Question about vdv

[Apocal]

Right, I get what you're saying, but that is precisely what a spearhead force is supposed to do. They had not only "probed" enemy defenses, but actually assaulted and captured major objectives... basically fighting "rather than scouting" their way to Baghdad.

 

They didn't capture a single major 1st MarDiv objective. They were supposed to take a bridge, but that mission was cancelled when it was decided a bunch of Humvees weren't going to cut it. They weren't even leading the division in most cases; it was only when the opposite LAR (doing the same thing, but in LAV-25s) ran into resistance strong enough to stop them that 1st Recon pulled ahead and led the rest of 1st MarDiv. For the most part the 1st Recon were operating on the alternate route, against zero resistance at all and frequently behind the leading elements of the division. That was intentional; no amount of pluck and gumption makes up for protected firepower. I don't think it takes away from their accomplishments, but credit where credit is due -- the LAVs were generally blazing a trail for the division, not 1st Recon.

 

In the same vein, Russians had used their VDV BTGs as spearheads in the war of 8.8.8 during their advances on Gori and Poti. Whatever those units were lacking in durability and firepower, they more than made up in morale, initiative, and training... and again their enemies were just not good enough to capitalize on the weaknesses of such light spearheads.

 

Gori was abandoned two days ahead of the Russian advance and there was nothing substantial defending Poti. The real fight of the war was getting troops through the Roki Tunnel and that fight was led by two MR BTGs, not VDV.

 

Taking from The Tanks of August:

Almost immediately after the beginning of massive Georgian shelling of South Ossetia, at 0100 on August 8, the Russian General Staff ordered the troops deployed at the training ranges near the Ossetian border to march towards the Roki tunnel. Within half an hour of receiving the orders, the two battalion-size tactical groups of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division’s 693rdand 135th Motorized Rifle Regiments were on the move. At about 0100, the Russian Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, was on the phone with President Dmitry Medvedev to report about the beginning of the Georgian offensive. It seems likely that during that phone conversation, the president authorized the Russian Army to cross into South Ossetia. At 0200 on August 8, the first Russian armor of the 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment’s battalion-size tactical group crossed into South Ossetia. It was soon followed by the battalion tactical group of the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment.

Edited March 2, 2015 by Apocal

[Stagler]

Re: Oblique

 

The reality is that in a shooting war against peers, airborne operations anywhere except for the far periphery of operations is going to be a suicide mission at best, an abject and total disaster at most likely.  It boggles my mind anyone would even think that waves of big fat transport planes, flying through a radar rich environment, where there's enemy forces with entirely modern and functional fighters is remotely a good idea.  I was taking the oblique route because telling people the previous is generally caustic and not especially helpful in conversation.

 

 

This and this alone.

 

 

Against an intelligent enemy, if you just punched a hole in this ADA network, and you're now pumping the air with jammers, what do you think you've just told him about your plans?  What do you think the outcome would be against an enemy that is comprised of pretty much the 8 out of 10 of the world's largest air forces?

 

It's not feasible, or viable, it's just a way to rapidly feed regiments better used on the ground into said ground at a few hundred miles an hour.

 

 

Marine Force Recon was forward not as an assault force, but instead to basically determine where the enemy was, or was not, and to destroy lesser forces where available.  Force recon is such a light force that it's really good at rapid movement, and it has some good recon tools, but in terms of overcoming the enemy, it was much more reliant on the regular Marines behind it (and further, the US Army advance dispensed with light scouts all together and instead led with tanks and IFVs given the limits on "light" motorized element capabilities)

 

Although the VDV are capable of large scale air drops. They realise this and favour operating as air assault infantry. All their vehicles can just as easily drive to the battle as be dropped. If they were to be deployed in eastern Ukraine. They would airdrop within Russia, rapidly deploying from Psykov, then drive over the border.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

Oh wow, really? You don't say, Captan... well guess what - they didn't stop and they had performed their objectives quicker and "cleaner" than a heavier force that would have been expected to perfom the spearhead role under a more conventinal doctrine. That was exactly the plan of their operational command and it had worked out perfectly. Nothing in war is absolute.. it is all relative. And in this case the relative "human factor" advantage of Marine Recon units was more improtant than the absolute armor thinkness or gun size of their opponents...

 

Conversely, again, the similar US Army truck mounted recon forces in the same theater wound up being used for convoy security chiefly because they simply did not have the ability to survive first contact with even a poorly motivated and equipped armor force.  The Marine effort was down a much less defended route, and what was more relevant was "can we drive through here?" than "where are the bad guys?" (not to be confused with a lack of opposition, there were plenty of people to shoot, just not as many of the remaining Iraqi regulars with heavy equipment type formations).

