British Army tactics

[Amedeo]

Can anyone point me to good internet resources (if any) about British Army tactical doctrine and regulations for the 1944-45 period?

Thanks,

Amedeo

[Andreas]

This maybe helpful:

British Army Training book

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Synopsis from Amazon:

Between 1940 and 1944, although large numbers of British troops battled around the littorals of the Mediterranean and Burma, most of the British Army bided its time at home. Between Dunkirk and D-Day, those troops lived in a grey area, neither fully at peace nor properly at war. While they trained under virtually peacetime conditions, their colleagues overseas were gaining up-to-date battle experience. The lessons from that experience should have made the troops who crossed the Channel in summer 1944 the most thoroughly prepared soldiers ever to go into their first battle. Sadly, the results in Normandy confounded any such expectations, as in battle after battle the combat effectiveness of British troops, particularly infantry and armour, proved weak. In this study, Timothy Harrison Place traces the reasons for the British Army's tactical weakness in Normandy to flaws in its training in Britain. The armour suffered from a failure fully to disseminate the lessons of experience in the Mediterranean theatres to troops training at home. Disagreements between General Montgomery and the War Office over basic doctrine for the employment of armour exacerbated matters. The infantry, meanwhile, failed to apply the lessons learned on the Western Front a generation before. They trained according to the habits of 1916, and, despite the efforts of some among their number, the British Army never fully recovered from that error. This book paints a picture of an untried British Army working hard to learn its trade. Oblivious to the fact that it was always one step behind the enemy, this was an army cruelly let down by poor direction from the top. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[ 09-22-2001: Message edited by: Germanboy ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Battle Drill, Battle Drill, Battle Drill

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Battle Drill, Battle Drill, Battle Drill<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You summoned me, sir ?

I placed the order already.

The synopsis makes it almost sound like no veterans of the Western Desert and/or Med went over with the rookies. And if they did there was no difference between the vets and rookies and how they performed in combat with regards to tactics.

British veterans weren't ?

One more thing: how did the Germans regard the British troops compared to the American troops ?

[ 09-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

The synopsis makes it almost sound like no veterans of the Western Desert and/or Med went over with the rookies. And if they did there was no difference between the vets and rookies and how they performed in combat with regards to tactics.?

[ 09-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that was the point, Tero. The British standardized their training as far as possible, so that if you were number 3 rifleman in an infantry section in Italy, your duties were the same as if you were number 3 rifleman in Normandy.

That is my understanding, anyway.

As for how the Germans regarded the British - I know they called the Canadians the "Tommy SS", but that is because Canadians were ubersoldiers.

Like the Finns.

[Smack]

DId they really think that highly of Canadian soldierS? I think Canada had great and almost suicidal troops, Normandy battles taught me that...

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Smack:

DId they really think that highly of Canadian soldierS? I think Canada had great and almost suicidal troops, Normandy battles taught me that...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not all of them. I interviewed a Leutnant in Panzergrenadierlehrregiment 901 (of the famous Panzer Lehr Division) that fought the Canadians in Normandy, and he wasn't all that impressed. He started out as a private in Poland 1939, fought in France, Russia, Normandy and through to the end of the war. He admired the Polish Army the most - true professionals (hamstrung by political decisions that didn't allow them to use their terrain to good advantage).

There are a few scattered quotes by German commanders about Canadian troops that are oft repeated, but I wonder if they aren't repeated so often because of their rarity.

For example, a German general at Dieppe remarked that Canadians "fought, as far as they were able to fight at all, bravely and well."

Other commanders weren't so generous, but it depended on the circumstance. The Germans who fought against the Canadian Black Watch at Verrierres (where 325 men crossed the start line, and 15 came back) had a different view than those who fought them at the Scheldt or in the Rhineland.

Not sure where the "Tommy SS" quote comes from; I suppose I should confirm that before I toss it out. Perhaps someone else can confirm it?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I think that was the point, Tero. The British standardized their training as far as possible, so that if you were number 3 rifleman in an infantry section in Italy, your duties were the same as if you were number 3 rifleman in Normandy.

