Panzer Tactics(very interesting)

[risc]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fionn:

Mind me asking where you found that Panzerleader?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hi Fionn,

The source is:

U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces"

(Mar'45) TM-E 30-451

Officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center

For Military History.

I have seen this document long time ago on

the HPS website.

Peter

[Berlichtingen]

To illustrate what Fionn just said, German units at Normandy were still fighting effectively after taking enormous casualties. Allied units were normally pulled from the line after taking something like 20% casualties. Another example would be the famous German Kampfgruppes. These formations were many times put together at the spur of the moment. They were highly effective battle formations. The Allies were not really capable of creating battlegroups of this type... especially the British.

[Berlichtingen]

Here's a bookstore that might be of interest to the followers of this thread

http://www.brandenburghistorica.com/

BTW Fionn... this is where I found the recording of Ob's stürmt oder scneit

[Mark IV]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As one a casual afficianado who has perceived the Germans to be automatons, I have to say there's nothing in this excelelnt article which changes my perception<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Quod erat demonstrandum. This is the perception to which I was referring.

It is, of course, false. Others are dealing with the facts of the matter, but Prussian martinets and Nazi robots are stock characters in historical, movie, and literary myth. One would think this document and others like it would help dispel the myth.

The idea that I was <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>in one breath reminding all that the common myths are false and then buying into one in the next sentence<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> is obviously mistaken. Those who think of the German army as automatons are less likely to differentiate between Wehrmacht, Waffen SS, and ideological Nazis. TO THESE INDIVIDUALS the whole German army was composed of little Hitlers, Goerings, Goebbels', and hypnotized followers.

To ME, even a casual study of historical fact proves the opposite.

I lived among the Germans, and spoke and drank with many who served on both fronts during the era. I have been reading, collecting, and playing the Wehrmacht for over 30 years. I will try to be more explicit in the future when characterizing popular views that I do not share.

[Fionn]

One other point...

It's a lot easier to motivate guys to do killing etc if they're only facing mindles automatons and not guys who are thinking, rational beings.

Strangely enough these exact same myths were propagated in WW1 too and not changed even when the greatest tactical revolution of that war (for infantry) was unleashed by Germans in the form of Sturmgruppe.

------------------

___________

Fionn Kelly

Manager of Historical Research,

The Gamers Net - Gaming for Gamers

[Mikeathome]

I think there's a couple of different levels of thought going on here.

Fionn - AFAIK german low-level initiaitve consists of following a set of very good battle drills. It wouldn't matter if hte local commander was a colonel or lance-corporal - the drills were still the same and had to be followed.

My example of an immediate counter attack is an example. There are otehr examples in the original post - always charge AT guns if at short range, never stop in front of a A/T ditch or minefield (retreat instead), always expect a counter attack.

These are excellent drills, and were well known down to the lowest command levels.

IMO they are NOT initiative. They are following SOP's. That the German SOP's were better than US ones does not mean that German's had more initiative at lower level - it means their SOP's were better.

Berlichten - allied forces were pulled out becaue they COULD be. Germans had no such luxury, hence were contstrained to fight on with much reduced numbers.

Mark IV - of course Germans are individuals. So were Soviet soldiers of the same time. That's not _my_ point.

My point is that the German army (SS, whatever) did not have better lower level initiative than, say, the Americans. The German lower level commanders were using a better set of SOP's than their US equivalents.

Hence the Germans were just as hide-bound as everyone else.

Mike

[Guest Big Time Software]

Uh, Mike... have you seen contemporary US Army manuals. Gosh, the SURE do look a lot like what Panzerleader quoted. Guess the modern day US Army is a bunch of mindless robots

In fact, the US WWII manuals looked a lot like the German one in spirit as well, but were not of the same practical quality. Many of their "drills" were based on false assumptions and some pretty bad tactical concepts. So the US soldiers had the same mindless drills, but they were less applicable and therefore found themselves befuddled quite a lot (especially early in the war).

So... as others have said, your perception of the German soldier in WWII is simply put... wrong. German tactical doctrine (which is contained in manuals which I have in front of me) stressed one thing more than anything else -> thinking. And that is why the Germans very often came out on the better end of the stick in very small unit actions. They used their brains AND drills to come up with the best plan to fit the situation. And when a leader fell someone below him was able to fill his shoes and keep things going more often than not. The Allies had a poor record of doing this on the whole.