 

And to that end, in a higher threat environment in 2003 the leading with tanks and IFVs was very effective, in that it plowed the enemy under on first contact.  When fighting weakness, or an enemy that is less much less mobile, highly mobile light forces can have positive effects, however, what kept Marine Force Recon from being tanked to bits was the fact that what Iraqi armor was available was tied up fighting the US Army heavy forces, not some sort of Hooah fist bump superiority of morale and human factors.

 

And even at that, despite being lighter and faster, and facing less opposition, the Army "heavy" forces still beat the Marines to Baghdad, so take from that what you will.

 

 

 

VDV would be used in 3 types of ways in a war like this, 1) To get to a area first and hold and secure it before bulk of force will arrive, 2) Escorted by SEAD aircraft will land in a area and take out logistics, and Artillery batteries, And support ect, ect. 3) together with the bulk of the motorized forces will attack together with frontline units. VDV can be assigned tanks too but not for roles such as 1 and 2. Imagine it like this, VDV is given the objective to get to a strategic area and used as a behind enemy lines asset and they will be used in surprise can compare to a blitzkrieg, SU-34s and other SEAD aircraft will be used and troops in BMDs and mortar support also btr-mds coming with their respective AA support like Verba for example, They make it to the objective  and attack enemy from the rear while also making a defense for the main force for when they arrive. And now you already have a successful front, Now you can assign tanks and attack choppers to the VDV and they can work in combined arms strategy. 

 

Again, this would be reasonable in the face of an enemy force that was not a peer threat.  As the case is, conducting it into the face of NATO would be a great way to conduct significant manpower reduction in the VDV, and save the Russian government a lot of money on pensions in the future.  The drop is still amazingly vulnerable, NATO commands an overwhelming capability in terms of air power (by all reasonable estimates, the question is "how much can NATO do over the Russian side of the FEBA?" not "Can Russians fly in a few regiments of VDV into NATO's rear?"), and it's just not a reasonable capability to exert.

 

If Russia just out and out invaded the Ukraine without NATO kicking around, it'd likely result in some pretty high causalities (I mean, one or two planes going down is still 50+ soldiers a pop), but against very important targets I wouldn't rule it out.

 

That said, if there's a 2S6 operating on the DZ (or even just a few dudes with MANPADS) it's going to be ultramessy.

 

 

 

On top of that, some of VDV units (i.e. 7th and 76th Divisions are actually Air-Assult capable as well); so they might also be used as a tactical force to capture improtant objectives in heli-borne assaults.

 

Same problem.  Massed transport helicopters are not especially easy to conceal, and against an enemy with peer capabilities it's going to be sadface.  Both Air Assault and Airborne type operations are good when you're dealing with an enemy that's defending a very wide area, or is unable to rapidly reposture on your movements.  If we're talking about the CMBS scenerio, that's not something Russia has to work with, and again if you think a few dozen MI-8s trucking along is going to get the job done, even with air cover, I have to question your understanding of how lethal airspace will be on both sides of the FEBA.

 

 

 

Although the VDV are capable of large scale air drops. They realise this and favour operating as air assault infantry. All their vehicles can just as easily drive to the battle as be dropped. If they were to be deployed in eastern Ukraine. They would airdrop within Russia, rapidly deploying from Psykov, then drive over the border.

 

This closer to what I'd expect.  They are strategically very mobile.  If the war went from NATO and Russia having a genital measuring contest, to all out real war, both sides would be rushing in air-transportable assets.  For the US, just as an example of the other side of the fence, this would likely be Stryker Brigades given the ability to realistically move them by strategic airlift.  For Russia flying in the VDV to the region, then mounting up and operating as mechanized infantry "light" is a very reasonable choice, and less wasteful than scattering dead paratroopers about eastern Ukraine.  

Edited March 2, 2015 by panzersaurkrautwerfer

[DreDay]

They didn't capture a single major 1st MarDiv objective. They were supposed to take a bridge, but that mission was cancelled when it was decided a bunch of Humvees weren't going to cut it. They weren't even leading the division in most cases; it was only when the opposite LAR (doing the same thing, but in LAV-25s) ran into resistance strong enough to stop them that 1st Recon pulled ahead and led the rest of 1st MarDiv. For the most part the 1st Recon were operating on the alternate route, against zero resistance at all and frequently behind the leading elements of the division. That was intentional; no amount of pluck and gumption makes up for protected firepower. I don't think it takes away from their accomplishments, but credit where credit is due -- the LAVs were generally blazing a trail for the division, not 1st Recon.