Was the British training really so constricted that if you were trained #3 rifleman that was all you knew about small unit tactics application ? If the squad Bren gunner got zapped nobody else knew how to operate it until they got a new Bren gunner.

And after a stint in the combat zone any British troops sent back home unlearned any combat experiences they might have aqcuired upon setting their feet on homeland soil.

And did "most of the British Army bided its time at home" in reality ?

Why did the British servicemen accuse the Americans of stealing their women ? Or was that just Nazi propaganda ? It was their compatriots all along....

That would also explains why the British troops unlearned their combat experiences. Being sent back home made them suscepible to severe morale hits when they learned their wifes and sweethearts had been sexually active while they were away. A fiendish American plot to undermine their allies performance so that they could claim all merits when the war was over.

As for how the Germans regarded the British - I know they called the Canadians the "Tommy SS", but that is because Canadians were ubersoldiers.

Like the Finns.

That one is easy to explain. They were clearly decendants of immigrant überFinns.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Was the British training really so constricted that if you were trained #3 rifleman that was all you knew about small unit tactics application ? If the squad Bren gunner got zapped nobody else knew how to operate it until they got a new Bren gunner.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's not what I said at all.

{quote]

And did "most of the British Army bided its time at home" in reality ?

[D'arcy Montague]

Hey Armedeo

Believe me, I've tried. I didn't find that much on the net, just odds and ends really.

Having said that, I was using google most of the time, rather than the military engines.

The most interesting resource I've come across was a 1942 Wardept publication, 'The modern British army'. Unfortunately it was my mates Grandad's, so you'll probably be hard pressed to find it. Maybe the basement of the biggest library near to you.

This confirmed alot of the modus operandii that I've learnt with the British. An emphasis on operating at company level, using A & B platoons as 'flying' platoons with C platoon in a support position, providing smoke & supression with the company's 2inch mortars. Aggresive use of Universal carriers in infantry support role etc...

[Sgt Steiner]

Hi

Another source of info is George Fortys

'British Army Handbook 1939-45' which has a chapter on Tactics,

Key phrases are 'Battle DRills' & 'Standard Operating Procedures'

This chapter has a couple nice diagrams showing Secytion Attacks, PLatoon Advances & Street Fighting.

Cheers

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

That's not what I said at all.

I know. But it did sound like you said it.

Time in England was spent constantly training;

That would stand to reason. But the sentence implies most of the British army was stationed in the British Isles for the most part of the war.

the value of that training is open to debate.

National bias/force specific performance. I think I'll abstain at this time.

See John English.

Where ?

Have you ever served in the military? A British or Canadian soldier is taught that his regiment is the best in the world - and to prove it, he must thump the living **** out of every other serviceman the second he gets to the pub or bar.

The Finnish army was and has been a conscript army and there has been traditional interservice pickering among conscripts but I do not recall any habitual violence when men from different service happen to enter the same premices. Donald Ducks reek of herring, Engineers have the arms of orangutangs, arty pukes can not find the head without proper coordinates and even then they spray it around just to make sure they hit it.

When some 95+% of the adult male population have served in the armed forces there is no point in rying to pick the best unit. Our army held back the Soviets twice so we KNOW we are good. Or at least our fathers were.

I'll take smiley as a sign to ignore this bit of silliness!

Just trying to find some sense in the seemingly illogical conclusion drawn from (what I find) incomplete facts. I'll read the book first before I get serious.

In all honesty, I think those kinds of situations are overstated...

Perhaps. But at personal level they MAY have been a factor that eroded morale of the troops.

and Tommy wore rolls of 9mm bullets in his Battle Dress trouser cuffs. Made good saps when used in a bar fight, according to the veterans. Tommy quickly got his own back when he returned!

I hope in most cases it was extracted from the GI and not the wife/girl friend.

[hansfritz]

The Finnish only held up the Russians twice,because the Russians had forgot what a bloody horible place it was the first time.They packed up there bags and just went home,deciding that they didn't want to learn to ski anyway.Rumour had it that they only wanted to meet Farther Chistmas,and to see if all Fins shagged Reindeer.They were correct.Any way wasn't Finland on the Nazi side.

