Montgomery/Rommel/Patton?

[Berlichtingen]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I'd have to say von Manstein based on his campaign in the Crimea and the 1943 Kharkov counter offensive. Pure brilliance.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Manstein's "Backhand Blow"

[tss]

I think that the arguments about who was the best commander of the war are quite pointless, since each general had his strong and weak points.

So, how about arguing for a while about the _worst_ commanders. My contenders for this award are two Soviet marshalls: Kulik and Mehklis (actually, I'm not completely sure what Mehklis' rank was but in any case, as Stalin's confidant and mastermind of the purges he was one of the most powerful men in Red Army in '37-'41).

Both received their posts solely because they had fought with Stalin during the Russian Civil War. Both had the opinion that one Communist division can easily defeat three attacking Fascist divisions. Therefore, as no enemy could achieve 3-1 superiority over the Red Army, defence in depth was no neccessary.

Their vision was that the attacking army would crush itself against the stout defenders and then it would be an easy march to occupy the enemy country.

After the Germans had shown to them that their power calculations were off, both supported the principle that all available troops should always be thrown into counterrattacks with no regards given to the actual conditions in the front.

Before the outbreak of the war Kulik had used his post as the director of Soviet Artillery to fight hard against motorization of artillery, preferring horse-drawn guns over tractor-drawn.

Someone mentioned Manstein's Crimean campaign as an example of a brilliant success. While the campaign truly was very successful, one should not forget that shortly before it Mehklis had wasted 100000 defenders in a series of senseless attacks. After this blunder Mehklis was finally relived from a position of authority and positioned as a Corps Comissar.

IMO, one of the worst losses that Soviets suffered during Winter War against Finland happened when Mehklis returned from a front line visit about 15 minutes before Finns encircled the division (163rd or 44th, right now I can't remember which one) by cutting the only road. The fact that Mehklis survived doomed some hundreds of thousands of Soviets to death.

-Tommi

[Herr Oberst]

Wow, alot of opinions here. Surely there's room for one more.

Monty: a grinder, albeit a very careful one. His main handicap was the admonition "Bring back as many of the lads as you can." Enuf said.

Patton: audacious, lots of flash and flair. An excellent commander, no doubt.

Zhukov: the ultimate grinder. Where the US won through materialschlact (spelling anyone?), Zhukov won through bodyschlact. His real capabilities will never be known due to the generally poor quality of the troops at his disposal. Soviet training was pitiful at lower ranks. How many missed opportunities were there on the Eastern Front for an overall quicker end to the fighting? Numerous, but missed due to poor quality of troops. (Just finished "Retreat from Leningrad: Army Group North 1944/1945" and "German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front, 1941-1945" from Schiffer Books, excellent reads).

On the German side, I have to go with von Manstein.

[Mike Oberly]

Stadsfeldwebel-

I think that is a completely inacuurate assessment-he certainly had his back to the wall in Leningrad in '41,and the city would probably have fallen had he not taken over its defense.One thing you should take into account is that while the Russians may have had numerical superiority most of the time,the quality of individual soldier and NCO was far below that of their opponent,especially early in the war.Zhukov was a high strategic genius.In fact,much of Russia's misery in '41 could have been eased had his suggestions not been discarded by the Soviet high command.

[Mike Oberly]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So, how about arguing for a while about the _worst_ commanders. My contenders for this award

are two Soviet marshalls: Kulik and Mehklis <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No argument here.

Mike

[Major Tom]

A lot of German commanders were handycapped by having Hitler with only a Corporal's experience actually trying to run an army. The average soldier expects to win every battle and achieve every victory as they were trained to believe that in their generals. When the Great German Generals failed to achieve the impossible goals in Russia Hitler was baffled and assumed it was due to their incompetence, rather than the situation's impossibility. Countless German Generals were removed, shot or transferred early in 1941 out of important area's because they failed once, even though they succeeded brilliantly, so, they never got the chance to prove themselves during the later years.