 

Fair enough sir. I will be the first one to admit that 1st Marine Division opps in 2003 is not my area of expertise. Unfortunately most of my knowledge of it is based on Generation Kill (the book) and some AAR reports that I was able to access relating to it;  so I simply don’t know enough about this subject matter to contest your points and I will gladly accept them.

 

 

Gori was abandoned two days ahead of the Russian advance and there was nothing substantial defending Poti. The real fight of the war was getting troops through the Roki Tunnel and that fight was led by two MR BTGs, not VDV.
 
Taking from The Tanks of August:
Almost immediately after the beginning of massive Georgian shelling of South Ossetia, at 0100 on August 8, the Russian General Staff ordered the troops deployed at the training ranges near the Ossetian border to march towards the Roki tunnel. Within half an hour of receiving the orders, the two battalion-size tactical groups of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division’s 693rdand 135th Motorized Rifle Regiments were on the move. At about 0100, the Russian Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, was on the phone with President Dmitry Medvedev to report about the beginning of the Georgian offensive. It seems likely that during that phone conversation, the president authorized the Russian Army to cross into South Ossetia. At 0200 on August 8, the first Russian armor of the 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment’s battalion-size tactical group crossed into South Ossetia. It was soon followed by the battalion tactical group of the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment.

 

Now the war of 8.8.8 is something that I am a little more comfortable discussing… I am glad that you have read The Tanks of August, which is a good (although a bit disjointed) account of that conflict. But I am sorry to say, with all due respect, that you simply don’t have any clue about what you are trying to debate here. The first two units to cross the Roki tunnel were in fact the BTGs from 693^rd  and 135^th MRRs as those local units were designated as an RDF for South Ossetia. Their mission was to join the friendly South Ossetian defense forces in Java and then to rescue the trapped Russian peacekeepers in Tzhinvali. However, by the time that Tzhinvali was cleared and Russian command had issued orders to push into Georgia proper - their spearhead was made up of the BTG from the 76^th VDV division (that was flow-in and rushed to the front ahead of other arriving units). This BTG eventually became separated from the 693^rd MRR, but yet they had pushed on to Gori and took the key strategic positions around it while destroying Georgian units that stood in their way. Only at that point was Gori abandoned by the Georgian forces despite massive amounts of heavy weaponry that was stored there.

 

As for Poti – it was far from undefended. It (along with Senaki) was protected by an entire infantry brigade, not to mention smaller army and navy units stationed there… Yet they all ran at a site of single Russian BTG from (as I recall) 7^th VDV Division (along with supporting 45^th VDV Spetsnaz units) despite Georgian absolute superiority in manpower and heavy weaponry.

 

As I’ve said -  wars are won by initiative, skill, bravery, valor, and superior weaponry (in about that order).

[Apocal]

Now the war of 8.8.8 is something that I am a little more comfortable discussing… I am glad that you have read The Tanks of August, which is a good (although a bit disjointed) account of that conflict. But I am sorry to say, with all due respect, that you simply don’t have any clue about what you are trying to debate here.

 

I know what I'm debating: by time the Russians were able to pour forces through the Roki Tunnel, the Georgians had zero chance to turn things around. That was the point of decision after which the only question was how long and at what cost. There is no realistic string of events that stops the Russian attack or prevents them from eating the Georgian forces wholesale once they are through the tunnel. I presume the Russians understood this just as well, which is why they sent two combined-arms formations with plenty of ass and firepower to do the job, rather than trusting the Georgians would be the incompetent pushovers they proved to be later.

Edited March 2, 2015 by Apocal

[DreDay]

I know what I'm debating: by time the Russians were able to pour forces through the Roki Tunnel, the Georgians had zero chance to turn things around. That was the point of decision after which the only question was how long and at what cost. There is no realistic string of events that stops the Russian attack or prevents them from eating the Georgian forces wholesale once they are through the tunnel.

 

I presume the Russians knew this just as well, which is why they sent two combined-arms formations with plenty of ass and firepower to do the job, rather than trusting the Georgians would be the incompetent pushovers they proved to be later.

 

You definitely have some knowledge of this, I did not mean to suggest otherwise; but I am afraid that you are missing the point of our discussion. The two MRR BTGs that you focus on went into South Ossetian friendly territory first because they were stationed localy (right across the border) and they were designated as first responders. If you really want to get into the specifics of it - they were completely outgunned by the Georgian forces for the first couple days... but that is besides the point... I was referring to the Russian advance into Georgia proper from South Ossetia and Abkhazia that was spearheaded by "light" but highly trained and motivated VDV units that were rushed to the battle zone ahead of other "heavier" formations...

