Doctrine

[Tris]

"Years ago I first saw army martinet doctrine in play, the brutish bootcamp technique of screaming at raw recruits as they jump off the trucks on the way in from the processing center. (Does this still happen, by the way, or has sense been driven home?)"

....Rest of crap snipped.

If a more profound and utterly ridiculous load of horesh*t has ever been posted I'm hard pressed to think of it.

Here we ago again.

Why do you find it necessary to address what I wrote with such vehemence? It is a simple account of a simple citizen soldier's impression of what boot camp used to be like when he served. I didn't make that up. I also asked if things had changed

First off for at least 15 years there has been a steady decrease in the quality of basic training recruits based precisely on the fact that boot camp has been dumbed down softened up. Even Marine Corps boot camp is a joke these days. Luckily mopst of this defficiency gets corrected in the manuever units or so we hope.(And yes I spent two years as a drill sergeant, and I was hardly a ballbuster.)

I would not describe Pitts (E7 by the way) as a man who dumbed down anything. He was, in fact, one of the most able soldiers I ever came across.

God forbid soldiers should be made to undergo 1% of the stress they will face under normal battlefield conditions.

Screaming at the top of your lungs, solely for effect, mind you, at some kid off a farm in Iowa two minutes after he tumbles off a truck in front of his first set of barracks will not make or break him in terms of the longterm picture of his military career. It will not serve to keep him any better out of harm's way, it will not provide him with a better jacket to stop enemy fire, it will not teach him to better think for himself in stressful situations.

This method of stress inducement seems to have served the Roman Legions fine. It seems to have gotten Wellington's legions through the penninsula and La Haye Sainte in a pinch, it got the German paras through their disastorous ordeal at Crete, it seems to have somehow helped Chuikov's 62d Army survive the cauldron of Stalingrad without cracking, apparently it got the 1st Marine Division out of the Chosin as in intact unit, it seems to have helped the NVA overcome the most harsh difficulties in their long march South on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. But somehow it offends the sensibilities of one Mister Tris.

And now it's "Mister Tris."

Well, okay, you can be as rude as you please. Be my guest.

"It's what we call being a "good soldier," or if you will a "good little German." While that will allow you to get along within the system, it might well cost you your life out in the field. You tell me which is ultimately more important."

That's a simple question to answer. "The good little german" as you so snidely put it...

I didn't make that up, either. It is part and parcel of our social experience, most especially with reference to the present topic. For what it is worth, my people come from Germany, my father's mother was born just outside of Leipzig, and I have no doubt whatsoever that you have used the term more than yourself to date.

...is precisely what any half-way competent initial military instruction is trying to arrive at.

This much is true. But screaming is hardly the way to make a good soldier, from what I saw. It is certainly not the only way to take a recruit and mold him into fighting material.

They're not trying to find or make a new Napolean, Patton, or Rommel in basic training. They're trying to impart bsic military skill and discipline. Later on as the years go by they will receive the instruction and experience and leeway neceessary for them to exercize initiative in an intelligent way.

Except we know this isn't necessarily the case. You alluded to as much yourself, Los.

But when it gets down to cutting the mustard and crossing that last hundred yards, it's discipline and obedience of the privates that wins battles and wars. Sorry if this simple principle is so profoundly absent in your understanding of things military.

You don't sound sorry at all. You sound rather pleased with your (as you would have it) discovery.

All I know is that I went in and came out in one piece and so I am able to to discuss this matter with you many years down the road. Without rancor or insult, I might add, so perhaps you can thank Pitts for something afterall.

[This message has been edited by Tris (edited 11-12-2000).]

[Guest Pillar]

Ok, that's enough.

This thread isn't about debate. Before any of you post anything, you should check to see if it is a positive (i.e. New Information or Expansion) or a negative (i.e. debating a doctrine).

This thread should be a scroll of links and posts full of wisdom. We can then start OTHER threads if need be to debate what gets posted here.

If we start debating here, this thread will *never* turn into a doctrinal database for CM players, nor will you have a springboard for your debates in other threads.

SO... Gather up your willpower and resist the urge to turn this thread into a debate -- please!

PS -- If someone comes into the thread trying to start a debate, just email them in private. Let their post *here* go ignored.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 11-12-2000).]

[Mark IV]

I was enjoying reading along, and have found the links of great interest.

Tumbling off the truck at Ft. Knox in 1977, there were... a bunch of drill instructors screaming at the top of their lungs, fwiw (and I'm sure it wasn't s**t compared to the USMC). Being a veteran of Catholic schools (nuns), I admired the DI's professionalism and creativity in this department, but it was apparent that many others on the bus had never been yelled at by pros. I found many of the expressions quite amusing, and actually laughed- once.

It was easy to see the psychology at work (actually, it's easier now), and it was remarkable, the change it wrought in the "troops" in fairly short order. Among other things, it let you know that whatever the recruiter promised you, you were now in a very serious environment, where listening well and responding promptly were in your immediate best interest. This was obviously a new concept to many of us.

Think of it as a filter... the few people weeded out by yelling alone, have no place on a battlefield. A kinder, gentler boot camp with future employability as a major goal is fine training for handing out food parcels in the third world, but not what I want for training the Armed Forces.

So, back to the changing world of doctrine (a revealing word in itself)....

[Los]

Anyway now that that's over with...

"In a nutshell, Captain Kolenda argued present US doctrine dictates the plan of attack before infield reconnaissance, hopes its plan is viable if not outright optimal, and uses whatever feedback it receives from its infield reconnaissance effort to develop its pretty-much-set-in-stone plan if it is convenient to that plan, but the plan itself is nevertheless going ahead. And then everyone prays for the best and relies on firepower to carry the day. Present US doctrine, according to Kolenda, also (in practice) argues against any great initiative, in terms of analysis or independent thought, taking place within the context of its infield reconnaissance assets, to the point, given by way of example, of not even noting whether armored assets discovered during reconnaissance were moving or where they might be moving to (in the example cited by Kolenda, this data might well have indicated to planners that the enemy was not

postured for assault but was instead obviously arranging itself for an active defense)."

Here we see the dangers of reading one article and considering the subject done and closed. There's really nothing in Army Doctrine or even tactical manuals that argues for the kind of end result that Kaneda sees occuring at NTC. Find anything about RECON Push or the description of anything similar to it in any of these documents. Heck there are a number of references to German operations in FM 100-5! (Your better off looking at combined Arms brigade manual or mech bn manuals than 100-5 which is war ona more macro level. (And BTW FM 100-5 gets updated every five or so years so operational doctrine is constanly changing and evolving as the Kanedas of the world get up the ranks.) This is more the failure of execution , failures in bn/bde lmentoring and leadership of junior officers, (everyone looks up ahead not back down) and understanding of doctrine. The parting of lip service to doctrine more than it is for glaring holes.

The best thing to get a hold of is FM 71-123 Tactics and techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion task Force and Company team. It's probably 800 pages of EXCELLENT stuff. The reconnasaince and surveillance sectins of each echelon and operation type (Defense movement to Contact, etc) have no mention fo Recon Push techniques. If anything it's Command Push. But again what the Army says it will do and how circumstances conspire to actually have it do are two seperate things.

Also there seems to be some sort of understanding about reconnasaince that happens before and during battles:

"and uses whatever feedback it receives from its infield reconnaissance effort to develop its pretty-much-set-in-stone plan if it is convenient to that plan, but the plan itself is nevertheless going ahead."

