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FancyCat

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Everything posted by FancyCat

  1. Russia had to invade openly in 2014 to prevent the separatists from being crushed. How will that occur again?
  2. Was the Baltics ungovernable during the Soviet era? No? I would say that the goal of the occupation succeeded. Only with the collapse of Soviet central authority and via non-violent resistance did the Baltics break away. 2014 sure didn't start out peacefully and occurred with significant Russian government backing. In the situation where the Donbas and Crimea is liberated via militarily overrunning the regions, there will be no way for Russian infiltration and support to filter back into the Donbas and Crimea. Which one would it apply to?
  3. 1. Pretty doubtful we can classify the UPA as a direct ancestor of the post-Soviet state of Ukraine. 2. That could apply to both sides?
  4. tbf, didn't they kill their way thru the UPA? On that note, since no insurgency is defeated purely thru killing, don't we have plenty of examples of insurgencies that are defeated? Chechnya, the Baltic anti-Soviet insurgencies, Polish, etc, just to remark on a few in Soviet/Russian orbit.
  5. A bit uncharitable, he does reply later that NATO will be protected, and since Poland is part of NATO, it will be protected. Mud!
  6. I'm pleased to see the ICRC (i assume its them) is monitoring Ukrainian POW camps. Considering this is a Russian broadcast, I think we can confidently confirm it as evidence of proper treatment of Russian PoWs is occurring and being monitored at least at this particular camp. Hopefully, a decent number of Russians caught the broadcast live.
  7. Now, this should relieve most pressure for long range missiles, as most public arguments for it were focused on stopping the source of the long range attacks on Ukraine.
  8. Exactly, better to have the stare down over Ukraine, where NATO is not obligated to go to bat in blood and potentially nuclear exchange. Because, Europe can not rely on the U.S to defend NATO indefinitely and personally, I am unsure if the rest of NATO is able to withstand not breaking apart vs Russia. We shouldn't let Russia test our red lines. See above. Why let Russia test the red lines? We know Russia's red lines want to be Crimea and the Donbas. We have slack to push them on that. Sorry, I don't believe Germany or France will defend the Baltics. I don't think it can be assured that the U.S will stay in NATO either, not with increasing isolationism at home over the long term. But we are nearing going around in circles, so again I will refrain from replying.
  9. What would it cost Germany to give up the Baltics? Finland? Big difference between Poland and the Baltics. Hey, Germany does not have nukes...it would have to rely on France to defend it from nuclear blackmail...see how it goes? We should not deescalate when this conflict has been Putin escalating. Right on time,
  10. If Russia gets the West to back down over Ukraine, why wouldn't Putin or his successor keep pushing? What stops nuclear blackmail? The threat of being backed into the wall? What is the wall for the West? We like to think it's NATO territory. Putin may decide it isn't. My point is why risk it getting to that red line? Why legitimatize Russia in Ukraine? Why not contest Russia in Ukraine? Where we don't have red lines. I personally don't want to think of having to fight for NATO. (I am also unsure if the U.S will always have NATO's back) We have a prime opportunity in Ukraine to ensure NATO is never at risk without risking any NATO lives. Russia will always rely on nuclear deterrence and threats of nuclear use. Certainly under Putin we cannot be assured it won't continue should it succeed in Ukraine. Let the risk of it be over Ukraine rather than the Baltics. (What about Russia's red line? I circle back to Russia declaring red lines in Crimes and Donbas, combine it with their desire to throw off the international order, clearly Russia wants to keep Crimea and Donbas, to take chunks of Ukraine as I already pointed out, legitimating it will have far reaching consequences worldwide) These discussions are nice but I've laid out my words, and I'm keen not to derail the thread further from the battlefield so im going to be quiet on this.
