Soviet Artillery practice?

[Commissar]

Question for you who are familiar with Soviet artillery practices. I remember reading the Soviets would have their infantry advance very close to artillery barrages. The idea was that the Germans wouldn't have enough time to recover and gain their senses before the Russian infantry were down their throats. I've read several books now that draw from original Soviet sources but I've not read about this practice anywhere. Was this a definite practice or is this just more misinformation?

[Michael Dorosh]

If the Russians did do this, I would be interested in knowing how often they practiced it in training. I know that Canadian and British troops in England routinely practiced this (they called it "leaning on the barrage"). Preplanned creeping barrages were popularized in WW I, and used only for set piece battles in WW II - but could be effective.

The point though is that training to do this was dangerous, though Commonwealth artillerymen were pretty scientific by 1944 and could account for most of the factors that caused short rounds (barrel wear, wind, etc.) though by no means were all accidental short rounds stopped.

I believe a biographer of Hoffmeister, GOC of 5 Can Armd Div, noted that when he was a battalion officer, he routinely took part in creeping barrage exercises "despite the danger".

Makes me wonder how much time Russian units devoted to formation training or all-arms training. Or did they just make it up as they went along, not having the luxury of Canadian and British formations of being relatively safe in England for months or years at a time.

[The Commissar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Makes me wonder how much time Russian units devoted to formation training or all-arms training. Or did they just make it up as they went along, not having the luxury of Canadian and British formations of being relatively safe in England for months or years at a time.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would assume the later. Since the Soviets were in a muddle of reforms and battle practices during the turbulent 30's, I doubt they got to practice much. However, if we can find evidence of this tactic being used during the Winter War, we can safely say that they did in fact practice it before the Germans got rowdy.

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I've read several books now that draw from original Soviet sources but I've not read about this practice anywhere.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What sources might these be?

[Commissar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

What sources might these be?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Erickson, Glantze, Loza just to name a few.

[Jeff Duquette]

It’s Glantz.

Try Harlod Gordon's essay on Soviet Artillery in "The Red Army". I have posted relatively large excerpts from this essay here in the past.

Also:

The Battle for Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study. "Artillery Support of the Kursk Salient Defense." Although this focuses more on defensive actions and does not address your question directly, it is an excellent write-up written by the Russian Army for the Russian army.

TM-30-340

Perhaps someday Charles Sharp will finish his trilogy and crank out “Soviet Artillery Tactics in WWII”.

Loza…hmmm…very dramatic and in areas a great read. I am still taken aback by some of his excerpts in “Commanding The Red Armys Shermans”.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Was this a definite practice or is this just more misinformation?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

According to my sources this is not misinformation. Rolling barrages were not proprietary to "uber-Commenwealth" artillery doctrine. Some sources are surely dated...some sources don't fit well with our preconceived notions therefore they must be incorrect

[Commander]

I tried that tactic once in a game against the AI and it worked pretty good. I suffered a few casualties but kicked some stunned German butt.

[Gen-x87H]

I try to do this as much as possible now. It works really good on defense.

Setup strong points and place a TRP about 30 meters infront of the troops. You usually can see the enemy within a 100 meters. The next turn hit the TRP. Usually the arty starts falling just as they ran into your hiden line. It can really cause some damage. Of course after you smack them around a bit retreat to the next strong point.

Gen

[tss]

I've read from some Finnish sources that during Winter War Soviet infantry did at least few times attack the same time when last shells of a barrage were falling. However, I can't give now a concrete reference since I can't remember what book that was in and a quick skimming through my bookshelf didn't yield results.

However, I found three clear references to Winter War creeping barrages in general [but without mention of the distance from Soviet front to the barrage], two from a Russian source (Stepakov's and Orehov's "Paraatimarssi Suomeen", I don't know if the book is published in Russia or not, it wasn't a couple of years ago) and one from a Finnish source ("Taipaleenjoki", by Mäkelä).

The Soviet references were based on interviews of Winter War veterans that were made 50 years after the war. The first one is by A.T. Grtetshiskin who was a NCO in 95th Independend Tank Batallion and tells about an advance on 11 March:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

It was our turn to enter battle. All men were called to HQ and we were given the mission to liberate the Karjala suburb [of Vyborg]. It was 8-10 km away. The road there was bordered by swamps on both sides. In the edge of the suburb there were first wire obstacle, then a ditch followed by a mine field. The road went through all these obstacles but out pioneers cleared the way. The batallion started to attack. When we came to the obstacle, each tank fired a red flare as a sign for the artillery to move the barrage onwards. However, they started to fire closer to us, instead. A short while later they adjusted the fire to correct direction. When we passed the obstacle a Finnish gun started to fire from the church. The Finns stopped the first tank and destroyed the second, and continued to fire along the road. The attack stopped.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The second one is by Lt. A.T. Kuleshov from 230th Independent Artillery Batallion, 164th Division, and tells about an attack at Kollaa on 7 March against "The Black Hill" (possibly "Punaisentalonmäki", "Hill with the Red House", in Finnish terminology):

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

... On 7 March the division commander Denisov came to front line observation post. There he asked the platoon leader Rozka: "How could we capture that hill?" Rozka then told his idea and the commander approved it.