Again there's nothing dictating this in theory or pratics in any field manual. When two forces come together REGARDLESS of Soviet (80s style) and US/Western, both conduct reconnaissance along a "broad front". Where these assets come from, be they Corps and division level assets (ala LRS/Spetznaz SOF), air and armored cavalry regiments, recon regts/bns or elements drawn from maneuver forces, as well as technical means (UAV, manned aerial, satellite, SIGINT) is irrelevant. SO there isn't planning and executin conducted in a recon vacuum. All this happens before and during the set peice battle. The scouts and brigade reconnasaince are tasked to "fill in the holes" for the commander as the plan is being formulated. (While at the same time either bearing the brunt alone or with other attachments conducting the counter reconnasaince mission, here the stuff begins to pile up on the scout platoon!)

What Kaneda asks of the Scout platoon leader is often impractical in most situations, and as he admits in passing possessing of great risks in and of itself. That call as to where to go at the decision point should rest normally on a manuever commander (which is why the apparently glaring hole in "recon doctrine") in the advance guard or forward deatchment and in conjucntion with the S-2 who needs to do a better job of coordinating and keeping joined to the hip with the scout PL both in mind and soul.

ANyway while doctrine doesn't argue for or specifically delineate a Recon Push style as might be misinferred from Kaneda's article, niether does it argue for or clearly delineate a Command push or recon pull style of operation either, (unfortunatly It merely stresses the qualities of surprise, concentration, tempo, audacity, understaning the commander's intent, etc, which theoretically provide the framework for this type of tactical environment (for chrissakes throw in all the study of WW2 german ops while your at it too), but this gets in part co-opted by all the officer corps and other frictions I've dilineated in an above post.

It's a very complex problem. But that's what the NTC and JRTC are there for, to test excercize and continualy modify/improve how we fight. And you'd be hard pressed to find someone else in the world putting as much effort into doing this at this level. Which is why there are very good ties with some of our closest allies, they garnish a lot from the CTs too in conjunction with their own training centers. There have been Canadian and British battalion Rotations to NTC and I have seen German Fallschirmjaegers at NTC so I know they at least rotate compnies attached to the Bn/Bde TF's going down there.

Los

[Los]

Before I apologize for being to harsh Tris, go back and show me where in your original post you are quoting ANYBODY or citing some other book or reference. You wrote the post either inadvertantly or not so that it was coming from you as if these were your personal observations and experiences, so I guess you get whatever crap that asked for. While I suspected you are probably quoting Fussel, regardless you are obviously agreeing with his point.

"Screaming at the top of your lungs, solely for effect, mind you, at some kid off a farm in Iowa two minutes after he tumbles off a truck in front of his first set of barracks will not make or break him in terms of the longterm picture of his military career. It will not serve to keep him any better out of

harm's way, it will not provide him with a better jacket to stop enemy fire, it will not teach him to better think for himself in stressful situations."

Of course you are incredible incorrect in this paragraph. I suppose I am to wait until this farm boy from Iowa is sitting in a foxhole next to me on night watch before I find out that he runs or breaks down into a blathering mess at the first shot? Or better off waste X amount of training resources and dollars on the guy before I find out on the basic training Live fire course or grenade range that the guy turns to jelly in situations of danger? In fact this is a silly debate, since it is precisely how all effective armies have always done this training since the beginning of time for precisely the reason I state. And BTW screaming in and of itself is not the sole tool of making a good soldier, it is one method of stress induction particularly in the most early phases of basic training.

Sorry If I was rude to you, but you're most likely smart enough to know that you were going to catch some guff from your comments (or at least next time you'll observe the need to quote properly?) Now all the sudden the "innocent old me gets head bitten off" routine? Whatever.

Los

[Los]

P.s. Sorry Pillar, I'll not darken your thread any further!

Los

[Guest Pillar]

Los,

What you've posted has been highly constructive. I wasn't directing that to anyone in particular -- I just sensed an argument coming on and that is NOT what this thread is about.

Thanks for all the great information. Keep it coming.

[Bobbaro]

Gentlemen of the Military, LOS, Scout et al, I find in this discussion, sometimes cussion, a wonderful exposition. Overlooking the frustration and induced irritation, It is one that is so material to our national security, exemplifying so much of what I have been observing in the information available addressing the apparent and convincingly alarming realities that cut through the self serving pap, that reassure our citizenry that all is better than well, furnished by politicians in and out of the military.

The rot so prevalent that is apparently at the top and consequently instilled into the doctrine and culture lower down is aided and abetted in national policy that is sometimes temporary, (at least 8 to 12 years depending on election results, maybe) and also at least semipermanent. The temporary has foreseeable remedy, but the fact that GENERATIONS, of Americans are piling up who have no direct military experience on a broad front via a draft and universal military training, is scary. The appreciation of the military necessities is dying out in the general population. It is only a very small minority who get direct education. One result is a misapprehension of what is involved in so called brutish training conducted by a martinet cadre of officers and NCOs. They do not comprehend that the toughest training possible is inadequate to completely prepare the soldier for what he faces.

Even being given such training does not guarantee that an individual can develop an understanding of the ultimate assistance such sweat gives over giving blood. Our friend here does give evidence, that if he experienced a touch of that training and did not come off better for it, there could have been a defiency of leadership that failed to create the necessary warrior spirit and understanding. If we teach our troops that they are failures, they will certainly learn that lesson. The notion of do as I command, worm, or suffer the consequences does happen. I saw very little of it long ago. When it did happen it was not truly malicious but stupid, playing with men as toys for amusement and not trainees, totally unprofessional. I considered my training on the verge of Viet Nam at the time as too soft, it was Army as you Marines might suspect.

One thing that Tris has touched upon in his reading and has caught his attention is that bookbound doctrinaire rigidity can be very dangerous. But is also to be appreciated that all officers can not be geniuses. We require too many of them to not have a big share of those, who either operate by the book or not at all. When the book is pretty good at least covering past experience (generally that is exceptional for an approved system)its application by the ordinary officer forms a good basis for reasonable success. That men will die who would have fared better with better leadership is just a fact of the human condition. We should be grateful for the common run of officers who give it their best. There are many other factors that costs lives and objectives that often loom loftier than a good common run of the mill officer. It sure beats the hell out of the alternative -- which is all too possible.

Tris, I would recommend the books by Col. David Hackworth for a good and insightful read. If Scout and LOS have not read any by this author, I would be most surprised. His is not an academic take at all; he has seen it all from the bloodiest to the Pentagon.

What a grand thing this forum is to bring together both the washed and the unwashed for an opportunity to mentor a little understanding into all of us who need it.

LOS, it is a tempting observation that the military should learn a lesson and bring all of its units and doctrine up to the capability of our OPFOR. You have pointed out that the fluid nature of assignments and the distraction of -- shall we say -- simimilitary deployments works strongly against training up to capability. But, if we went at least for a majority of OPFOR capable units, it would surely require some humdinger support. Making it "book" would kill it, given Zero Defect etc.

Our military difficulties are merely a repeat of a historical pattern. Until the shooting gets in heavy earnest, the military starves, stagnates runs off in skew directions and wilts. Except for a precious few who remain to seed the next need.

What if we found a war and they weren't there? The ScoutPLs are now resigning in what amounts to droves in the scale of necessary military personnel retention. It is scary.

Gentlemen, we can not fault Tris for not haveing an inquiring mind. It is the stuff that is necessary to bring the civillian voter up to snuff.

Tris, our military is being gutted to the future unnecessary loss of lives on the perception that trainees ought to not be mentally stressed or physically trained under conditions so tame as to absolutely preclude any chance of injury. You do not save lives in battle that way. In fact the little blood lost in tough training is more than compensated in battlefield experence.