  11. It should be. (Tho with the way much of the west's statements are supporting the restoration of full territorial integrity of Ukraine. I quibble that it is not committed, it is promised, but who knows if the promise is kept down the line) It is in Putin's interest to act like that. Whether is earnest or not. It is a essential part of his strategy to act like escalation can go up to the worldwide apocalypse. It's blackmail. You don't give in to a blackmailer. You certainly don't give in to a blackmailer who on the eve of the invasion, tossed all prior justification for intervention in Ukraine to assert a worldview legitimating naked aggression for the seizure of territory of another sovereign state. You don't give in to a blackmailer who is supposed to be a guarantor of the international order, who basically flipped the table at the UN and started the invasion of Ukraine right in the middle of a UN Security Council meeting, with a demand to the end of Western dominance and the international order where naked aggression is punished. If the West's major powers cannot support Ukraine in this near complete black and white conflict for the restoration of it's territorial integrity than why should any state rely on them to provide protection in the future? Why should Japan not rearm with nukes? Vietnam? Taiwan? If Ukraine is failed to be supported, why should the rest of the eastern flank states feel secure? Finland, the Baltics, Poland? The population and size of the Baltics make it quite attractive for a Russian seizure. But NATO? If NATO can't be bothered to face up with Russia over Ukraine, due to nuclear blackmail, than it makes it exceedingly more likely it can't over the Baltics. Russia's goal, from Putin's words, is to demolish the rules based international order, reorganize the world and to legitimize naked aggression and Russian imperial aims. If you can't understand why this needs to be opposed and punished for, then whatever, there isn't any point in continuing this discussion.
  12. People, Putin wants to return to the age of Peter the Great, where states waged war and carved out land and people like slices of beef for breakfast, lunch and dinner. No **** letting him annex or hold anything in Ukraine represents a defeat for the West, his entire goal of invading Ukraine was to signify worldwide that **** is back in vogue. So ya, he's gonna be daring the West with that big red button but the key is NOT to give in. Otherwise, every state will run for their own big red button, including the ones in the West! And every piece of **** with dreams of glory and Peter the Great in every country is suddenly gonna start thinking of the same carving of land and people and then that's it, Pandora's box. No, the West, the world cannot let that happen. That is why support for Ukraine must be steadfast and with the full restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine.
  13. As Butschi mentioned, many Germans are in favor of it, including many members and portions of the ruling coalition in the German government. The context of the Kubela's statement must be placed alongside the statement of the head of the German parliament defense committee, https://www.yahoo.com/now/u-supports-transfer-german-leopard-175300192.html who reported that the U.S is ready to support Germany in supplying western tanks to Ukraine. When I refer to Putin betting on Western support for Ukraine waning, and Ukraine being left to deal with a stalemate and/or forced into unfavorable peace treaties, that belief is fuelled by western reluctance in supplying Ukraine. Legality or no legality, in my opinion, the West, NATO, Europe has been given a lifeline via the Ukrainians and their resistance, in that the destruction of the Russian military is occurring in Ukraine, with absolutely no burden on any of NATO in terms of lives, something that every Western nation is keenly vulnerable to. (And I won't look a gift in the mouth, if we contemplate the scenario where Putin had successfully taken Ukraine, the chances of NATO vs Russia increase greatly down the line)(resistance by no means is forever, as the Ukrainian SSR represents, and you know, as a citizen of the U.S, I am grateful not to have to think of a future where Russia, empowered with Ukraine, challenges in the Baltics with hybrid warfare and internal discord in the West. Very grateful.) But adversely, that means eastern Ukraine is turned into a devastated land, and the lives of Ukrainian civilians and military are killed every moment that goes by. As the RUSI report alludes to, casualty rates for Ukrainian personnel are high. Manpower is essential, especially the trained and experienced personnel, anything that can preserve them best serves Ukraine and the West in successfully defeating Russia. Western tanks represent a escalation, but also represent a challenge to Putin, who mind you, has chosen escalation, over and over again. If the goal of NATO support in Ukraine is to force the liberation of all Ukrainian lands, by any means possible, considering Putin has time and time indicated he feels that the West will be bored of supporting Ukraine, tired of missing cheap Russian energy, and fundamentally weak to sacrifice anything for Ukraine, it is essential for Putin to seriously consider the preservation of his military and relations repaired with the West via the withdrawal of all Russian forces back into Russia. That Putin has doubled down, that he has annexed parts of Ukraine, represents that he continues to think western support will fade and he will succeed. And yes, the goal of the west is not merely to restore borders to pre-invasion, but to force a loss territorially for Russia, who in invading, has targeted the entire international order, the west's dominance and ethical position. failure to punish, represents a death knell for any state deciding to side with the west in the future. (What about military dominance? Surely we can just bomb our competition? nope, if sovereign states can no longer be assured that they remain whole via the enforcement of the international order, the result will be nuclear proliferation and rearmament and instead of one or two nuclear armed states, we will have plenty more, with all the hellish implications it results in)(western influence is utterly falling apart worldwide, failure to uphold the rules of the international order via the restoration of the full wholeness of Ukraine will only signal the full extent of that weakness) And, lives lost, equipment lost, surely Putin and co gives a damn? No, I don't think so. He thinks not in lives, but in money and land. Lives, only insofar as resources. As shown by Iran, he can get replacement equipment from friendly states. If we let him cause a stalemate in Ukraine, that will only enbolden the rest like China to start supporting Russia and openly challenge the West. That, in all measures, we need to avoid. I think there's a lot of "Russia is defeated" going around, but I'm not so sure we can count Russia out. Clearly, Putin is determined to escalate due to western weakness. We must match him in order to illustrate our resolve. We need to make clear he should strongly consider the offers on the table right now. We are not doing that in my opinion.