Rozka took three comrades from his platoon and armed his patrol with one Finnish SMG, a LMG with extra ammo, two carbines, and three hand grenades for each men, as well as red and yellow signal flares and a red flag. Two artillery batteries were allocated to support the team.

The team took positions in the trenches of the company that was left to the hill. Exactly at 16.00 Rozka fired a yellow flare that was a signal for the artillery to start firing the whole hill from bottom to top so that each yellow flare moved the fire upwards. When the daredevils had managed to advance to the hill under cover of the fire and they had fired a red flare as a signal, the fire was moved to the reverse slope. Then they rose the red flag as a signal to hold fire momentarily.

Whenever an artillery preparation started, Finns usually leaved their positions and withdrew to cover and this happened also this time. When the bombardment stopped, Finns came out of their shelters and started to man their positions again. Now the daredevils opened fire. As the Finns noticed that the situation was difficult for them, they withdrew with no further resistance. The following infantry companies then occupied the positions. After that the hill was called "Artillerists' Hill". The next day the infantry units advanced 10-15 km.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The problem with this story is that Soviets didn't manage to break through at Kollaa during the war, so at least the last sentence is incorrect. Howver, they managed to capture large parts of Finnish front line in the last days of the war so the description of the actual attack may be accurate.

The third reference tells how Soviets marked the front line for artillery by repeatedly firing signal flares at the Terenttilä section of Taipaleenjoki in the battles of mid-late February.

Also, the artillery preparation order (as relayed by Tiihonen in "Karjalan kannaksen suurtaistelut") for the Soviet offensive that started on 10 June 1944 lists maintaining a creeping barrage as one of the tasks for artillery. The order mentions that the infantry units should mark the front line by firing flares and that the barrage should fall 150-200 meters ahead of the signals. (Additionally, there were FOs with radios advancing with the infantry to call fire on noticed strongpoints).

There are Finnish reports from both infantry and air force that those flares were, indeed, used.

- Tommi

[jwxspoon]

I seem to remember also reading that during heavy artillery prep fires before an attack the Russians would also leave "lanes" 100-200 meters wide that were not hit with artillery. This supposedly would allow the armor to rush through the lane at the end of the artillery fire, with the intention of moving into the enemy's rear area and cutting off retreat as well as reinforcements.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by jwxspoon:

I seem to remember also reading that during heavy artillery prep fires before an attack the Russians would also leave "lanes" 100-200 meters wide that were not hit with artillery. This supposedly would allow the armor to rush through the lane at the end of the artillery fire, with the intention of moving into the enemy's rear area and cutting off retreat as well as reinforcements.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't think it was armour, but infantry detachments from what I have read. But yes, I have come across this reference in Mellenthin, IIRC.

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I seem to remember also reading that during heavy artillery prep fires before an attack the Russians would also leave "lanes" 100-200 meters wide that were not hit with artillery. This supposedly would allow the armor to rush through the lane at the end of the artillery fire, with the intention of moving into the enemy's rear area and cutting off retreat as well as reinforcements.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That sounds suspiciously like a potion of the Harold Gordon excerpts I posted here in the past. I think the lanes were left open for infantry, but I dont see why armor couldn’t take advantage of the lanes as well. The idea was to keep German infantry in their dug-outs thinking they were still being subjected to a barrage. Red Infantry sneaks through the fire lanes and are into the trenches before the Germans are aware of their presence. Or so the legend goes.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

That sounds suspiciously like a potion of the Harold Gordon excerpts I posted here in the past. I think the lanes were left open for infantry, but I dont see why armor couldn’t take advantage of the lanes as well. The idea was to keep German infantry in their dug-outs thinking they were still being subjected to a barrage. Red Infantry sneaks through the fire lanes and are into the trenches before the Germans are aware of their presence. Or so the legend goes.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I check with Mellenthin and the Handbook later. As for not taking armour through them, a bunch of crawling soldiers is slightly less visible than your average T-34/85, so this might be an explanation.

