OT: LAV 105mm vs Abrams - (Was: Sherman not a tank)

[Cavguy]

I have seen a lot of mis-information about the LAV fielding generated from the Popular Mechanics article and speculation about the role of light tanks.

I am an Active Duty US Army Armor Captain currently at Ft. Knox where they are doing a lot with the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), better known as the LAV brigades. I have received a few briefings on the developments.

I would like to state the following points, all of which are public info, unclassified, and I will gladly answer any further questions.

1) The army is not ditching the M1 Abrams. Six brigades are transitioning to the LAV until the Future Combat System (FCS) is fielded in the 2010-2015 timeframe. Of those six brigades, five are currently light infantry brigades being upgraded with LAVs. Having served in light cavalry with a HMMWV, I can definitely attest this is a step up. The net loss of Abrams tanks is 2 battalions across the force.

2) The M1 is being upgraded over the next few years to the M1A2 Separate Enhancement Package (SEP)version with FLIR sights, IR Jamming, and other improvements. It is projected to serve in the force until 2031 (a 50 year old tank!) when totally replaced by the FCS. The LAV is only a INTERIM solution until the FCS is fielded.

3) The M1 is too heavy for most operations. The majority of bridges in the world simply cannot handle a 70 ton MBT. As an enemy, you can predict where our armor HAS to go based on terrain and bridges that can support our armor. Therefore, the Abrams makes us predictable in restricted terrain choke points. Not to mention it is logistically impossible to provide fuel and deployment through air resupply alone. We just don't have that many C-5's and C-17s to dedicate as tank haulers. For every tank flown, something else is left behind.

4) Adding extra armor to defeat new improved AGTM warheads is a zero sum game. This only increases weight, which exacerbates the problems of the current MBT. With the advent of the SAM the Air Force stopped trying to make its aircraft "survive" a hit. Instead it focused on "avoiding" a hit through various countermeasures - ECM, flares, decoys, stealth, etc. If you can't see/hit us, you don't need as much armor. The navy has done the same with its Phlanax system to defeat cruise missiles.

5) Technology currently exists to defeat incoming AGTMs through IR Jamming and active intercept. In the very near future we will be able to deflect APFDS rounds traveling at 5000/m sec with various intercept technologies. These will be part of the FCS.

IR/Thermal masking technology will render the FCS nearly invisible through most sights. This is not star wars - it exists. Armor will still be needed to defeat small calber (<14.7mm) weapons. If you can't hit me, I don't have to have 50 tons of armor and a huge fuel guzzling powerplant, I can weigh 20 tons and have much less of a logistical tail. (which is huge for the M1)

6) The IBCT will have its own recon Squadron (Battalion) organic. For comparison, a DIVISION has one recon squadron currently. The thought is that having extra recon assets linked digitally using UAVs, LRAS3, and other new technologies will provide a much better picture of the battlefield for the IBCT commander which will allow him to pick the time and place of the fight through better intelligence.

7) There will still be six heavy divisions in the active force for the foreseeable future to deal with situations that require heavy armor. The IBCT simply allows the army to be relevant for rapid deployment situations with added firepower. Having been in a Light Infantry Division, I can say that this is a definite step up.

(8) 105mm vs. 120mm. Our 105mm currently can defeat all MBTs in service around the world. The 120mm was adopted on the Abrams for a number of reasons, most importantly that we promised the Germans we would standardize on the 120mm(they build the gun). The 120mm provides overmatch for future armored threats and also doesn't wear as quickly since it is smoothbore vs. rifled, but that is another discussion. Plus we have HEP and Beehive rounds for the 105mm, which haven't been fielded for the 120mm.

I know I haven't covered everything, so feel free to ask questions or send follow-up. I don't speak for the army and am not involved in the project (I am preparing for command of an Armor Company or Cavalry Troop) but would be happy to answer questions to the best of my knowledge.

BTW, some high speed pictures and info on the LAV 3 is available at the General Dynamics Land Systems website (URL not handy).

Cavguy

[This message has been edited by Cavguy (edited 01-25-2001).]

[Holman]

Cavguy,

Nice post, and thanks for the info.

I have a question in a slightly different direction, but this seems a good place to ask it: what is the reasoning behind the transition from the regimental and divisional structure of the WW2-era to the brigade structure of the present (US) military? Am I correct in thinking that the division has given way to the brigade as the core unit of operational thinking? I'm not sure that I understand the reasons and the ramifications, but I'm hoping that someone might be able to explain it in a small space.