But - - - tough training that isolates the individual and does not include the trainers and the rest of the team is destructive. The Marines have made a fetish of the team and leading from the front. They frown on officers and NCOs who do not meet this standard. The fact of the success of this is reflected in the replacement of "basic training" with Boot Camp in the vocabulary of the Army and in its imatation of the Marine campaign hat (parden me, covers) for their training personnel as well and now using the term Drill Instructors.

[This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 11-12-2000).]

[Tris]

I'll address this first. Hopefully it will serve to defuse any resident animosity between us, Los.

Before I apologize for being to harsh Tris, go back and show me where in your original post you are quoting ANYBODY or citing some other book or reference.

Which article? Do you mean my post to ScoutPL? If so, I referenced (without direct quotes--for brevity's sake I thought it best to be representative) for effect the article written by Captain Kolenda and tried to make sense of that in light of what ScoutPL had just written.

By the way, I assume this "Kaneda" person you speak of is the Kolenda I refer to. One of us is mistaken, and I think it is you. If I'm in error I apologize sincerely to Mr. or Captain Kaneda.

You wrote the post either inadvertantly or not so that it was coming from you as if these were your personal observations and experiences, so I guess you get whatever crap that asked for.

First you ask the question, then you answer it yourself, only from within a pure vacuum. Sorry, but this is a rhetorical technique.

I have offered no (read: zero, zilch, nada) personal observations re scouting for the military in the field. I clearly attributed my reference to the work of Captain Kolenda, so why you suppose I was delving into my military past in this instance is quite beyond me. Go back and read what I wrote one more time, please. I think then it will be more clear.

And you are mistaken, Los. No one on this board or anywhere else deserves to be called out of name, no one deserves to be yelled at or browbeaten or talked down to or anything you'd care to mention of a similar abusive nature, no matter how grossly in factual error they happen to be. It is neither constructive nor civil to treat people with such little regard.

For what it's worth, I'm still alive and kicking here. I can take it, if that's an issue. I repeat, though: it's not likely to get this discussion anywhere productive fast. Afterall, we're not here to toss grenades back and forth but to discuss tactics, no?

While I suspected you are probably quoting Fussel, regardless you are obviously agreeing with his point.

Quoting who? First you said I didn't quote anyone, now I'm quoting Fussel? And agreeing all in the same breath? In that case I stand humbly corrected.

"Screaming at the top of your lungs, solely for effect, mind you, at some kid off a farm in Iowa two minutes after he tumbles off a truck in front of his first set of barracks will not make or break him in terms of the longterm picture of his military career. It will not serve to keep him any better out of harm's way, it will not provide him with a better jacket to stop enemy fire, it will not teach him to better think for himself in stressful situations."

Of course you are incredible incorrect in this paragraph. I suppose I am to wait until this farm boy from Iowa is sitting in a foxhole next to me on night watch before I find out that he runs or breaks down into a blathering mess at the first shot? Or better off waste X amount of training resources and dollars on the guy before I find out on the basic training Live fire course or grenade range that the guy turns to jelly in situations of danger? In fact this is a silly debate, since it is precisely how all effective armies have always done this training since the beginning of time for precisely the reason I state. And BTW screaming in and of itself is not the sole tool of making a good soldier, it is one method of stress induction particularly in the most early phases of basic training.

Now that you've had your say on the matter may I please have mine?

I will give you an example of how Sgt. Pitts dealt with misfits. We had a few of those, as do most platoons in Basic. One of them was a wiseguy--you know the kind, always with the "When do the RA's [see note below] get their heads examined?" stage whispers and all that. Well, Pitts brought this kid around with quiet humor, designed to promote peer pressure.

At first, you see, some of other recruits in the platoon laughed whenever the wiseguy made his remarks, but Pitts had plenty of opportunity to show this fellow up for what he was. For instance, ever hear of the Izzy-dizzy? A silly exercise where you spin with your forehead pressed to a baseball bat during platoon "games and competition" period (hey, don't blame me--I didn't write that cruise ship's itinerary). Anyway, so our platoon will be competing against the others in our company the next day and Pitts sits around with us in the barracks and makes up the list of who's to do what with whom. Sure enough, someone suggests the wiseguy ought team with him in the Izzy-dizzy. Pitts chuckled and said, "Well now that's a good choice--he's already dizzy." At that the kids laughed, only this time it wasn't in chorus to the wiseguy but more or less at him.

There were countless examples of this use of fundamental psychology on the part of Pitts, with this wiseguy and others. Not every misfit was the same, of course.

The thing is, Pitts did get us through and without yelling and screaming. Does this mean to say that Pitts was a softie, that he was incapable of giving proper basic training to recruits? Not at all. Pitts spoke with authority at all times. He was soft-spoken by nature, I'd imagine, yet somehow no one misunderstood him early on when he told us, "When you're at ease you may move everything but your left foot and your mouth."

See what I mean?

So it's different strokes for different folks. If you want to know, I'd say the army would be better off with more soldiers like Pitts. But where to find them? These men are exceptional. And so the army makes do with material of a lower caliber and resorts to the "use a bigger hammer" approach to getting the round peg of recruits into its square organizational hole. Now this might be practical--all things considered I'd think it is, now that you mention it--probably is inevitable, but none of that says it's the optimal approach to training, even at the very modest level of BT.

NOTE: RA is an acronym for Regular Army, so the wiseguy's reference was to anyone stupid enough (in his opinion) to want to go into an army headed for the horror of Vietnam.

[This message has been edited by Tris (edited 11-13-2000).]

[ScoutPL]

Bobbaro, I dont want to get in a debate about headgear but I would like to know your source for the US army "copying" the USMC's use of the campaign hat for DI's. It has been in use by both services since before WWI. I'm pretty sure the army still teaches its recruits to refer to their trainers as Drill Sergeant, even though their job description may have them listed as Drill Instructor.

Speaking as an officer who just left the army, I'd like to throw two cents into the "modern-military" pot as well. I enlisted in 1988, at the height of the cold war. My battalion commander and battalion sergeant major were vietnam vets, as were all of the leadership above them. Those guys pushed us into the ground. Every opportunity was taken to train and train hard. I think my battalion commander would have had us doing tactical feeds at the mess hall if he could have gotten by with it. A year later we jumped into Panama and six months after that we got involved in the Gulf War. I got to see first hand how the hard, demanding training we had been through had prepared us for combat. Fast forward to 1997. I return to the 82nd Abn Div as a new platoon leader. Expecting the same hard charging, train, train, attitude. Boy was I in for a rude surprise. As a platoon leader I had to spend at least 4-6 months getting a soldier just out of basic and AIT into physical shape. The standard at our training centers is to just pass the PT test and send them forward. The NCO's cant do anything to stress the privates out and it shows when they get to the unit. It isnt rare for newly arrrived soldiers to lapse into depression, become disillusioned or to just flat out go AWOL. And I can assure its not because we do any hazing or mistreating of the new guys. They just couldnt handle the day to day ops of a regular unit. On the contrary I spent more time conjoling and "problem-solving" with new soldiers then I did anything else. And this was after the squad leader had tried and tried and given up. Basic no longer prepares soldiers for combat. At the most it teaches them how to wear the uniform, how to stand in a straight line, who to salute, and how to not shoot anyone on the range. Yes I mean to say anyone, since none of them seem to have a fighting spirit or a desire to kill this nations enemy's. They're all more interested with getting paid and disappearing up to their rooms to play nintendo as much as possible.

I was much the same way when I came into the army. I sluffed off when I could and wasnt very self motivated. But the hard training and sterling example set by my leaders at all levels changed all that. We still get alot of great guys in and most of the new recruits can be brough tup to the standard we'd like to see, it just takes time and isnt our job. We train teams, squads and platoons, not individuals. Yet thats exactly what we are forced to do when we get these poorly trained recruits.

