Realistic tank platoon? (US)

[Olle Petersson]

Going back to the original questions on US tankers:

Main issue; make sure they're Green, with the "hitter" being Experienced. (In '45 you can perhaps raise some of them a notch...)

See also the "Sherman vs Panther" thread.

Cheers

Olle

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Olle Petersson:

Going back to the original questions on US tankers:

Main issue; make sure they're Green, with the "hitter" being Experienced. (In '45 you can perhaps raise some of them a notch...)

See also the "Sherman vs Panther" thread.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have posted a reply to your statement about the Panther crew quality there. May I ask what is the basis for the blanket statement about crew quality you are making here and in the other thread? While it may be true for the first weeks in Normandy, beyond that it does not square with anything I have read, and it became much more dependent on unit and location.

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Andreas

<a href="http://www.geocities.com/greg_mudry/sturm.html">Der Kessel</a >

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 12-11-2000).]

[Olle Petersson]

OK, here's my way of thinking:

Green troops = Fair to good training, no or little combat experience.

US tank crews, the first time after arriving in Europe: Fair to good training, no or little combat experience (with exception for those few that had fought in Tunisia and Italy.) After a few weeks in action (in France or Germany), they were either dead/wounded or the platoon aces (crewing the 76mm Sherman).

Now filter into this the infantry grunts supplied with tanks and thus called tankers; these were definately Conscript, in CM terms, lowering the average a little.

As I also noted; later on this average might rise a notch to Experienced, since more units have survived long enough to become veterans. The newbies are still Green.

When I say average, I mean average for the entire ETO. Some low intensity areas, like the Bulge, had lower quality troops assigned to them, while other more active areas had better troops (but also more lower grade replacements).

Cheers

Olle

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Olle Petersson:

Going back to the original questions on US tankers:

Main issue; make sure they're Green, with the "hitter" being Experienced. (In '45 you can perhaps raise some of them a notch...)

See also the "Sherman vs Panther" thread.

Cheers

Olle<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I do not think that is a fair assessment at all.

Certainly in many vases Shermans were crewed by inexperienced crew, and a "green" Sherman would hardly be unusual.

But at the same time, many of the Armored units had excellent crews, and would often be rated veteran or higher at any time after August of 44.

You seem to be suggesting (correct me if I am wrong) that since the Panthers crews were specially selected, they should have veteran or better experience, and since the Americans were generally inexperienced, they should only have vet status in exceptional cases.

Since the ratio of PzV to PzIV production was roughly 50-50, you are suggesting that 50% of all medium armor crews in German service were better than regular, not to mention the idea that ALL the heavy crews even better than that. Wow! An amazing accomplishment for the Germans!

Further, since Shermans made up the bulk of American and Allied armor, and they are (according to you) 80% green, the vast majority of Allied crew quality is less than regular quality.

Were are the Germans getting all these veteran troops? You are suggesting that the median German skill level is veteran (or better) while the median Allied skill level is green.

The idea flies in the face of common sense. There is no way that Germany was able to maintain that high of a level of quality in crews under the pressures they were facing by the time the Western Front opened. Attrition was atrocious in German units, and the Armored units were even more so, as they were used much more often. It simply is not possible to maintain that high of a level of expertise under the conditions the Germans were fighting in.

Jeff Heidman

[Guest Germanboy]

Olle, I am afraid I have to side with Jeff here. His reasoning exactly reflects mine, and I think you are making two seriously wrong assumptions:

1. you overestimate the losses of US tankers and the effect this had on the crew experience situation. Actual losses of tank divisions were quite low, 11th Armoured (UK) lost only about 180 men during Epsom, despite losing 50% of its tanks.

2. you underestimate the severity of losses incurred by the Germans in France. The rebuilt Panzer Lehr and 12th SS were no comparison to their predecessors in Normandy when they fought in the Bulge.

IMO you are alo not correct when you equate training vs. combat experience with the experienced unit being at a higher level of experience. Again the UK, 11th Armoured, which had never seen combat as a division, outperformed 7th Armoured (the famous Desert Rats) hands-down in France, and 7th Armoured only improved when they were breaking out over the Seine. This was because they had

a) the wrong kind of experience (desert/Italy vs. Normandy) and

simply did not like to have to go to war again, after spending 4 years at it already.

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Andreas

<a href="http://www.geocities.com/greg_mudry/sturm.html">Der Kessel</a >

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 12-11-2000).]

[Olle Petersson]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

1. you overestimate the losses of US tankers and the effect this had on the crew experience situation. Actual losses of tank divisions were quite low, ...

