John Erickson goofs?

[Commissar]

For those of you who have read "The Road to Berlin," Erickson makes two references to two SS units that confuse me. He makes serveral references to an SS Gross Deutschland and a 6th SS Panzer division. First, I've never heard of an SS Grossdeutschland division. The Army's elite Grossdeutschland and the Deutschland regiment in the 2nd SS Das Reich I know existed. I think 2nd SS got the title 'Das Reich' in order to avoid confusion with Grossdeutschland. I've never come across any SS Grossdeutschland late in the war. Anyone know what he's talking about?

Also, where is he getting a 6th SS panzer division from? My understanding is there were only 7 SS panzer units: 1st SS Leibstandarte 'Adolf Hitler', 2nd SS Das Reich, 3rd SS Totenkompf, 5th SS Wiking, 9th SS Hohenstaufen, 10th SS Frundsberg, and 12th SS Hitlerjugend. I've checked one source and according to it, there was a 6th SS division but it was no panzer division. What's going on here??

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Commissar ]

[Michael Emrys]

Interestingly enough, the Soviets in their staff study of the Kursk battle as reproduced in The Battle for Kursk 1943 by Glantz and Orenstein make the same mistake. Which leads me to wonder if Erickson was working from Soviet documents.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

6th SS Division was cavalry - Florian Geyer - if I am not mistaken.

Did they convert to armour? Even if just on paper?

Squad Leader got the Deutschland/Grossdeutschland mixed up in one of their scenarios, too - Piercing the Peel, I think.

[Guest Babra]

There was a 6th SS Gebirgs Division "Nord".

[gunnergoz]

These authors, like anybody else, make mistakes. I was yesterday reading an otherwise authoritative and credible history of the Eastern front and the author, David Glantz, who has a seemingly expert grasp of grand strategy and operational art, idiotically refers to the Panther and Tiger as both carrying 88mm guns. And he wasn't speaking about the JagPanther, guys! Obviously, he was out of his area of expertise, but come on...

It does sort of make you wonder about the quality of academic preparation some of these "successful" (i.e. widely published)historians may have had. Could it be that we grognards actually have a leg up on these ivory tower types? We may argue about how many 88's can dance on the head of a pin, but we do know the difference between the two!

[Rupert_2]

Florian Geyer was the 8th SS Kav-Division and as Babra says it was the Gebrigs who where the 6th SS Div.'Nord'.....

[Jeff Duquette]

The 6th SS was apparently a Mountain Division. I’ve seen the Division referred to as “Nord Division” or “Nordland Division” or “Gebirgs-Division Nord". I think there were a fair number of Norwegian volunteers in the division. The division fought primarily against the Soviets in the far north of Finland & Norway…in the vicinity of the Murmansk, Petsamo area. Seems like I recall that Petsamo had some strategic importance during the war…something to do with iron ore or some such thing. The 6th SS Division also took part in the Nordwind offensive on the western front in the winter of 1945.

The SS Wiking Panzer Division (or Panzergrenadier Division or Motorized Infantry Division depending upon the year you are referring to) originally consisted of three Schützen Regiments each named:

<UL TYPE=SQUARE><LI>The Germania Regiment,

<LI>The Westland Regiment

&

<LI>The Nordland Regiment

Wiking Division personal were made up of a mixture of Dutch, Flemish, Danish and Norwegian volunteers. I think a fair number of Norwegian volunteers were concentrated within the Nordland Schützen Regiment of the Wiking Division.

Speculation on my part here: Perhaps Erickson came across a reference to the Nordland Regiment of the Wiking Panzer Division and mistakenly referred to it as the 6th SS Nordland Division.

Regarding David Glantz; He has in past writings (ala his essay entitled “American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in WWII”) been very openly critical of several crusty old German References such as “Lost Victories” and “Panzer Battles”. A fair bit of this critiscism was apparently founded on nit-picks such as German misidentification of Soviet Units. Discount the entire work simply because the 5th Guards Tank Corps was refered to as the 6th Tank Corps. Yet Glantz gives us a bit on Panthers equipped with 88’s. I reckon people that live in glass houses shouldn’t be so quick to start throwing rocks.

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Rupert_2:

Florian Geyer was the 8th SS Kav-Division and as Babra says it was the Gebrigs who where the 6th SS Div.'Nord'..... <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Absolutely right, both of you. Sorry bout that - I used to pride myself on being able to name the first 12 from memory, and then when I really need to...should have hit the books, eh?

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

The 6th SS was apparently a Mountain Division. I’ve seen the Division referred to as “Nord Division” or “Nordland Division” or “Gebirgs-Division Nord

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Now, I thought the 6th was Nord, and the 11th was Nordland. They were two seperate divisions, no?

[Jeff Duquette]

Whoops your right That was from Alan Clark’s “Barbarossa”. I Looked at it again after reading your post, and he doesn’t really refer to a division number for “Nordland”.

Seems like I remember Siegfried Knappe referring to the “Nordland Division” several times toward the tail end of his book “Soldat”.

Commissar…What was the context of Erickson’s mention of the “6th SS Panzer Division”. Can you scan and post a couple paragraphs of the passage in question?

So much for my Nordland Division and Nordland Regiment theory.

[André]

Erickson is known for using Russian documents extensivly for his research.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Heinz 25th PzReg:

Erickson is known for using Russian documents extensivly for his research.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's possible that these Russian documents have mistakenly attributed Grossdeutschland as belonging to the SS. They did wear a cuff title, after all (though everyone but Guy Sajer wore it on the opposite arm... )

A lot of poor histories written in the 50s and 60s (in English) also thought that GD was an SS unit, so I suppose it was one more of the myths about WW II that got perpetuated. Unlike the testicle nonsense, serious research has put that myth to rest.

(And I am kidding about Sajer - sorry, but I just couldn't resist!)

[Fred]

The 6. SS-Gebirgsdivision was named "Nord". It was given Division status in June 1942 (former only known as "Kampfgruppe Nord")

It consisted of the 11. and 12. SS-Gebirgs-Regiment.

The 11.SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadierdivision was named "Nordland"

It consists out of volunteers from northern countries (Denmark Holland, Norway). It saw first action in November 1943 in Croatia.

It included the SS-PzGren-Reg No. 23 ("Norge") and No. 24 ("Danmark").

Source:The german army handbook

Fred

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Mike Said: though everyone but Guy Sajer wore it on the opposite arm<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

heh heh they made all those damned Frenchie recruits where it on the opposite arm. Helped um maintain racial purity while in the chow line.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Mike Said: A lot of poor histories written in the 50s and 60s (in English) also thought that GD was an SS unit, so I suppose it was one more of the myths about WW II that got perpetuated. Unlike the testicle nonsense, serious research has put that myth to rest.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I recall having an old SPI board game on the German 1942 offensive toward Stalingrad and into the Caucasus…cant recall title now. GD was mistakenly identified as an SS motorized infantry division. The counters for GD were all the dreaded black with white print. There was quite an uproar even back than about this misidentification…numerous angry SS’ophiles sending in letters to James Dunnigan regarding GD not being in the Waffen SS.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I recall having an old SPI board game on the German 1942 offensive toward Stalingrad and into the Caucasus…cant recall title now. GD was mistakenly identified as an SS motorized infantry division. The counters for GD were all the dreaded black with white print. There was quite an uproar even back than about this misidentification…numerous angry SS’ophiles sending in letters to James Dunnigan regarding GD not being in the Waffen SS.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Now THAT is funny. The drooling SS mavens complaining about the inclusion of a "racially pure" full-bred German division in their order of battle?

I am looking forward to CM2's treatment of SS troops - I suspect there will be large changes in terms of quality and composition over the 1941-45 period. Grossdeutschland, on the other hand, will remain a high quality "vanilla" infantry unit.

[Cull]

Just thought I'd throw this in since books are beig discussed. Has anyone checked out Frontsoldaten by Stephen Fritz? I happened to see him on tv at a gathering of authors who had done "personal narrative" books about the experience of soldiers at war. This one is a study of the German Landser of WWII.

I'd recommend it if you're into the social/psychological side of the story, with a little analytical work from the author. It's not militarily technical at all, though, so don't look for discussions of weapons, tactics, etc. Oh, and it does have quite a bibliography of personal histories, oral accounts and such....

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jack Arilliac:

Just thought I'd throw this in since books are beig discussed. Has anyone checked out Frontsoldaten by Stephen Fritz? I happened to see him on tv at a gathering of authors who had done "personal narrative" books about the experience of soldiers at war. This one is a study of the German Landser of WWII.

I'd recommend it if you're into the social/psychological side of the story, with a little analytical work from the author. It's not militarily technical at all, though, so don't look for discussions of weapons, tactics, etc. Oh, and it does have quite a bibliography of personal histories, oral accounts and such....<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

FRONTSOLDATEN was discussed extensively here, I think. I think its a piece of crap; 25 percent of the quotes come from Sajer, and not one single interview seems to have been conducted by the author himself - it all relies on second or third-hand quotations. I conclude from that that it is poorly researched. Many times, Sajer is quoted extensively several times in a row. A first year grad student knows better than that.

Would have been intersting to see what Fritz had to say about his work. Do you recall anything specific?

[Commissar]

In "The Road to Berlin" the so called 6th SS Panzer Division is listed twice, page 510 and 514.

The first reference maybe confusing it with 6th SS Panzer Army (an index mistake).

The second reference is after the fall of Budapest and the following Red Army operations to clear all of Western Hungry. The paragraph with 6th SS Panzer Division read as follows:

"German armour battered away at Trofimenko's right flank, where on 14 March Wohler threw in his last reserve formation, built out of 6th SS Panzer Division and fielding 200 tanks and SP guns, in one final desperate push to the Danube. . . "

Again, maybe there is some confusion with 6th SS Panzer ARMY or something like that.

GD did not remain an infantry unit. It went to being a panzergrenadier division with their own organic Tiger company or battalion and got expanded to a panzer korps. Not bad for a small, body guard regiment.

I don't think you'll see that much change with Waffen SS units. If BTS were not willing to make elite SS units any better than elite army units, I seriously doubt their going to change their stance now.

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Commissar ]

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Commissar:

In "The Road to Berlin" the so called 6th SS Panzer Division is listed twice, page 510 and 514.

The first reference maybe confusing it with 6th SS Panzer Army.

The second reference is after the fall of Budapest and the following Red Army operations to clear all of Western Hungry. The paragraph with 6th SS Panzer Division read as follows:

"German armour battered away at Trofimenko's right flank, where on 14 March Wohler threw in his last reserve formation, built out of 6th SS Panzer Division and fielding 200 tanks and SP guns, in one final desperate push to the Danube. . . "

Again, maybe there is some confusion with 6th SS Panzer ARMY or something like that.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think you are correct as my maps show the 6th. SS Pz. Armee counterattacking at that time and place. That would be an awful lot of tanks for a single division to have at this point in the war, but about right for an army.

Curiously enough, on the Soviet side there was also the 6th. Guards Tank Army.

Michael

[Jeff Duquette]

Sounds like the mystery is solved for the 6th SS.

[Michael Dorosh]

Russian unit sizes were often different from western ones - Russian tank brigades, for example, were the same size as a US or German tank battalion. A Russian tank corps was the equivalent of a western division, etc. Good work, Mike.

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Regarding David Glantz; He has in past writings (ala his essay entitled “American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in WWII” been very openly critical of several crusty old German References such as “Lost Victories” and “Panzer Battles”. A fair bit of this critiscism was apparently founded on nit-picks such as German misidentification of Soviet Units. Discount the entire work simply because the 5th Guards Tank Corps was refered to as the 6th Tank Corps. Yet Glantz gives us a bit on Panthers equipped with 88’s. I reckon people that live in glass houses shouldn’t be so quick to start throwing rocks.

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My good friend, Jeff. Wrt Glantz, I think his references about the German memoirs had more to do with a general lacking in Soviet operational data, as well as omissions of operational contexts so as to better highlight tactical successes. It looks much better to read about the Germans tactically thrashing a Soviet thrust without realizing that operationally the German front is collapsing elsewhere.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From an article by David Glantz, concerning American Perceptions of the Eastern Front...

One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956. Mellenthin's work, an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler's adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin's work adopted a didactic approach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been incorporated into the current "body of truth" about Soviet military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra- tion, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of human life. As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin's experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.

Mellenthln's work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless. Mellenthin's classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book. In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army's units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11ch Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the Chir.

Similar flaws appear elsewhere in Mellenthin's work, many of which result from a lack of knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths.

Of equal importance to Mellenthin's work, but written from a higher level perspective, was the memoir of Eric von Manstein entitled Lost Victories. An important work by an acknowledged master at the operational level of war, Manstein's book viewed operations from 1941 to early 1944 at the strategic and operational level. Manstein's criticism of Hitler reflected active disputes which ultimately led to Manstein's dismissal as Army Group South commander. Manstein's account of operations is accurate although again Soviet forces are faceless, and opposing force ratios are in conflict with those shown by archival materials of Fremde Heeres 0st (Foreign Armies East), Gehlen's organizations, and of the OKH (the Army High Command). Again Soviet superiorities are overstated.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Jeff Duquette]

My dear friend Greg Glantz, in his hurry to denounce Mellenthin for a general lack of operational context regarding the 48th Panzer Corps and its defensive actions in the Don Basin and along the Chir River during late November and December of 42, ignores the fact that Mellenthin only joined the 48th Panzer Corps staff sometime after Operation Uranus was in full swing. Given this little detail, Mellenthin – without the benefit of long searching hours in German and Soviet Military Archives – does in fact provide some operational context to the 48th Panzer Corps predicament during this time period. Presumably the situational background is derived from memory. If his narrative lacks specific Soviet formation titles etc, I would imagine this can be attributed to “the fog of war” and to Mellenthin’s memory. Similar to Sajers wrong side cuff incident.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Greg Said: It looks much better to read about the Germans tactically thrashing a Soviet thrust without realizing that operationally the German front is collapsing elsewhere.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Mellenthin is hardly sweeping the overall operational situation of Army Group South under the rug in order to further manifest the glory of the 48th Panzer Corps. In his own words the situation was beyond bleak:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: Von Mellenthin’s “Panzer Battles”

On leaving Zeitzler I sought more detailed information in the Operations Room. On 19 November the Russians had broken out of the Kremenskaya bridgehead with three armored corps, two cavalry corps, and twenty-one rifle divisions; they had pierced the Rumanian positions and made a breach twenty miles wide. Forty-eighth Panzer Corps, in reserve behind the Rumanian Third Army, had counterattacked with the 13th Panzer Division and the Rumanian tanks under his command, but had been hurled back by the Russians. The corps commander, General Heim, and his chief of staff, Colonel Friebe, had been relieved of their posts for alleged inability to make a decision. A few days later I heard from Colonel von Oppein of the 13th Panzer Division that the advance of his panzer regiment was indeed delayed, because the lighting flexes of his tanks had been eaten through—by mice. However, rightly or wrongly, corps headquarters was held responsible for the delay— hence my appointment.

The Russian advance from the Beketonskaya bridgehead on the Volga had been made by two armored corps and nine rifle divisions, which had joined hands with their comrades at Kalatsch on 22 November, thus closing the ring round Sixth Army. Between the Volga and the Don six Russian armored brigades and twenty rifle divisions were exerting strong pressure on the northern flank of Sixth Army.

The large situation map in the Operations Room was not pleasant to look at. I tried to find the location of my 48th Panzer Corps, but there were so many arrows showing breakthroughs and encirclements that this was far from easy. In fact on 27 November the 48th Panzer Corps was itself encircled in a so-called "small cauldron" to the northwest of Kalatsch.

Such were the impressions at the Fuhrer's headquarters on 27 November; on the morning of the 28th I set off by air for Rostov, where I was to report to the newly-formed headquarters of Army Group Don. There seemed to be no end to the flight of the good old Ju.52 from East Prussia; we flew over battered Warsaw, then across the roadless Pripet Marshes, and the snow-covered plains of the Ukraine. We came down for a brief halt at Poltava, with its ominous memories of the invasion of Charles XII, and arrived at Rostov late in the afternoon. Covering 1,500 miles, I gained a good impression of the endless spaces of Russia, and the immense distances involved.

That evening I reported to Field Marshal von Manstein, and his chief of staff. General Wohler. Manstein had aged since he had visited our division in Poland in 1940, but his reputation had grown with the years, and his exploits in the initial advance into Russia, and subsequently in the conquest of the Crimea, had raised his fame higher than that of any commander on the Eastern Front. As an expert on siege warfare he had been sent to the Leningrad sector to plan the capture of the old Russian capital, whence he had been hastily summoned to restore the situation on the Don and open a way to Stalingrad. Manstein, who has been aptly described as "an emotional man who seeks protection under an icy exterior," passed me on to his lt. Colonel Busse.

From Busse I obtained new information, to supplement what I had learned in the Operations Room at O.K.W. According to him. Sixth Army with twenty divisions was encircled by approximately sixty Russian divisions. The Rumanian Fourth Army between Elista and Stalingrad had been crushed by the Russian advance from the Volga and could no longer be regarded as a fighting force. But there was a thin screen of elements of Fourth Panzer Army under Colonel General Hoth, on a line extending from Elista to Kotelnikovski. This screen had the task of covering the rearward communications of Army Group A under Field Marshal vonKleist. The latter army group was fighting in the Caucasus and its rearward communications ran through Rostov. The first reinforcements for Fourth Panzer Army were already en route from the Caucasus front.

It appeared that the main body of the enemy east of the Don was still facing Sixth Army. This had made it possible for Luftwaffe formations and rear-services personnel to build up defensive positions west of the Don bend, though they were but thinly manned. The Rumanian Third Army had been rushing back to the west, but thanks to the energetic steps of Colonel Wenck, who was attached to the Rumanians as their chief of staff, the retreat was halted and some line of resistance was established in the Oblivskaya area as far north as Veshenskaya on the Don. (See the map on page 200.) There the Rumanians joined hands with the east wing of the Italian 8th Army which had yet to be attacked (a pleasure to come!). Forty-eighth Panzer Corps with its 13th Panzer Division, not to speak of its one half of a Rumanian armored division, had fought its way out of encirclement and had withdrawn; the corps had taken up positions on the River Chir, west of Petrovka. Army Group Don was assembling forces on both sides of Kotelnikovski. These reinforcements came mainly from the Caucasus front; they were to strengthen Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and enable him to relieve Stalingrad. When the situation allowed, the 48th Panzer Corps was to move south of the Don and support Fourth Panzer Army in its fateful counterattack.

At dawn on 29 November I flew to the battle headquarters of the 48th Panzer Corps. My aircraft was a Storch, and the pilot and I watched out carefully, lest we land on the wrong side of the front. Plying at tree-top height I obtained a truthful impression of "Mother Russia." The terrain on both sides of the Don is one vast endless steppe, broken occasionally by deep valleys, in which villages are tucked away. The landscape recalled the North African desert, but with snow instead of sand. As we came down on the small frontline airfield, I realized that I had entered a new and very grim phase of my military career.

On my arrival at headquarters of the 48th Panzer Corps I found a situation which gave no cause for rejoicing. After the unsuccessful counterattack, the corps commander and his chief of staff had been relieved of their posts; their dismissal was so summary that they were not even given time to hand over to their successors. It goes without saying that this is not the way in which things should be done. But it was Hitler's way. The only man I could turn to in this turbulent situation was the la. Major von Ohien, a member of the General Staff and an old friend of mine. He and I had been together at many steeplechases—back in happier days.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Mellenthin goes on for several more pages discussing his impression of the grim situation of the German Army in the Don Basin before he finally gets to 48th Panzer Corps counterattack against the Soviet 1st Tank Corps @ State Farm 79 (or more properly a kampgruppe of the 11th Panzer Division encircled and destroyed the Soviet 1st Tank Corps around State Farm 79).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: David Glantz: ”American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in WWII”

A DA pamphlet entitled “German Defensive Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs” contained similar Is In a chapter describing a delaying action conducted between 5-24 August 1943 the authors mistakenly stated that German forces abandoned the city of Khar'kov on 18 August when, in fact, the correct date was 23 August. Such errors intermixed with accurate date cast serious doubt on the validity of these works as a whole.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The following is the section of the study in question by Glantz. The original study was apparently written by Generaloberst Erhard Rauss while in an American POW camp after the war. Many of these Department of the US Army Historical Studies regarding combat on the Eastern Front were initiated following the war under the direction of SLA Marshall (or at least he seemed to have gotten the ball rolling). Marshall took advantage of the fact that so many German “big fish” were all in the "same basket"…so to speak. He was attempting to preserve a bit of history while it was still somewhat fresh in the minds of some of those Eastern Front veterans. The particular section of “German Defensive Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs” with the date mix up is entitled “Delay on Successive Positions”. Glantz is apparently suggesting that the entire study is invalid based upon Erhard Rauss’s inability to recollect the date of the German withdrawal from Kharkov. This in spite of the fact that Rauss is within 5 days of the actual event, and had no archival information to rely upon when preparing this study!

This is the entire bit from “Delay on Successive Positions” complete with the incorrect withdrawl date. My copy of the study is actually included in a larger work entitled “The Anvil of War, German Generalship in Defense on the Eastern Front”.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In a situation where enemy infantry attempts to break through without much armored support, a delaying action in successive positions may be the most promising defensive tactic. The underlying principle of this maneuver is to inflict casualties upon the enemy without becoming too closely engaged. By offering limited resistance on successive positions, the defender attempts to weaken the enemy until his forces are too disorganized to mount a sustained offensive. After the hostile attacks have lost their momentum, strong resistance may be offered on a permanent position or a counteroffensive may be launched. Delaying actions are therefore temporary expedients to prevent a break- through by trading a minimum of space for a maximum amount of time to allow the defender to move up new forces.

Complications arise when the flanks of a weak delaying force are open to attacks by strong hostile armor supported by ample reserves. In August 1943, during the delaying action south of Belgorod, the Germans reached Kharkov after co-ordinated withdrawals from eight successive positions which they held during daylight and evacuated under cover of darkness (map 17). The distance covered by each withdrawal varied between five and six miles. Kharkov was held for a week and then the delaying operation was continued by a withdrawal via Poltava toward the Dnepr. During this phase, however, the unfavorable situation in the Kiev area compelled the German commander to accelerate the withdrawal, forcing him to abandon 120 miles of terrain within twelve days. During the retrograde movement from Belgorod to Kremenchug on the Dnepr, the enemy was never able to break through or push by the flanks. The entire delaying force, consisting of twelve divisions, crossed the Dnepr and established a permanent defense line on the west bank of the river.

The auspices for this delaying action were not favorable. After the failure of Operation ZITADELLE, the German pincers attack on Kursk in July 1943, the Russians held the initiative. They launched the pursuit with powerful reserves, while the Germans withdrew to the positions they had held before the ill-fated offensive. The XI Infantry Corps moved into the heavily fortified defensive system anchored on Belgorod and repelled all enemy attacks across the Donets River. The Fourth Panzer Army, adjacent to the northwest, tried to offer resistance in open terrain and was overrun by strong Russian armored forces. Remnants of one of its infantry divisions sought refuge behind the left wing of the XI Corps. An attempt by Fourth Panzer Army to close the gap by an armored counterattack was unsuccessful. The Russian tanks advanced without much interference and reached Bogodukhov on 6 August. This enemy thrust endangered the XI Corps north of Belgorod. Russian armored spearheads advanced towards Poltava and Akhtyrka fifty miles to the rear, while other enemy forces attacked the front and flank of the corps to encircle and annihilate it. The corps front formed a deep salient into enemy territory which might have disintegrated with complete encirclement its final destiny. This would have meant a widening of the gap from 15 to 50 miles and the immediate loss of 5 divisions. To prevent such a disaster the corps had to withdraw from Belgorod, but the retrograde movement was to be gradual in order to gain time for the preparation of countermeasures. In view of the limited strength of the corps, it would have been a mistake to attempt to close the gap by widening the corps sector nor was any such plan feasible since the enemy kept up his pressure on the entire front. On the contrary, the corps had to keep its forces together and form a solid block against the superior enemy forces.

These considerations determined the conduct of operations. The corps commander decided to fight a delaying action in successive positions until the corps reached Kharkov and then to hold the city. The corps had to build up a front facing north and protect its left flank against an enemy envelopment, while the right flank was anchored on the Donets River. Elements of two infantry divisions were reinforced by an assault gun battalion, an antitank battalion, and twelve Tiger tanks to provide cover for the left flank. During the night from 5 to 6 August, Belgorod was evacuated after heavy street fighting and the next position, prepared on the high ground immediately south of the city, was occupied. Luftwaffe and service troops defended the road crossings in the swampy lowlands along the Lopan River against enemy spearheads threatening the deep flank. The greatest danger, however, loomed along the Belgorod—Kharkov Rollbahn, where the enemy massed his forces in an attempt to break through to Kharkov. A full strength assault gun battalion, with forty-two self-propelled guns, moving up from Kharkov, was to protect the highway. Its mobility and fire power were to enable the battalion to stop any possible armored break-through.

The position south of Belgorod was held for one day and abandoned after the enemy had deployed his forces. Continued resistance in one position would have led to heavy casualties and the annihilation of the isolated corps. Constant enemy attempts to outflank the left wing submitted the command to a severe nervous strain and made extreme demands on the physical endurance of the troops. However great the sacrifices, they had to be made if worse disaster was to be averted. On 9 August the limits of endurance seemed to have been exceeded when, after an all-night evacuation, the Germans failed to reach the new phase line by dawn. Enemy spearheads broke through along the Rollbahn and the whereabouts of an entire division, the 168th Infantry Division, was uncertain. News from the Donets and Lopan sectors was no less alarming. Enemy armor had broken out of the Donets bridgehead, other Russian forces had crossed the Lopan, and the assault gun battalion from Kharkov had failed to arrive. Low-flying hostile planes in great numbers dropped fragmentation bombs and machine gunned troops on the march. Suffering heavy casualties, the German forces grew restless. A few division commanders came over to the corps command post, which by then was situated close ro the front line, and requested authorization for an immediate speedy withdrawal to Kharkov in view of the critical situation and the low morale of their forces. Suddenly several trucks loaded with stragglers came tearing down the highway, ignoring all stop signals. When the trucks were finally brought to a halt, the stragglers explained that they had become separated from their 168th Division unit and had been seized by panic when they were subjected to an armored assault farther up the road. Their intention was to drive straight through to Kharkov, at that time forty miles behind the German front. They reported that their division had been wiped out and added that the 88-mm. antiaircraft batteries, detailed to block the highway, were no longer in place.

Every experienced combat commander is familiar with this sort of panic which, in a critical situation, may seize an entire body of troops. Mass hysteria of this type can be overcome only by energetic actions and a display of perfect composure. The example set by a true leader can have miraculous effects. He must stay with his troops, remain cool, issue price orders, and inspire confidence by his behavior. Good soldiers never desert such a leader. News of the presence of high ranking commanders up front travels like wildfire along the entire front line, bolstering everyone's morale. It means a sudden change from gloom to hope, from imminent defeat to victory.

This is exactly what happened. The corps commander stood at a crucial point along the Rollbahn, orienting unit commanders and assigning them a mission in the new defense system which he attempted to build up. Self propelled antitank guns arriving at this instant were immediately committed to block the highway against an armored break-through which seemed imminent as the fire from approaching tanks came ever closer. The corps commander quickly drove past the newly established line toward the din of battle to find out for himself whether the antiaircraft guns were holding out. Driving around a corner, he suddenly witnessed the destruction of a Russian tank by the improvised anti-tank front. He counted eleven more disabled tanks and saw the remaining enemy armor withdraw straight into an extensive mine field where one tank after another was blown up.

Shortly afterward, German fighter planes appeared, and shot down more than a dozen enemy aircraft, clearing the air over the corps front. German heavy weapons and artillery pinned the enemy infantry to the ground when they advanced on a broad front. The threat of a break-through along the Rollbahn was eliminated and the German lines held.

The 6th Panzer Division on the left flank faced a difficult situation when, in addition to its own sector, it had to take over the one previously held by the missing 168th Division. The enemy exerted heavy pressure and the panzer division requested immediate antitank support. The corps commander dispatched twelve antitank guns and arranged for an air strike on the Russian tank column advancing east of the Lopan River. These combined efforts prevented the immediate collapse of the German flank cover.

Delayed by traffic jams, the long-awaited assault gun battalion did not arrive until noon. After refueling in some gullies covered with underbrush, it was committed in a counterattack against the enemy tanks threatening the left flank. The massed attack of the forty-two guns surprised the enemy and hit him hard. The assault guns destroyed all enemy tanks and antitank guns on the east bank of the Lopan, shattered the Russian bridgehead, and drove the remaining enemy forces across the river. By early afternoon the situation was under control. Reports from the Donets sector indicated that the enemy was unable to enlarge his bridgehead in the face of stubborn resistance from German infantry units supported by assault guns.

Even though an entire division was missing, the corps had scored an initial defensive success. The enemy's intention to annihilate the German forces by a concentric attack from three sides had failed. Heavy Russian losses in personnel and materiel, including sixty disabled tanks, resulted from the day's operations. During the night to 10 August, the corps made an unobserved withdrawal to a hastily prepared position about six miles to the south, the salient points of which were occupied by advance detachments. Weak rear guards, left behind in the former position, led the enemy to believe that the line was fully occupied. The next morning, when Russian infantry attacked the position after a heavy concentration, they found only the rear party maintaining contact. The German troops, exhausted by the previous day's fighting and the night march, were able

to recuperate during the morning hours. By noon the first enemy patrols cautiously approached the new position. Its gun emplacements and strong points were well camouflaged, and enemy ground and air reconnaissance therefore failed to locate them. Three divisions held the line; one of them had left its positions along the Donets to join the corps.

The Russian attacks resumed during the afternoon with increasing violence. The most dangerous Russian arm was not the badly mauled armor or the tactical air support, but the powerful artillery. In this instance, the effect of the heavy artillery fire was not so devastating since the excellent camouflage of potential German targets forced the Russians to deliver flat trajectory fire. But whenever German machine guns or heavy weapons fired from open terrain, they were spotted by hostile observers and quickly neutralized. If the were to escape destruction, they had to use well-concealed and readily accessible alternate and dummy positions.

By the evening of 10 August, the enemy attacks had lost some of their sting. In view of the experience of the last few days, the Russians made probing thrusts after dusk to maintain contact with the corps in case of another German night withdrawal. The enemy infantry was given a hot reception and, after all attacks had been repulsed, the corps withdrew to the next prepared position. By the time the infantry occupied the new line, the bulk of the artillery and antitank guns were ready to fire. Forming a solid block, the corps was unshaken by renewed enemy onslaughts.

The same delaying tactics were employed during the following days. The withdrawal to successive positions was exhausting, but the casualty rate remained low. The enemy suffered disproportionately high losses, which forced him to gradually relax the pressure on the German lines. The corps front was shortened and strengthened by units no longer needed for flank protection, and reserves were formed. The 168th Division, missing for several days, was found in a well-concealed area when the corps commander made a reconnaissance trip

north of Kharkov. The division commander explained that he had understood his unit was to act as corps reserve and that he had therefore withdrawn to the forests twenty-five miles behind the front. After his conduct had been castigated in no uncertain terms, he was told to commit his division a covering force in the next position to be occupied. This made it possible to pull out the 6th Panzer Division, designate it corps reserve, and move it to the forest area for a well-deserved rest.

The XLII Infantry Corps, adjacent to the right, was forced to join the XI Corps withdrawal during the night of 11—12 August because its defense line along the Donets formed a deep salient in Russian-held territory. The infantry division on the left wing of this corps had not previously been engaged in a tank battle; it offered little resistance to strong Russian armored forces, which broke through without difficulty and suddenly appeared in the rear of the XI Corps

front outside Kharkov. The situation became even more critical when the recruits of a newly arrived regiment, overcome by fear of the approaching Russian tanks, ran for their lives until they were stopped at the bridges in the suburbs of Kharkov. Strong enemy infantry poured through the wide gap to exploit the initial break-through achieved by the tanks. The 6th Panzer Division was immediately alerted and its spearheads intercepted the enemy in the southeastern outskirts of Kharkov where he had occupied the big tractor plant. The division counterattacked, dislodged the enemy from the factory after fierce fighting, destroyed many tanks, dispersed the Russian infantry, and closed the gap. The danger was eliminated for the time being.

