Infantry Use in Armored Units

[Simcoe]

When I'm playing an armored unit in one of the modern games and I reach the crest of a hill/rise I will have my infantry run out ahead until they spot/get shot and then run them back into their APC/IFV. How often do you do this in Combat Mission and how often does this happen in real life? I just find I don't really show armor unless my infantry has shown itself first.

 

[chuckdyke]

35 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

How often do you do this in Combat Mission and how often does this happen in real life?

I watched one of the Chieftain's videos and saved this graphic. How survive. The man served in Iraq as a tanker I understand. 

 

Edited April 29, 2022 by chuckdyke

[domfluff]

An interesting and complex question, and one which really has no definitive answer.

First, defining the problem.

Effective small arms range is about 300m, and was ever thus. This leaves the rifleman with a fundamental problem - they'll typically be asked to attack a static enemy position, which means at some point they will need to cross that last 300m through effective small arms range themselves, exposing themselves to the maximum amount of risk.

"Armoured infantry" in the WW2 sense are the equivalent of APC-born infantry. An M113 in CMCW, Strykers and FV432 in CMSF and BTRs in any of the modern titles more or less fit this mould.

The Infantry Fighting Vehicle was a development of the sixties, and represents a fundamental shift in intent. Everything that applies to APCs also applies to IFVs, but the reverse is not true. I'll therefore discuss APC employment, before going into the differences in IFV doctrine.

The US manuals did (and the equivalents still do) emphasis three options for when the squad dismounts: dismounting in front of the objective, dismounting on the objective, and dismounting past the objective.

The US manuals were also unusually aggressive with their on-paper use of M113s, emphasising fighting from the vehicle as much as possible. How much that was put into practice is another question. British Cold War doctrinal use of the FV432 was not to use them as a fighting vehicle at all - instead to dismount the infantry, then withdraw the APCs to a safe rally point.

"In front of the objective" would typically mean dismounting one terrain feature away, and proceeding on foot. The vehicle in that case was optionally able to provide suppressive fire, but that wouldn't necessarily be their primary role - the main intent of the vehicle in this case would be to get the infantry close to the target under cover and protection of armour, and then allowing them to make their own way, with the option for support.

This is a sensible default position to have. It does mean that the infantry need to cover the last 300m by themselves, but it also doesn't risk losing the squad to a single AT round. It's the slowest and the most cautious, but perhaps the least likely to achieve a decisive result.

"On the objective" is a lot more bold. This would involve suppressing the enemy, and driving the APCs directly onto the objective point, disgorging troops at potentially point-blank range, or fighting from the vehicle itself. The logic here is that the armour protection will help you close the 300m gap, you shorten the danger close range of the accompanying artillery, and you're likely to force a quick and decisive result from the engagement.

This, clearly, involves accepting a tremendous amount of risk. It does maximise speed, particularly if you never dismount, but a single AT round can ruin your day.

"Past the objective" is similar to dismounting on the target, but instead you're pushing around the objective, and attacking backwards, using the vehicles to screen.

This has some similar risks to dismounting on the objective, but the intent is that you're taking advantage of the APCs mobility to flank, and then isolate the target with the resulting screen. Attacking from an unexpected direction is clearly powerful, but as with any manoeuvre like this, you'll be exposing your own flanks in the process.


IFVs then. The fundamental difference with an IFV is that they are designed to be a fighting vehicle. Rather than a transport that can sometimes give supporting fires, typically to a firefight that's already underway, they are intended to be the primary source of firepower for their squad, meaning that they will inevitably be much more exposed.

There was an article in Infantry magazine called "When the Squad Dismounts" (Simpkin), which discusses IFV development and differences in doctrine, comparing the US, German and Soviet approaches to the problem.

In that article, he suggests that the US doctrine was for "support" - that the Bradley IFV was mostly to be used at longer ranges, dismounting before the objective and using the long range of the various weapon systems to provide support from hundreds of metres away, perhaps 1km.

For Soviet doctrine, the IFV was firmly part of the squad, so if the Soviets dismounted at all, they would dismount as close as possible to the enemy. Doctrinal ranges for this were 300m, or 1km against significant AT assets, but I suspect that's an over-estimate, and the correct distance is really "as close as you can". In any case, the IFV would never stray far from the squad, and would accompany them through the depth of their attack.

Then he talks about the Bundeswehr and the Marder. What he claims here is something I've been unable so far to substantiate, but I'd be really keen to do so. In that article he discusses how the Marder would be employed in a manner more similar to a light tank - i.e., that the infantry would be dismounted at range, and then the Marders and Leopards would roam ahead by themselves, creating depth by attacking into the enemy position. In this scheme, the infantry would be supporting the Marder with long-ranged fires, rather than the reverse.