2. you underestimate the severity of losses incurred by the Germans in France. The rebuilt Panzer Lehr and 12th SS were no comparison to their predecessors in Normandy when they fought in the Bulge.

3) IMO you are also not correct when you equate training vs. combat experience with the experienced unit being at a higher level of experience. ... This was because they had

a) the wrong kind of experience (desert/Italy vs. Normandy) and

simply did not like to have to go to war again, after spending 4 years at it already.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>1) Everybody "knows" that a hit Sherman explodes with no chance of any surviving crew members, right?

At least that's the general impression spread by the vast community. (And then perhaps I have a slight bias against US in general. Interesting that your example is British... )

2) Allright, I do back off a bit about the average Panther crew. I still think Jeff is wrong about the 50-50 production of PzKw IV/V. It might be true for the late years, but PzKw IV production started several years earlier, and the late war organisations I've seen state that there were about twice as many PzKw IV as PzKw V in use '44. I also hold on to that crews for the heavy tanks (Panther being a medium) were hand picked among the other tank units.

As for the Bulge, I was referring to the US units placed there to recover and/or gain some experience before "facing the elephant".

3) How else would one rate them within the abstracted game terms? Experience is usually what helps in finding covered routes and estimating range correctly.

3a) What's wrong about the covered and tight terrain in Italy vs the bocage terrain in Normandy? Slightly different climate and elevation variations, otherwise both terrain types are very favourable for defenders and lousy for tanks.

3b) This is only a matter of morale, and should not be confused with fighting quality. When they fight they do it well, tey're just not as interested in doing it (but they're still more likely to survive than a less experienced unit).

I think this should apply to some battle proven veterans on the German side as well, who know they've lost and only fight 'cause they're ordered to (and sworn to serve Der Führer in person).

The fact that CM (as well as ASL and a couple of other games) combine troop quality and morale into a single factor doesn't appeal very much to me. I like to see those factors separated, as is done in Command Decision.

Cheers

Olle

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Olle Petersson:

1) Everybody "knows" that a hit Sherman explodes with no chance of any surviving crew members, right?

At least that's the general impression spread by the vast community. (And then perhaps I have a slight bias against US in general. Interesting that your example is British... )

2) Allright, I do back off a bit about the average Panther crew. I still think Jeff is wrong about the 50-50 production of PzKw IV/V.

As for the Bulge, I was referring to the US units placed there to recover and/or gain some experience before "facing the elephant".

3) How else would one rate them within the abstracted game terms? Experience is usually what helps in finding covered routes and estimating range correctly.

3a) What's wrong about the covered and tight terrain in Italy vs the bocage terrain in Normandy?

3b) This is only a matter of morale, and should not be confused with fighting quality. When they fight they do it well, tey're just not as interested in doing it (but they're still more likely to survive than a less experienced unit).

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I assume you are joking about the Sherman - but just to make sure, this 'knowledge' is wrong. Shermans tended to brew up more easily, but by no means did a hit kill all the personnel. It just meant you had to get out really fast. The British used the same Shermans as the US in Normandy.

From the figures I have seen posted here on the forum by Pzkpfw 1 (I think) there were almost exactly 50% Panthers in Normandy. This is to be expected, since the German army in northern France was very tank-heavy and consisted of high-level tank divisions (Panzer Lehr and a lot of SS made up the bulk), in order to defeat the invasion.

I do not deny that there were green tankers in the US army throughout the whole war, but I am absolutely certain that a blanket statement like the one made by you earlier is unfair. 12th US AD at Herrlisheim showed what inexperience could do, but later became an excellent fighting force and the spearhead into Germany.

I don't know what the difference between southern Italy and Normandy is, but 7th AD was in Italy only for a short while before they were moved to England, so the bulk of their experience was from the desert and Tunisia.

I think the 'just not as interested in doing it' is key here. This means they won't press attacks as much and they are more likely to break off a fight. You can simulate this in CM by giving units the chance to be fanatical in the scenario editor, or not. There is also an issue about the experience of leader - low-ranked leaders (up to Coy CO) die faster than their soldiers. They get replaced by more inexperienced leaders and the unit loses its edge (a reason why campaigns are so unrealistic).

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Andreas

<a href="http://www.geocities.com/greg_mudry/sturm.html">Der Kessel</a >

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 12-12-2000).]

[Olle Petersson]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

1a) I assume you are joking about the Sherman.

1b) The British used the same Shermans as the US in Normandy.