Most of my reasons for leaving deal with the officer corps however. The total embracing of technology in favor of common sense simplicity, the rampant careerism, and the ballessness of most of the mid level leaders really turned me off. I decided I could go do something else with my life and if my country ever needs me I'll be there to clean up after the next Task Force Smith drops the ball. So now I'm a policeman, dealing with real problems on the street, not worried about whether my guys are going to get to train today or have to go cut the sergeant majors grass again.

[Tris]

Los, I seem to have misread you insofar as I thought you thought I'd made reference to personal scouting experiences. Apparently, your objection was not this but that I had none of these to relate to, and also that I didn't quote any reference besides Kolenda's article. All I can say is that it was Kolenda's article which prompted my observations on the remarks made by ScoutPL, who seems to be substantially at odds with Kolenda's conclusions. I have no personal stake in this. My interest is academic.

RE your other post, just a couple of notes.

I've reached no conclusion re Kolenda's opinions. I have no way to know what happens at NTC since I'm not there. I only know what people write here and other places. I try to put that to good use by asking what I consider to be pertinent questions. I will say that Captain Kolenda did not come across in his article as some fuzzy-wuzzy and he seemed less entrenched in his thinking than ScoutPL.

What, precisely, is your take on it? What is your view on how the army shakes out these days with regard to the theory and practice of the art of reconnaissance in war? You've made more than one reference to an officer corps which in your opinion is lacking in some major respects. How does that jive with Kolenda's article? How could the army better organize and make use of its reconnaissance assets? You written that nowhere is recon push an advocated technique, but you've also written (or strongly implied) that there may, in effect, be no certain reconnaissance doctrine whatsoever, that battalions and brigades throughout the army might well be doing it as they individually please and making it up as they go along! What are we to make of that? And how about Kolenda's call for closer relations between S2 and the Scout PL? You wrote earlier that this is an issue which you recognize from your own experience in the field. Kolenda took it further and suggested a "synergy" should be achieved in the relationship of and the efforts between these two people. Do you have an opinion on that?

Speak to me, please.

[Tris]

Thank you, Bobbaro, for disagreeing with me so politely. Allow me to respond to just one thought of yours.

Tris, our military is being gutted to the future unnecessary loss of lives on the perception that trainees ought to not be mentally stressed or physically trained under conditions so tame as to absolutely preclude any chance of injury. You do not save lives in battle that way. In fact the little blood lost in tough training is more than compensated in battlefield experience.

My example of martinet behavior as exhibited by most drill sergeants at the base I took my basic training at (Fort Campbell) should not be misconstrued as anything other than it was: a lone example of inferior technique which is allowed to continue on the altar of military doctrine. Does screaming at recruits when they first enter boot camp help them to become better soldiers? No, it does not. Do all armies embrace this primitive training doctrine? It's likely most of them do, for what that could be worth. But so what?

Is it anyone's contention here that just because an activity is widely practiced it is necessarily a good thing in and of itself, that there might not be a more reasonable alternative to this behavior?

Look. Basic training isn't just about getting off the bus. It's a process of some duration with an eye to getting these recruits assimilated into the army culture and equipping them with the minimal skills they will require in order to be able to go on to other, more advanced training. It's a long process to turn a civilian into a soldier, a good soldier, at least.

So, when I referred to the yelling of drill sergeants I wasn't whining for the poor lads around me, or hugging a tree, or anything like that. I merely pointed to an example of how doctrine, per se, tends to get a grip on everyone around it who hasn't the intelligence and the backbone to stand up and say, "Wait a minute, that makes no sense." Well, my sergeant apparently had the sense to do just that--which might well explain why he was still where he was and the master sergeant had that other stripe. You buck the system and you get bucked right back, usually in the teeth. But Pitts was the better man, I've no doubt of that at all, and the training I received at his hands was nothing short of topnotch.

[Los]

Whoa too much to read. First off,

Tris, If I made misunderstandings it was to this post by you which I quote in its entirety:

.........

The attitudes of officers come right back to army training and doctrine.

Years ago I first saw army martinet doctrine in play, the brutish bootcamp technique of screaming at raw recruits as they jump off the trucks on the way in from the processing center. (Does this still happen, by the way, or has sense been driven home?) While other drill sergeants screamed and bullied and yelled for pushups, meanwhile the top kick grinned like some fool as he overlooked all, my instructor, a professional soldier from Louisiana called Pitts, calmly, quietly organized his charges and marched us into the barracks to begin our assimilation into the greater army culture. Pitts' more studied approach continued throughout my bootcamp experience. While other instructors missed no opportunity to act out any manner of histrionics at the expense of the men assigned to their tutorage, Pitts never uttered a harsh word or raised his voice, and yet our platoon scored as high as any other as far as I know.

Of course, one does not necessarily have to raise one's voice to "scream," intimidation comes in many forms, and when los refers to proper procedures with regard to written reports and plans, and to stepping out of the box, I shudder, for I have no doubt there's some of that at work, too. It's what we call being a "good soldier," or if you will a "good little German." While that will allow you to get along within the system, it might well cost you your life out in the field. You tell me which is ultimately more important.

........

Perhaps we are talking about two seperate posts but it was precisely this post which I responded harshly to you about. There are no quotes and no inclinations that any of this is from quoted from someone else other than yourself. So I responded to you as if this was entirely your opinion and observation. If you were merely quoting some other source, as I gathered from your retort, then perhaps you can see that there was no way for me to know this. As to Fussel I bring him up for one reason. While the vast majority of those who ever ever gone through Basic Training (Myself included) hated the methodolgy and tactics pursued at times, either brutiush or dull, of those who "imparted their experience on us", the vast majority of those who have been in combat have come to either appreciate that small amount of abuse they were given or at least come to understand it's perfectly valid reason, no matter how chicken**** it seemed at the time. (Again, myself included.) Fussel is the sole legitemate literary exception to this. (And I like his writing too.) It's as natural a part of our existence and the environment we must function in as gravity is to the law of physics. The fact that somehow you remained stuck on this one aspect of your training well what can I say?

SO anyway if we have to delve into the "history" of our disagreement it started right there.

It's important to understand something.There are some of us on this board that do precisely the stuff most people here like to play at for real. So we know exactly that the experience and understanding you recieve from playing Combat Mission or reading a couple articles on line about doctrine or about reading ten books a year on the subject is pretty much like looking at the whole thing through a straw. In many classes even having served a hitch as a private in his of that unit gives one even a rudimentary view on some of the bigger issues. SO it's easy to get annoyed a definative statements some armchair types make re: various subjects that we know to be either patently false or much deeper than meets the eye. This kind of posting is pretty much the norm here on this board. (Soley due to the shear volume of posters).

I can liken the experience to this: I also happen to be a big fan of flight simulation and air combat. I even have a private pilot's license so I have some rudimentary understanding of the basics of flight. But lets say you are hanging out with your buddies that happen to be real USAF F16 pilots. Now some schmoe comes on and says he read somehwere that the SU27 has a faster roll rate and turn radius than an F16 so the F16 is totally outmoded against the Flanker in a dog fight. Of course the F16 pilot happens to know that the Flanker's roll rate is measured over time and starts out twice as slow as an F16s roll rate though it eventually develops over the life of the role. This translates to, the F16 is mre response in the split seconds it takes to realise you have to do a roll while the Flanker pilot will be yanking at his stick waiting for his roll rate to develop. That split second can be critcial in a gunfight. Or maybe the Falcon pilot knows that the ergonomics of his cockpit are in all aspects superior to that of the Flnanker , making it a more dogfight freindly workplace. Or maybe the Flanker pilot just knows that its' the trainig and preparation of the pilot that makes all the differnce in the word. Either way he's stuck with a sitaution where someone is drawing conlusions based on a small sliver of the whole picture and now to correct this perception he either has to launch into a dissertation that may or may not be appreciated and is in either way highly technical time consuming or tiring, all he can just sit there and smirk and say whatever. Anyone of us can find ourselves in his situation even if you are talking shop about Lab technicians and drawing blood or mechanics and the virtues of this ro that car or teachers and the education system.