What about Kesselring? He managed to defend all of Italy from 1943-45 with meagre manpower! Indeed, he was helped by the terrain and the high quality of his troops, but, the East and West Front's always came first in German priority. Some of the Bloodiest Western Allied defeats were suffered in Italy.

In regards to the Invasion of France in 1940, I am sure that the number of Divisions per side was 120 German, 96 French (Including Fortress Divisions, useless in mobile warfare) 22 Belgian, 9 Dutch, and up to 13 British (including 3 Territorial and 1 weak Armoured). Indeed, the sides were equal, but, the Allies were uncoordinated. So, in reality you have 3 separate Allied forces and one concentrated German force.

About 1/3 of the French army was of high quality and mechanized, however, they were never in the place to engage the main German thrusts. Second rate formations were in all of the key area's of attack, which is the reason for their relatively weak defence. The French 1st Rate formations made a great showing of themselves. Qualitatively, they were the equal of the German forces, along with more and better equipment.

You must remember too about the Matilda's. There were only 30 Matilda II's with the 2 pounder gun, and only 80 Matilda I's armed with just a HMG. The Char B1, and B1 bis's were only in the horribly organized Armoured Divisions, about 50 in each of the 4. The all engaged picemiel and were attritioned down to Brigade or Regimental size. The really usefull French formations were their three Mechanized Cavalry formations. They each had a well ballanced force of 80 Medium tanks (S1) and around 60 Light Tanks and 60 Recon AFV's, they also had an entire Brigade of Infantry. In the few encounters with these forces the Germans themselves were beaten. But, these like all of the French forces were trapped and forced to abandon all of their equimpent in escaping.

There were many great French Generals. General Weygand managed to temporarily defend the entirety of France with less than 60 tired Divisions vs 120 fresh German divisions. He developed the Hedgehog tactic of creating fortresses of infantry bolstered by lots of AT in towns and forests leaving any penetration by German forces to be dealt with by tanks. If this strategy was used when the supply of tank's and AT guns were plentyful the German attack would have been repulsed. NATO has taken up this tactic as the one to use against a possible Russian attack during the Cold War. Not many commander's can lay claim to their innovative tactic being used for over 50 years, especially in today's modern world.

[Mike D]

In my opinion, Rommel is the best of this bunch in terms of a battlefield commander. A very close second to him that is still better than either of the other two would be Jochen Peiper. He never rose as high on the ladder as the rest of these guys, but he was one hell of a commander and tactician.

Mike D

aka Mikester

[Knaust]

Well...to be good I think a guy must be INNOVATIVE in every field of life...then who was more INNOVATIVE than Guderian...and in WWII which plan was more cunning than Fall Gelb?

[Das Boot]

Actually, the Germans didn't go with Fall Gelb, an almost a total copy of the Schlieffen-plan (spelling?) from 1914, since a copy of it fell into the allies hands. Instead von Manstein came up with the Sichelschnitt (spelling, again?) that reversed the axis of attack from the north to the middle. No doubt, that Guderian was a great general, but the attack on France was Mansteins idea.

BTW, Zhukov wasn't just a meatgrinder. IIRC In August 1939 he defeated the japanese in some border fighting using armour and infantry in close support and actually did this sort of combat before the germans.

[Fionn]

What you are referring to was Khalkin Gol (sic) and it is often held up as the first Soviet Blitzkrieg...

I've read about it in some detail some time ago and it wasn't a very impressive victory. Losses were extreme despite air, armour, artillery and infantry superiority.

The only reason he accomplished anything was that his tanks were so vastly superior to anything the Japanese fielded and so numerically superior.

Compare that to the German commanders who were able to launch counter-attacks whilst vastly outnumbered etc.

------------------

___________

Fionn Kelly

Manager of Historical Research,

The Gamers Net - Gaming for Gamers

[Das Boot]

Fionn, I'll take your word for it. BTW, do you have any info on soviet losses in the last month or so of the Pacific war, I read somewhere that they were horrendous?