  14. The Foreign Minister of Ukraine asks again for Western tanks. Is he uninformed as to what Ukraine needs to wage this conflict? Need not be immediately, logistics need to be set up, but surely Ukraine would be less publicly pushing Germany if such promises were issued.
  15. I am unsure where the ignore button is unfortunately. They don't need to be immediately sent to Ukraine of course, but pledges and public promises for the creation and maintaining of supplies is important. Big portions of the industrial capacity of Ukraine is status unknown or damaged or knocked out, including military repair. Restarting and increasing NATO and Soviet ammunition is continuing, but I believe Soviet air frames are largely phrased out in Europe no? Other operators of Soviet era aircraft are unlikely to be friendly to NATO. The sooner training and procurement can begin, the easier the time for Ukraine to phrase it in especially if this war continues. As for uninformed, Ukraine itself is leading the requests for tanks, long range missiles, (tho recently this switched to air defense) so I unsure why Ukraine is asking for it if not militarily useful. Ukraine led requests for western aircraft. I remember when it was begging for western anti-ship missiles. I strongly recall Russian sentiment that it would be unacceptable escalation for it to be provided. It's been a constant narrative the entire conflict, even as Russia escalated it's demands and expanded their aims and set new lines like annexing territories. But I am not ignorant to risks of escalation, but suggesting Putin is going to flip the switch due to targeting of inside Russian borders, again Russia has claimed the Donbas and Crimea as it's territory, we are clearly standing on red lines.
  16. tbf, i still think at this point that Russians can still travel to the U.S and Europe, except for certain sanctioned people, but largely their families are free to head over via 3rd party flights to avoid the flight path cancellations. those killings of Russian businesspeople in the west, i think were a overt signal for people that visiting Europe and U.S is fine, as long as you remain faithful and loyal to Russia.
  17. Wonderful. If Ukraine can illustrate continued capability to use Tu-141 to impact those air bases, ATACMS can potentially be normalized as being less esculatory than the Tu-141s, having less range.
  18. Other posters were advocating for “easy, quick” solutions for the end of the war. I do not think ATACMS will make the war quicker, or substantially easier. What I’m saying is historically, Ukraine has shown patience, foresight, and willingness to hit Russia where it does not gain, only loses, and where Ukraine gains and not loses. In this context, I suggest it’s not out of hand for Ukraine to be given more longer range weapons. Ukraine has its own capability but limited supply, like the Tonka missiles which were sparingly used, or the Neptune. Like Neptune, only after Ukraine showed the capability and the ability to handle the same sort of weapon, western equivalents were provided. Ukraine entire strategic aim has been “nibbling”! It’s been incremental! Kherson, Moskva, logistical strikes! We provided like 4 HIMARS launchers, imagine if 8 were provided or 12 at the beginning! Western aid has been that limited! Escalation? Bah, Putin has stripped the forces aligned against NATO, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/28/russia-ukraine-war-nato-eastern-flank-military-kaliningrad-baltic-finland/ Article states 80% of the 30k troops facing the Baltics and Finland are now in Ukraine. S-300 batteries defending St. Petersburg are gone. Naval personnel from the Baltic Fleet have appeared in Ukraine. Suggesting Russia will regard the forced movement of nuclear capable bombers away from NATO territory as a serious threat does not mesh with Putin stripping conventional military capability from NATO borders. It speaks the opposite, Putin has no fear of any nuclear or conventional NATO response to Russia anytime soon. Aid to Ukraine is stuck. We are sending Marder IFVs to other countries so they can hand over freaking BMP-1s. Ukraine is adopting NATO style protection of crew and personnel but has only Soviet style armor, if Ukraine has rightly decided to try and preserve the lives of its personnel, it should be obvious that Marder IFVs, Leopard tanks, like MRAPs already in Ukraine, contribute significantly to preserving the lives of Ukrainian personnel. It is entirely within reason to classify small amounts of long range missiles to Ukraine as non-escalatory cause western aid continues to be exceeding slow, limited, and often relegated to hand me downs and less preferred equipment. But just like with prior Russian attempts to stop the increase and sophistication of western aid to Ukraine, they are predominantly threats aimed at warning that the aid represents escalation and conflict between NATO and Russia, but we have not even seen attempts to stop the aid en route in western Ukraine due to Russian worries about striking NATO.