Anyway you'll receieve no further animosity from my direction.

Anyway, re: kolenda. (thanks for correcting me on his name,again was typing in a hurry with two boys and a wife inpatiently waiting to be taken out.)

My take on him is this: I agree in general with his comments. I disagree that our doctrine says anything close to what he says it does. He is takingthe easy way out,. It si much easier to criticse our doctrine in a porfessional journal than it is to call a spade a spade and talk about the root causes of eth matter. But then again NO ARMY IN THE WORLD, is going to find itself in a situation where it is leaving critical decisions on briagde and battalion operations on a regular basis up to a lieutenant somewhere. Unless of course that army happens to be in it's second or third year of high intensity warfare on the eastern front and that LT has already proven his worth with a Knights cross or a Hero of the Soviet Union award. No matter what any army does anywhere it will never achieve the operating status it does in peacetime that it does after years or months or war. Never. (Unfortunately) Theonly exception to this is normaly in the special operations community where on may small operations you don't even have an officer around. But again that's because the wars is never really over on that side of the fence. It's ongoing. And they're normally insulated from the conventional side of the house and have the luxury of being a small insular organization beholden to someone outside of the normal chain of command.

Anyway I'm digressing. To answer just one thing, nothing but good can come from a better relationship between the S-2 and the Scout platoon leader but more importantly from the S-2 being a more integral part of the decision making porcess when the fights on. (As opposed to the BC/XO/S-3 triumverate and the S-2 who's job it is to provide informatin or "product".)

Bobbaro...

I don't believe it's a moral rot, somehow irreversable, nor do I beieve there are not quality leaders in the system. There are. But it takes the higher leadership to bring out an environment where it's OK to act in a certain way. Right now the pendulum is startingto swing away in the opposite direction as it does from time to time. Even now there are a dozen other critcial factors I can interject into my argument here that I simply don't have the time or will to bring up, but there's a lot to this subject.

I have read everything Hackworth has put out. I would most scertainly NOT recommend those books for the layman looking to get an accurate read on things going on today! They would make useful additional reading after you already had a solid grounding. As the years have gone by his tone and ideas have gotten more strident and as often as not, off the mark. Please do not think that all us military types hang on his every word like he's some modern day messiah. He's not. My own personal opinion is that he's never got over his own personal screwing from Vietnam (who can blame him?) and has made it his life's mission to screw back, supposedly "on behalf of the men". Whatever. Like anyone or anything else he makes good points and bad points. **** from his opinion the most criminal decision the military ever made was when the US dropped the .45 and went to the 9mm.

One thing is for sure and you hit on it. (My last point for those already yawning). High quality people are leaving in droves. It's one thing to go on a six month deployment to somehwere and do peacekeeping or whatever and then come home and train and more importantly be with your family again. It's another to come home and find out in three weeks you going out again somewhere for another three or six months time after time. Or to be an E-8 with 19 years and find out you are being "involuntarily extended" for three more years. (What is this 1812?) What with the force levels down so low with all the cuts, the Army down by a third of what it was but the operational tempo up 300% it's ridiculous. Tie that to Zero Defect, political hand tieing and meddling of operational commanders, and other bull****, these personnel policies are driving good people out. Doctrinal or tactical disagreements are so far down the line it barely registers on the radar scope.

All that being said, I spend most of my time working with other amries and I don't see them any better off.

Now if you guys will excuse me I'll get back to my CM2 research.

Cheers...

Los

[Los]

Oh and by the way, here it is, juicy stuff:

71-123 "Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armor Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company/Team."

http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/71-123/toc.htm

FM 17-95 CAVALRY OPERATIONS

<A HREF="http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/17-95/cont.htm[/url" TARGET=_blank>

FM 17-98 SCOUT PLATOON

[url=http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/17-98/toc.htm</A>

Tactical Vignettes and solutions including various recon subtasks. Someone should turn these into CM scenarios.

[urlhttp://knox-www.army.mil/center/dtdd/doctrine/VIGNETTES.htm

I hope you have a fat pipe. Enjoy.

Los

[This message has been edited by Los (edited 11-12-2000).]

[Bobbaro]

Scout, I have no first hand knowledge, and just got the impression from hearing conversations from interested parties concerning terminology. Perhaps too many of these people got their picture drawn in Hollywood despite any military experience they had. From what you say, Hollywood may very well be in a better position for making impressions than present training is capable of being, even for those who served. About the Campaign hats, yes, your right about their antiquity and Army history. However, I never saw them used or even appear during my brief real world contact covering 60 to 66. Neither did I see any evidence via media, books or report during the Korean war period. My sergeants wore the Tideway type hats.

My treatment as a recruit was not so much tender as it was sort of indifferent. I was not in for my military edification, but merely to do my duty and go on with my life. However, having watched WWII roll by with plenty of relatives involved and sweated out my brother's potential to go to Korea, rather than remain stateside as he did, along with a goodly general interest in and appreciation for things military. I felt that my training was fairly slack. Some things were done fairly well, but a lot of time seemed spent perfunctorily. The old Korean war vets that formed a lot of the cadre seemed to be just going along to get along, seeing that the recruits did well enough to keep them from criticism. Likely, doing a job until retirement. They were good guys. We got a tear or two coming out of basic as we gave old Sgt Cadle, who ran our platoon, a fifth of whisky as a going away present. We got some training in the techniques and equipment of war and some physical hardening, (not enough)and next to nothing in preparing us for anything approaching the mental load.

The same was generally true in Advanced Infantry training. Much less physical and no more mental. Mostly familiarization with weapons of various sorts. Had I not been in the reserves, I would have gone on to something more in detail in some assignment no doubt. I would have recognized the tools and at least remember that I had heard something of the techniques. But to employ them effectively would have been something else. In reserves the weekends were next to nothing except gaining the sense of belonging to a group, but only the two weeks summer camps saw anything else. We were readied somewhat to begin learning a trade but in a frighteningly laid back manner. After Viet Nam heated up, talking with people who had gone back in seemed to speak of a much more purposeful kind of training.

From what you say about training now, it appears my experience may have been "rigorous" in comparison.

I fear neither a concerned President nor gung ho Secty, of Defense or better directed congressional expenditure of funds can repair the institutional damage. A gut cutting war and acres of unnecessary blood is the only thing capable of bringing back reality. There is something about body bags that speak loudly. Even then I fear that those responsible will not be held accountable in any way. Worse, I fear that even a kind retirement and pat on the back will not move them out. I fear that these people are so far removed from the actuality and even really caring, that all that will be done is a cover up and another classic example of scapegoating. Scapegoating is a very old military tradition.

The words of your post are tragically repetitive of others I have read concerning present training and affairs.

I probably should have addressed you in private as this sheds no light on Pillar's quest. But, seeing persons with mistaken notions of at least what rudimentary individual military preparedness is made of helped set me off as it is something I see as a wide spread problem. David Hackworth penned a not so hypothetical tale of a mother forcing the Army to slack off her son's rugged training through a congressman. Then he pictured the greater anger she exhibited at the inadequate training her son got, that caused his death in combat.