[Knaust]

yeah Das Boot...u are right...and in my previous post i said that Manstein was the best general coz he conceived the attack on the Ardennes and Guderian was best too coz he was the father od armoured warfare...both INNOVATIVE!...

[Guest kevi]

Ok ... limiting to European WW2

Tactical = Guderian

Operational = Manstein

Strategical = Stalin (he won; with the most to lose)

Roosevelt-a close second (he won too; I am not a fan of his domestic policy however)

The Brits-continued to lose dominance in the

world. But they helped get the Germans into war with Russia, a key strategical event.

I think you need to separate the three levels of warfare. Note: all made hay on the East Front-where it REALLY mattered.

Students of history can argue this till the cows come home. But these three will make most “short lists”.

- Kevin

[Neutral Party]

Well the best thing Stalin did was leave it to Zhukov. Aren't we all glad Hitler did not follow that pattern.

As for the Brits getting Hitler to attack Russia. This would be very clever if it was true. However Hitler had to attack Russia in the same way that a small dog has to attack the postman - it was in his nature. He would have attacked Russia no matter what the Brits did.

Joe

[Major Tom]

I would put Stalin as to be about the same quality of a commander as Churchill (Remember the Dardanelles?). For about a week after the invasion of Russia Stalin was in a severe state of shock. He ignored all reports of enemy activity which resulted in a much worse opening war disaster than Pearl Harbour. 2000 Americans died in the opening day of hostilities by a sneak attack by the Japanese, due to Stalin's incompetence tens of thousands were killed or captured. Stalin was a political leader, he probably had no effect other than on morale.

[Mark IV]

Major Tom: I absolutely agree that Kesselring doesn't get the press he deserves for the defense of Italy.

However, on the subject of Hitler having only a corporal's experience, I have to say something bound to be unpopular: Hitler was encouraged in his belief in his own ability by the stodgy, timid attitude of many senior Heer officers in the early war years.

Those generals were not motivated by some humanitarian reluctance to invade their neighbors, but by a failure to understand the new style of warfare at their fingertips, and a failure to grasp the psychology of their opponents. Hitler had the good sense to listen to the innovators (Manstein, Guderian), and proved far more adept at Euro-psychology than his senior commanders.

After pulling off calculated gamble after gamble despite the misgivings of the Heer, Hitler was somewhat justified in thinking he might be the reincarnation of Napoleon. The Anschluss, Ruhr occupation, Sudetenland, Poland, and France were all his babies (even if that only consisted of getting out of the way of the guys with the right ideas). There is no doubt that he took it an invasion too far, but even that started well and he was looking pretty sharp until winter.

I always liked von Rundstedt, considered a big-picture guy and a master of logistics, and another general who knew when to let innovative minds prevail.

As for Stalin being a strategic genius, what on earth could justify this assessment? Yeah, he finally let the pros run the war (does Timoshenko get any credit here?), but his "strategy" consisted of getting surprise-attacked, then reorganizing his armies and pointing them West. His motivational qualities are legendary- after executing many of the experienced officers in the Red Army before a looming war that should have been obvious, he could be sure that his memos wouldn't be tossed unread into wastebaskets- but what on earth did he exhibit in terms of strategy?

[dumbo]

(ooops just noticed some of these points have already been made by others, never seen the "page 2 button before" Still here it is.)

Stab: This was not how Zhukov or even the Russians generally fought. FYI Zhukov won some of his battles outnumbered and out equiped by the Germans. Although you are right to point out how thier superb artillery barrages worked later in the war but this was only one part of the comined arms operations which by 43 were already superior to the German operations in many ways ,Russian airpower is often dismissed but in fact played a huge part from 43 - 45 particularly thier ground attack aircraft.