[Tero]

Originally posted by hansfritz:

...and to see if all Fins shagged Reindeer.They were correct.

Has the ban on national slurs been lifted already ?

Any way wasn't Finland on the Nazi side.

I suggest you look it up. You could start by listing all the actual mutual treaties Finland and Germany signed.

If you are correct in your assumption why then was the only action your forces took against us a RAF bombing raid in 1941 that dropped its load way off target while FAF planes watched over not far away from the bomber formation ?

[ 09-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by hansfritz:

The Finnish only held up the Russians twice,because the Russians had forgot what a bloody horible place it was the first time.They packed up there bags and just went home,deciding that they didn't want to learn to ski anyway.Rumour had it that they only wanted to meet Farther Chistmas,and to see if all Fins shagged Reindeer.They were correct.Any way wasn't Finland on the Nazi side.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Finland was a strange case. It was technically on the Nazi side, in that it allowed Germans toops on its soil, fought side by side with them, supplied and recieved supplies from them, and individual Finns joined the Waffen SS and were often placed in high NCO positions as being politically more reliable than other nordics. Finland had its version of the NAZI party, but the ruling party was not NAZI, more like a real hard core right wing war party (only the United States fought the entire war with a liberal party in office -- if you consider Stalin to be so liberal that he swung back over to conservative since he too was technically a left party leader).

Finland however was about the worst allies the Germans could have asked for. They were half hearted in supporting offensives and rapidly lost their vaunted ability once they switched from defensive to offensive. Their logistical supply chain was a mess, and Germans could not convince the Finns to rationalize supply or weapons issue, in part because Finns wanted independence from German force organization.

The reality of the Finnish participation in the Second World War was that it was self-serving. It only turned to Germany when the allies turned their backs on her (because Russia had become an an ally) but it was more a fair weather ally of the Germans, and as soon as the wind blew the other way in a serious manner, it did an about face and was against Germany. Unlike Sweden and Denmark it did not try to save European Jews (Wallenberg is a classic example of the Swedish overt attempts at saving European Jews, although oddly enough it was Stalin who ordered his execution putting in the writ "to dangerous to live") but niether did it actively deport Jews to Germany for slaughter like the Vichy did.

So aside from its glory days in the Winter War, you just cannot assign Finland a good or bad mark for its participation. More like it was a minnow in a room of sharks and it did its best to survive, which in fact it did.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Finland was a strange case.

Indeed. Even if the history of WWII is written in black and white norms only it is hard to cathegorically place us in either coloured collumn.

individual Finns joined the Waffen SS and were often placed in high NCO positions as being politically more reliable than other nordics.

What is your source on this bit of data ? This statement is inaccurate at best. There was a volunteer battalion which served in the Viking division from 1941 until 1943 when it was recalled home. There may well have been isolated cases of individuals joining the SS but as all Finnish males of military age were needed in our own army large numbers of them going off individually without permission from the authorities was quite impossible.

Finland had its version of the NAZI party,

What is your source on this bit of information ? Please supply the names of the parties.

but the ruling party was not NAZI, more like a real hard core right wing war party

:confused: Again, like the good professor you are you should be more specific with the names of the parties.

Are you sure you are looking at the source for the Finnish and not the Japanese data ? Or are you reading this straight from a Soviet propaganda leaflet ? When Titans Clashed ? If it is the latter you should crossreference the source thoroughly. The bits about Finland in it are taken unedited straight from Soviet 60's era books.

IIRC the wartime government was a coalition (rainbow) government which was set up by left wing, center and MODERATE right wing parties. I'll lokk that one up ASAP to confirm this.

Finland however was about the worst allies the Germans could have asked for. They were half hearted in supporting offensives

How many joint Finnish-German offensives were there ? What support was not given ?

and rapidly lost their vaunted ability once they switched from defensive to offensive.

Like when exactly ?