[Guest Pillar]

Excellent Excellent EXCELLENT!

Keep up the great contributions.

This thread is exceeding my wildest hopes and dreams! I have reading material now to last me for months.

As for turning the tactical vignettes into CM scenarios -- I'M ON IT. (As soon as I have the time).

What a great thread!

[Bobbaro]

Tris, I am curious about the period you had your military experience. Mine was about '61. There have been great changes in the way things are done over the years, especially in the last few years. We had a small share of harassing leadership; next to nothing in fact. Nothing like the Marines of the day got. ScoutPL did not see much in the way of Marine training culture showing up in the Army, or that was the impression I got. LOS indicates that he believes that shock treatment is appropriate for weeding out mentalities obviously too tender for the battlefield, which has some obvious merit. Perhaps it even sometimes works. More likely it will, if part of a consistent program of training.

My treatment was largely of the kind you reported, except often probably more on the slack side. I did witness competent leadership and a little of the other. I suspect that since (at least in my swatch of experience) that the Marine DI approach did not become an Army institution as it was in the Marines and when encountered was more likely something individual and more likely to be resented as personal. Marines expect it. If they don't I can't imagine what planet they lived on. Marine theory has been different from the Army's. I am not telling you anything you don't know.

Anyway, where it is an individual decision or practice to use this approach in some isolation from the general rule, it much less likely to achieve much more than reveal the most conspicuous emotional weakness in recruits. Perhaps worth it for that. Saves a lot of time and expense. Not very kind though. Why can't such be found and dismissed through screening in the first place? Probably impossible, but due to organizational defects rather than absolutely. If your noisy NCO emptying the bus had been a part of a complete planned recruit training experience it may have made more sense to you. As it was, in isolation acting alone, his effort was wasted. Like all things military, a team approach is necessary for results. Had you experienced a concerted program designed to weed out problems and totally reorient the recruit's entire mentality from civilian to military and military Marine style as the Marines do consistently, then that one guy hollering would smear out in memory into a general impression. The Army taught me its program and drilled me to accomplish it. The Marines attempt and pretty damn well succeed in *remaking* their recruits.

I have grown more tolerant of a lot of what I once regarded as beside the point military foolish traditional practices. They do have necessary function, sometimes functions that the book rationale misses entirely. For example saluting: I originally felt that it was a ridiculous non functional eye candy for officer's deficient self confidence. I grew less critical and put it to mindless tradition. But, now I see it as a practice of positive feedback to officers that a soldier recognizes them as such and are ready to act in their role as subordinates. That is important as a minimal sign to an officer that his communications will be heard. And if discipline has not broken down entirely that he can expect a reasonable effort at obedience. That seems to me to be enough. That relationship is critical both on the battlefield and behind it. I was told that it was a formal greeting. Somehow that seemed to belie the fact that officers did not offer to initiate such a greeting, but when did initiate a correspondence, it was more like, "Hey soldier?" come here.

A wonderful Korean War period story about that was told to me by a guy who witnessed it. Sloppy Joe missed his opportunity to salute a Lt. and was called for it. Ordered to give one hundred salutes, he wagged, his arm weary. There was another witness. A General. He in turn stepped up after number 100 was finished and addressed the Lt. He said that is was well that he had taken the initiative to correct the private. But now it was his duty as a saluted officer to return all the salutes as regulations required.

The Marine approach is a studied one much refined in practice and applied across the board. If a recruit is singled out, it is generally the recruit who stood into the limelight. This institution is designed to place all these guys into the same cramped comfortable boat and weld them into a team by shared and overcome hardships ready to charge hell with a thimbleful of water.

While America won't tolerate efforts at truly realistic training as too risky to a soldier's health and loves to punish some DI who has the misfortune of having some trainee fall out and die. we end up saving a few training casualties for the return of having many more die on the battlefield not as prepared as they might be. The Marines program has suffered weakening, but not as much as the Army's.

The Army's approach has always been different. But never so different than now. It is becoming so questionable as to wonder if it is not being designed to charge a Girl Scout riot reading pages from their Consideration Of Others field manual, COO. Yes a bit of poetic license, but with very large grain of truth apparently. Our military has received 3rd, class treatment before, but never has it been so insidiously invaded within. But don't believe it. We have that advice from very high governmental officials. Our Captains are surely resigning simply because of a needed bolstering of internal communications telling them how nice they are. A study should solve the problem.

[Tris]

If your noisy NCO emptying the bus had been a part of a complete planned recruit training experience it may have made more sense to you. As it was, in isolation acting alone, his effort was wasted. Like all things military, a team approach is necessary for results. Had you experienced a concerted program designed to weed out problems and totally reorient the recruit's entire mentality from civilian to military and military Marine style as the Marines do consistently, then that one guy hollering would smear out in memory into a general impression. The Army taught me its program and drilled me to accomplish it. The Marines attempt and pretty damn well succeed in *remaking* their recruits.

The yelling was the norm where I was, Bobbaro. Sgt. Pitts was the one who stood out like a sore thumb due to his silent bearing.

Yes, I imagine that this loud approach does work miracles with the "numbers'" the army works with. The irony is that we might expect greater results from the much more intellectual (not to say humane) approach of Pitts in the Marine Corps where all of the material has volunteered for service in that branch of our armed forces, as opposed to having been drafted (this was the case back when I went in in 1971) or attached to some reserve or NG outfit.

I don't deny that the army does have a system, or at least from the reports of ScoutPL did have a system which worked, how efficiently I do not know. It was easy to watch the greater dynamic at work, identify its various components and see them play their respective roles. And so, the raw material would come from all parts, mostly young people. (Our platoon had one man who was 44 years old--can you believe that? I swear to God, this man had served in Korea, and then begged to get back in, and his presence at Campbell was proof positive that he either "knew" someone or that the army was willing to take on older men. I'm not sure as to the wisdom of that, though. War is hard work and for young men, as a rule. I doubt if the old vet ever saw action a second time.) They come in round numbers and all look different, but soon enough they get their first haircut and lineup for their first kits of GI and after awhile its OD Green everywhere and no one looks all that much different from the next kid in line. People being what they are, this has its intended effect. Combined with the atmosphere of "away from home" and the yelling and screaming and orders everywhere to behave in strange ways and manners and these kids naturally tend to band together and develop quickly a new set of cultural laws and standards designed to get them through, as a newly-founded group, this very unsettling experience. Can't speak to how many misfits are actually weeded out due to the process, but I'd imagine the army back then could easily predict it as close as any poll ever could. Afterall, this is all figured out on paper beforehand, a cool numbers game.

Still, it ought to be intuitive that this almost Neanderthal approach to organizational demands and imperatives is beyond primitive, at base, and hardly exclusive to the achievement of acceptable results down the road. And believe me, I found ScoutPL's description of what's happened recently disturbing. But let me explain why.

It must be the case that the army has not been able to reason out an alternative approach to the problem.

Think about that. We speak to the greatest military entity the world has ever known, invested with untold influence and real power, yet its leaders have been unable (or unwilling) to sit down and put their heads together and dream up a way to admit and successfully matriculate raw recruits from Process Center A to wherever they eventually end up . . . without the need for any number of NCO's and junior officers along the way, and from what we've heard toward the end of the pipeline instead of the start, to play house and Dr. Kildare and everything else under the sun in an effort to "round them out."

That's scary. It suggests that my remark re doctrine and the inherent limitations thereof was not far off the mark--as, of course, I knew it not to be. The problems of doctrine are almost as old as doctrine itself since they had to have set in immediately after the establishments of these rigid institutions of ways and means.