This does run counter to something stated on the current Bundeswehr website - that the Panzergrenadiers are "Mounted for as long as possible – dismounted for no longer than necessary.” That would imply more of a unit that would dismount on or past the objective, rather than early and in support.


In terms of your direct question - recce is a thing. You might be in a situation where you have dedicated reconnaissance vehicles or other assets (e.g., snipers), but you might have to dedicate sections of your platoon or company to that task. Reconnaissance is typically best done on foot, but there's the obvious trade-off with time. Certainly blundering forward with armoured vehicles into the unknown is the wrong thing to do. In an ideal sense you don't want a platoon to be operating independently, ever, so this kind of task should really be given to the units that are designed for it.

[chuckdyke]

Overwatch and maneuver elements. Overwatch: Don't be seen don't be targeted. Maneuver elements will be seen and will be targeted. Reduce the risk by advancing in the correct formation. Good scenario to try SF2: The Thin Black Line. 

[holoween]

2 hours ago, domfluff said:

Then he talks about the Bundeswehr and the Marder. What he claims here is something I've been unable so far to substantiate, but I'd be really keen to do so. In that article he discusses how the Marder would be employed in a manner more similar to a light tank - i.e., that the infantry would be dismounted at range, and then the Marders and Leopards would roam ahead by themselves, creating depth by attacking into the enemy position. In this scheme, the infantry would be supporting the Marder with long-ranged fires, rather than the reverse.

IIRC he was specifically describing a delaying action and in that case it could make sense.

But more like

-dismount infantry in a good defensive position and let them start to dig in.

-move tanks and ifvs forward so they can start engaging early forcing the soviets to deploy then fall back

-repeat until you reach the infantries positions for a proper defense

timed well this could allow the attrition of the CRP and FSE of a soviet MRR and set them up attacking with the main body into your prepared defenses without much recon and preparation and then giving you time to withdraw during the night or prepare a counterattack.

I have however never seen this discussed or put in practice outside of the article you mentioned and it would only be really usefull for this specific purpose.

2 hours ago, domfluff said:

This does run counter to something stated on the current Bundeswehr website - that the Panzergrenadiers are "Mounted for as long as possible – dismounted for no longer than necessary.” That would imply more of a unit that would dismount on or past the objective, rather than early and in support.

This seems to be the actual employment most of the time

[domfluff]

I do agree that this probably describes a delaying action, but that "delaying action" was also pretty much the default position in a Cold War scenario - you're just not going to be able to take on a MRR streaming towards you head-on.

The interesting bit (assuming that's true - again, I've seen it nowhere else, but it's not like there's reason for him to lie) is that it implies that although all NATO powers were intent on doing a defence in depth, they were going about it in different ways.

I can believe the latter though - keeping the infantry mounted for as long as possible would be sensible if your primary focus was on mobility.

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, domfluff said:

keeping the infantry mounted for as long as possible would be sensible if your primary focus was on mobility.

Being mounted in an armored vehicle also helps protecting troops from artillery / mortar fires.

[ViperAssassin26]

8 hours ago, Simcoe said:

When I'm playing an armored unit in one of the modern games and I reach the crest of a hill/rise I will have my infantry run out ahead until they spot/get shot and then run them back into their APC/IFV. How often do you do this in Combat Mission and how often does this happen in real life? I just find I don't really show armor unless my infantry has shown itself first.

 

well in actuality that hill would be pounded with air and or artillery before any infantry proceed to take the hill. so sending infantry up hill with no support, you're bound to get torn up

[Simcoe]

2 hours ago, ViperAssassin26 said:

well in actuality that hill would be pounded with air and or artillery before any infantry proceed to take the hill. so sending infantry up hill with no support, you're bound to get torn up

I should have been more clear. My situation is you reach the crest of a hill or rise and rather than peak over the top with your tanks you send a squad over the hill to see if anything is waiting for the tanks. The hill isn’t an objective and any enemy would be pretty far out. The infantry is just peaking over the hill before moving the tanks up.

[Simcoe]

8 hours ago, domfluff said:

An interesting and complex question, and one which really has no definitive answer.

First, defining the problem.

Effective small arms range is about 300m, and was ever thus. This leaves the rifleman with a fundamental problem - they'll typically be asked to attack a static enemy position, which means at some point they will need to cross that last 300m through effective small arms range themselves, exposing themselves to the maximum amount of risk.