I stand my my Judgement of him being number 1 bar none, as a side note he trashed the same Japanese army in 39 which was to route the Western allies a few years later.

That said you are spot on about wanting to be a soldier under him. That war was nasty and brutal. While saving moscow he gave personal orders to some feild commanders telling them if they rereated he would have them killed but in fairness he did dave Moscow (myths about Russian numbers or the weather stopping the German army are over done in my view.

Regarding Monty, The German generals did indeed say Monty was the allied general they thought was the best, however its worth bearing in mind this was from the (excellent) interviews done by Liddle Hart who worked for British Intelligence, I cannot help think that these captured generals thought it might be rather useful for them to complement their captors nationality on this point bearing in mind he was also making recommendations to the Nuremburg trails at the same time.....

Cheers,

dumbo

[This message has been edited by dumbo (edited 01-06-2000).]

[Major Tom]

Like everyone with a tactic succeeds they tend to forget to adapt. Blitzkrieg succeeded in 1939, 1940, and in the beginning of 1941, but, by that time there was sufficient enough experience by their enemies to develop a suitable defence. Even in 1940 the Allies already knew of the weaknesses of Blitzkrieg, and it's limitations. Ever wonder why they never made any blitzkrieg attacks? Hitler wasn't a genious for accepting a daring plan, just very lucky. Many national leaders accept daring and risky plans and not all of them succeed. Gallipoli, the 6 Day war, Tet offensive, and Barbarossa were all big gambles that failed. Hitler's success until 1941 should not be measured to his brilliance, but rather his enemie's incompetence. He honestly never believed that England would go as far in the war as it did, he assumed Russia would collapse in 6 weeks, he stupidly declared war on the US on December 10, 1941, success went to his head.

Indeed, there were German army plots as early as 1938 to kill Hitler. They were trying to coordinate with the British who were supposed to flatly deny Germany's right to the occupation of the Sudatenland, the Germans would arrest or kill Hitler under the pretext that he was endagering the nation and set up a new government. However, after the victories of 1939-40 not too many German commanders, let alone any German (other than a Jewish German) would want Hitler killed, or his regime to end.

I really like posting these discussions, I just hope nobody is taking them too seriously!

[Mark IV]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I really like posting these discussions, I just hope nobody is taking them too seriously!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No danger here- after all, it's not real. CM is real.

Note that I don't argue that Hitler was any kind of military genius, only that he had reasons to think that he was. The Germans had the same tools as England and France at their disposal to develop blitzkrieg, probably less, yet they were the ones who executed (no pun intended). They probably would have been far less successful and settled for relatively limited gains had the traditional thinking been allowed to prevail (it very nearly did).

I would challenge a couple of your points, however:

I think the Germans did indeed adapt as the war progressed (they didn't have much choice when giving ground).

The great defensive battles in the East are studied to this day by combined arms commanders and they are masterpieces of grand tactical adaptation. Unfortunately it was too late to save the big picture.

And I think the Allied did make blitzkrieg attacks, in their own way. War had evolved quickly and they had more material to throw around, so they could be more conservative of manpower, generally speaking. But coordinated air, artillery, and massed armor attacks which strive for rapid crushing victory through infiltration and encirclement hardly went out of fashion in 1940. We quit calling it "blitzkrieg" when it quit being exclusively German, but isn't modern war mostly "blitzkriegisch"? Except for the stars, Guderian would have been pretty comfortable tactically with the IDF in '73.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>However, after the victories of 1939-40 not too many German commanders, let alone any German (other than a Jewish German) would want Hitler killed, or his regime to end.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's really my point. If the German nation and even the stodgiest German officers were swept up in the success, it's not surprising that Hitler himself was. And he was right, way right, to listen to the innovators. It's when he stopped taking advice from ANYBODY that he became a victim of his own success.

[Guest kevi]

Guys –

My definition of strategist might be

defined Grand-Strategist by many because I include political, economic and military measures.

