Doctrine

[Tris]

Since this thread seems to be temporarily stalled I thought I'd toss in the following link:

http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/interviews/snodgrass/

[Guest Pillar]

I have a question:

Is Field Manual 100-61 a guide to how foreign nations conduct their armour and mechanized operations?

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-61/toc.htm

Or is it US Doctrine?

Thanks.

[Guest Pillar]

One point ScoutPL indicated was that the American recon doctrine and overall battle plans are based around speed and time limitations.

Tris then asked how the German army, which uses a different approach than the US (arguably slower) manages to succeed with their approach. I don't think the question ever got answered, as the discussion digressed into one of training issues. Then again, perhaps the answer was burried somewhere and I missed it.

So how do the Germans deal with this alleged time issue? What about the Soviets? Do they have more time to conduct their operations than the US? Is the US Army primarily shock-based, and incapable of sustained conflict -- hence speed being more important?

I'm just raising potential explanations. Hopefully someone will shed light on the truth. Thanks.

[ScoutPL]

Pillar, no particular numerical order for US FM's. Considering they have FM's for everything from how to dig a latrine to how to fight a Corps, even an organized numerical marking system would boggle the mind. A lot of FM's are grouped together though with a common first digit. Like most infantry FM's start with the number 7 (7-8, 7-10, 7-20 etc.)

As far as time and the planning process in the german and soviet armies are concerned, I think that these factors would have effected all sides equally in WWII. But take a staff planning process from 1944 and compare it to one in 2000 and you will find an enormous reduction in speed and a substantial increase in the thoroughness of planning. Most of this is accomplished through technology, by the way.

What I'm saying is be careful when you attempt to compare doctrine and planning issues, be sure you're not comparing forces from different eras. That said I would argue that the Germans in particular had a problem with expediant staff planning in WWII. I can think of a number of times (particularly on the eastern front) when they were still in the planning process when they were preempted by the allies. Plus whenever they tried to rush an attack they often ran into problems or it fell short of its goals due to an inability to synchronize and plan accordingly. The attack on Mortain springs to mind as an example.

I think the russians planned on a large scale, not worrying to much about the little fights. A division or corps commander would have a goose egg drawn on his map 50 km behind enemy lines and be told to get there tomorrow. He sent out his recon toward the goose egg and well, we've debated enough about the rest. Such large scale planning doesnt take alot of time for planning the details so their overall planning time was reduced.

I'm by no means an athority but after thinking about it for awhile here at my computer thats the thesis I came up with. Anybody else got one?

[Guest Pillar]

How would you compare the various doctrines comparative time-management advantages to be today? Does the modern German/Soviet army take much longer than the US to "Get movin'" ?

[Bobbaro]

Here are some things G. Patton had to say,

(from link supplied by rune) Note the 12 to 18 hours advance for attack orders from corps to division. Each echelon down takes a bigger piece of the time pie. Makes you worry about what was left for the guy actually doing the fighting, how much got frittered away above leaveing him not enough.

Wuoting:

c. Reconnaissance

You can never have too much reconnaissance. Use every means available before, during, and after battle. Reports must be facts, not opinions; negative as well as positive. Do not believe intercepts blindly, crosscheck -- sometimes messages are sent out to be intercepted.

d. Orders

(1) Formal Orders

Formal orders will be preceded by letters of instruction and by personal conferences. In this way the whole purpose of the operation will be made clear, together with the mission to be accomplished by each major unit. In this way, if communication breaks down during combat, each commander can and must so act as to attain the general objective. The order itself will be short, accompanied by a sketch -- it tells WHAT to do, not HOW. It is really a memorandum and an assumption of responsibility by the issuing commander.

(2) Fragmentary orders

After the initial order, you will seldom get another formal order, but you will get many fragmentary orders in writing, or orally, by phone or personally.

Take down all oral orders and repeat them back. Have your juniors do the same to you.

Keep a diary with all orders and messages and the resulting action pasted in it in sequence.

Keep your own orders short, get them out in time, issue them personally by voice when you can. In battle it is always easier for the senior officer to go up than it is for the junior to come back for the issuance of orders.

A division should have twelve hours, and better, eighteen hours, between the physical receipt of the order at Division Headquarters and the time it is to be executed.

(3) Warning Orders

Warning orders are vital and must be issued in time. This requirement applies not only to combat units, but also to the Surgeon, the Signal Officer, the Quartermaster, the Ordnance Officer, and the Engineer Officer who must get warning orders promptly. They, too, have plans to make and units to move. If they do not function, you do not fight.

[ScoutPL]

I'm just not that familiar with their doctrines and they havent fought any major wars recently so its hard to extrapolate anything from recent history. I do think the US still holds a slight advantage due to the widespread use of technology (electronic reconnaissance, desimmination technology, etc). Notice I said slight, because both of these armies use technology, but I think the US has pioneered its use since Vietnam and so is able to stay ahead. The bad thing coming out of all that is I think US military has become too reliant on technology. As stated above, the Army staffs in WWII were producing very short and to the point field orders for major operations. I often went to the field with a regimantal attack plan that covered roughly 72 hours and would be 20-30 pages think. Chock full of all sorts of cute computer graphics, timelines, matixes, etc. The regimental staff had almost as many captains as there were company commanders in the regiment. All of them overworked, trying to get on the commanders high graces so they could get the next company command slot. It all perpetuated a slothful, paperbound, rigid system that I think is getting way out of control.

[Guest Pillar]

Ah, fond memories.

[Olle Petersson]

I thought this was going to be an interesting thread. About 60 replies within a few hours...