[Jeff Duquette]

Great post TSS…as usual.

[Tero]

One interesting remark I found the other day stated that it was SOP for the Red Army artillery FO's to come close to the front line and even sneak inside the defensive positions so they could spot and direct fire better.

And then there were of course the usual balloons.

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

I check with Mellenthin and the Handbook later. As for not taking armour through them, a bunch of crawling soldiers is slightly less visible than your average T-34/85, so this might be an explanation.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It might also have to do with leaving the ground in such a condition that tanks are able to drive on it, even after the barrage has been lifted.

[tss]

Here are three more Soviet Winter War quotes. These are from the minutes of Red Army's crisis meeting on 14-17 April 1940.

The first extract is from Ivan Pavlovitsh Roslyi's speech. He commanded the 245th Infantry Regiment at Summa:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Roslyi: ... Later, when the artillery preparations started, our infantry was sheltered but some units were too far from the enemy front line -- we all know well that moving in deep snow wastes a lot of time when we try to close the enemy -- so I gave the commanders an order, and not only an order but used a month to train them to do it, that they should get their men moving even before the barrage stopped since then the enemy was under our artillery fire and couldn't fire back. The infantry advanced until it was 100 meters from the barrage which was against regulations.

Stalin: We have to change them.

Roslyi: We advanced very close to enemy which was necessary since after the barrage ends the enemy waits only for a few minutes in their trenches. We knew that and decided to use those minutes few minutes to advance before the enemy rises from the trenches. We had practiced it in advance and the infantry advanced very close to enemy and also tanks started their advance on the right moment. The success was guaranteed because we combined succesfully the operations of different branches. So, after fifteen or twenty minutes we had risen a red flag in the "Molotok" woods ["Saapas"] and after five or seven minutes on top of Hill 65.5 ["Poppius"]. When our infantry saw the flags they rose as a single man and charged shouting "uraa". <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Next extract is by Mihail Petrovitsh Kirponos who commanded the 70th Infantry Division:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Kirponos: ... So when our infantry hugged close the artillery barrage, the enemy didn't have time to leave dugouts and our success was good when our infantry started to advance. However, we have to note that the White-Finns quickly realized our method and stayed in place even when our infantry was 100 meters from them. They took an advantage on the slow speed of our infantry in deep snow and harassed it with automatic weapons. Advancing 100 or 200 meters in a deep snow is not easy.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And the last one is by Nikolai Vasiljevitsh Muhin who commanded the 473rd Howitzer Regiment:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Muhin: ... We also have to realize that there was another essential deficiency, namely that we don't always synchronize our operations with infantry movements. The infantry should advance to 100-150 meters away from the enemy but our infantry didn't follow this order but stayed 350 meters away and so wasted time, the men got tired and were inefficient. We removed this detect only much later. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There are probably more quotes in there.

- Tommi

[Jeff Duquette]

Again...great information TSS. I don't often save posts from this forum. Yours tend to be an exception as they always seem to contain little gems of historical information. I see at least one of your references indicating Red Army tanks following along behind a creeping\rolling barrage. Have you come across other examples?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

see at least one of your references indicating Red Army tanks following along behind a creeping\rolling barrage.

I hope you took a special notice about the date of the meeting. The incident described happend a few months before the meeting. IIRC in mid-February 1940.

Have you come across other examples?

There are several instances described in Finnish histories, especially in those written about the summer assault of 1944.

There are were also numerous instances of small scale applications during the static phase when it was apparently rehearsed in small scale raids and POW snatching missions.

I'm sure there are references to that in Valeras site in the first hand account war stories section.

[ 10-20-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I hope you took a special notice about the date of the meeting. The incident described happend a few months before the meeting. IIRC in mid-February 1940.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tero, I dont follow the significance of the timing here between incident and meeting?

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Tero, I dont follow the significance of the timing here between incident and meeting?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I was thinking more about the date of the actual doctrinal change and the meeting itself vis-a-vis the Barbarossa debacle and the Red Army improvement of artillery doctrine which supposedly took place at a later date.

The Red Army was implementing doctrinal changes at a time when it was supposed to have been at the very lowest water mark of its development history. The doctrine was implemented into front line troops re-training already in December 1939/January 1940.

Makes you wonder how slow to respond and mechanic the Red Army artillery really was in action and how much of it was just higher echelon red tape, like the interference of the comissars.

In the beginning of Winter War the barrages were truly inept, mostly fired using map spotting with preselected and enforced target areas and strict second-by-second schedules.