Sorry to disagree with you so strongly, but you might as well say that all German soldiers loved Hitler and were willing to die for him. It is just nonsense.

Steve

[Mikeathome]

Steve I'm afraid I can't really accept your apology for the strength of yuor disagreement, because I find it insulting that you have made some pretty silly comments about me, misrepresented my point of view, provide evidence that agrees with me and then say I'm wrong.

I'd happily accept an apology for all that.

I do not think that any soldiers were mindless robots at all. Nor do I think that all Germans were Nazis or that all Americans are Democrats.

The original post is a series of SOP's. It does not say "_think about_ retreating from an impassable obstacle", or "_think about_ charging straight at AT guns if at short range", etc.. It says DO IT.

Certainly the German army taught these things to a lower level than other armies, and it's leaders knew that they were to use them, even at a low level. So of course they performed better!! I said as much - it's my whole point!

You say yourself that the US army manuals of the same era were not as good, therefore the US army did not perform as well:

"Many of their "drills" were based on false assumptions and some pretty bad tactical concepts. So the US soldiers had the same mindless drills, but they were less applicable and therefore found themselves befuddled quite a lot (especially early in the war)."

According to your own post the quality of SOPs was a major reason for the better performance of the German army.

Read my post again Steve - this is EXACTLY what I was saying.

Mike

[Guest Zigster]

Training and Doctrine (and conditioning) is the framework within which we operate, whether as soldiers or civilians, and practice ultimately makes perfect. Repeatedly rehearsing conditioned responses to any given situation ultimately improves our response to that situation, in the same way that repeatedly playing a scenario will improve your performance in it.

If we wanted free-thinking individuals to make every tactical decision without adherance to doctrine, we wouldn't bother to train them at all. We are ALL automatons utimately. To suggest that this nation or that has some fundamental difference in the way they think or react smacks of the teachings of certain Nazi doctors. To be blunt, it's a crock of sh**. If a particular army or unit shows a higher degree of tactical flexibility it is because they have been trained better, conditioned better.

It's worthwhile to look at the 12th SS Panzer Division, Hitler Jugend, for a good example of what innovative and comprehensive training can accomplish. By every Western standard the 12th SS should have been a third rate, low class outfit due their tender age and inexperience. Rather, they proved themselves a tough and capable outfit, coupling the entusiasm of youth with sound tactical doctrine. No doubt they had their share of pure automatons as well as their share of innovative tactical thinkers. I suggest they had these in the same proportion as every other army of the day.

[Das Boot]

Mikeathome,

I think you're simplifing things. Sure, these basic lessons are very concise and state exactly what to do in a given situation, but they don't cover every eventuality.

War is fluid and no guideline can tell you exactly what to do at all times. Training will give soldiers some basic rules of engagement, but only in a "perfect" combat environment will reality equal SOPs at all times, so - as Steve said - they have to THINK.

For instance:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 18. Ammunition should not always be conserved; in the decisive moment, if you want to save casualties, you may expend ammunition at exceptionally high rates (for instance, an emergency attack.) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is hardly an iron clad SOP, and it again stresses the most important issue: Commanders have to judge THEMSELVES when to conserve ammo and when not to.

In short: War isn't math and no formula can be given to win. Training will get you far, but to fully exploit it, you have to think how best to use your knowledge.

[PanzerLeader]

I fully agree with Das Boot, these guidelines don't cover all eventualities, and are quite vague sometimes. A battlefield commander surely cannot only rely on these to win the battle..

[Major Tom]

Movies and show like that of "Combat" or "Saving Private Ryan" tend to show the Allied forces as superior in squad level tactics. Indeed, if all of these German casualties took place for the little Allied loss of life in these short movie engagements I could not forsee the German army in retaining its cohesion after a few weeks combat. Almost every episode of "Combat" had 1 American die to every 20 Germans.

It can't be said that all German formations have the best squad level training. Indeed, many of their regular and veteran units were better trained. Many were extremely poor units. No matter how much training an individual recieves cannot overcome inexperience. This is what most of the crack German units had over that of the Allies.

By the time of 1944 and the landings at Normandy most of the German troops, the average-good troops have experienced some years of combat on the continent. The British had many years of desert warfare, but, this is totally different to warfare in a temperate zone climate. The American's only experienced combat in Tunisia and in Italy. Indeed, those forces, British, American, Canadian, French, and Polish in Italy spent most of their time there (except for the US 7th Army) and were only transferred out by 1945.