Their logistical supply chain was a mess,

Not according to the Finnish sources. Granted, we used aircraft from ALL parties except the Japanese and that complicated things. And we were dependent on the German supply of oil. Otherwise there was nothing wrong with the supply chain of the field armies.

and Germans could not convince the Finns to rationalize supply or weapons issue, in part because Finns wanted independence from German force organization.

And this is all bad ? It was easier to take what you need from the enemy than hump it all the way from the rear. Besides, there were more than enough small arms and artillery for the army after Winter War, courtesy of the Red Army and western aid. Why switch it all for arms you would have had to pay with hard curency ?

The reality of the Finnish participation in the Second World War was that it was self-serving.

Our leaders were looking after Finnish interest only. Guilty as charged.

It only turned to Germany when the allies turned their backs on her (because Russia had become an an ally) but it was more a fair weather ally of the Germans, and as soon as the wind blew the other way in a serious manner, it did an about face and was against Germany.

Opportunists all the way. Unlike the altruistic Allies.

Unlike Sweden and Denmark it did not try to save European Jews but niether did it actively deport Jews to Germany for slaughter like the Vichy did.

In this we ARE in the same growd with the US and the UK.

BTW: you failed to metion the fact that Finnish jews served in the Finnish army.

So aside from its glory days in the Winter War, you just cannot assign Finland a good or bad mark for its participation. More like it was a minnow in a room of sharks and it did its best to survive, which in fact it did.

True.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

In all honesty, I think those kinds of situations are overstated...

Perhaps. But at personal level they MAY have been a factor that eroded morale of the troops.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't doubt that for a second; and indeed, there was probably a lot of it going around. I'd have to check my copy of LOVE, SEX AND WAR by Costello to see if there are any numbers associated with this phenomena. On an individual basis, you are absolutely correct that this had a part to play on army morale. I suppose Finland was lucky in this regard - to be fighting on her own soil. What was the Finnish policy regarding home leave? Canadian soldiers were denied it in the overwhelming majority of cases - meaning that most Canadians stayed overseas once sent there. The policy changed a bit in 1944-45, but even then, I would say the majority of combat soldiers in England throughout the war spent a minimum of 2-3 years without any kind of home leave to Canada and their families.

With regards to the training - some units did spend up to 4 years in England (the II Canadian Corps as a whole, for one) without seeing action - including many British divisions. One doesn't want to confuse battle experience with training. Some Canadians were rotated out to I Corps (and even British units of the 8th Army in the desert) to get battle experience, though these numbers were small. Not sure what the British policy was on battle experience/rotations. Knowing their regimental system, I can only imagine it was as rigid as the Canadian policy, but am open to correction.

[Hon John Howard MP LLB]

Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[qb]I think that was the point, Tero. The British standardized their training as far as possible, so that if you were number 3 rifleman in an infantry section in Italy, your duties were the same as if you were number 3 rifleman in Normandy.

Was the British training really so constricted that if you were trained #3 rifleman that was all you knew about small unit tactics application ? If the squad Bren gunner got zapped nobody else knew how to operate it until they got a new Bren gunner.

[/QB]

No - that is not what was said.

The No3 rifleman in a given situation (and these were the "battle drills") performed the same function in "contact" "immediate ambush" and "counter-ambush" and similar situations (the vital first 10 seconds when actions have to be instinctive to survive)or even training for the old "run-dive-roll-observe-fire" drills. It was the lack of standardisation which meant a person trained in the UK when sent to the WD or Burma had to be "untrained" and then re-trained that meant a large waste of effort.

Any member of the section was trained to use any of the weapons of the section/platoon rifle, LMG, grenade (various), 2in mortar, PIAT. Most if not all were trained to use the additional weapons of the company/battalion ie the level of the MMG/3in mortar.

And after a stint in the combat zone any British troops sent back home unlearned any combat experiences they might have aqcuired upon setting their feet on homeland soil.

No - they were used for the value of their experience.

Later in thread there is reference to the British regimental system mitigating against the passing of experience back to "home" formations.

