Nope, generic Soviet Rifle Division did not have any integral armoured components at all. For assault guns they would have 21 120mm mortars, 12 regimental 76.2 howitzers and 12 122mm howitzers. They'd also have 24 76.2mm AT guns and 12 45mm or 57mm AT guns.
But it is not a big secret that Soviet Rifle Divisions were not designed to fulfill the same roles as US Infantry Divisions. So why compare apples and oranges? What you really should compare a US Infantry Division to is a Soviet Mechanized (not Tank) Corps. This Corps will have the beforementioned Tank Brigade, plus at least 3 more Tank Battalions in its other 3 Mech Infantry Brigades, plus the usual two Regiments of medium and heavy TD respectively. That would be a plenty of armor components.
Well, I wouldn't be so sure about the superiority of omnipotent Allied airforce either. What good it is if you cannot utilize it?
On 1 October 1998, the British newspaper The Telegraph published an account of "Operation Unthinkable", which was a study ordered by British Prime Minister Churchill to investigate the possibilities in a sneak attack on the Soviet Army. The plan was to rearm up to 10 German divisions, and attack the Soviet forces in Germany with the combined US, British, and German armies. It was presented to him on May 22, 1945.
Churchill asked Lt Gen Ismay to pass the Unthinkable report on to the Chiefs of Staff committee (COS), composed of the most senior military officers; Gen Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir David Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff. They replied on June 8, dismissing the report's idea that offensive action against the Russians could be taken,instead suggesting that Britain should be thinking of defence.
The COS concluded:
"It is clear from the relative strength of the respective land forces that we are not in a position to take the offensive with a view to achieving a rapid success."
"Our numerical inferiority on land renders it extremely doubtful whether we could achieve a limited and quick success, even if the political appreciation considered that this would suffice to gain our political object."
"In support of our land forces we should have technically superior, but numerically inferior, tactical air forces. As regards Strategic Air Forces, our superiority in numbers and technique would be to some extent discounted by the absence of strategical targets compared to those which existed in Germany, and the necessity for using these strategic air forces to supplement our tactical air forces in support of land operations."
"Our view is, therefore, that once hostilities began, it would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we should be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds."