What IS Realistic Firepower and is it in CM?

[Terence]

Hello Everybody,

I was reading Keegans "The Face of Battle" today, and came across a really interesting assertion. Note that I do not say "fact."

Keegan (no slouch himself, in the military history department, I'm given to understand) quotes S. L. A. Marshall's "masterpiece" Men Against Fire.

According to Marshall, in combat units, even highly trained soldiers, even when hard pressed, no more than about a quarter (ie. 25 percent) of the men actually fired their weapons at the enemy.

Now, I'm not as familiar with Marshall's work as I'm sure some of you are, so I'm interested to see if you know of anything rebutting or confirming or modifying this statement.

The statement that a maximum of 25 percent of a unit did any shooting seems like something of a generalizaion, although it falls sort of in line with the commonly referenced (but by no means entirely accurate) 80/20 rule, which argues that 20 percent of the criminals commit 80 percent of the crimes, 20 percent of the cops make 80 percent of the arrests and in most organizations, only 20 percent of the people do 80 percent of the work.

In itself thats a pretty stunning generalization, and I mention it hesitantly cause I don't want this to descend into a slanging match of "in my company we do x" or "in my town the cops do y.."

If it IS true, and only a quarter of the infantry men, even in really good units fired at the enemy, is this reflected in the firepower figures for Combat Mission?

I think that it isn't, cause even unsuppressed conscripts will fire all their weapons at the other side if they have LOS and the firepower stats in the unit information screen reflect this, as does the firepower number that we see when we use the target command in the orders menu.

Any body else thought about this or seen any discussion of it. For a gamer, this is probably not a huge deal, but for a historical grog type, could this be an issue?

Also, any of my pbem opponents who read this should know that I am suffering some bewildering computer problems at home and will try hard to get your turns to you asap.

Terence

[MrSpkr]

I think what he is referring to is the increasing size of support, administrative, and other troops not "in the line." Certainly in a combat infantry company, every man on the line would use his weapon if given an opportunity.

I question, somewhat, CM's incredibly high casualty rate (although, as this may include stunned or lightly injured men, it may be about right); however, it is realistic to expect most of the men you have in combat situations to fire their weapons and actively attack/defend.

Also, keep in mind some troops in CM, if used correctly, shouldn't be firing at the enemy unless it is the last resort (i.e., HQ units, F.O. units, truck drivers, gun/vehicle crews who have abandoned thier gun/vehicle, etc.).

MrSpkr

------------------

But we're saying goodbye to them all

We're Harry's police force on call!

So put back your pack on

The next stop is Saigon

Don't bless the few bless 'em all!

[Maastrictian]

There is no question that Keegan is one of the best military historians out there. Can you give me a page reference? I'd like to see the context in which he makes that assertion. I agree that it is a bit hard to belive.

--Chris

[Terence]

Originally posted by MrSpkr:

I think what he is referring to is the increasing size of support, administrative, and other troops not "in the line." Certainly in a combat infantry company, every man on the line would use his weapon if given an opportunity.

I considered this as I was reading it but the quote that Keegan uses, and his further discussion makes it absolutely clear that this is NOT what he means. He is _not_ counting the non combatatants and not counting the artillery and so on. He means the opposite of your last quoted sentence above.

Which I agree is noteworthy.

To paraphrase, he says that when the bullets are flying on the battlefront, only about 20 percent or 25 percent of a rifle company (to use your example) shoots their weapons back at the enemy.

As I recall, Patton used to work himself into bombastic and hysterical fits when it was reported that many of his troops were not firing their rifles at the enemy.

As to the citation, Keegan discusses this and uses a long quote from Marshall's Men Against Fire on page 72 of my copy of Face of Battle. Its in the chapter called Old Unhappy Far Off Things, right at the beginning of the section called "Verdict or Truth."

[markwf99]

SLA Marshal's work has always been suspect, at least his thesis concerning the very small percentage of GIs who (supposedly) fired their weapons during combat. I believe that there's been some pretty good material recently that showed he basically made up the whole thing.

Many authors and researchers have taken Marshal's work at face value. Weigley, van Crefeld, Keegan and many thers used the volumn of fire theory to show that GIs were stuck in their holes with brand new rifles waiting for artillery and airplanes to win the war for them. (I know I'm taking a little liberty here, but the concept holds true nonetheless.)

[MarkEzra]

SLA Marshall's points were taken very seriously by the US Army. They developed a new updated method of rifle training that included POP up target traing and heavy praise for any sucess on the rifle range. The pop up target re-enforced the see and shoot reflex very well. By the time of Viet Nam a large % increase in infantry weapons use was noted. This is one of the assumption that some Child pyschologist have pointed to in discussing the dangers of violent video games the point and kill targets that pop up...

[Terence]

Originally posted by markwf99:

I believe that there's been some pretty good material recently that showed he basically made up the whole thing.

Really? I would love to take a look at any material that shows that, as this "US troops didn't do a lot of shooting" does seem like a very unusual thing to claim.

Also, any idea HOW or WHY Slam got the wrong idea?

(I really am interested in this topic, and don't have an ax to grind either way.)

[Terence]

Originally posted by MarkEzra:

By the time of Viet Nam a large % increase in infantry weapons use was noted.

So there were some comparative studies done then to back up Marshall's claim? And then more studies done later on during the Vietnam war?

Any way to take a look at them or a summary? Are they referenced anywhere publically available, do you know?

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

To MrSpkr - No, Marshall was not talking about "teeth to tail" issues, he was indeed talking about the troops actually in combat, in the firing line. And Terence has it about right, that it follows a sort of social 80-20 rule. In combat, the psychological reaction is the biggest issue.

Marshall based his conclusions on careful and detailed research, a model in its time and in many ways, even since. He interviewed men coming out of combat, about what they had done and what others had done. He found that reactions broke out into several stereotyped roles within the group. One portion fought the enemy, another smaller portion cowered (or rarely, ran away outright). Most did neither of the above, and instead focused their efforts on actions that helped the group, but without directly fighting the enemy. Those include carrying ammo and equipment, spotting, treating wounded and getting them to safety, clearing jams, loading magazines or ammo belts, acting as runners and delivering messages or warnings. Some in the middling category would fire if on crew-served weapons, or if everyone else was firing, in some coordinated and visual fashion (aka a "mad minute"). About half in this majority group exposed themselves to enemy fire, perhaps more than was even necessary, while the other half avoided doing so.

The psychology of the thing has to do with inhibitions about killing people, as well as reactions to personal danger. Some react to such danger with a "fight" response, naturally, over and over. They are reacting to the enemy, and also "displaying" to the rest of the group, or trying to lead by example. They go through a cycle of increasingly reckless disregard for their own safety, until most of them reach a "burnout" stage and become apathetic about both combat, and their own fate.

A second group reacts with dedication to the group. They imitate the fearlessness about personal danger of the first set. But they do not kill, or only rarely do so, when it is a group action (e.g. crew served weapons, mad minutes, occasional "rescue" situations). These types can be as brave as you please, running through barrages or MG fire to rescue a fallen comrade, etc - but they are just not killers. After a period of burnout, they may pass into either the 1st category or the 3rd, or not.

A third group reacts to the danger by seeking their own safety, but remains committed to the group. They avoid exposing themselves, are always shouting "get down!" and the like, and try to avoid drawing fire. But psychologically, they must do something to help the group in its trial, or they can't live with themselves. So they do things that are useful, that do not involve too much danger. Carrying things, including weapons, ammo and wounded, treating wounded after they have reached safety, loading - the grab-bag of "labor" tasks in combat.

In the fourth group, the primary response to combat is disbelief, stun, followed by submission - meaning the attempt to make aggressive people stop being violent and dangerous, by appearing unthreatening to them. This rarely means outright surrender, unless the enemy is very close. It does involve a disregard for dangerous commands and a disconnect from the welfare of the group. People who responsed this way still obey orders - meekly. But they wouldn't hurt a fly. They sometimes do useful things, but more often they do not, and are found after the battle is over, cracking jokes, often ones about the unbelievable craziness of it all.

There are no reliable indicators of which class someone falls into, before the event. As Montaigne wittily put it, "one who has never been in danger cannot answer for his courage". The types are definite and personal, extending from combat to combat, with only marginal variation up and down the list.

A greater propensity can be found for the first category, in highly aggressive people, in a literal and almost animal sense of the term. As in, how many fist-fights does this guy get into outside of combat. But not all that fall into the 1st type of response, fit this stereotype, and not all who act that way out of combat, fight in the real thing.

Naturally leaders are found most often in the second class, and in members of the first who are not anti-social, and are peaceful outside of combat. A solid portion of the natural fighters don't have an ounce of leader in them, being focused on the enemy, not the group, and on killing, not winning. A large portion in the first class also experience "battlefield psychosis", in which they forget everything they did from some moment in the fight, until it was over.

A typical comment is "then I just put my mind someplace else and I guess the training takes over. I really don't think I did more than anybody else out there." This, from a 20 year old kid whose foxhole had 100 dead enemy in a perfect semi-circle around it. He will tell you in great detail everything that happened before the enemy "rush". After that, he can't remember a thing. His mind does not accept what happened, what he did.

Armies are complex social organizations, not machines. And real battle isn't a game.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

MarkEzra is quite right. The army took it very seriously, and they changed the way rifle training was done. Pop up targets as he mentioned, also human-shaped targets instead of bullseyes. And increases in portions firing were definitely noted as a result. The breakdown of combat pysch reactions remains very much a real issue. What the better training has mostly managed to do, is to get people in the 2nd and sometimes 3rd categories, to at least sometimes shoot. A lot of area fire results, but it is fire. A disproporionate amount of the fighting is still done by a natural-fighter subgroup.

This is not all that hard to understand. A 150 man company can walk onto a battlefield with enough ammo to kill a division of enemy. But if it kills or wounds a unit the same size of itself, discounting what supporting artillery does, then that is a rare and bloody fight. More typical is 1/3rd that amount. Why? Because both sides are avoiding the danger the other side presents, enough to keep most of the shooting at longer distances, or blind to keep the other guy's head down. It is easy for a subgroup that is willing to expose itself to get aimed, clear LOS shots, to account for most of the actual wounds inflicted.

Incidentally, in air combat, where aggressiveness is even more essential to success, much the same thing was found. 20% of the pilots got 80% of the kills. The only thing that the stand-out group had in common beforehand, was a greater propensity to get involved in fist-fights while still in training.

[Michael Dorosh]

Marshall's conclusions jive with the memoirs of a RCR officer named Galloway who served in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and NWE. He said that most riflemen in battle did not do much killing - that rifle fire was not of any import in inflicting enemy casualties. (His exact words were that "the majority of men in fighting platoons could have arrived on the objective carrying pitchforks" instead of rifles for all the difference it would have made in terms of effect. No doubt the rifle was a security blanket to those that carried it - and banged away without hitting anything in particular).

This is reflected in CM - look at the firepower figures for squads - most of the FP come from the squad automatics, as was done in real life. At point blank range, FP comes from grenades and hand-to-hand stuff.

Marshall was right (Keegan's book The Face of Battle is a masterpiece, by the way, and should be required reading - Jason, you might use him as an example of how a good historian uses supposition and theory based on evidence, I am sure you will find him eye opening).

Casualty rates in CM seem more or less realistic - a low proportion of KIA. Battles/operations based on actual events seem to give casualty rates perhaps slightly higher than in real life - but not by much.

Whatever Marshall's methodology may have been, I think his conclusions were accurate, and are echoed by first person accounts. Automatic weapons contributed the most to the infantry's ability to kill - whether his line about "natural fighters" is true (it may be complete hogwash, really), the end result is the same - and I think CM accurately reflects where the firepower in an infantry platoon really comes from.

Perhaps another reason that MG/PIAT crews etc. do not have pistols or rifles - they were not predisposed to use them to any great effect.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Terence:

So there were some comparative studies done then to back up Marshall's claim? And then more studies done later on during the Vietnam war?

Any way to take a look at them or a summary? Are they referenced anywhere publically available, do you know?

Marshall did similar work in the Korean War, after his conclusions on WW II led to the Army changing their basic training methods. Supposedly, more GIs (about half) fired their weapons in action in Korea.

Again, i don't defend Marshall, but it rings true no matter how he came to his conclusions.

The Vietnam example is also interesting - the M16 is a much greater "security blanket" than even a Garand - allowing one rifleman to dominate his immediate front with firepower. It is doubtful riflemen were any more "effective" (the key word) with their fire than in WW II, though comparing the two may very well be apples and oranges. Sometimes the only way to kill VC was up close and personal, since he was much more elusive than the Germans in Europe. I don't think a statistical analysis of bullets to casualties would prove much.

[Terence]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Marshall's conclusions jive with the memoirs of a RCR officer named Galloway who served in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and NWE. He said that most riflemen in battle did not do much killing - that rifle fire was not of any import in inflicting enemy casualties.

OK, so sayMarshall had the right of it and most of the casualties inflicted by infantry come from automatic weapons. But in CM, you still have a firepower factor (which you see when you extend the targeting line to a target in LOS) based on every man in the unit firing his weapon.

And if Marshall IS right why are _all_ these guys firing? Or is the firepower factor based only on about 25 percent of the unit.

I'm kinda glad, though that the game doesn't only have 2 out of 10 guys shooting. That would make it even harder to win, and I primarily play this as a tactical/historical game...

[Leonidas]

Fascinating discussion. Do you suppose that the next generation of infantry will be more likely to fire in combat, having been raised on emotionally immersive first person shooters?

[Terence]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I don't think a statistical analysis of bullets to casualties would prove much.

Yeah, neither do I.

Its the issue of shooting vs. NOT shooting at all that intrigues me.

The fact that in WW2, US riflemen didn't shoot much, and that this behavior was changed by overt training tells a really interesting story about both the US Army and the human condition.

I must find out more about this, I think its really compelling.

EDIT: Whoops. I said "fact." I didn't mean to. I'm not sure that in my mind this has been established as a fact since some people have said that contrary evidence has come to light recently. It is fascinating, though.

[This message has been edited by Terence (edited 03-30-2001).]

[MrSpkr]

Originally posted by Terence:

As to the citation, Keegan discusses this and uses a long quote from Marshall's Men Against Fire on page 72 of my copy of Face of Battle. Its in the chapter called Old Unhappy Far Off Things, right at the beginning of the section called "Verdict or Truth."

I'll check that out over the weekend. I have studied some of SLAM's work as an undergrad, but would be interested in seeing his methodology AND any corroborative studies.

I would agree that in some situations several men may be much more interested in taking cover than in firing, but, particularly in advances, it would surprise me to learn squads were likely to use only 1/4 of their potential firepower.

Also, I stand corrected as to the men carrying ammo, litter bearers, etc. Obviously I did not take those into direct account. However, I wonder whether CM does, either. Perhaps some of these persons (stretcher bearers and medics, in particular, not to mention the guy in the company responsible for finding breaks in and repairing broken land lines for artillery support) are simply presumed in the game and not modeled at all?

MrSpkr

------------------

But we're saying goodbye to them all

We're Harry's police force on call!

So put back your pack on

The next stop is Saigon

Don't bless the few bless 'em all!

[This message has been edited by MrSpkr (edited 03-30-2001).]

[Terence]

Originally posted by Leonidas:

Fascinating discussion. Do you suppose that the next generation of infantry will be more likely to fire in combat, having been raised on emotionally immersive first person shooters?

no, cause they will be too obsese to make it through basic without a coronary.

[MrSpkr]

Originally posted by Terence:

no, cause they will be too obsese to make it through basic without a coronary.

Hehe. Or they might bail on psychological grounds

(i.e. "Wait, I need the cheat code for this;"

"Dang. I got shot. RESTART!"

"Sarge, I need to pause this for a sec so I can run to the bathroom and grab a pint of ice cream from the fridge!"

------------------

But we're saying goodbye to them all

We're Harry's police force on call!

So put back your pack on

The next stop is Saigon

Don't bless the few bless 'em all!

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

To Michael -

Will find? LOL. I've read everything Keegan ever wrote, and long before I ever heard of you or combat mission. Incidentally, he has his own subjects he is sloppy about, for example his absurd crusade against a straw-man Clausewitz. Which is not to say he isn't indispensible on many other questions.