I don't claim to have any ready answers, so please do not accuse of being arrogant or a know it all or something like that. I merely see the problem, or rather I once saw the system at work firsthand, and, judging from the confusion and wasted time it inevitably led to, I recognized at that time there must be something better. Just had to be.

ScoutPL: I would like to say once to you that you have my respect and admiration for your service to our country, and I believe your presence here is a boon to one and all. I regret the bitter words thus far exchanged between us. I can only say that it was never my intention to upset you.

Los: I think the confusion we shared stemmed from your initial post to me in which you chose to make reference not only to the post of mine which you quoted but also my reply to ScoutPL. It was because of this that I thought your main thrust focused on my piece which dealt mainly with Captain Kolenda's article. I hope at some time you care to share more of your experience and the insight you allude to as to the why and wherefore of our military's situation as you view it today. We certainly need a strong military, strongest possible, in today's screwed-up world--just listen to the clamor for some other state, that alone should tell you how very real the threat is. I can only hope that when it comes time for our boys to serve actively again they will be up for the challenge. I expect they will.

[Tris]

It's important to understand something.There are some of us on this board that do precisely the stuff most people here like to play at for real. So we know exactly that the experience and understanding you recieve from playing Combat Mission or reading a couple articles on line about doctrine or about reading ten books a year on the subject is pretty much like looking at the whole thing through a straw. In many classes even having served a hitch as a private in his of that unit gives one even a rudimentary view on some of the bigger issues. SO it's easy to get annoyed a definative statements some armchair types make re: various subjects that we know to be either patently false or much deeper than meets the eye. This kind of posting is pretty much the norm here on this board. (Soley due to the shear volume of posters).

Los, you went on the write more re this issue and I found it all of interest. I would encourage anyone on this thread to study your remarks as closely as possible. I choose to limit myself to the above quoted passage for reasons of saving bandwidth.

I understand your point. I am eager to say that I do not consider myself an expert on military matters of any kind except as these might pertain to the history of warfare down through the ages, where I have at least devoted a modest amount of my time to readings of a broad nature for the past 40 odd years. I would guess this describes me most accurately as a sort of military history buff, and again, in no manner, shape or form do I consider myself an authority.

So, I come to discussions of this kind with an open mind, or as much as any man might claim such, and a desire to learn more at the feet of those who have more experience than I. This is where veterans such as you and ScoutPL enter the picture.

I see the problem as this: thin skins. And, I'm hesitant to say, a somewhat regrettable lack of what I call intellectual balance. That is to say, an education, of both formal and experiential nature, which serves to afford a more comprehensive view of life as opposed to the specialist's entirely more narrow appreciation of affairs.

Needless to say I cannot do a thing about how a man's mind develops along the way. I can tell you, however, that the dynamic in play with regard to this terrible propensity on the boards for one person after the other to take offense at the expression of critical comment and opinion is not a healthy or propitious sign. It is, in fact, a symptom of the lack of intellectual balance I allude to above.

Re your thesis specifically on expertise: there is an inherent trap for the expert, which you might well be aware of but I'll point it out just so it's on record. The trap is this, that the expert will show a tendency to ignore the input of lay in any discussion he holds forth on, which has, as a rule, the undesirable effect to discourage such lay input and the feed the expert interests of the informational/discussion loop with an attitude that eventually must come round to the point where, essentially, no other opinion really matters. Which effectively serves to end the discussion.

I said before that you might be aware of this unhappy cause-effect for the reason that this is precisely the dynamic at work within the army, most especially during peacetime but prevalent at all times, even during war. This cause-effect not only allows for but actively encourages the exclusive topdown mentality of command which both you and ScoutPL have identified, at least in passing, and to which Captain Kolenda more actively chose to address himself, however obliquely, in his article on reconnaissance.

And isn't this true? Is it not a case where it leads to the old Peter principle in the end? Are not good, sometimes better, men ignored, screwed over and eventually forgotten as they leave the army in round numbers? Are not most of these men of junior rank, were they not ignored in the main, is frustration with the system their greatest collective concern or not? And do those who stay for the dubious reasons that they have come to enjoy too much their bailiwicks, have come to snuggle too warmly in the accommodations provided and thrive too well and absent of competent overview in the rare atmosphere extant within this so-described stifled service, do these servicemen regret such human passage or thrill to it? In the end, is the result of this weening process better or worse for our country?

My message comes round approximately to this, that while experts should always be accorded respect and attention (this is only logical), these types always need to be on their guard lest they come to take their own opinions too seriously, to the exclusion of other opinion, other reason, other thought. When that happens, intellectual growth ceases, academic air evacuates and balance flies harried out the window.

Besides, that, I'm all ears! I come here because I wish to learn more. While I have an opinion or two to express, I mostly have questions--oh, very yes, many many of those.

[This message has been edited by Tris (edited 11-13-2000).]

[Los]

Anyway back to the issue of doctrine. It seems that some believe our doctrine to be pretty porked, that there's some big emergency brewing and no one is minding the store. Moreso, (and I've probably contributed to this inadvertently) that our officer corps is somehow deficient or inable to act upon this "crisis".

All this stemming from one article someone read on recon (the looking through the straw approach as I called it before.) First off let me say this I will chalk up most of our porbelms (and there's always porblems, some get fixed, others crop up, others last as long as whoever happens to be in office in DC, whatever), firmly as personnel management policies. These are things like manpower levels, Rating schemes, staffing, all kinds of issues. These woes end up spilling over into a number of other areas but they are the root casue of many porblems. You don't get the majority of long term professionals quitting the military because they disagree with some foreign policy issue of that they disagree with doctrine. They quit for simle things, like you it's getting near impossible to ahve a family while still running around on all the overtaxing deployments, incomparable pay compared to the private sector, combined with the level of chicken**** swinging into high gear. It's any one or a whole host of these types of things.

These things come and go.

Back to doctrine. We have a very weird situation in the American Army. FM100-5 depicts an incrdeibly open minded far ranging, oh the sum of all experience in warfare free wheeeling manuever, sun-tzu quotin' type of doctrine. Oh it really is qyuite unlighteninhg. But it's also a very broad doctrine, not a lot of detail, regardless of how optimal the writing.

Then you have all the FMs things on how to fight your latoon, your squad, your battalion your brigade. All the basic buildling blocks. It's excellent stuff, well written, proven in combat over the past century over and over, taking whatever works from whatever country invented it. GOOD STUFF. But it's very technical and porcess oriented How to breach an obstacle, train for NTC, conduct logistics, manage the fires of a Bradley platoon. Again all kinds of good stuff.

So what do we have?

On one hand you ahve a pretty enlightening overall doctrine, FM100-5, which is in a constant started of dynamic evolution. (Whether one realizes it or not the military, at least in our country, is incredible dynamic, regardless of whether or not someone gets yelled at stepping off the bus in basic training or not, much more so than most private sector firms half its size.) As a battlefield commander it tells you everything you are supposed to be, BUT NOT REALLY HOW TO BE IT.

Then on the other hand you have all our training, FMs schools excerizes, that teach the unit how to operate as efficiently as possible, to be ready to fight in combat and conduct this or that battle drill and this or that movement under all conditions at any time to a certain standard. Tactics are taught, but they focus on the tactics needed to accomplish this or that task (Conduct a raid, do a route recon, conduct a platoon movement to contact. In this manner all the building blocks necessary are in place to have a force that can be lead and fought effectively.

But now here's the rub.