Thanks.

[Blackhorse]

We should do lunch some time. Are you in the Captains Career Course?

[TankDawg]

HI Cavguy,

Welcome to CM.

Good post.

One point...I sure wish the Army was ahead of the curve with anti-missile systems. The IR jamming is great, but other countries currently field many different and better ways to stop enemy ATGMS. I have directly asked the Armor Center Threat Group and even the CG (at the time, General Harmeyer) and they both totally dodged the question.

do you have any further insight on this?

Just look at the T-90s the CIS are exporting to India to understand how far behind we are.

------------------

Jeff Newell

TankDawg

[Cavguy]

Originally posted by TankDawg:

One point...I sure wish the Army was ahead of the curve with anti-missile systems. The IR jamming is great, but other countries currently field many different and better ways to stop enemy ATGMS.

do you have any further insight on this?

Just look at the T-90s the CIS are exporting to India to understand how far behind we are.

Thanks for the welcome. I have been lurking for awhile but haven't posted much. Love CM! I have also posted some on th TacOps board since we are wargaming with it in AC3 -executing our TF and CO/TM plans.

Agree with you on the IR jamming and active defenses. The CIS has the sentinel(?) which apparently is sort of a variation reactive armor - it explodes before the missile hits sending shrapnel to destroy/detonate the AGTM before impact. I got a lot of this info at a luncheon with MG Bell (he was talking to a group of us AC3 students) and he was talking active and passive countermeasures. The COL from doctrine branch also gave a presentation (Death by Powerpoint) on the IBCT that contained some useful info. And of course we junior captains see the need to impart our wisdom in daily discussions during small group.

From my understanding we will not be seeing it soon as all armor mod funds are dedicated to the SEP, LAV and FCS research. So many needs, so little money I guess.

We have been doing some very interesting threat info briefs, the Russians are having a fire sale on good equipment to lots of countries. However, you have to have a competent army to use it well. The Iraqis had good equipment but not good troops or training....

Cavguy

[Cavguy]

Originally posted by Martyr:

I have a question in a slightly different direction, but this seems a good place to ask it: what is the reasoning behind the transition from the regimental and divisional structure of the WW2-era to the brigade structure of the present (US) military? Am I correct in thinking that the division has given way to the brigade as the core unit of operational thinking? Thanks.

This has been the subject of much acrimony and gnashing of teeth since the early 60's when the army went to the pentomic "battlegroup" that removed the regiments. Basically the army did away with the battalion, and had 6-8 companies in a "battlegroup" commanded by a full bird. Didn't work for many reasons, not the least of which was span of control.

The army reorganized in the mid 60's. Instead of bringing back regiments with their proud histories, it created the brigade=>battalion=> company system. However, the battalions were all affiliated with a regiment for lineage purposes. For example, I was in 3rd Squadron 4th Cavalry (3-4 CAV) Regiment which belongs to 25th ID in Hawaii. In the WWII system the 4th Cavalry was organized and fought as a regiment. Since the 60's the regiments were split up and the battalions given to brigades. 1-4 CAV, which is the same regiment, now belongs to 1 ID in Germany. The colors and history of the regiment stay active but the units were split to brigades. 2-4 and 4-4 CAV are deactivated. A weird system, I know.

The only two "regiments" still together are 2 ACR and 3 ACR. 1/327 IN, 2/327 IN, and 3/327 IN in the 101st all belong to the same brigade at Ft. Campbell, but that is the only other place I know that has a regiment together.

Others may be able to explain it better. We retain the regiment designation to keep the histories alive.

To answer your last question, the Army has focused on Brigade Combat Team (a plused up brigade with attachments of FA, Engineer, CSS, etc) operations for years. All rotations through NTC and JRTC are as BCTs, not divisions. Every deployment I have seen (except the gulf war) has been built around a BCT. Divisional maneuver will be rare in the future.

The army will still retain its divisional structure for the foreseeable future, however. Brigades will become much more self sufficient than in the past.

If you ask me, an ACR is the way to go!

CavGuy

[This message has been edited by Cavguy (edited 01-25-2001).]