I think it is quite important to take notice how rapidly the Red Army artillery was able to snap out of the mechanic doctrinal routines and start using viable methods. The change during Winter War took effect in just over a month. In that time the force commander was replaced but I doubt they changed the entire officer corps and all the men in the formations. The initial assault stalled in December and the new assault begun in early February.

In CMBB terms: should there be a difference in the Red Army artillery proficiency depending on the rating of the overall commander of the force or that section of the front as it is supposed to be dependant on the timeperiod ?

[ 10-20-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[tss]

Jeff Duquette wrote:

I see at least one of your references indicating Red Army tanks following along behind a creeping\rolling barrage. Have you come across other examples?

Not explicit mentions. (From Soviet sources, that is).

The minutes of the 14-17 April 1940 Soviet meeting give strongly an impression that pre-Winter War regulations didn't allow creeping barrages, or at least following them in close contact (one unidentified person said: "Creeping barrages were forbidden from us, they thought it was wrong and dangerous")

When war showed that piecemental frontal assaults against a trench line are doomed to fail, Soviet commanders in different sectors started to improvise new techniques.

Arkadi Jermakov, commander of the 100th Infantry Division sums Soviet attitude to creeping barrages nicely in his account:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

... I don't think it is a bad idea that artillery fires when infantry attacks. In future we have to experiment it. It doesn't matter much if someone gets wounded. We have to practice this already during peace time and in manouvres the infantry should advance so close to artillery fire as possible.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One of the accounts confirm the above-mentioned Kuleshov's account of capture of "The Black Hill", at least on general level. In addition, it mentions that about a dozen direct-fire guns continued to fire on the hill to maintain the impression of an artillery barrage.

I tried to fit the description into Finnish accounts, but unfortunately my references on Kollaa are quite limited. However, the best fit was when Soviets captured "Punaisentalonmäki" on 8 March. Other possibilities are "Bombanmäki" or "Korsumäki", but "Punaisentalonmäki" fits the geographic description best.

I strongly recommend reading the minutes for everybody who can access them. I don't know if they are translated fully in English, but someday I encourted parts of them online. (Russian military zone?). They give a very valuable insight on pre-Barbarossa RKKA high command. Not to mention that it is a source of great quotes:

"I have to add that mortars are cruel weapons so we should have lots of them" - Nikolai A. Kitsh, artillery commander of the 8th Army.

"If we can root out the irresponsible attitude towards underwear and linen, we can reduce state expenses by at least a half" - Lev Mehlis, Chief of the RKKA political department.

"Where would it lead us if we fired only at targets? It would be stupid, utterly obsolete." - Stalin

And this gem:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Voice: They publish a daily bulletins abroad where they collect military news of foreign countries but we don't circulate it openly.

Stalin: Why?

Proskurov: Because it defames the Red Army.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

(Ivan Proskurov, chief of the military intelligence department, was arrested several months later and shot in late 1941).

- Tommi

[ 10-22-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

[Jeff Duquette]

Tero:

Interesting commentary and observations. I would have to agree with your assessment and observations, with the stipulation that rapid doctrinal changes must have been extremely difficult to implement immediately following Barbarossa and the frontier battles of 1941. The astonishing losses in equipment and massive casualties amongst trained artillerists and artillery officers would have amplified difficulties in implementing doctrinal changes. And yet we begin to see a definite change in doctrine during this period. Perhaps this was simply a function of desperate expediency… it is perhaps also a reflection of Red Army pragmatism and adaptability.

There is a great deal of centralization of artillery assets by the Soviets in late 41 and 42. Concentration and husbanding of what artillery assets and trained personel were still available to the Red Army in late 41 through 42. The direct effect on combat power of a lowly Infantry Division in the Red Army might very well have been stripping field artillery away from line formations. In a period when an infantry division from the German Army or Anglo-American Armies would have had multiple battalions of field artillery of both medium and hvy caliber, A Red Army Infantry Division may very well have been expected to function with primarily medium and heavy mortar battalions as their only artillery asset.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Tommi Said: "If we can root out the irresponsible attitude towards underwear and linen, we can reduce state expenses by at least a half" - Lev Mehlis, Chief of the RKKA political department.<hr></blockquote>

And yet another example of Red Army pragmatism.

[JasonC]

Jeff said "a Red Army Infantry Division may very well have been expected to function with primarily medium and heavy mortar battalions as their only artillery asset." If restricted to the retreat conditions of 1941 through mid 1942, that may be accurate. Even for 1942 as a whole it is probably misleading, and for the rest of the war it would certainly be way off.

The Russians turned out guns very rapidly from 1942 on, as soon as the economy had been mobilized and the 1941 factory relocations had been settled. The Germans did not match them in any category of gun production except AA, until 1944. And the absolute level of production was very high.

