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German Inf 44 vs. Inf 45 battalion


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Was messing around with unit costs tonight, updating and changing Jason McGrody's fine unit database for v1.1 and customizing the layout for me when I stumbled upon the German Infantry 44 vs 45 comparisons.

The 45 squad costs 1 more point than the 44

The 45 platoon costs 3 more pts than the 44

The 45 co costs LESS than the 44. Cost differential varies with experience, but it's 45 points less for regular troops. hmmm...

The 45 battalion costs LESS than the 44. Again, 136 points less for regular troops.

Curious, I investigated the TO&E. The 45 company contains 3 platoons, and that's it. The 44 company contains 3 platoons WITH 2 HMG42s attached. Interesting, why would they do this?

The 45 battalion contains 3 companies + 1 heavy weapon company. The heavy weapon company consists of 2 platoons of 4 HMG42s + 81mm mortar FO + 75mm FO. The 44 battalion contains 3 companies (remember, each co has 2 HMG42s attached) + 1 heavy weapon company. The heavy weapon company consists of 1 platoon of 6 HMG42s + 81mm mortar FO + 120mm mortar FO. Thats 4 more HMG42s and a 120mm mortar instead of 75mm arty. Much more ooomph if you ask me. So again, as time went on the caliber decreased.

Now, was this some decision based on lessons learned. Maybe the MG42s broke down too much or hindered retreating ( smile.gif)? Maybe 120mm mortars weren't as good as 75mm tube fired munition? Or, was this based on necessity, like lack of industry to make the necessary instruments of war, such as the 120mm mortar rounds?

I'm really curious about this. I had always assumed a 45 company or battalion would necessarily be better than a 44 company or battalion, but based on what I discovered, I think I might prefer the 44 over the 45 (I'm still cogitating on it). I know there are differences in the small arms carried between the 2. The 44 squad has 6 rifles, 2 MP40s and 1 LMG42 while the 45 squad has 5 rifles, 1 MP40, 2 MP44s and 1 LMG42. Based on that I prefer the 45 squad over the 44 squad. But the 44 company and battalion give you more and more powerful heavy weapons, that on the surface seems hard to pass up.

Anyone notice this? Anyone have their druthers? Anyone care? If you do care and have your druthers, I'd be interested in hearing why.

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Jeff Abbott

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:

By '45 the loss rate was so high that maintaining even modest Bn TOE was out of the question.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So you're saying that the 45 Bn TOE is the way it is out of necessity and not out of any lessons learned?

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So you're saying that the 45 Bn TOE is the way it is out of necessity and not out of any lessons learned?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Correct. The same holds true for the tank bn TOEs. Germany was running out of personal (that means qualified NCOs and COs), besides running out of tech. equipment.

If they would have had the manpower and equipment they would most propably have stayed with the 1944 KSTNs. Look up the personal and tank strengh figures of 1944 "Freie Gliederung" and compare them with the 1945 KStNs. It was done out of necessity.

Helge

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Juardis:

So you're saying that the 45 Bn TOE is the way it is out of necessity and not out of any lessons learned?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes most of what they did in the last year of the war was out of desperation, due to losses.

In 44/45 they included biycles in the Pzgd Bn which was not due to any lesson , just they had no other form of transport for them.

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German infantry battalions were lucky to have anything like regular TO&E even in 1944 (the units in Normandy were probably the last). By 1945 most infantry divisions were down to 6 battalions instead of 11, and support was whatever could be scrapped together (though Stugs were seen more and more as direct infantry support and added to infantry units as part of the general reorganization of the divisions).

Lessons learned through '44 led to the downgrading of the Panzer Divisions from all tanks to a more balanced 2 Pz regiments & 2 PzGr regiments. These watered-down formations were better suited to combat offense/defense of the '44 campaigns.

Production lags played a major part in most of the reorganizations, as Hitler consistently mandated the creation of new divisions without reinforcing existing units. The 100,000 men used in the Luftwaffe divisions (almost totally useless) could have been used to rebuild over 40 regular divisions to full strength.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by paullus:

The 100,000 men used in the Luftwaffe divisions (almost totally useless) could have been used to rebuild over 40 regular divisions to full strength.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What a huge error this was.