But all of them relate to modern doctrine, instead of anything applicable to CMBO.

Anyway, I find it more interesting to discuss the basic doctrines of the late 1930ies, since that's what the armies were based on, and how these doctrines evolved through the war.

From memory

Germany

Hammer and Anvil.

- Panzerdivisions, that vere mobile, self supporting (for at least three days) and contained all types of arms (armour, infantry and artillery), were to break through weak spots in the enemy defences and then hit the rear areas.

- Infantry divisions were to defend the frontline, slowly pushing ahead with some assault guns in support.

- Luftwaffe; a) Provide defense from enemy aircraft, by fighters and AAA. Use attack aircraft as artillery for the panzer divisions when their organic artillery was out of range or on the move. c) Perform strategic bombing.

Enemy armour was to be fough primarily by towed ATGs. Tanks vs tank combat was to be avoided, but when unavoidable (as could be expected since the Panzers operated well ahead of the ATG screen) they should have some AT capability.

France

The Wall!

Based on the success in WW1, the tactic was to use lots of infantry in fortified positions along the frontline.

Artillery was to pound the enemies and pave the way for assaults.

Tanks were to be spread ot to support the infantry.

Air force ????

Since the war was to be pretty stationary, there was no need for high mobility or a high proportion of radio communication.

Britain

About the same as France, but with more mobility, since they expected to do most of the fighting overseas.

Armour was divided in Cruisers and Infantry tanks. The latter were for infantry support, like the French armour. Cruisers were to operate more like the German tanks, with breakthrough and hitting deep. They had less support though.

USA

Defending "the American way".

Pretty much the same as France, but with less armour support for the infantry, and more light tanks used for recon/cavalry missions.

(A pretty good doctrine for protecting US soil against invasions, as was their task, IMO. First when faced with the totally different task of invading Morocko and Algeria it failed, and needed some adjustment to fit the new needs.)

Cheers

Olle

[This message has been edited by Olle Petersson (edited 04-05-2001).]

[ferdinand]

Maybe you could explain how the differences in strategy translated in the tactical approaches for each country ?

And did these differences persist to the end of the war, or did everyone adapt to the reality of the battlefield, and used more or less the same tactical doctrine in 45 ?

[Olle Petersson]

Originally posted by ferdinand:

1) Maybe you could explain how the differences in strategy translated in the tactical approaches for each country ?

2) And did these differences persist to the end of the war, or did everyone adapt to the reality of the battlefield, and used more or less the same tactical doctrine in 45 ?

To start with #2:

I guess all involved eventually strived to use the same tactic. However, the possibilities to do so varied.

- Germany had a constant shortage of manpower, fuel and air support, so they had to rely on a more static defence with heavy armour.

- Soviet lacked the communications needed to quickly adapt to new situations, and therefore were more constrained to pre-planned actions.

- UK/USA got the ground actions about right, but their domination in the air "forced" an "overuse" of airstrikes.

Back to #1:

First we have to make clear that the only (well, almost) operation where this issue can be valued is the German attack on France in 1940.

- French defence was based mainly on the Maginot line (that, AFAIK, was a little undermanned at the time). North thereof they had a line of infantry, with the fastest (motorised) units most to the north. The idea was to make a straight north-south line through Belgium.

This line was pretty thin in the south, because there it was reinforced by the Ardennes (that prevented any tank movement) and the river Meuse. In the unlikely event that the enemy should advance this way, they'd still need about a week to employ enough artillery to support a river crossing. During this week the defenders would recieve reinforcements...

As it turned out, the Germans sent their main thrust, with lots of tanks(!), through the Ardennes. They arrived at Meuse late one morning, took a few hours rest, and initiated the attack (without artillery support) in the afternoon. At the evening they had a firm bridgehead...

Cheers

Olle

[Guest wwb_99]

Well, there were huge differences in tactical approach on the eastern and western fronts. The root cause of this difference is that while the western front had a very well developed road network, the east was almost totally roadless. In 1941, there were only 3 East-West paved highways in Russia (Warsaw-Moscow, Warsaw-Leningrad, and Krackow-Kiev).

While the spaces were vast there, many times fighting a single road was vital for the supply of an entire Corps, thus concentrating the fighting around these key arteries. Whereas in the west, rarely would one single strip of aspalt or gravel be the only option.

WWB

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[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Tris:

This thread ought to have excited interest. I presume it has not for the reason that 1) no one has bothered to follow the provided links, 2) did so but couldn't make heads or tails of that material either, 3) could make heads and tails of the material but found it so contrary to their own preferred notions that they have no intention at all of going public with this new blow to their gross denial or 4) some demented combination of all of the above.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually I became bored with this forum after one more bout of insult-slinging replacing argument by a certain clique on this forum on a thread on maneuver warfare. I hadn't been reading the forum for some weeks and decided to come and see if things have changed. (I am still playing CM pbem games, in between bouts of Europa Universalis-they have an even busier forum than this one, with no flame wars to speak of).

The early posts on this thread contain some very interesting information, but unfortunately it didn't take long for the mud-slinging to start.

I just want to transmit one bit of information about the German methods of fighting, which are often not well understood here although they are well documented.

German General Kleist forbade his commanders to give written orders to their subordinates: all orders were to be given orally and orders were to be written AFTER the battle. This was to avoid the long command delays described in some of the posts on this thread.This was fully consistent with the German doctrine of "command intent".

Of course this method of command is totally incompatible with the "top-down" orders format of command that is still prevalent in the US Army despite some progress in implementing maneuver warfare concepts.

Henri

[ 04-09-2001: Message edited by: Henri ]