  19. One very, very important factor, while we can only guess as to the actual intent of Western leaders being “slow”, “cautious”, “limiting” in regards to aid to Ukraine, we see that Putin is publicly prepared to continue the war, particularly with respect to betting on Western support to Ukraine to wane, and Russian positions improve so Putin thinks the West is weak and unwilling to support Ukraine and anger Russia. In that sense, limited provision of ATACMS matches well with Western reluctance to support Ukraine. Provide a few missiles, refuse more, Ukraine is pissed, Putin sees that yes, long range missile strikes are harder to do by Russia, but Ukraine is publicly left to dry…not really “escalatory” is it? I.e, we have no idea whether the mood in the Kremlin is panicked or calm, but certainly Biden and co does, including potential warning signs like alertness of the nuclear triad, etc, therefore, combined with how the West has operated during this invasion, it is absolutely within Russian mindset that the weak West is “half-assing” support for Ukraine including these ATACMS and therefore, not likely to panic. Merely a scenario, but one to illustrate how escalation might not be so clear to Putin.
  20. Certainly we won’t know what the UKR general Staff and Zelensky are thinking of using should long range missiles be provided, but every indication from prior history indicates exceeding awareness of how to best not provoke Russia or cross lines that benefit Russia and negatively affect Ukraine. Everything I’ve seen in public statements points to silencing Russian airfields, Russian airbases and missile infrastructure that so far Ukraine has no way of stopping Russia from lobbing massive missile strikes. As far as I can tell, those targets aren’t exactly one for one the same as your suggested targets, industrial capacity (tho military repair bases have been set afire), ISR (tho Ukraine has hit airfields and radar sites in Belarus and Russia proper with drones and missiles), SLOCs in Russia close to the border have not been heavily impacted like in Belograd, or political HVTs. Except maybe that car bombing, but I still think it was a FSB op. Actually, a very restricted campaign against a few targets is in my opinion well aligned with Ukrainian intentions and understanding of how to best inflict damage against the Russian government without needlessly causing rallying the flag effects. For example, a limited campaign striking the airfields where the long range missiles striking Ukraine with impunity would absolutely be worthwhile, considering the limited infrastructure for Russia to site these forces, the limited amount of aircraft, and their logistical tail, and certainly, Ukraine has already struck at these targets, both closer to the border and the recent attacks. A limited campaign to strike a tanker aircraft, or 1-4 strategic bombers, and that’s it, Russia would have to stop or risk further unsustainable damage to the strategic air fleet. It wouldn’t cause a rally the flag effect, it would be a significant boost to Ukrainian military and civilian morale, it would degrade and delay the ability for the Russian military to launch further missile attacks, and importantly, would represent a commitment to Ukraine by the West without being “needlessly” destructive and backfiring. Sorta like when only 4 HIMARS were provided to Ukraine at the beginning. (Later more but still) I recall people being annoyed at the fact that the US has 450 himars but only provided 4. We certainly don’t need to provide more than a few ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, this entire conflict has been characterized by quite slow and few supplies to Ukraine. Example, U.S waits for Russia to launch another massed missile strike at Ukraine, publicly declare a few missiles were given, amid Ukraine firing them at the airfields. Russia must takes steps to prevent losses, and degrades the ability for missile strikes on Ukraine as a result. I mean we already helped sink the Moskva. Is the Admiral Makarov off limits due to being able to fire missiles against land targets? Russia has already virtually ignored the drone attack on the Engels air base. Wiki says it’s the only base where the Tu-160 is based at so another limited strike via ATACMS could force Russia to relocate or stop using it for missile strikes, certainly a important goal worth pursuing.
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