Most of the troops that landed in Normandy were very well trained, but, most haven't seen combat. Some were in France in 1940, but, that was 4 years ago, the war and equipment changed much since then. The only action that the Canadians who landed in Normandy experienced was that of Dieppe. And most of those who participated were still in France in POW camps.

The Allies were forced to pack 4 years of temperate zone combat knowledge into 1 year of combat. The Germans have been fighting on the Continent almost straight since 1939.

There were many good German units who also didn't see combat until Normandy. There were also many good Allied units whose first combat was Normandy also. Doctrine is only as good as those who teach it. By the book officers did exist for every army, but, there were probably many horrid German NCO's and Lieutenants, plus, there were probably many imaginative and versitile Allied contemporaries also.

[Guest Big Time Software]

Hi Mike,

Sorry, I didn't mean to be insulting and fail to see where I have been. The last comment I made was an analogy, not putting words in your mouth. As for reading and understanding your posts, I have done both fairly well I think. But to be clear, if you are of the opinion that the Germans had a superior level of initiative at the lower level than the Allies, then we in fact do agree. But if you think that they were slaves to SOP, as your posts would suggest, then I whole heartedly disagree. Here are some quotes from you...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As one a casual afficianado who has perceived the Germans to be automatons, I have to say there's nothing in this excelelnt article which changes my perception.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I read this to mean that you disagree that the Germans had a superior degree of self reliance and initiative, and instead actually were blind followers of SOP. If so, I disagree completely with your opinions. See next point...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>AFAIK the individual german soldier was constrained to follw pretty strict battle drills. This post includes several simple drills - when to charge, when to back off, etc.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

To the degree that ALL SOLDIERS OF ANY ARMY are constrained to follow battle drills, correct. But there is no point to be made here if that is what you meant. Might as well say the sky is blue when it is the middle of the day without any clouds as this has been the standard military practice for all nations for centuries. This is what I meant when I asked if you have seen contemporary military manuals, or even those from the day of other nations. They read the same way. So to conclude that the Germans were some how REQUIRED to follow what was written TO THE LETTER is groundless and in fact incorrect.

The German SOP was not designed to be followed to the letter, but was instead supposed to serve as a basis for making decisions using the practical experience of others as a guideline. The notion that a sergeant at the front would crack open a manual, consult it, and then launch an attack based on the word for word SOP is simply unfounded. This is as true for the German Army as it was for any other. The difference is that the German knowledge base was better AND (this is the point you really seem to disagree with) the entire German methodology of their military training was to think for themselves (in the military sense of the word thinking) and do what the leader thought best for the given tactical situation. This is called initiative, and the Germans had more of it than others on the whole. I am not alone in this opinion either.

Many Allied veterans have commented on the superior initiative (not training necessarily) even during the latter stages of the war. Post war the US has basically adopted the German methods completely from what I can tell. That is... initiative is the most crucial element for a leader to have, and therefore it should be encouraged and not discouraged.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>IMO they are NOT initiative. They are following SOP's. That the German SOP's were better than US ones does not mean that German's had more initiative at lower level - it means their SOP's were better.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Again, you are looking at SOP as if there were no other choice than to follow it to the letter. These SOPs didn't have to explicitly say "use your best judgment here" because it was so fundamental that no German leader would think that he wasn't supposed to do anything else but use his own initiative. Here is the example of where German initiative came into play...

In the German Army of WWII a higher leader would say "take that hill". The junior leader would then discuss the best way of doing that with the forces at his disposal, including the coordination with other leaders and other assets. The junior leader would then make up his own mind how best to handle the given task based on training (SOP) and experience. This is true for other armies as well, but the DEGREE of flexibility shown by senior leaders in their assignements to junior ones was FAR greater for the German Army as a whole compared to any of the Western Allies. Flexibility requires initiative, and that is why it is correct to say the German Army as a whole had a greater degree of initiative built into the lower levels of command.

In fact, the Germans FROWNED upon the higher leader telling the junior ones EXACTLY how things should be done. In other words, a Captain would tell his Lieutenants to take that hill in the most vague terms possible. It would be up to the Lieutenants and then Sergeants to figure out the hows. This is NOT how it worked in the US and Commonwealth armies for most of the war. Instead the senior leader would specify TOO many details that would constrain the junior leaders into set courses of action that they had little or no control over. All Allied armies got better at this as the war went on, but there are many that contend that the British never really "got it" on the whole.