The Russians made an average of 25,000 field pieces, 76mm and larger and not including mortars, each year from 1942 to 1944. Overall they fielded 100,000 tube artillery pieces and 10,000 rocket launchers, 45,000 120mm mortars for regimental level support, and 150,000 82mm mortars for the battalion and company levels.

And around 3/4 of these weapons were out by the end of 1943. Gun production jumped more than 6-fold over the peacetime level by the fall of 1942. Ammo production was slower to rise, because more of the relevant factories and materials were in captured areas (especially the Donbas region), but was still up more than 3 fold by the same date. Russian economic mobilization was rapid.

Just in calendar 1942, thus after the steepest losses, they fielded 30,000 new artillery tubes, 25,000 new 120mm mortars, and 100,000 new 82mm mortars. That is enough to outfit 300 divisions at TOE - twice over. The Russians did not lack tubes. Tubes are rarely the economically scarce item when it comes to artillery, because they are not that hard to produce.

Ammo production was a more serious bottleneck, but they got around it with lend lease feedstocks and by starving the air force of bombs. In 1942 they made 74 million shells (for tanks, AT, etc as well as arty), plus 54 million mortar rounds and 4 million rockets. Which meant mid hundreds for each new mortar, ATG, and tank, and 1000-1500 for every new field gun or rocket launcher. Even with nothing coming out of 1941 (which was far from the case), they wouldn't have been short by the time of Stalingrad.

A typical Russian infantry division did not lack tubes, but the main Russian type was a 76mm gun, which leaves something to be desired in oomph. Only 1 battalion per division had 122mm howitzers. Partially making up for this, each regiment had heavy 120mm mortars. In 1942 companies were still using 50mm mortars, with only the battalion level having 82mm. Above the division level you'd find what heavies there were (122mm in quantity, 152mm, 132mm rockets).

Russian div arty was "undergunned" by German or western standards, for one because they were using smaller tubes. They also lacked communications equipment, trained personnel, etc. Many of those 76mm batteries - 2/3rds of div arty - fired direct on targets they could see, for lack of the equipment and training to use indirect fire effectively.

It wasn't that they were out of tubes (from the fall of 1942 on, that is - earlier they couldn't get stuff to the front fast enough and it died rapidly when it got there). The div arty typically fired one battalion of 122s, while regiments each fired the equivalent of a battalion of 120mm mortars. They didn't assign a tube 105 battalion to each regiment out of div arty, they just had organic 120mm in the regiment.

Whereas the other powers heavily concentrated firepower at the division level (occasionally corps - some German artillery "pools", and US artillery brigade groups), the Russians had relatively more firepower below that echelon (the regiments heavy with 120mm mortars) and above it (artillery formations up to army size by late in the war). When the other powers just assigned a battalion to support each regiment or combat team, that was a distinction without a whole lot of difference. But when they massed a division's fires to achieve a particular objective or break a particular attack involving one of its sub-units, they were doing something the Russian system was not built to do.

Later, the Russians used higher level artillery formations for that sort of massed fire. But did so to an operational plan, instead of reacting flexibly to the needs of subordinate units as they arose. The sub units had their "assigned" support, and it was about as much as anybody else could count on, as "assigned". They just didn't "cross over" as much. That German and western trick got more out of each gun, letting it support several units, in effect, as long as their tactical needs happened in sequence instead of all at once.

For what it is worth.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

A typical Russian infantry division did not lack tubes, but the main Russian type was a 76mm gun, which leaves something to be desired in oomph.

Compared to the 120mm mortar yes. But it made up for some of this in range. And in direct fire mode it was at least as nasty as the 45mm AT gun.

Many of those 76mm batteries - 2/3rds of div arty - fired direct on targets they could see, for lack of the equipment and training to use indirect fire effectively.

It was also SOP prior to Barbarossa.

But did so to an operational plan, instead of reacting flexibly to the needs of subordinate units as they arose.

They tried to force the enemy to play their game instead of playing the game according to the enemys rules. Fail or succeed, the result was in most cases, if not always, spectacular.

Later, the Russians used higher level artillery formations for that sort of massed fire. But did so to an operational plan, instead of reacting flexibly to the needs of subordinate units as they arose. The sub units had their "assigned" support, and it was about as much as anybody else could count on, as "assigned". They just didn't "cross over" as much. That German and western trick got more out of each gun, letting it support several units, in effect, as long as their tactical needs happened in sequence instead of all at once.

In other words the Red Army used artillery in a more focused way.