While this is true to a certain extent, wounded personnel ("copped a "Blighty") or on promotion (particularly those commisioned) were as a general rule, NOT sent back to their original battalions. They were passed to whichever battalion in the regiment had vacancies at that time (many going to battalions proceeding overseas rather than their own which may have already been there). Many of those commissioned from the ranks were not even sent back to their original regiment because of the problems of "familiarity".

This is in contrast to the Australian Army where personnel were both promoted/commissioned in their own battalion or posted elsewhere - there seemed little system except where "the system" needed them.

Why did the British servicemen accuse the Americans of stealing their women ? Or was that just Nazi propaganda ? It was their compatriots all along....

"Over-sexed", "Over-paid" and "Over-here"!

The second is a valid point - pay differences between US and UK forces were extremely marked. There were problems between Canadian and Oz rates of pay and UK forces in WWI wth the same complaints from the same people. The "Tommie" had always had the "rough end of the pineapple" over pay !

The third point could be interesting. Remember it was not the proportion of the Army that was away from home it was that of the overall UK armed forces. And even if still "in-country", leave provisions and difficulty of tranport (particulalrly early to mid-war when disruption due to bombing was at its peak) would mean "access" to loved ones would be difficult.

See wartime films like "In which we serve", "Way to the stars" and "The way ahead" (RN, RAF, Army respectively) for the effect of wartime conditions on "access".

[Michael Dorosh]

John - excellent post.

The dictum of the time was as you say, but officially it was DOWN, CRAWL, OBSERVE, FIRE.

At least, it was in the training pams I have seen. It was taught as part of fieldcraft, and many histories (Canadian, at least) repeat the phrase, as it was often repeated (read: drilled into) them.

DOWN, CRAWL, OBSERVE, FIRE

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I suppose Finland was lucky in this regard - to be fighting on her own soil.

We did have our share of problems in this field also even if they were not as pronounced. There were German troops in Finland and especially their logistics personel were in an "advantage" in towns because they could abscond extra rations and other supplies. There were also isolated incidents involving Russian POW's who were working in the farms.

What was the Finnish policy regarding home leave?

Once the static phase started the leave rotation was started and it worked rather well and it was fair. The farmers got special furloughs in spring and in the autumn and families resettling the Isthmus were given a chance to go and rebuild their homes. The timing of the Red Army assault in 1944 was well thought out in this respect. A sizable portion of the troops were on farming leave and artillery horses and tractors were doing farm work quite far from the positions.

One doesn't want to confuse battle experience with training.

Quite. However, having not read the book it is hard to envision the Desert Rats going soft all of a sudden prior to D-day while the 21st Panzer remained at its peak even when it had been rebuilt around the remains of the old illustrious formation. Unless of course the formations remained the same but the veteran troops were reassigned to other units. Which in turn did not happen according to the synopsis.

...but am open to correction.

Likewise.

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

John - excellent post.

The dictum of the time was as you say, but officially it was DOWN, CRAWL, OBSERVE, FIRE.

At least, it was in the training pams I have seen. It was taught as part of fieldcraft, and many histories (Canadian, at least) repeat the phrase, as it was often repeated (read: drilled into) them.

DOWN, CRAWL, OBSERVE, FIRE<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think John is guilty of assuming that what he learnt as a digger was what was taught in 1944-45.

In the Oz Army its been "run-dive-crawl-observe-fire" - we prefer to make a moving target for the enemy.

However, apart from that, an interest set of insights on both sides which has reinforced what I already knew/believed about British training - its fairly rigid and orthodox. Harks back to the "battle-rings" (or schools) which the British army established in WWI on the Western Front - all troops were regularly moved through them to ensure that they recieved the latest training and were at a consistent level throughout the army.

In WWII, I understand the British Army adopted a similar system but primarily within divisions, rather than outside them, as happened in WWI.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Hon John Howard MP LLB:

No - that is not what was said.

I know.