The other aspect of initiative was the forming of Kampfgruppen. The Allies NEVER got the level of control over diverse elements as the Germans did because the concept of leadership was too ridged in the Allied armies. Some of the worst examples can be found in the British Armored divisions where the tankers and troops actively behaved as if they were supposed to work on their own instead of in harmony. In short, there was a system that stifled initiative to a large degree.

To sum up, if you are of the opinion that superior German SOPs were all that the Germans had, and initiative was at a nonexistent or even similar level compared to Allied armies, I can very safely say that you are incorrect to say this. Every book on my overloaded shelves here does not support your position if that is what you think. If your opinion is something different, unfortunately I can't see what it is as your posts seem to be fairly clear and not really open to misinterpretation.

Steve

[This message has been edited by Big Time Software (edited 01-24-2000).]

[Knaust]

In the German Army initiative at every level was strongly encouraged since the time of vonMoltke....this was a strict rule....so no german automatons even in WWI.

Indeed in WWII Hitler's directives often contracticted this rule...but at small levels initiative was always high.

[Major Tom]

I have to agree with Steve here. I just saw a documentary on the US 100th Battalion, part of the 442nd (or 422nd?) Infantry Regiment. The Battalion/Regimental Commanders appeared to be sensible blokes, but, the higher up in command the more that they thought they knew how to run the war, resulting in uneccessary casualties. Even thinking back to the "Thin Red Line", the American high commander was constantly rubbing it into the face of his subordinates if they didn't follow orders.

Another instance, the Canadian 1st Battalion of the Black Watch, part of the 2nd Division was ordered to advance across a field without any flank support or artillery. Yet, they did it with tremendous casualties. What CM allows us to do is to make up for this ineptness, I am truely interested in seeing how the CMMC runs.

I just have one question about the German military. What of Hitler's insistances? His orders of "No retreat". Are these handled differently as they are mostly directed towards the German Military High command having no guts in disobeying Hitler (or having the guts and being promptly removed). What would the Squad/Platoon commander say if such an order that they knew was militarily unwize? However, Hitler did say give no ground, but, in many occasions ground was intelligently given, so I am possibly arguing a mute point.

[Guest R Cunningham]

I think part of the vaunted German initiative was the levels at which it was displayed. It was more evident at the lower levels than in the other armies.

One German criticism of the britsh, for example, was that the platoon was too dependent on the officer and when he was put out of action, the platoon couldn't function IAW the plan because they weren't trained to do so.

This whole discussion revolves around the concept of Auftragstaktik or Mission orders where the subordinate is given a task but not told in exquisite detail how to go about accomplishing it. In the modern US army we talk about "sucking eggs." The axiom is to give the order to suck an egg, but let the junior officer/NCO figure out how to best suck that egg with the means at his disposal.

Grist for the mill from "On Infantry:"

"Yet another way of describing the approach used by the Germans during the blitzkrieg years is 'Flächen und Lückentaktik,' the tactics of surfaces and gaps. The message implied in this designation was simple: areas where the enemy resisted (surfaces) should be avoided and areas where the enemy was weak (gaps) should be exploited. The implications were, at least for the British and French officers, radical. Units which encountered resistance were expected to leave their own assigned sector and follow in the wake of whatever neighbor was making better progress.

This behavior, which in other armies might result in a court martial, required leaders with an unusual degree of intelligence and that peculiar character trait that the Germans called Verantwortungsfreudigkeit - a certain willingness to accept, or more particularly, enjoy responsibility. At least in the early days of the Second World War, the Germans had little trouble finding officers and NCOs like this. This was largely due to the fact that these traits had been valued by the German Army for such a long time that leaders were expected to possess them.

That such leaders required considerable latitude in the performance of their duties soon became obvious. Whether this attitude started with Frederick the Great, with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during the Napoleonic Wars or with Moltke during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, is a matter for scholarly debate. What was clear was that, to a degree unheard of in other armies, the German soldier was expected to do whatever th situation required. Failure to act when the situation demanded action was considered worse than a wrong choice of method. In extreme cases, this philosphy required that a soldier disobey orders that were inconsistent with the situation. Hellmuth von Moltke, the chief of the general staff who did so much to shape the German Army of the late nineteenth century, was fond of recounting the tale of a young major who, on receiving a reprimand from Prince Frederick Charles, offered the excuse that he only obeying orders; the prince's prompt retort was 'His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would kno when NOT to obey orders.'"

Skipping a bit....