It's bridging between these two levels of understanding that there is at times a problem. What to do with all these excellent combat pieces that have been so paintsakingly equipped and trained up? How to develop the budding Creighton Abrams, or Col Balck, or other master tactician? (and where to find the time and resoruces to train them and their units to this higher level of perfection?). IT's here that there's a bit of a porblem. It nearlyalways an individual passio that drives teh cream of the crop upwards, since in an age where everything is to be etsed and standardized, it's hard to foster and train a crop of master tacticians. And the other way of doing it requires lots fo training time and dollar resources so the expereince of fighting battles n a CTC format in oder to garnish valuable experience is simply not available to most (unless you are lucky/good enough to have been selected to be in the 11th ACR and actually be in the environmnet where you can do nothing but fight battles 40 times a year.)

That's the rub. It's not our doctrine per se ro hw we fight at all. It's how we execute and how we deal with the insidious nature of infrequent experiences and persihable skills. And simulation is not the answer. It's a training multiplier not a sole source asnwer. You don't get the the most critcial part of understanding the comabt environemnt in a computer sim, THE FRICTION.

But all is not lost.

The Soviets themsleves have said, the hardest thing about learning how to fight the Americans is that they don't follow their own doctrine. I say, thank god! For ever bumbler that Kolenda poinst to in Push/Pull, there's someone esle inventing some new way to fix the porblem. Two or three brigades go to NTC and fall on their ass due to failed recon. (BTW they're supposed to do that that's how they learn. The last thing an OC wants to see is a unit tat comes to NTC and doesn't screw up. Theyw on't learn.) then one of the BC's from one of those units becomes a brgade s-3 or an Bde CDR and decides to create in his unti a Brigade recon Troop. Through his own resources, he's picked up an extra company, who will fill the whole in some scouting tasks so he doesn't have to steal resources from the battalions. Next thing you know the whole armor community is looking at it.

Or you get a battalion that goes down to JRTC and get's it's ass kicked, identifying the mobility of their heavily leaden troops as a main problem. So they go back to home station, work out new ways to establish and maintain relaible company resupply, and forbid anyone bringing a rucksack out to the field next tme, nothing but butt packs. And they decide to fight differntly. Now they go down again a year later and kick the OPFOR's ass.

There's no shortage of discussion, answers, and ideas wrt how to fight better. There's no shortage to the ability of the organizatin to change. It only takes a quick glance at et happenings and discussions going on at Armor Branch or Infantry branch. This is a revolutionary time as information pervasiveness buts up against the traditional ways of seeing a battlefield and understanding what's happening. And you ahve this Opertations Other than War mandate and the viability of getting there firstest with the mostest also playing havoc/creating opportunities (i.e. Armies light wheeeled bdes, testbed and the whole are we cops or fighters debate going on at a national level.)

SO don't be worried that no ones minding the store. Gotta run!

Los

[ScoutPL]

A couple quick points.

Tris, please explain to me what doctrine has to do with how we treat new recruits, I'd be interested in learning how you make that connection. Also, you might want to slow down a little, you're beginning to sound like the expert on experts!

About training recruits. Basic training must accomplish a mirade of tasks but the one thing it must accomplish over all else is to remove the doubtful and questioning attitude that our society breeds. When it comes to combat, I think we can all agree that teamwork and reliance on your peers will get you through. But someone has to point the team in the right direction and at times lead it in the right direction. And that someone cant be effective if their orders are going to be questioned or laced with doubt. When a soldier stops to think each and every order through it slows down the team, it reduces their effectiveness and it gets men killed. In basic training you are trained to the point you can change the magazine of your rifle in the dark in a matter of seconds. The instinctive, disciplined obedience of orders is no less important. But because such selfless obedience is in total contrast to what our society teaches it is much more difficult to instill then a simple motor skill. When I went through basic in 1988 I was extremely self motivated to become a soldier and I knew what to expect and was prepared for it. Alot of my peers weren't and it was interesting to see how this transformation took place. At the beginning of the cycle every sentence was laced with why? why? why? By the end of the cycle we all jumped when we were told to jump, not bothering to ask how high until our feet had left the ground. As an infantry leader I demanded that kind of instinctual obedience from my soldiers, not because I was a flaming, a-hole, demigod, but because when I yelled down the line to cease fire, it might be to save some fellow soldiers and my verbal command needed to be obeyed immediately, despite fears, doubts, or incoming fire.

Now, I'm experienced with the end product of both systems (the in your face, piss your pants indoctrination and the "please do one more pushup, private" kinder, gentler basic training). And I would take a group of privates trained in 1985 over a group trained in 2000 anyday. Rationalization may work wonders in a regular unit (I learned quickly which soldiers would respond to little guidance and a soft voice and which ones required a more direct, authoritative tone) but not without having that instinct to obey firmly in place before hand. And I dont think any man can have that instinct without having rationalism and the belief he has the right to question authority drilled out of him beforehand.

[Tris]

Tris, please explain to me what doctrine has to do with how we treat new recruits, I'd be interested in learning how you make that connection. Also, you might want to slow down a little, you're beginning to sound like the expert on experts!

Doctrine is something taught, in brief. It also carries an almost pejorative meaning, that being "dogma," which simply stated equates to "belief," but as I said we're talking pejorative here.

Anyway, your question is easily answered by yourself (and could just as easily have been puzzled out by you had you bothered). Here is what you wrote in your third paragraph:

Now, I'm experienced with the end product of both systems (the in your face, piss your pants indoctrination and the "please do one more pushup, private" kinder, gentler basic training). And I would take a group of privates trained in 1985 over a group trained in 2000 anyday. Rationalization may work wonders in a regular unit (I learned quickly which soldiers would respond to little guidance and a soft voice and which ones required a more direct, authoritative tone) but not without having that instinct to obey firmly in place before hand. And I dont think any man can have that instinct without having rationalism and the belief he has the right to question authority drilled out of him beforehand.

As for being an expert on experts: I take that as a compliment. Thank you.

Look. I am an educated man with three degrees, I'm fairly well read, and I have varied experience to draw on. What would you expect from me, drivel? I suppose I should come on here and go "Awwww shucks . . . don't know wha'ta say . . . what think y'all?"

[This message has been edited by Tris (edited 11-13-2000).]

[ScoutPL]

OK Tris, I wanted to give you an opportunity to explain yourself before I responded and I've done that. But right quick, I think its kinda funny you spend so much time complaining about "experts" then jump up and claim you're proud to be one yourself! One of those degrees in humility, by chance?

Doctrine, in most military forums, describes how an army will fight. It sets up the basic framework that the military hangs all of its ideas, tactics, and techniques on. It serves as a guiding hand to the leadership when they decide on which weapons to procure and which methods to use on the battlefield. It also has a lot to do with what we train our soldiers. But very little to do with HOW we train our soldiers. Everybody on this thread has talked about FM 100-5. Which very plainly sets out the US Army's doctrine. I challenge you to find one iota of info in it on whether we should yell at new recruits or not. Which is what we've all been discussing when it came to training. If you wanted to broaden the perspective a little bit to include WHAT we were training our soldiers to do, then you should have warned the rest of us. Then you wouldnt get hit with questions.

"Doctrine is something taught.." That is absolutely true. But not to privates. As a 2nd looey I only received an hour or so on it and it was all pertaining to how it effected my 32 man platoon. Doctrine is the realm of staffs and higher commanders. I can assure you they dont have drill sergeants jumping on the bus and yelling at them when they arrive for training!

[Tris]

Have it your way then re doctrine.

I do not complain about experts. I may argue for or against ideas they champion, but I'm fine with them personally.

Also, I still have not pronouncd myself an expert on anything. I am an able man, though, and I do not apologize for that.

[Guest Pillar]

Is there a particular order we should be reading these things in?

I.E. Start with 100-5, etc. etc.

If so, please let me know. Thanks.