"Armoured infantry" in the WW2 sense are the equivalent of APC-born infantry. An M113 in CMCW, Strykers and FV432 in CMSF and BTRs in any of the modern titles more or less fit this mould.

The Infantry Fighting Vehicle was a development of the sixties, and represents a fundamental shift in intent. Everything that applies to APCs also applies to IFVs, but the reverse is not true. I'll therefore discuss APC employment, before going into the differences in IFV doctrine.

The US manuals did (and the equivalents still do) emphasis three options for when the squad dismounts: dismounting in front of the objective, dismounting on the objective, and dismounting past the objective.

The US manuals were also unusually aggressive with their on-paper use of M113s, emphasising fighting from the vehicle as much as possible. How much that was put into practice is another question. British Cold War doctrinal use of the FV432 was not to use them as a fighting vehicle at all - instead to dismount the infantry, then withdraw the APCs to a safe rally point.

"In front of the objective" would typically mean dismounting one terrain feature away, and proceeding on foot. The vehicle in that case was optionally able to provide suppressive fire, but that wouldn't necessarily be their primary role - the main intent of the vehicle in this case would be to get the infantry close to the target under cover and protection of armour, and then allowing them to make their own way, with the option for support.

This is a sensible default position to have. It does mean that the infantry need to cover the last 300m by themselves, but it also doesn't risk losing the squad to a single AT round. It's the slowest and the most cautious, but perhaps the least likely to achieve a decisive result.

"On the objective" is a lot more bold. This would involve suppressing the enemy, and driving the APCs directly onto the objective point, disgorging troops at potentially point-blank range, or fighting from the vehicle itself. The logic here is that the armour protection will help you close the 300m gap, you shorten the danger close range of the accompanying artillery, and you're likely to force a quick and decisive result from the engagement.

This, clearly, involves accepting a tremendous amount of risk. It does maximise speed, particularly if you never dismount, but a single AT round can ruin your day.

"Past the objective" is similar to dismounting on the target, but instead you're pushing around the objective, and attacking backwards, using the vehicles to screen.

This has some similar risks to dismounting on the objective, but the intent is that you're taking advantage of the APCs mobility to flank, and then isolate the target with the resulting screen. Attacking from an unexpected direction is clearly powerful, but as with any manoeuvre like this, you'll be exposing your own flanks in the process.


IFVs then. The fundamental difference with an IFV is that they are designed to be a fighting vehicle. Rather than a transport that can sometimes give supporting fires, typically to a firefight that's already underway, they are intended to be the primary source of firepower for their squad, meaning that they will inevitably be much more exposed.

There was an article in Infantry magazine called "When the Squad Dismounts" (Simpkin), which discusses IFV development and differences in doctrine, comparing the US, German and Soviet approaches to the problem.

In that article, he suggests that the US doctrine was for "support" - that the Bradley IFV was mostly to be used at longer ranges, dismounting before the objective and using the long range of the various weapon systems to provide support from hundreds of metres away, perhaps 1km.

For Soviet doctrine, the IFV was firmly part of the squad, so if the Soviets dismounted at all, they would dismount as close as possible to the enemy. Doctrinal ranges for this were 300m, or 1km against significant AT assets, but I suspect that's an over-estimate, and the correct distance is really "as close as you can". In any case, the IFV would never stray far from the squad, and would accompany them through the depth of their attack.

Then he talks about the Bundeswehr and the Marder. What he claims here is something I've been unable so far to substantiate, but I'd be really keen to do so. In that article he discusses how the Marder would be employed in a manner more similar to a light tank - i.e., that the infantry would be dismounted at range, and then the Marders and Leopards would roam ahead by themselves, creating depth by attacking into the enemy position. In this scheme, the infantry would be supporting the Marder with long-ranged fires, rather than the reverse.

This does run counter to something stated on the current Bundeswehr website - that the Panzergrenadiers are "Mounted for as long as possible – dismounted for no longer than necessary.” That would imply more of a unit that would dismount on or past the objective, rather than early and in support.


In terms of your direct question - recce is a thing. You might be in a situation where you have dedicated reconnaissance vehicles or other assets (e.g., snipers), but you might have to dedicate sections of your platoon or company to that task. Reconnaissance is typically best done on foot, but there's the obvious trade-off with time. Certainly blundering forward with armoured vehicles into the unknown is the wrong thing to do. In an ideal sense you don't want a platoon to be operating independently, ever, so this kind of task should really be given to the units that are designed for it.

Great write up as always. US doctrine comes off as almost arrogant in this respect. Dismounting infantry anywhere except the objective for longer than a couple minutes is death for the Soviets but no problem against a technologically inferior force.