[elementalwarre]

cavguy, would you comment on air-mech-strike's points in http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/012024-4.html?

more precisely, air-mech-strike claims

- tracked vs wheeled performance, reliability, etc has not been thoroughly tested

- LAV is not sufficiently airmobile

again, i'm a -civilian- US citizen with NO vested interest in any particular side of this. as close i get is wargames and active/reserve/retired friends in the military

[Maximus]

Cavguy,

For the some of us who aren't up to snuff on Army acronyms, can you please explain some of the acronyms you used in your posts.

Thanks.

Whoops, you already did. But could you ellaborate a little more on to what this LAV system is.

[This message has been edited by Maximus (edited 01-25-2001).]

[Cavguy]

Originally posted by elementalwarre:

cavguy, would you comment on air-mech-strike's points in http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/012024-4.html?

more precisely, air-mech-strike claims

- tracked vs wheeled performance, reliability, etc has not been thoroughly tested

- LAV is not sufficiently airmobile

First, I am a lowly Captain who will have to salute and ride in whatever they give me. However, opinions are like A**holes, everyone has one so here is the predominant one making the rounds at AC3 and the consensus of the groups of junior officers (who seldom have the bigger picture)

- Almost unanimously we would have preferred the M8 AGS/M113 combination over the LAV. The M8 was cancelled in 96 as the replacement for the M551 Sheridan. It is an airdroppable light tank with a 105mm, autoloader, and add-on armor. The 113 is tracked, available, and reliable. Soldiers always prefer the known to the unknown.

That being said - we weren't asked, didn't perform the tests or write the specifications for the BCT, there were other factors in the decison the brass made.

- We have serious differences over the armor protection (or lack therof) on the LAV. I would not be confident with it in urban fighting. RPG's would tear it apart. It wouldn't have been much help in a Somalia scenario with tires and weak armor. (Pakistani M113's saved the day) Another good argument is that a wheeled APC can't run stuff over to get out of a bad situation. However, we will work with what is given to us.

- The lack of a turret and weak main armament (M2 .50 cal or Mk19 on the infantry/scout variant) is a matter of concern. Anti-armor capability is a javelin crew in the back. I would like to see something more substantial - a 20-30mm chain gun, and a hammerhead Javelin missile launcher.

- I believe the army picked it for logistical reasons. A common platform reduces the parts required in theater. If two platforms were used the logistical requirments would increase. If the goal is rapid deployability, you must have a small logistics tail. A common design goes a long way, and the LAV is a common platform.

- Again, it is an improvement over what the light infantry has now, and heavy armor will still be around.

- The two BCT's developing doctrine at Lewis will come up with tactics and techniques for MOUT employment, I am inclined to see what they come up with.

Cavguy

[This message has been edited by Cavguy (edited 01-25-2001).]

[Cavguy]

Originally posted by Maximus:

Cavguy,

For the some of us who aren't up to snuff on Army acronyms, can you please explain some of the acronyms you used in your posts.

Thanks.

Whoops, you already did. But could you ellaborate a little more on to what this LAV system is.

[This message has been edited by Maximus (edited 01-25-2001).]

The Light Armored Vehicle 3 is a 8x8 wheeled armored personnel carrier that will for a common platform for scouts, infantry, anti-tank, artillery, and other functions in the IBCT. It is manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems. The goal is to give the army a lightweight, air deployable personnel carrier/weapons platform with enough firepower to hold the line until heavy armor can be brought into theater.

<img src=http://www.gdls.com/releases/photos/ICV-002.jpg>

[This message has been edited by Cavguy (edited 01-25-2001).]

[jhtrickey]

Originally posted by Cavguy:

)

- Almost unanimously we would have preferred the M8 AGS/M113 combination over the LAV. The M8 was cancelled in 96 as the replacement for the M551 Sheridan. It is an airdroppable light tank with a 105mm, autoloader, and add-on armor. The 113 is tracked, available, and reliable. Soldiers always prefer the known to the unknown.

I missed out on being part of the test team when they demo the AGS system. They already had enough lowly captains at the time and didn't need another one. Got to see some briefs on it. Also missed out on the IPAT ammo test.

[Maximus]

Thanks Cavguy for the description and the pics.

But man, those things wouldn't last long against a strongly committed AT effort. If I were the US Army, I wouldn't throw away the Abrams tanks on a bet now. Granted I understand the weight and bridge issues, but just having some M1A2s on the scene is a pretty good deterent in itself, is it not?

[Cavguy]

Originally posted by Maximus:

Thanks Cavguy for the description and the pics.

