about 50mm seems highly questionable." That is of course sufficient to render the tank or it's crew out of the game so to speak, brewing up being necessary only to render the tank unrecoverable. I am perfectly cogniscant of the basis of discussion in this thread, I merely wanted to point out that the British rationale included acknowledgement that at larger calibres later in the war the bursting charge was most likely 'overkill' and that getting the round in was more important.

As far as ignoring the Sherman and MkIV brew-up stats I?m afraid that you will have to elaborate on what your point is here. We are after all talking about two totally different vehicles with different ammunition storage layouts.

OK let's elaborate. Referring to your original post.

Average Number of Penetrations Received for Brew-Up of a Tank

Sherman M4___1.9 penetrations

PzKw Mk.IV___1.5 penetrations

PzKw Mk.V____3.2 penetrations

PzKw Mk.VI___3.2 penetrations*

(*Only a small sample of MkVI's in study)

Later you wrote this:

British stats would suggest that Panthers and Tigers examined in Normandy were taking on average in excess of three perforations for a brew-up. I would contend that this was partially attributable to the Brit?s not employing APCBC.

So is the difference between the MkIV and the Panther/Tiger due to the differences in the vehicles? Are the differences between the Sherman and the MkIV due to differences in the vehicle or the ammunition? Are you suggesting the MkIV figure would have been lower if the Brits had used APCBCHE instead of APCBC? Could this data be skewed in anyway by the positioning of the hits on the respective vehicle types? Obviously I am confused since I thought you were contending that these figures meant something with regard to ammunition and the chance of 'brewing-up' when in fact we're talking about three totally different vehicles and an unknown number of different round types plus a number of other sources of variation.

[Jeff Duquette]

Regarding North Africa being a totally different situation and therefore the Jentz material is irrelevant seems far-fetched. Again the reasoning behind the British dumping AP-HE was somewhat motivated by experiences with German spaced armour on tanks being fought by the British in N. Africa. It is quite clear that Jentz has provided us a little window here into the effects of AP-HE on the interiors of tanks.

Simon Said: “In principle, penetrating shell with a bursting charge should have better behind-armour effect than solid shot, but whether this matters in calibers above about 50mm seems highly questionable."

Sorry..I have to digress on this one. Your quoting Rexford now? This is quite humorous considering your past attacks on the guy’s credibility. I’ll have to make sure Rexford sees that you’re quoting him now

But seriously, it would be more interesting if you could produce an independent source to verify your suppositions. Quoting from previous threads on this forum seems – at best – an extremely watered down approach to proving a point.

Simon Said: So is the difference between the MkIV and the Panther/Tiger due to the differences in the vehicles? Are the differences between the Sherman and the MkIV due to differences in the vehicle or the ammunition? Are you suggesting the MkIV figure would have been lower if the Brits had used APCBCHE instead of APCBC? Could this data be skewed in anyway by the positioning of the hits on the respective vehicle types? Obviously I am confused since I thought you were contending that these figures meant something with regard to ammunition and the chance of 'brewing-up' when in fact we're talking about three totally different vehicles and an unknown number of different round types plus a number of other sources of variation.

You answered my question with about four more questions.

Simon Said:Like gunneroz I am suspicious of the wet stowage issue and the ammunition flammability problems.

As much as It pains me, I still have to side with Jason on the basic reasoning behind internal fires inside tanks (although I will refrain from quoting Jason here

From: “Montgomery’s Scientists, Operational Research in Northwest Europe”. Editor Terry Copp. This was originally drawn from WO 222/72 and WO 222/111

“Solandt reminded his listeners of the contributions OR had already made. He recalled that early reports from the desert fighting had suggested that crew casualties were largely due to burns. This had

led to "an orgy of designing clothing that would protect crews against flaming petrol." Major A.L. Chute of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps had gone out to the Middle East in March 1941 to study the physiological side of tank warfare on behalf of the Medical Research Council. Chute established that there were very few cases of severe burns and light burns were limited to the exposed areas of the body so even the lightest clothing would prevent them. A study of burnt-out tanks had determined that "fires in the fighting chamber were not petrol fires but were due to the ignition of cordite stowed in the tank." This report led to the armouring of ammunition stowage bins and a decline in the incidence of interior fires.”

[Padre]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

The armor component of a U.S. infantry division was about the same as a Russian tank brigade (which had 93 AFV at TOE). The armor component of a U.S. armor division was about the same as a Russian tank corps, which despite its name was the real division-level organization. The Russian tank corps had a heavier mix of AFV types, but then that is true generally. The vehicle numbers are comparable.

The previous fellow's point remains true, that the U.S. infantry division had a serious armor component, and Russian infanry did not. At most, they had a few SU-76s to fufill all the roles of assault guns, TDs, and SPA.

Nope, generic Soviet Rifle Division did not have any integral armoured components at all. For assault guns they would have 21 120mm mortars, 12 regimental 76.2 howitzers and 12 122mm howitzers. They'd also have 24 76.2mm AT guns and 12 45mm or 57mm AT guns.

But it is not a big secret that Soviet Rifle Divisions were not designed to fulfill the same roles as US Infantry Divisions. So why compare apples and oranges? What you really should compare a US Infantry Division to is a Soviet Mechanized (not Tank) Corps. This Corps will have the beforementioned Tank Brigade, plus at least 3 more Tank Battalions in its other 3 Mech Infantry Brigades, plus the usual two Regiments of medium and heavy TD respectively. That would be a plenty of armor components.