2) From the figures I have seen posted here on the forum by Pzkpfw 1 (I think) there were almost exactly 50% Panthers in Normandy.

3) ... I am absolutely certain that a blanket statement like the one made by you earlier is unfair.

4) I think the 'just not as interested in doing it' is key here. This means they won't press attacks as much and they are more likely to break off a fight. You can simulate this in CM by giving units the chance to be fanatical in the scenario editor, or not.

5) There is also an issue about the experience of leader ... (a reason why campaigns are so unrealistic).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>1a) Sort of... I know some persons that are pretty convinced that Shermans do explode, always, just like American cars in Hollywood movies.

1b) Only better.

I'm trying to avoid the topic of hardware here, and concentrate on crew competence.

2) Ah, so there was a different composition in this area then. I assume there were fewer Panthers in Italy, and some of the Panthers in France were withdrawn from the eastern front.

3) I admit it might be a bit over the top.

But otherwise we wouldn't get this interesting discussion, would we? I like to take the odd position in a discussion, just to clear out any uncertainties and make the other participants motivate their standpoint, instead of taking it for granted.

Anyway, I'm thinking of these tank crews and their quality in the line of sportsmen. In just about any given sport, the vast majority aren't very good, and pay to play (these are Conscript or Green, in CM terms). Then there are a couple that actually make it into competitions and team play, the middle league (Regular or Veteran).

A few are talented and well trained, these make it to the major league, and a few of these make it big (Crack or Elite). It's only the last category that get any reputation...

Since the armies had to recruit everyone within range they would get the whole spectrum, as is. Initially (at the very beginning) there will be none in the top category, but as time pass on some tank crews will filter their way up towards the top.

The German army had their talent scouts out looking for crews with better talent and "drafted" these to the "major league" (the heavy battalions).

4) The fanatic option works well for low quality troops with good fighting spirit. Not the other way around, which is the point here.

5) That's a good one that I haven't given much thought, since I generally think from a higher perspective.

Cheers

Olle

[Keith]

Olle,

I would have to say you are way off base here. The facts are:

1) The standard Panzer Division TO&E called for an armor regiment comprised of one battalion of Pzkfw IV and one battalion of Pzkfw V. That makes 50% in my book.

2) By 1944 most of the so-called "elite" panzer divisions were mere shells of thier former quality because they were for the most part they DESTROYED on the Eastern Front. It was standard Hitler policy to rotate burnt out divisions to the WF until Spring 44'.

3)It was also standard Hitler policy to equip new formations with tanks at the expence of bringing burnt out veteran divisions up to strength. The most notorious example of the bankruptcy of this policy is the formation of the stop-gap Panther Brigades in 44'. These panzer troops were as green as green could be and their performance showed it. If you want to educate yourself try reading up about the Lorraine campaign were the VETERAN 3rd Army KICKED THE HOLY **** out Manutauffels GREEN Panther brigades.

[Buckwheat]

Just to clarify the "Armoured/Tank" designation of Commonwealth troops:

Two main arms of service are Infantry and Armoured. Historically, most Armoured regiments are descended from Cavalry, hence the nomenclature 'regiment' for a battalion-sized unit, and the smaller formations called squadrons, troops and patrols. Incidentally, a private from a Cavalry unit is the only soldier properly called 'Trooper.'

Infantry units that are equipped with tanks are referred to as 'Tank,' because they're not part of the Armoured Corps. Conversely, armoured units may have a substantial infantry component.

My knowledge of WWII military history isn't great, so correct me if I'm wrong.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Buckwheat:

Just to clarify the "Armoured/Tank" designation of Commonwealth troops:

Two main arms of service are Infantry and Armoured. Historically, most Armoured regiments are descended from Cavalry, hence the nomenclature 'regiment' for a battalion-sized unit, and the smaller formations called squadrons, troops and patrols. Incidentally, a private from a Cavalry unit is the only soldier properly called 'Trooper.'

Infantry units that are equipped with tanks are referred to as 'Tank,' because they're not part of the Armoured Corps. Conversely, armoured units may have a substantial infantry component.

My knowledge of WWII military history isn't great, so correct me if I'm wrong.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not quite, there were Royal Tank Regiment batallions (e.g. 9 RTR) with infantry support tanks. The soldiers there were also called 'troopers'. AFAIK the UK adopted the cavalry nomenclature for all armoured units when they changed the Yeomanry regiments (quite late in the 1930s) from horses to tanks. This was done for recruitment purposes (Carver is the soruce for this 'The British Army in the 20th Century', IIRC)

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Mr. Clark]

Okay, to give myself and possibly some other non-Grogs some help with realism here...