Edited March 2, 2015 by DreDay

[Apocal]

You definitely have some knowledge of this, I did not mean to suggest otherwise; but I am afraid that you are missing the point of our discussion. The two MRR BTGs that you focus on went into South Ossetian friendly territory first because they were stationed localy (right across the border) and they were designated as first responders. If you really want to get into the specifics of it - they were completely outgunned by the Georgian forces for the first couple days... but that is besides the point... I was referring to the Russian advance into Georgia proper from South Ossetia and Abkhazia that was spearheaded by "light" but highly trained and motivated VDV units that were rushed to the battle zone ahead of other "heavier" formations...

 

Yeah, I was just saying there wasn't a fight for either city. Sort of pointless to talk about picked men making up for light firepower when there wasn't really any action to be had.

[Michael Emrys]

Against an intelligent enemy, if you just punched a hole in this ADA network, and you're now pumping the air with jammers, what do you think you've just told him about your plans?

 

That it's a feint? (Sorry, couldn't help myself.)

 

 

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Whatever those units were lacking in durability and firepower, they more than made up in morale, initiative, and training...

 

Ah yes, the old myth of "fighting spirit". Nearly every fighting force has some version of it, and sometimes it even works. It's definitely worth having along if you can manage it. But it seldom serves as a substitute for material advantage and good tactics.

 

Michael

[DreDay]

Ah yes, the old myth of "fighting spirit". Nearly every fighting force has some version of it, and sometimes it even works. It's definitely worth having along if you can manage it. But it seldom serves as a substitute for material advantage and good tactics.

 

Michael

 

Please note that I had placed training (which certainly includes tactical skill) on pretty much the same level as high morale and initiative; so I am not exactly sure what you are taking issue with here...

[Michael Emrys]

Please note that I had placed training (which certainly includes tactical skill) on pretty much the same level as high morale and initiative; so I am not exactly sure what you are taking issue with here...

 

While you do not in so many worlds claim that morale, initiative, and training can replace material superiority, I get the feeling that you are not far away from claiming that. But I recall that that was the credo of the Imperial Japanese Army, a credo that was rather decisively debunked. Don't get me wrong, as I said earlier, morale, initiative, and training are better to have than to be without. But troops tend to have high morale as long as they are winning. They also get really good training if they stay alive long enough to learn what combat teaches. Both those things can happen if they can destroy their enemies without getting blown up themselves. Good training and good leadership are good things to go into battle with, but it is also good to have equipment that will do the job and can be relied on to do the job. The morale of troops who are seeing their buddies get blown up on both sides of them due to deficient or defective equipment will plummet no matter how good it may have been at the start of battle.

 

Michael

[DreDay]

Yeah, I was just saying there wasn't a fight for either city. Sort of pointless to talk about picked men making up for light firepower when there wasn't really any action to be had.

 

Yes indeed, there was no real fighting in Gori or Poti, largerly due to the rapid Russian advance of VDV spearheads that had precluded the Georgians from organizing their defensive perimeter. There was some fighting in Tzhinvali, but most of it was done by local defenders who were eventually joined by Russian elements of the two MRR regiments that you had mentioned. However the BTG from 76th VDV division did "fight" their way to Gori (overrunning several supply points, scattering retreating Georgian units, and destroying an AT battery that was guarding a key entrance to the city) - the fact that they were chosen for such role and had performed it successfully (eliminating the need for costly urban combat) speaks to my original argument. Successful maneuver and decisive advances are more important in operation art than the actual battles (that you want to keep to a minimum). That is not something that's well reflected in wargames (as it is not particularly fun to play with), but real-life operational art is based on those principles.

[DreDay]

While you do not in so many worlds claim that morale, initiative, and training can replace material superiority, I get the feeling that you are not far away from claiming that. But I recall that that was the credo of the Imperial Japanese Army, a credo that was rather decisively debunked. Don't get me wrong, as I said earlier, morale, initiative, and training are better to have than to be without. But troops tend to have high morale as long as they are winning. They also get really good training if they stay alive long enough to learn what combat teaches. Both those things can happen if they can destroy their enemies without getting blown up themselves. Good training and good leadership are good things to go into battle with, but it is also good to have equipment that will do the job and can be relied on to do the job. The morale of troops who are seeing their buddies get blown up on both sides of them due to deficient or defective equipment will plummet no matter how good it may have been at the start of battle.