The No3 rifleman in a given situation (and these were the "battle drills") performed the same function in "contact" "immediate ambush" and "counter-ambush" and similar situations (the vital first 10 seconds when actions have to be instinctive to survive)or even training for the old "run-dive-roll-observe-fire" drills.

The Finnish basic drill went (IIRC) "run, dive, crawl, observe, roll, fire"

It was the lack of standardisation which meant a person trained in the UK when sent to the WD or Burma had to be "untrained" and then re-trained that meant a large waste of effort.

Was it really the lack of standardisation that made the situation supposedly bad once the troops were sent over ?

This raises also the question of the predominance of basic training and what it included. How far did it go and was there any separate combat training ?

Any member of the section was trained to use any of the weapons of the section/platoon rifle, LMG, grenade (various), 2in mortar, PIAT. Most if not all were trained to use the additional weapons of the company/battalion ie the level of the MMG/3in mortar.

This would stand to reason.

No - they were used for the value of their experience.

Not according to the synopsis.

While they trained under virtually peacetime conditions, their colleagues overseas were gaining up-to-date battle experience. The lessons from that experience should have made the troops who crossed the Channel in summer 1944 the most thoroughly prepared soldiers ever to go into their first battle. Sadly, the results in Normandy confounded any such expectations, as in battle after battle the combat effectiveness of British troops, particularly infantry and armour, proved weak.

Unless of course you mean the veteran formations were regarded higher and given easier tasks to conserve them (or conversly given tougher tasks that decimated them). There is something fishy in the equation. Is the author of the book (or the synopsis) British ?

Later in thread there is reference to the British regimental system mitigating against the passing of experience back to "home" formations.

What was the procedure the British army used to familiarize fresh troops sent as replacements ?

While this is true to a certain extent, wounded personnel ("copped a "Blighty") or on promotion (particularly those commisioned) were as a general rule, NOT sent back to their original battalions. They were passed to whichever battalion in the regiment had vacancies at that time (many going to battalions proceeding overseas rather than their own which may have already been there). Many of those commissioned from the ranks were not even sent back to their original regiment because of the problems of "familiarity".

The experiences of the WWI buddy regiments must have been cataclysmic in many respects.

This is in contrast to the Australian Army where personnel were both promoted/commissioned in their own battalion or posted elsewhere - there seemed little system except where "the system" needed them.

The more these issues pertaining the "universal soldier" approach taken in CM are discussed the more it would seem the differences far outweighed the similarities between different armies. Even different between different branches of the same army.

"Over-sexed", "Over-paid" and "Over-here"!

The second is a valid point

The first one must also have been based on something.

- pay differences between US and UK forces were extremely marked. There were problems between Canadian and Oz rates of pay and UK forces in WWI wth the same complaints from the same people. The "Tommie" had always had the "rough end of the pineapple" over pay !

How would you say did the fact that the field armies were built around a core of peace time professional formations beefed up with masses of enlisted or called up personel and formations affect the situation ?

Were the formations kept separate and if so did that have any effect on the performance of the British armed forces as a whole ?

The third point could be interesting.

Remember it was not the proportion of the Army that was away from home it was that of the overall UK armed forces. And even if still "in-country", leave provisions and difficulty of tranport (particulalrly early to mid-war when disruption due to bombing was at its peak) would mean "access" to loved ones would be difficult.

What proportion of the army was actually stationed at home ? What about RN and RAF ?

See wartime films like "In which we serve", "Way to the stars" and "The way ahead" (RN, RAF, Army respectively) for the effect of wartime conditions on "access".

Of these films I have seen "In which we serve". I recall seeing the "Family at War (?)" TV series many years ago.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Quite. However, having not read the book it is hard to envision the Desert Rats going soft all of a sudden prior to D-day while the 21st Panzer remained at its peak even when it had been rebuilt around the remains of the old illustrious formation. Unless of course the formations remained the same but the veteran troops were reassigned to other units. Which in turn did not happen according to the synopsis.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think 'going soft' is probably the wrong expression. There were a number of factors here, but amongst them are that 7th AD had been in 'it' from the start in the desert, while they knew that many divisions were in England training for the whole four years. Also, they had seen what a German AP round could do numerous times, and the vets in the division had come through - but if you believe you have a finite amount of luck to spend, they could probably see the bottom of the barrel for that one.