Tank fright is frequent among newly activated infantry divisions when training in antimechanized defense has been neglected. Combined arms training with armored or assault gun units is essential in order to give each soldier the experience of being overrun by a tank while in his foxhole and to acquaint him with the use of antitank weapons.

A recently arrived panzer division strengthened the corps flank and blocked the approach routes to Kharkov. The evacuation of Kharkov by the Germans became necessary because of unfavorable developments on the southern front. It was carried out without difficulty on 18 August, and a previously prepared position a few miles to the west was occupied by the corps. The new position was situated on high ground protected by a swampy valley cutting across the approach roads. It was considerably shorter than the position skirting Kharkov and could therefore be held very effectively.

During the withdrawal of the German rear guard, the only bridge across the marshes which had been left intact collapsed under the weight of some Hornets(88-mm. tank destroyers). One infantry battalion reinforced by eight Hornets was thereby cut off on the east bank. The enemy attempts to annihilate this small rear guard were frustrated by German units supporting the bridgehead from the west bank. The rear guard held out for twenty-four hours until the bridge was repaired and it could cross under cover of darkness.

In its new position, the corps had to ward off some fierce attacks by enemy forces trying to envelop both flanks. Several local penetrations were sealed off by armored counterattacks. But even this strong position had to be evacuated after a short while since it formed a dangerous salient to the east after the adjacent units were forced to pull out. The next withdrawal led the corps into exposed, flat terrain where it had to extend its wings until the sector covered the forty-mile stretch between the Kolomak and the Beresrova Rivers.

In the meantime the over-all situation forced general withdrawal behind the Dnepr River. The XI Corps was given the mission of organizing and covering the withdrawal of twelve divisions across the highway and railroad bridges at Kremenchug (see Part One, pp. 103 ff). During this retrograde movement, the same delaying tactics were employed which had been so successful during the withdrawal from Belgorod to Kharkov. Again and again, delay on successive positions forced the enemy to make time consuming preparations for battle and to suffer heavy casualties, leading to the gradual exhaustion of his forces. The Russians recognized these intentions and tried every day to force the issue by achieving an armored break-through. Above all, the enemy wanted to capture major cities commanding the road net needed for speedy maneuver. In view of the rainy weather, the possession of hard-surface highways became a decisive factor to both sides since the mud prevented any movement off the roads. The Germans took this factor into account and concentrated their antitank defenses in and around important towns. During this phase, cities were therefore far more important than during the fighting in the area north of Kharkov. The enemy achieved only one armored break-through when he blocked the German withdrawal across the Orchik River near Karlovka. A critical situation developed because of additional delays in the river crossing caused by floods, mud, and the steepness of the west bank. There was a grave danger that enemy tanks might reach the weakly held west bank before the arrival of the German units which were forced to take devious routes. The densely populated suburban area of Karlovka near the river was set ablaze by enemy artillery fire, which meant a further delay in the crossing. Demolitions of factories, railroad installations, depots, and supplies, ordered by higher headquarters in line with a German scorched earth policy, caused still more delays. A major enemy breakthrough at this point seemed certain, when suddenly the Russian tanks were forced to slow down because of mud, and the danger subsided.

With a change in the weather the ground dried; the infantry divisions were able to move faster and the daily rate of withdrawal was stepped up to twenty to thirty miles. The Russian tanks did not renew their pressure until the corps halted for several days at the Kremenchug bridgehead. Russian striking power was impaired by several weeks of German delaying actions on successive positions. The enemy counteroffensive had spent itself.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Now if Glantz is questioning the validity of this entire study based upon the fact that the 18 of August should have been the 23rd of August, why should I hold much faith in Glantz’s work if he is unable to correctly identify the proper main gun of one of the most famous German Tanks of WWII? Fairly weak and relatively absurd.

[ 05-14-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Grisha]

Okay, Jeff, I hear ya. And I agree that an operational work, whether German or Soviet, shouldn't be invalidated on such inconsequential details like a date that's off by a few days, or a caliber of gun on a tank(though I would prefer the second error to the first if the work is operational in scope). I'm guessing that Glantz is trying to emphasize two points though. One, that these memoirs were after all based on memory alone, and not archival data. And, two, since a historian's work is only as valid as his sources, it is extemely frustrating when working with memoir material, since what is factual and what isn't is never certain, requiring in itself research with archival material to verify. Thus, the German war memoirs make for difficult source material when discussing the War in Russian with an emphasis on reliable recorded data.

Still, these memoirs written by Guderian, Mellenthin, and von Manstein are historical gems in that they capture the 'picture' of that war from the German side, much like Alexander Werth's War in Russia does for the Soviet side.

[ 05-14-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]