"The skill shown by the German infantry in defending the villages south and east of Caen

was displayed throughout the battle for Normandy and, indeed, throughout the campaign in Northwest Europe. While there were many reasons for this, the heart of the German infantry tactics (and thus the tactical superiority of the German infantry) was the ability of German squads to maneuver. This was a function, not merely of organization and weapons, or even of the tradition of Stoßtrupp tactics, but of the psychology of the young NCOs and men within them. Contrary to the view promulgated by allied propaganda, the German soldier was far from an automaton. Less gregarious than either his British or American counterpart, he was highly capable of individual thought and action. Comments such as 'the infantry soldier is not trained to fight in twos and threes, whereas the German does so frequently,' and 'the German is a first-class at infiltration, because he will work as a single individual' often appeared in Allied reports. While some of this can be explained by pointing to the high standards of education and strong traditions of craftsmanship in German civil society, a good deal of credit can be given to the German Army practice of training every soldier to take charge of himself and his comrades."

[This message has been edited by R Cunningham (edited 01-24-2000).]

[Guest Big Time Software]

Major Tom,

Hitler's insistance on controlling military matters flew in the face of everything that the German Army was about. And the consequences were felt at lower levels than ever should have been, especially after the July Bomb Plot.

However, Hitler's decrees did NOT affect CM level combat decisions any more than what would be normal. The difference is that instead of getting an order through the chain of command, allowing iniative to be exercised at each level, a solid order came through from up high to low. Generally this didn't get any lower than Divisional. So a CM formation would take their orders form the same officer, but that officer (or one or two higher) would have received his orders directly from Hitler and NOT his imediate superior. The quality of the order from Hitler is not relevant as any commander could make bad calls as well.

The worst cases of Hitler's interference were on the Eastern Front. The so called Festerplatz concept he came up with. This was to insist on fortress like points along the front to cause problems for any large scale Soviet offensive. The concept is not without some merrit, but the execution was so ridged (i.e. no initiative) that the location of these fortresses were sometimes militarilly useless. Hitler sometimes had them set up in economically vital areas without regard to military value and prudence.

Anyhoo... this is a complex and very rich topic and I am in no way going to do anything but scratch the surface. So I will stop right here

Steve

[Mark IV]

One of the most important SOPs, and I think one area where the Germans were markedly superior, was item 2 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>put subordinate leaders into the picture about the tactical situation, mission, and anything else which may impact on the coming action<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The ability to see your role in the big picture is vital to intelligent seizure of the initiative. As you observe the battle situation change, the hill you were directed to take may no longer be vital, but stopping the developing surprise flank counter-attack may be. If you are acquainted with the overall effort you are better equipped to make the correct decision in such a case.

This was reinforced by item 4, "constant appreciation of the situation." In other words, there was no place for the "I don't get paid to think" mentality.

Perhaps more telling was item 28, <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Against strong enemy resistance, there is no point in continuing to attack<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

These are hardly words for automatons to live by. Trusting the company commander with the decision to break off an attack is Big Stuff, and it's a matter of record how successful the Germans were on the tactical offensive with this philosphy at the company level. It takes supreme confidence, at the highest military levels, to decentralize decision-making to the lowest levels.

To "empower" low-level commanders to this degree means you'd better have a damn good SOP, by the way, so that a commander acting on his own initiative doesn't have to invent tactics as he goes.

The seeming paradox is that the better your battle-drill, the more battlefield control you may safely relinquish.

[BOSS Roller]

Does anyone know if this higher level of German initiative is represented in CM? Was, or could, this be accomplished by simply increasing the "level of experience" (ex. Green, Veteran, Elite) of German units?

For example, a German unit could be given Elite status, while it's Allied counterpart, with similar experience and training, could be given Veteran status.

[Guest Big Time Software]

Boss, higher level decision making isn't simulated in CM at all. That is because you are the higher level Your CO is the scenario designer. There is really nothing more to simulate here. Bumping up or down experience levels of the troops is actually a bad thing to do. Picture this... there were some very gifted leaders in charge of some pretty bad units. So to increase the quality of the poor troops to reflect the great leader is illogical. Higher level decisions do not have a direct impact like this.