But man, those things wouldn't last long against a strongly committed AT effort. If I were the US Army, I wouldn't throw away the Abrams tanks on a bet now. Granted I understand the weight and bridge issues, but just having some M1A2s on the scene is a pretty good deterent in itself, is it not?

Which is why the M1A2 is sticking around until 2031. The LAV is the INTERIM Solution until the FCS is fielded in 2010. The LAV is off the shelf - the FCS is a new new generation of technology - a 20 ton "stealthy" killer. Read my first post carefully.

Also, the only way to get enough M1A2's there in force is by ship - takes 30 days or more usually. Which is why the IBCT and FCS are being developed - we need something heavier than the 82d Airborne and lighter than a heavy division that can deploy quickly with reasonable firepower. The IBCT is it.

Cavguy

[This message has been edited by Cavguy (edited 01-25-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

I offer my opinion. The army is brain-dead to pick the LAV. They should have used the Bradley and modified it as needed, and the M8 or something like it for the gun system. The army knows the Bradley and how to fight in it. It is also tracked, and long experience has shown the value of tracks in everything but road marches. Even half-tracks do not have the off-road mobility in terrain of a tracked vehicle. And it is better armored, enough to deal with MGs anyway, while the LAV can be penetrated by most HMG at combat ranges and from any angle. Using LAVs is very much like using BTRs, and the Russians found in Afghanistan that MGs with SLAP ammo (slightly up-market kinetic energy MG rounds) could chew them apart regularly. It also has a turret, and a gun, and an ATGM launcher - just little things like that.

And the weight requirement for the interim system was set just above the weight of current Bradleys. In other words, they rigged the rules so that the Bradley would not pass, but anything even marginally lighter would. Then they were still having problems getting the 105 version of anything to pass the weight tests, so they relaxed the weight tests for the gun-system version. When asked why they would not consider a different chassis for the gun system, standardization of type was given as the reason.

And why was the weight requirement set where it was? Because the mission spec was to be air-lifted by a C-130 - a ~50 year old obsolescent airplane. And the gun version won't be anyway, or doesn't have to be. And they already spent gobs on the C-17 which was supposed to handle airlift and the Brad in particular, and does not have this weight cut-off that excludes the Brad. But they haven't fixed its wing-cracking problems when they try to land it on runways as short as its specs, so they made the test requirement the C-130.

In other words, after blowing about $50 billion on military airlift upgrades without getting a plane that works to spec, they are going to make up for that not working by ignoring and making no use of a huge fleet of capable Brads, and will instead blow tens of billions more on a new fleet of tin cans that fit in a plane older than most colonels. And call it "mobility".

Never forget that money spent on training, readiness, maintenance, upgrades, new vision equipment, and more cheap smart weapons, only wins wars and will only save your life. Money spent on major new weapon systems is much more important - that goes to the friends of congressmen.

Besides a new vehicle order, why did the brass not want the Brad? Because it is tracked, and tracked means higher POL usage especially for ordinary road moves and in training, and that means a larger logistical support job. All of the history says the tracks are worth their weight (I am not talking 70 tons M-1s for the first deployment, I am talking about 20 ton Brads instead of 19 ton LAV MGS systems).

The army is throwing away off-road movement, turreted gun firepower, ATGM launchers, existing training and doctrine, and spending extra money up front to do it in the tens of billions - to get better gas mileage! It is the stupidest thing I have seen the army do in my lifetime. They also reduced the vehicle TOE of the brigade to include 3-vehicle platoons and eliminated about 40% of the ATGM launchers, to save some packing space, that all told will add up to less than 1 day of faster deployment time for a single brigade. One friggin' news cycle for the pols calling the shots, and bam a quarter of the brigade's AT firepower is shot, and doctrinal vehicle pairs are out the window.

Generals have to move whole formations around on the map; they have to supply them and fly them here or there. The guys at the pointy end are forever telling them to give us some armor, enough to stop artillery rounds nearby and machineguns at least - top give us tracks so we don't bog - to give us more advanced missles that can actually kill whatever we point at. Do the generals listen? Only after Task Force Smith.

And what is the entire exercise for? Because the brass has CNN envy. They have to be 1-2 news cycles faster, or the pols won't give them face time and will call the air force instead.