TOE of a U.S. infantry division at the end of the war, would include 54 Sherman mixed 75 or 76mm, 6 Sherman 105mm, 36 Hellcat or Jackson TD, 17 Chaffee or Stuart, and 18 M-8 armored car, and 6 M8HMC-75mm SPA. When a full recon battalion was present instead of just a company, that would double the light tanks, armored cars and SP75mm howitzer. So overall there are 96 "heavy" and 41-82 "light" AFV.

A U.S. armored division, except for the earlier pattern 2nd and 3rd, had ~350 AFV, roughly 1/3rd of them light types, while those two had more like ~450, around 40% of them light. At least 2/3rds of the armor divisions had been fielded with uniform 76mm Sherman by the end of the war, though some had doubtless mixed in 75mm as replacements afterward.

The main differences were simply that #1 the Russians had much heavier tanks on average and #2, the Russians have more leg infantry. On the other side, the Western powers were fully motorized. The balance of those is certainly in favor of the Russians on the ground, primarily because of better tanks.

The comparison of the air forces is, however, a bad joke. The Russian air force was numerically large, but had relatively few truly first-line AC (some of the better late-model Yaks, etc), and by western standards nothing like the same sortie and readiness rates. Against the late war Germans, who by the end lacked air cover, the Sturmoviks were quite useful, certainly. But there is simply no comparison with western tac air - as any German vet who saw both places will tell you - let alone strategic air. That changed when Russia developed the MiG-15 after the war (from captured Me-262 plans, among other things), but the earlier Russian fighters were barely in the same league.

Well, I wouldn't be so sure about the superiority of omnipotent Allied airforce either. What good it is if you cannot utilize it?

On 1 October 1998, the British newspaper The Telegraph published an account of "Operation Unthinkable", which was a study ordered by British Prime Minister Churchill to investigate the possibilities in a sneak attack on the Soviet Army. The plan was to rearm up to 10 German divisions, and attack the Soviet forces in Germany with the combined US, British, and German armies. It was presented to him on May 22, 1945.

Churchill asked Lt Gen Ismay to pass the Unthinkable report on to the Chiefs of Staff committee (COS), composed of the most senior military officers; Gen Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir David Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff. They replied on June 8, dismissing the report's idea that offensive action against the Russians could be taken,instead suggesting that Britain should be thinking of defence.

The COS concluded:

"It is clear from the relative strength of the respective land forces that we are not in a position to take the offensive with a view to achieving a rapid success."

"Our numerical inferiority on land renders it extremely doubtful whether we could achieve a limited and quick success, even if the political appreciation considered that this would suffice to gain our political object."

"In support of our land forces we should have technically superior, but numerically inferior, tactical air forces. As regards Strategic Air Forces, our superiority in numbers and technique would be to some extent discounted by the absence of strategical targets compared to those which existed in Germany, and the necessity for using these strategic air forces to supplement our tactical air forces in support of land operations."

"Our view is, therefore, that once hostilities began, it would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we should be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds."

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Another opinion derived from my rear-end…American-British tanks moving into the attack would typically carry larger compliments of ammunition than what could be stored in compartmentalized ready racks. So you would typically have increased number of rounds which become potential initiators of Brew-Ups. In addition ammunition in compartmentalized ready-racks have a little bit more protection from low velocity hot splinters.

I read a study that basically said the same thing.

[Guest machineman]

It would certainly have been an interesting matchup, two opponents who both relied on overwhelming material superiority on land and air facing off against each other. The western allies would have known what it was like to come up against an artillery heavy opponent who could match their 'shell the target off the map and occupy what was left' tactics; while the Soviets would learn just how much damage a large and skilled airforce with all the fuel, bombs, and pilots needed could do.

The one alternative history scenario I found had the Soviets advancing quickly at first only to run out of supplies and parts as Lend-Lease was cut off. Especially important was the inability to repair the American made 6 wheel drive trucks that mobilized the Red Army by that point in the war.

Without the transport, fuel, and other supplies provided by Lend-Lease the Soviets would have to win quickly or lose the attrition game.

[Simon Fox]

Jeff,

You seem incapable of discussing something you have written without becoming excessively defensive about it. As if that were not enough rationale you apparently have decided that I am argueing some specific point of view diametrically opposite to your own. Unfortunately while it may be more comfortable for you to take that viewpoint it is not the case. From your interpretation of what I have written I can only assume that you are insensitive to the nuances of language either by choice or some other reason.

Regarding North Africa being a totally different situation and therefore the Jentz material is irrelevant seems far-fetched.

Yes it is far-fetched. What a giant leap of supposition it is to assume that "quite different" means "therefore...irrelevant".

Again the reasoning behind the British dumping AP-HE was somewhat motivated by experiences with German spaced armour on tanks being fought by the British in N. Africa.

No need to say it again, I already did.

Your quoting Rexford now?

No.

This is quite humorous considering your past attacks on the guy?s credibility.

Mmm.. an interesting viewpoint, very revealing.

Quoting from previous threads on this forum seems ? at best ? an extremely watered down approach to proving a point.

Am I doing either of those things? What suppositions am I making? You suppose all to much.

You answered my question with about four more questions.

Yes, that's my point.

As much as It pains me, I still have to side with Jason on the basic reasoning behind internal fires inside tanks

I am glad you are convinced. As for myself I try not to take sides.

------------------

"Stand to your glasses steady,

This world is a world of lies,

Here's a toast to the dead already,

And here's to the next man to die."

-hymn of the "Double Reds"