Suppose you want to make a QB with an American Rifle company supported by some tanks (to clear out a village or something, I don't know) What would be an example of a realistic 1944 tank and tank destroyer support for this theoretical Company?

I'm trying to hit a happy medium between "playing sandbox" and realism... since I could read all the WWII books I can find till my eyes fell out and never have the wealth of facts some of you have.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Comment on the original question first - US tank platoons. I agree with other's comments, that there was no uniformity and the organization was ad hoc. The process is the tankers trying to get better tanks and keeping whatever they get, and supplimenting it with whatever tanks they can recover, while losing whatever they happen to lose.

To understand the case of mixed vehicles 9as opposed to types of Shermans), it may help to know the layout of an armored division and its usually attached armor. It included 3 tank battalions, a TD battalion, and an armored recon battalion (in addition to mech infantry, arty, etc). The tank battalions had 3 companies of Shermans each, and usually 1 company of Stuarts as well. Sometimes one of these was attached to the armored recon battalion, sometimes the Stuarts and the recon battalion were parceled out to task forces. The TD battalion was usually used as an additional tank battalion.

So, there are 150 odd Shermans in the TOE, plus 50 Stuarts, 36 tank destroyers, and 24 M-8s or so. They were usually under TOE but sometimes actually above it, because of recovered tanks they hadn't been authorized. It would not be terribly surprising, therefore, to see 1-2 TDs substituted for tanks, or an attached pair of Stuarts for local scouting, or 4 tanks or 6. Not because of doctrine, just because units effectively "owned" their tanks and gathered what they could.

On the quality of tank crews and unit qualities generally, I have a few comments. The first is that in the west the quality of the German forces in general was much less uniform than the quality of the Allies, not the other way around. The reason is simple - Germany was scrapping the bottom the manpower barrel in the last year of the war.

They had 60 year old men with old rifles in the Volksturm, and Polish and Russian POW levies in the static infantry divisions, and 15 and 16 year old kids in the Volksgrenadiers. Many of these were conscripts in the CM sense of the term - men who were civilians within a week of their first battle or had about that much training, physical stamina, or motivation. The youngsters typically gave a reasonable account of themselves, however, and they should usually be considered Green.

And such recruits were by no means restricted only to the non "prestige" formations. The little brother brigade of the Gross Deutchland division was committed during the U.S. counterattack in the battle of the bulge, for example. They had fine tanks, a mixed battalion of IVs and Panthers, plenty of halftracks, automatic weapons. The troops were kids. They had been trained, but they were committed piecemeal during a crisis in the battle, their CO was killed by artillery shortly after they came into the line, and they rapidly got disheartened and performed poorly. Green at best.

Many, probably most, of the soldiers who fought in the west had never attacked in their lives. They had generally good officers but also lots of crazy overhead red tape and infighting between services and branches, much worse than inter-Allied cooperation. Many formations had good cadres - veteran privates or NCOs who became the sergeants of rebuilt formations and led the raw recruits. In the good cases, these stiffened them enough to make them into regulars after first seeing some action.

This was true of the SS formations too, which were not the elites people often mistakenly consider them. They were given good equipment for political reasons, certainly. And the physical health of the men was fine, unlike some of the Volksgrenadiers. But they were not selected for military ability and often refused to learn anything from the vastly more experienced regular army officers. They were given high profile missions with lots of the best material, and proceeded to take disproportionately high losses in combat.

The best formations in the army were the panzer, panzergrenadier, and motorized infantry divisions of the regular army, often identified by their "old" army division numbers (2 digits, not the 3xx VG ones). These were regular to veteran, with the lower designations only merited in the case of divisions gutted by combat and recently rebuilt. Their cadres were outstanding and generally so were their junior officers. They plugged the holes. To their number should be added the German parachute infantry, all picked men in good physical condition and well led.

The story of the Brits is a regular army with some veteran units, unable to replace losses anymore. Over the course of the campaign, the result was the army became more veteran but also more understrength compared to its TOE. Other than the first few weeks after D-Day and Indian units fighting in Italy, none of them are green. They were somewhat hampered in practice by less than inspired generalship, which was in part a function of the extreme reluctance of the politicians to tolerate additional losses. Both for its own sake, and also because they knew Britain could not replace them and its role and bargaining position after the war depended on the size of its army then. Many individual units, like the airborne, the all-volunteer Canadian force, and some others, were veteran to crack by late 44.