 

Michael

 

Michael, please don't take this the wrong way; but you are stating the obvious. It is better to be healthy and rich than sick and poor - we all know that and there is no need to dwell on it. Yes, all the best training and morale and initiative would not help you if your weaponry is incapable of hurting the enemy (as was the case with Japanese Imperial Army AT artillery and armored forces). There is no need to take it to such extreme. That was not my point, and there is no need to debate it based on such assumprtion.

[Michael Emrys]

Successful maneuver and decisive advances are more important in operation art than the actual battles (that you want to keep to a minimum). That is not something that's well reflected in wargames (as it is not particularly fun to play with), but real-life operational art is based on those principles.

 

Here, my friend, I think we are largely in agreement. Getting there "firstest with the mostest", to once again misquote the old general, is nearly always a good idea. But we have to keep in mind that having the mostest—however you care to measure it—is as important as being firstest.

 

Oh, one thing that I might argue with is whether that would be fun in a wargame. Might not be fun in a game like CM, which is all about resolving the battle once the forces have joined. But in a higher level operational or grand tactical game it might be great fun to pull off a coup like that.

 

Michael

[DreDay]

Oh, one thing that I might argue with is whether that would be fun in a wargame. Might not be fun in a game like CM, which is all about resolving the battle once the forces have joined. But in a higher level operational or grand tactical game it might be great fun to pull off a coup like that.

 

 

Oh I completely agree. The only relevant game that comes to my mind is The Operational Art of War that is hopelessly outdated at this point. I would love to see a modern reincarnation of it; but I still fear that you and I will be in a very small pool of die-hard wargamers that enjoy that kind of stuff; evern when compared with the CM seriesl; so I don't know how commercially viable such a project would be... I would love to be proven wrong on that though!

[BTR]

Yeah, but given a narrow front like the Ukraine, where are they going to insert from?  It's going to be airspace that's dangerous to be a small high performance fighter, let alone a transport.  Unless they're going to drop outside Warsaw because YOLO, seems doubtful given the concentration of air defense.

 

They don't have to be dropped Right on top ala WW2 to be effective and disruptive. Smacking them into southern Belarus on short notice to put pressure on Kiev could be something achievable given they leave Belorussian soil immediately after. 

[Stagler]

Exactly as BTR said, their mobility is their strength. Not to be used to surprise the enemy by appearing outside his barracks so to speak. Just the ability to suddenly surge and be at any one location within the space of a day without prior warning. I.E to surge on the Ukrainian border within a day and launch an attack before Ukrainians can reposition their forces to cover their avenue of approach.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

They don't have to be dropped Right on top ala WW2 to be effective and disruptive. Smacking them into southern Belarus on short notice to put pressure on Kiev could be something achievable given they leave Belorussian soil immediately after. 

 

Sounds like we're in agreement as I also posted:

 

 

 

<Reference to not parachuting onto the enemy> This closer to what I'd expect.  They are strategically very mobile.  If the war went from NATO and Russia having a genital measuring contest, to all out real war, both sides would be rushing in air-transportable assets.  For the US, just as an example of the other side of the fence, this would likely be Stryker Brigades given the ability to realistically move them by strategic airlift.  For Russia flying in the VDV to the region, then mounting up and operating as mechanized infantry "light" is a very reasonable choice, and less wasteful than scattering dead paratroopers about eastern Ukraine.  

 

I've been disputing the actual paradrop stuff because of the following:

 

 

 They make it to the objective  and attack enemy from the rear while also making a defense for the main force for when they arrive. And now you already have a successful front, Now you can assign tanks and attack choppers to the VDV and they can work in combined arms strategy. 

 

 

Which is pretty unambiguously dropping behind the FEBA. This is not a realistic mission set against NATO.  Rapid deployment, and deployment on a flankish-axis (I doubt the Belarus border, or any possible approaches will be unsecured to the degree to make them "rear" although hitting the flank security in some strength is likely) is pretty reasonable though..

 

On the other hand, now we're getting into geopolitics and the question might just migrate into "would Russia retaliate with nuclear weapons against NATO attacks into Belarus" given the weird twilight state Belarus is in.  

Edited March 2, 2015 by panzersaurkrautwerfer

[Stagler]

If a breakthrough was made and air control was denied to NATO after an opening engagement, helicopter borne troops would exploit. They wouldn't try to drop behind a NATO unit in an opening engagement on any large scale because they would assume NATO superiority.

VDV does not possess very good organic AA assets.