The one amazing thing the Germans were able to consistently do late in the war was take a cadre of experienced offcers and non-coms and turn a green group of soldiers into a very effective fighting force.

The Luftwaffe insisting that the Luftwaffe Divisions be commanded by Luftwaffe officers and NCOs with little or no training or experience was disasterous. Those 100K men spread as reinforcements into existing Whermacht and SS field units could have made a tremendous impact, but instead they were concentrated into grossly ineffective Luftwaffe divisions.

The amazing part if that most of those 100K men would have been excellent infantrymen given decent leadership. They were generally more healthy, intelligent, and capable than the recruits otherwise available to the Wehrmacht at the time.

The Allies should be thankful Goering was such a power hungry idiot.

Jeff Heidman

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Guest Big Time Software

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The amazing part if that most of those 100K men would have been excellent infantrymen given decent leadership.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed. When the battered LW divisions were disbanded, and further LW ground personnel became available in late 44 on, they went to Heer and Waffen SS divisions. Most of the men used to rebuild the 17th SS PzGren division, for example, came from Luftwaffe personnel.

So the figure of 100,000 was not a total writeoff. I don't know how many men survived their initial bloodletting, but I suspect a decent percentage. And some units did manage to fight very well, so not all LW formations were totally inept. However, the energy, time, manpower, and equipment that was wasted on forming new divisions (instead of refitting existing ones) was a huge blunder. And in general the raising of new formations was something that hurt the Germans quite a bit.

Steve

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Mind you one of the strengths of the Regimental system is that as long as the cadre of the new formation was veterans they could rebuild a compitent Rgt within the normal training cycle. No doubt that the constant stream of specialist equipment to these political army units like SS & LW divisions seriously depleted the HEER to the point where in '44 Inf Bn were luck to be any where near full strength.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Correct. The same holds true for the tank bn TOEs. Germany was running out of personal (that means qualified NCOs and COs), besides running out of tech. equipment.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

(FROM MEMORY, AS I DON'T HAVE THE CORRECT BOOK HERE) In early in the war, tank batallions were 3 companies, each with 4 platoons, each with 4 tanks. Total 48 tanks/batallion. In 1941 (or 40 or 42?) each batallion was reduced to just 2 companies. This was done to increase the total number of batallion formations. However, the additional "pieces on the board" were more than offset by the decrease in the fighting power of each batallion, along with the increase in total "housekeeping needs" created by the new formations. This was, IMHO, a losing proposition. I think the German army would have been better served keeping established units at their regular size and creating more. By war's end each tank batallion was reduced to just ONE tank company! This was due mostly to losses that could not be made good by Germany's fast-failing industrial machine.

DjB

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As I recall the TOE went like this

1939-40

Pzgt 3-4 x Tk bn each with 4 x co 4 x pltn 5 x vehicles 88/bn including command

41-42

Pzgt 3 x Tk bn each with 4 x co x 4 pltn x 5 vehicles 88/bn including command .

Plus a PzJ Bn with 3 x 12-14 Pzj or Towed 50mm ATGs

1943

Pzgt 2-3* x Tk bn each with 4 x co x 4 pltn x 4 vehilces 72/bn including command

* only elite SS and some times a Tiger Co

Plus a PzJ Bn with 3 x 12-14 Pzj

1944

Pzgt 2 x Tk bn each with x 3-4*co x 4 pltn x 4 vehilces 56 to 72/bn including command

* only elite SS had 4 co and often one bn was Stug bn of 3 companies of 14 Stug.

Plus a PzJ Bn with 3 x 12-14 Pzj or JgdPz or Assault guns

1945

Pzgt 1-2* x Tkbn with 3 x co x 3-4 pltns x 3 Tks 30-40 tks per bn

* elite SS div had 2 tk bn while others had 1x Stug Bn instead.

Plus a JgdPz Bn with 3 x 10 JgdPz or Assault guns

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