The U.S. varied more than the Brits but much less than the Germans. The reason is that it was feeding in a continuous stream of replacements, but these were still high quality men in their prime and had decent training, and their cadres were getting better at integrating them into the force. Some of the units were veterans before D-Day, notable the 1st Infantry division. The airborne divisions had also been blooded and were high quality men, but probably only regulars on D-Day. They were vets by the time of Market-Garden and the Bulge.

Most of the army was green in Normandy through invasion and St. Lo battles, but became regulars in the Normandy fighting. They became veterans, many of them, in the fight at the west wall, in Hurtgen and the Lorraine. But other formations were being bled enough to remain just regulars.

The U.S. had the flexibility to rotate units off the line or to quieter parts of it to rebuild after losses. Units in the midst of this process are the only ones in the army in late '44 that deserve the "green" designation. That includes many of the formations hit in the Bulge, of course. They are certainly not "conscripts". In the counterattack stage of the Bulge, both the 3rd army from the south and the men attacking from the west were veterans, especially in the armored divisions.

After the Bulge, the army is regular to veteran pretty much across the board for the rest of the war.

One man's opinions...

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

I am quite sure we are talking about a very simple confusion due to UK unit designation here.

Tank brigade (6th Guards, 31, 34): Churchills, with no infantry, arty, other support. Used to support infantry. From what I can see from 'Tank Tracks: 9th RTR at war', a corps level or higher asset, given to divisions as needs be. Exception seems to have been the 1st with Shermans, which I find rather strange, it also only seems to have had 1/3rd the establishment in numbers that the other independent brigades had.

Armoured Brigade (4th, 8th, etc): Shermans (no idea about support), used for independent and/or breakthrough/exploitation tasks. No idea who owned them or where they were engaged.

So as far as I understand it, the word tank in the unit title referred to a designated infantry support unit. Armoured was more generic, and probably supposed to take the role of the cavalry in earlier wars. I could be totally off on this though.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My understanding has been that all the independent brigades were called Tank and all the Armoured brigades were organized into divisions.

I suppose you will now present me with half a dozen counter-examples.

Part of the difficulty may lie in the fact that the British, over the course of the war, experimented with three or four major organizational schemes for their armoured divisions. These usually entailed adding additional infantry and artillery, and in some cases reducing the number of tanks. In all this reshuffling, I suppose it is possible that some Armoured brigades might have been shaken loose from their parent divisions by the time of Normandy and after.

Michael

[Slapdragon]

It is interesting that we will find no real school answer, because neither side was real uniform on some things. As Keith mentioned, the US forces in Loraine considerable out matched the German tank forces in skill (what stopped the US advance was supplies and German Infantry formations, which the Germans did a majority of their defensive fighting with.). As Jeff mentioned, at Normandy you could see US tankers go ashore with a wide variety experience. In fact, since experience is dependent on leadership, and since US tankers had been in since 43, you could get a Vet going ashore as easily as anything else, and higher classifications were possible very easily.

It is the same on the German side. Some schmuck (pardon my Yiddish) shoved into a Panther with 12 hours of classroom work and a pep talk is going to go into action next to a crew commanded by a veteran of Kursk who can drive rings around the allies. In general, since forces reflect their higher command, they will have similar experience levels, but I do not thing anything was impossible. Just like a single individual turning an entire battle. They could have a Funston, Sergeant York, Audie Murphy, Whittmann, or some other heroe type in the bunch which takes out a whole enemy company single handedly and stalls an advance.

Unit composition is likewise up in the air because both the US and Germans, in WW2 at least, did a lot of adhoc team building. The US had more tanks and TDs in independent battalions than in organized Divisions, and the Germans were not shy about throwing into action odd, understrength formations to plug gaps. While US tank Battlalions in theory were never split lower than the Company level in theory, each company assigned a Regiment or Battalion to support, in the heat of a moment, to capture a set objective, those forces could mix down to the squad level for the 60 minutes the game represents.

The Germans of course also had the wonders of the Kamfugruppe, which could put any mix of forces uder the command of one midlevel leader.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

My understanding has been that all the independent brigades were called Tank and all the Armoured brigades were organized into divisions.

I suppose you will now present me with half a dozen counter-examples. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

4th and 8th Armoured Brigades were independent in Normandy and (I think) North Africa. They had their own infantry & AT complement, something (again) I think the independent Tank Brigades did not have. The 4th and 8th were equipped with Shermans. Dragoon will no doubt correct me if he reads this.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.