There is nothing wrong with a focus on greater deployability for a portion of the force. But the single best way to increase that is to fix the military airlift situation, and relying on the C-130 to soldier on instead is a ridiculous answer, when that is the supposed emphasis and point of the whole thing.

There is nothing wrong with smart light armor - the Bradley forces proved that in the Gulf, where they did extremely well. But the Bradley was the vehicle to use, not the LAV, because the purpose of light armor is to stop MGs and heavy artillery nearby, not AK-47 rounds, and because light should refer to the armor not the firepower, and because moving off-road means tracks or bogging, period.

It sounds to me like your junior officer friends have all of this pretty well figured out, when you say they are "concerned" about things like no tracks and no turret and no gun and no ATGM. They are right. They ought to be livid, not just concerned.

It is not too late to change the ridiculous rigged specs for the tests, especially since the MGS isn't going to pass the original weight specs anyway. Nor is it too late to plan on flying them places in fixed C-17s, which darn it we paid a royal bundle for already, not C-130s.

Arg. Can you tell these kinds of screw-ups make me mad?

One man's opinion...

[Guest machineman]

There's a number of these 105 mm multiwheeled tank destroyers around; South African Rooikat, Italian Centauro, French AMX-10. Anyone know how have these worked out?

[KMHPaladin]

I disagree.

This comes from an 18-year-old who is in college and has never served in the US military. However, I have had a lifelong interest in military history and I believe that qualifies me to relate some sort of opinion.

First, I will not lie - I would feel sorry to see the Abrams go. As an enthusiast of military technology as well, there is nothing "cooler" than a big tank. However, these "big tanks" have a waning usefulness to a modern army.

As I say this, I want to make clear that I'm not arguing in support of the LAV. Personally the M8 AGS seems like a better decision - a "light tank" instead of a "heavy armored car." However, I believe that the concept of a lighter and more mobile armed forces is the inexorable direction in which the future is taking us. With a global economy and the resulting possibility for problems nearly anywhere, we can no longer be happy to cache our heavy armor in West Germany and wait. Our "prepackaged" ships are an excellent concept and could provide a force to prevent problems in the Middle East, but they can't be everywhere.

To be clear, I don't think that all of a sudden we're going to be fighting only guerrilla wars. The proliferation of Russian hardware and that same global economy make this highly unlikely. However, I believe that in the future we will be facing "low-intensity" conflicts that will require lighter and more mobile vehicles that don't have a logistics train that is even more difficult to transport than the vehicle itself. That said, I don't think that M1A2s should be removed - far from it. However, to continue to solely buy massive Main Battle Tanks is a misuse of funds and ignores the apparent path of future warfare.

------------------

KMHPaladin

KHarkins@voicenet.com

"We have the enemy surrounded. We are dug in and

have overwhelming numbers. But enemy airpower is

mauling us badly. We will have to withdraw."

-- Japanese infantry commander, SITREP, Burma

[This message has been edited by KMHPaladin (edited 01-26-2001).]

[Warmaker]

I'm currently in the U.S. Marines and while I'm not a big fan of the LAV series it does have it's uses. First of all, it's not that expensive especially since the Marines don't get much in the way of money. Secondly, it's light and for airlift and on Amphibious Assault Ships that's a plus. The Marines primarily use it for reconaissance roles while the Amtracks/Helos/KC-130s carry the grunts around. The guys are quite aware of the soft skin of the LAV. There's also Anti-Tank versions with TOW launchers. It's a flexible vehicle but certainly has it's limitations. I do envy the Army of the Bradley though and wish something light like that was for the USMC.

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"Uncommon valor was a common virtue"-Adm.Chester Nimitz of the Marines on Iwo Jima

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Cavguy:

(8) 105mm vs. 120mm. Our 105mm currently can defeat all MBTs in service around the world

Cavguy just curious on what 105mm gun you are refering to here as well as ammunition.

Regards, John Waters

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"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[russellmz]

The following is Michael K. Robel, LTC, AR, USAR evaluation of the proposed Medium brigades vs. the current heavy force from Jim Dunnigan's strategypage.com web site.

"Lessons Learned

As expected, principles for a lightly armored wheeled force are the same as for a heavier tracked force, but their employment is different. Lessons learned included:

-- The LAV series vehicle is vulnerable to 14.5 mm heavy machine gun fire out to about 1,000 meters, particularly if the shooter is stationary, hull down, and concealed.