Another factor was that they had nice diesel-powered Shermans in Africa, courtesy of the US Govt. They left them there, and were not only given slab-sided, crappy Cromwells that ran on gasoline, but also told that this tank was the best thing since sliced bread, an insult to their intelligence and battle experience (and before the proponents of the idea that British tanks rocked get all in a huff and fluster - this is directly from a divisional history of 7th AD, and based on the assessment by people like Tout).

The division was also badly led during the initial phase, something that was born out when the Brigadiers (I think it was both of them) and the GOC were replaced. Villers-Bocage was a direct consequence of loss of nerves on the part of the command.

A veteran unit will only be as good as its leadership - particularly its junior leadership. Since there will be a high turnover amongst these (high casualty rates, survivors being promoted up the CoC) that means that there will be an element of wastage even if the division does not take large casualties in numbers. 11th AD seems to have come perilously close to being disbanded after Goodwood (at least that was what the officers were told) due to the high number of losses in junior leaders, although overall losses had been small, compared to e.g. 15th Scots in Epsom.

[Ari Maenpaa]

Slapdragon,

OK, this is off the topic here, but I'm interested in your opinions of WW2-era Finland. As it seems that you are a history professional, I find it intriguing how different views you have got from mine or other Finns' in general.

I wonder if these differences come from the supposed Finnish propaganda like many here seems to believe or from the too one-sided western sources which are based on the Russian history writing. Quite possibly it's more or less both.

Anyway there have been some factual errors in your information. For instance some time ago you wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> In 1945 Finland was bewteen a rock and a hard place. They had declared war against Britain and had Brtain declare war against them on December 6th 1941. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is not true. Finland never declared war against Britain during WW2. But she broke up the diplomatic relations to Britain late in summer '41, basically because Britain had allied with the USSR and because Operation Barbarossa had already began.

On the other hand Britain did declare war against Finland because of the pressure from the Soviets. Churchill even consulted the Dominions before the declaration and only Australia supported it. But Churchill had already tied his own hands by his earlier promise to Stalin. Even he himself regretted it.

Btw. USA broke up the diplomatic relations with Finland only in midsummer ’44, after the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was signed. But she didn't declare war against Finland.

Maybe it's better to continue this discussion later in some other thread.

Ari

[Dan Robertson]

Current UK battle drill is as so.

Effective enemy fire. Rounds pass between foot to head height or casualties taken.

Section comanders descision. (take cover)

Infantry men will fire a short burst in the general direction of enemy.

Run to cover.

Drop before cover.

Crawl into cover

Return fire

Then depending on the strength of the enemy drill is to either go forward and over run them or retreat and attack with greater forces.

The Drill for supporting fire is to move when your support is firing. Usually you will shout go before starting the covering fire, but this is not possible if advancing in sections.

Soldier 1: Puts enemy under effective fire (prepare to move)

Soldier 1: (move!))

Soldier 2: Retreats from cover

Soldier 2: Moves until next cover

Soldier 2: Drops before cover

Soldier 2: Crawls in to firing position.

Soldier 1: Prepares to move

The reason that the rounds are fired when the enemy makes contact is to give the impression that they have contacted a larger formation than they expected. Obviously with a bolt action rifle this would be ineffective, but with an auto matic rifle a section can sound very much louder if they all fire at the same time.

If you are entering an aera you suspect the enemy may be in you will be patroling anyway, which is like the above but without the firing, and with longer bounds. A sensible comander will set up the patrol so that it is hard to tell how many men are in the patrol, this is done by a varying the number of people moving at one time.

The reason you drop before your firing position to to make it harder for the enemy to pinpoint your position. If you drop and raise in the same place you will be an easy target.

The battle drill are fundementally as flexible as the men using them, if you are approaching a wall for example you wonldn't need to drop a distance infont of it. Ditto if you are crossing a street (but we have a drill for that also)