Back on the subject of Marshall, the U.S. Army hated his conclusions, and set out over the course of two generations to discredit his work. They did find some sloppiness. It is possible the 1/2 shooting figure, seen in Korea, would be a more accurate average even for early on. The army still took his stuff seriously (he was the chief army historian in the ETO, and eventually a brigadier general).

Most of the training changes based on his analysis, occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s. So the uptick noticed between Korea and Nam can plausibly be traced to changes in training. But there is no obvious explanation of the uptick between his WW II claims - first put forth in 1947 - and the ~50% firing figure he himself found in Korea.

He may have exaggerated the effect in WW II, or it may be that heavy weapons were able to carry more of the weight in WW II than in Korea. Terrain and force-wise, Korea was an infantryman's war, though with powerful artillery support, certainly. Nobody claims that everyone fires in combat.

Incidentally, the comment about the hard to find VC strikes me as quite beside the point for Nam. Most of the fighting (certainly the heaviest fighting) in Nam was against NVA regulars, not VC guerillas. And plenty of those fights were as stand-up, shoot-it-out as you please. I do not disagree, however, that there was lots of area fire - terrain playing a big part in that, which may have been what you meant.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Terence:

But in CM, you still have a firepower factor (which you see when you extend the targeting line to a target in LOS) based on every man in the unit firing his weapon.

Are you sure?

This may be selling Steve and Charles short. Do we know for a certainty this isn't factored in?

[Terence]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Are you sure?

This may be selling Steve and Charles short. Do we know for a certainty this isn't factored in?

Well. Umm. Err. Not 100 percent for sure, but Im pretty sure..

Ok. I have no idea.

Do you? I'll certainly check when I get the damn home computer working again...

[Michael Dorosh]

Jason - well I'm glad we agree on something! Keegan is definitely a pre-CM phenomenon for me too; it was fascinating reading him while an extra on the set of Legends of the Fall - his stuff on the Somme seemed especially pertinent to me at the time!

I may have been hasty in my use of the term "VC" - having read Herbert's book recently about the 173rd, it may have coloured my thinking - certainly you are correct that the NVA was the main adversary and especially post-Tet.

[Jasper]

One thing that I've pondered - is the effect of natural selection on the makeup of a unit. For example: The person that disregards his own safety - for whatever cause either noble or ignoble - would seem to me more likely to end up a casualty. Perhaps this explains the higher rates of casualties among offices than enlisted men.

So given that the most dangerous people are removed from a unit - to be replaced with an "average" replacement - how does that change the makeup of the unit?

Or to rephrase the question - is there anything to be found examining casualty rates with the classifications mentioned above?

Or to rephrase the question - again! Is there a porpotion of the groups that 'works'? Example: If everyone is a killer, then does that unit 'work'? I can see some problems if everyone wants everyone else to go get them ammo. So will a unit who's make up 'doesn't work' get formed by natural selection into one that does?

PS - Great summary Jason!

------------------

Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ or

http://hyperion.spaceports.com/~funfacts/ or

http://www.britwar.co.uk/members/FunFacts/ for military documents written during WWII.

[This message has been edited by Jasper (edited 03-30-2001).]

[Forever Babra]

I will not comment on the numbers, but I can assert with a fair degree of certainty that someone not predisposed to kill WILL find something else to do in a firefight, and there is no shortage of things that need doing.

The question only remains as to whether or not the 20% figure is accurate.

Not to be overlooked is Keegan's discussion of "critical distance". Assuming the theory to be valid (and I do), what would be the typical critical distance for an infantryman on the WW2 battlefield, and how many small-unit actions were fought within it and without it? Does LOS affect the size of it? If a unit takes fire, but can't see the firing unit, will it cower or break even though it takes no casualties? It could be fairly presumed that being inside critical distance will boost that 20% figure, but by how much?

[Terence]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

Not to be overlooked is Keegan's discussion of "critical distance". Assuming the theory to be valid (and I do), what would be the typical critical distance for an infantryman on the WW2 battlefield, and how many small-unit actions were fought within it and without it? Does LOS affect the size of it? If a unit takes fire, but can't see the firing unit, will it cower or break even though it takes no casualties? It could be fairly presumed that being inside critical distance will boost that 20% figure, but by how much?

what is critical distance?