-- The lack of the TOW on every LAV makes employing these units against a force with main battle tanks different as compared to BFVs. However, each platoon has four Javelin missiles, so this is somewhat mitigated.

-- The attacking medium force must make shorter bounds then a heavy task force. Massive overwatch fires are necessary. I overwatched the movement of single platoon with as many as seven platoons. Ensure the Assault Guns or Javelin’s are properly positioned. The Javelins must be dismounted.

-- The large amount of mortars is a plus, enabling a massive amount of indirect fire on the enemy. The medium Scout Platoon is more lethal than the heavy TF Scout Platoon, but the temptation to use it to fight is much greater, since they are not in HMMWVs.

-- Even more than the heavy force, finding or creating a flank is a necessity. The lighter vehicles are much more vulnerable on the flanks than is a heavy force, making being caught in a fire sack or against a mine field a real trap.

-- The US either needs a longer range ATGM or a countermeasure device to balance out the long-range fires of the OPFOR ATGMS. The AT-7 and AT-10s outrange the TOW and the M1A2 by at least 1,000 meters. In spite of my previous articles conclusions concerning the four versus three-company battalion, we should consider leaving the heavy units at four companies apiece."

------------------

russellmz,

Self-Proclaimed Keeper for Life of the Sacred Unofficial FAQ.

"They had their chance- they have not lead!" - GW Bush

"They had mechanical pencils- they have not...lead?" - Jon Stewart on The Daily Show

[Stoffel]

He Cavguy,

This discussion is going on at the tacops page.

You can find it at:

tacops@perilpoint.com

Many specialist have debated about this issue overthere.

Sorry for the rest of you my previous message was in Dutch.

[This message has been edited by Stoffel (edited 01-26-2001).]

[RMC]

Looking at that LAV with the 105 I am struck by the height and the ungainly appearance. What angles can the gun be fired without knocking the vehicle over? It looks like maybe a 30deg arc across the front would be OK.

I keep hearing the word "interim" being thrown around as an apology for the chortcomings of the LAV. But I remember the Vulcan and Chaparral were also interim solutions and ended up serving long past their scheduled replacement dates. I thnk we may see the same thing here with a White House supposedly less inclined to support miltary adventurism of the bleeding heart kind.

[russellmz]

also, there is a non military team testing lav in tacops, very interesting!

http://www.strategypage.com/tt/WARGAMIN.htm

http://www.strategypage.com/tt/msiepage.htm

------------------

russellmz,

Self-Proclaimed Keeper for Life of the Sacred Unofficial FAQ.

"They had their chance- they have not lead!" - GW Bush

"They had mechanical pencils- they have not...lead?" - Jon Stewart on The Daily Show

[This message has been edited by russellmz (edited 01-26-2001).]

[M Hofbauer]

CavScout: The army reorganized in the mid 60's. Instead of bringing back regiments with their proud histories, it created the brigade=>battalion=> company system. However, the battalions were all affiliated with a regiment for lineage purposes. For example, I was in 3rd Squadron 4th Cavalry (3-4 CAV) Regiment which belongs to 25th ID in Hawaii. In the WWII system the 4th Cavalry was organized and fought as a regiment. Since the 60's the regiments were split up and the battalions given to brigades. 1-4 CAV, which is the same regiment, now belongs to 1 ID in Germany. The colors and history of the regiment stay active but the units were split to brigades. 2-4 and 4-4 CAV are deactivated. A weird system, I know.

hey, does that sound a bit like Conn Barracks, Schweinfurt...?

[Wolfpack]

Any idea when the IBCTs will be upgraded to Force XXI standards? Or if there are any plans to do so at this time? I was working in III Corps and 4th ID HQ the past couple of years and was favoribly impressed with the technology they're using, although mobility seemed to be a big hangup, there had been only one actual "field" exercise by the time I left. (By field I mean, actually in the dirt, not in the Force XXI parking lot) I know that 1st Cav was next in line, to get the workup, but since they're using the IBCTs as test beds for the LAV and newer weapons, it seems like they'd be a natural to be the first to implement Force XXI C&C...unless they'd rather wait until all the bugs are definitely worked out here in Texas. =)

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It is nearly always better to be beaten and learn, rather than to win and take no new knowledge from that victory.

[RMC]

Yes, Hofbauer, 1-4 Cav, the worst cav squadron in the US Army, is located in Schweinfurt on Conn Barracks. If there is a way to break a tank those guys have found it.