Steve

[Simon Fox]

An interesting discussion which deserves my input

My viewpoint is slightly different from those offered so far and this is principally because I like to put these opinions into their context. I agree with Steve that the perception that German troops generally displayed a greater willingness to act on their own initiative is far too commonly observed by numerous authors for it to be untrue. (However, I strongly object to him lumping "Commonwealth" all in together, though I recognise he probably meant Brits and Canadians ) Even so I suspect this superiority has been overemphasised somewhat, some of the reasons for which have already been alluded to. Consider the context:

(1) The framework within which junior leaders operated (ie SOP) was excellent for the Germans but flawed for the Allies. Therefore in order to adopt a better SOP allied junior leaders had to break out from their SOP on their own initiative. This was far more initiative than was called for from German junior leaders because they already had a decent framework.

(2) I think it is reasonable to state that the allied troops which landed in Normandy were overtrained (certainly the Brits) and this training employed flawed/inappropriate approaches which were thus deeply ingrained. I would suggest also that overtraining would likely suppress initiative (especially if it wasn't encouraged) and induce a reliance upon procedure which would make it much harder to break out of.

(3) There is no substitute for experience. The allied units in Normandy were largely inexperienced and those with experience had gained it in an entirely different theatre and its effect was somewhat diluted as a consequence. In contrast many German units were highly experienced and if not were leavened with a strong cadre of experienced NCOs and officers.

(4) The onus was for the allies to do the attacking. This was in one of the most favourable defensive terrains in the ETO. It was also in the face of an enemy with significantly more infantry firepower and mortars which was critical in the bocage terrain. British training emphasised cooperation between arms (believe it or not!) and heavy reliance upon armour and arty support of infantry. But this was badly exposed in the bocage since the former were too vulnerable and the limited observation hampered the latter. Even so the Germans hardly performed outstandingly when on the attack in the same country.

It is hardly suprising in these circumstances allied units and leaders took some time to come to grips with their jobs which were tactically more complex than those facing the Germans. This learning process being non-uniform resulted in the patchy performance of allied units especially as new units "entered the fray". On the whole I think it would be fair to say that generally US units adapted more quickly than British but it is a generalisation. IMO this can be ascribed to several factors: Brits were less likely to promote junior officers from experienced NCOs, the attrition rate for junior leaders were very high and their manpower situation was critical.

On the whole I think this issue of differences in military cultures vis a vis initiative is overemphasised (though real) and the characterisation of the Germans as 'empowered' and filled with zeal to employ their own initiative is as unpalatable and ridiculous as that of them as automatons. Equally reversing the characterisation to see the allies as automatons is also ridiculous. None of my reading suggests that junior British leaders down to NCO level were not generally "in the picture" or that battle plans were excessively rigid, though I am sure there are plenty of exceptions. The assessment of the Brits taken from German accounts of their SOP is of no value in this respect. I mean how the hell does 'Klaus' know whether the British platoon has gone to ground and lost the initiative because their officer has bought it or because he and his mates are hosing them down with 3 or 4 MG42 whose firepower they cannot hope to match and probably can't even locate. Enough blather...

[Guest Big Time Software]

I figured Simon would show up sooner rather than later And yes, "Commonwealth" was not meant to cover Aussies and New Zealanders as I was only meaning to keep the focus on the NW ETO (otherwise we would have to start talking about the Soviets, and that is no small topic!!).

I agree with you completely. The failure of the Allied forces hitting Normandy is not a simple one. I will quibble about a few points you made here and there, but they don't detract from your main point. And that is that the Germans were not a 10 and the Allies a 0 on the scale of initiative leadership in practice.

However, on average the Germans were better at it than their Allied counterparts and this did have a noticable affect on combat in the NW ETO. It is also fair to say that the Allies got better with each day they fought against the Germans, so much so that by the end of war some of the seasoned units were as good as the best German ones. Unfortunately, it took a lot longer to change this in a uniform manner (i.e. decades), which is not surprising as institutions aren't known for their ability to change over night

Steve

[Simon Fox]

Hehe, that's why I haven't inundated you with emails today.

Yea, I think my main point was that it's hard to dissect out all the different factors involved ie an army with a good tactical doctrine which generally encourages initiative vs one with a flawed tactical doctrine which is a bit neutral on initiative (discourage would be too harsh). But then I'm too much of an overblown wind bag to put things so succinctly

[Guest GriffinCheng]

I would suggest this book:

"Figher Power" by Martin van Creveld.

This book employs a scientific approach to analyse the combat effectiveness of German and American troops in ETO.

[Berlichtingen]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In the German Army initiative at every level was strongly encouraged since the time of vonMoltke....this was a strict rule....so no german automatons even in WWI<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Need to go back further. The trend was started by Fredrick the Great