As you know, Stalin had absolute control over all these during his rule. They can

not be separated in Stalin' evaluation.

I know Stalin is a controversial selection.

But because the east front was the most critical AND

the Soviets won the war AND

gained huge geo-political benefits unexpectedly

including

so many of Stalin’s pre-war aims, I think he deserves serious attention.

Sure he was a cold blooded, paranoid communist “bastard”

I deplore communism … and hate …

Stalin with a capital H.

But he had a clear vision of Soviet interests and how to protect and

expand them. At the level of strategy,

a leader can never be perfect.

No, they are a products of their own

culture and times. Improvement of the geo-political position of a culture is what

matters at the strategic level. Better strategy generally wins over better tactics.

So the strategist that improves his culture's position Vs the enemy is better.

Results matter more than methods - it is war right?

Also remember, WW2 was “real time”. Stalin, Roosevelt and Hitler did not have the

opportunity to replay the war as we do.

Stalin made all the key descisions for the Soviets. He led (forced at gun-point at times) a backward culture into the modern era. His legacy made American students do “Nuclear Drills” hiding under desks

(I was one at age 9).

As for military WW2:

Stalin was the world communist leader. Communists were committed to expanding

their economic system by any means.

Stalin had eyes on ALL of Europe.

Following the Russo-German Pact and

conquest of Poland, the Soviets converted

the Bialystok salient into an offensive springbroad. Stalin (remembering recent

WWI history) thought the Germans would bog down in France as they did in WWI. Stalin planned to strike and take Western Europe at that point. The old two front strategy BUT with huge Mechanized forces to overcome traditional trench tactics. BTW, Stalin and the Military never relied on tactics but the

STRATEGIC use of massed force. The Germans surprised the world and overran France

releasing troops. The Germans massed forces on Soviets border to INTIMIDATE the Soviets

away from Romania, Bulgaria and the straights at Bosphorus. Stalin does NOT give in OR panic. He delays; thinking the Germans will not attack. However, Stalin approves a BOLD plan to sacrifice Popov’s forces in the Bialystok salient as a gambit pawn, just in case. He trades lives and ground for victory - not won far from Soviet soil as he wished – but on it. This allows time for the Soviet operational reserve to counter at the Dniper. The Germans are stopped on the Moscow axis and head to the Ukraine AWAY from their prime objective Moscow (and Russian soil BTW). The Soviets make many TACTICAL mistakes and lost 100K’s troops but the strategic situation was saved. The Germans then rolled the dice and were bleed

white at Moscow as the Soviet strategic reserve is fed in. The Germans lost the cream of the infantry (WW2 was a infantry war) never to be regained. War over except the race against the West to claim Europe. The Soviets made tactical mistakes in 1942 also - but recovered due to the war economy

ruled by Stalin.

Stalin was ultimately responsible for all Soviet decisions (military and alike) that

organized the Soviet side of the post-war world vs the West. His methods were not pretty, nor American, but effective for that culture at that time.

Never were so many lives sacrificed

to attain strategic goals. It was Stalin Vs the West in Europe - he won and drastically

improved the Soviet global position.

(The US won too)

He may not have been #1 at politics, economics, or military matters. Combined, he was the most outstanding and hated. Stalin was deeply involved in the Strategy that put my little 5th grade head under a desk in the Cold War. Against all the odds.

Perhaps I confuse Stalin's historical and strategical significance. But with Stalin, they are so very much related.

- Kevin

Ref.

Thunder on the Dnepr (Fugate and Dvoretsky)

Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German invasion of Russia (Gorodetsky)

[Berlichtingen]

kevi,

Everything I have read on the East Front leads me to believe that Hitler ordering Army Group Center to swing south (forming Kiev pocket) had more to do with stopping the German drive in 1941 than any grand scheme of Stalin's. Had Army Group Center continued toward Moscow, they would have likely taken it (there was little force to defend at that point)... captured Stalin (I recall that he was sick and couldn't be moved at the time) and ended the war in the East (Moscow was far more critical than in the time of Napoleon).

[Neutral Party]

kevi

That's a very interesting analysis. Here's another perspective.

There is no doubt that Stalin was adept at maintaining his own position as the leader of the Soviet Union. This seems to me to have been his main preoccupation in the period leading up to the "great patriotic war". In order to achieve this goal he arranged the liquidation of those he perceived as potential threats (e.g., almost the entire politburo after Lenin's death, Trotsky, etc.,) and contrived a society where any signs of individuality, initiative and tendency for original thought were stomped on. This policy was applied with particular severity to the Red Army.

However, the qualities that enabled Stalin to keep such a tight grip on power in the SU were of limited value when engaged in war with an external aggressor. The level of preparedness, initial disposition of Soviet forces, armored force doctrine could hardly have been improved on - by the German General Staff. Forgive me if I don't believe that this was all somehow part of Stalin's grand design to take over the world.

Your bottom line is the Russians won the war and aquired nuclear weapons therefore Stalin was a great strategist. Presumably if they had lost and the Germans had won then Hitler would be the worlds greatest strategist. Maybe they both should just have tossed a coin and saved everyone else the hassle.

In my opinion the SU won the war by a feat of almost unbelievable self-sacrifice, much of which entailed getting themselves out of the very deep hole that Comrade Stalin's grand strategy had dug for them. In this they were aided very substantially by the material support of the Western Allies (primarily the US).

There is however no doubt that Stalin was a more succesful delegator than Hitler, probably because his initial experiences were of catastrophic defeats rather than easy victories. This, together with Hitlers vacillation from August to October 1941 is probably what saved him in the end.

[Major Tom]

I think that it was pure logistics which caused Stalin to succeed and Hitler to fail. Stalin could afford incompetence, that is, to lose so much men and material, where Hitler couldn't. They were both fairly equal in hindering their own war efforts but Hitler's could not be made up so easily.

Also, without the Western Allies the Russian's couldn't have beaten Germany. Without the Russians the Allies could not have defeated Germany also. Both parts were equally important to the other's survival.

[Guest kevi]

Hi Again -

Please detach your thinking from what we normally do - millitary operations -

and think of global politics and economics

too.

That was the crux to communism - military opps were to be used as a last resort.

Stalin was a pure strategist in that he controlled all aspects of Soviet society and understood how to use them in war.

Good strategy wins ... better strategy wins with fewer losses. Stalin won. Flip a coin ... OK ... Based on the economics and politics and military balance ... the Soviets win. Sometime a GREAT Stragegist "flips a coin" if its in his societies interest. Most time he wins. The idea is to understand one's culture and win ... sometimes by bluff .. like poker ... but

its not a game .... successful strategy involves not just the movement of troops ..

but moving nations forward vs their competition. Stategy is more Poker than

Chess.

- Kevin

PS: the German move on Kiev was a mistake that was forced by Soviet pressure Army Grp Center's South flank. This is well documented. Stalin's elastic defence moved operational reserves from the Ukriane to the upper Dniper as planned. The Germans lost the war of attrition after. Attrition .. material and moral is key to strategy

Stalin understood this very well.

- Kevin

[Mark IV]

Major Tom: Whoa... the first American shipments began reaching Russia about 6 weeks before Stalingrad.

The war had moved back out of Russia before any real second front opened in the West. The fact that a hypothetical second front had to be defended by the Germans certainly helped Stalin- but the Russians were well on their way to handling the Germans before the West showed up on the continent. They WERE winning on their own. They might have been doing even better, if Stalin had not forced them to front-wide counter-offensives in Winter 41, instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive blow in the German center.

It's said that Stalingrad had the opposite effect on the two dictators' relationships with their militaries. Stalin finally learned to trust the pros- and Hitler lost all faith in them for good.

[This message has been edited by Mark IV (edited 01-07-2000).]