Machor

Yup! Horses on the Payroll (RCAF Journal - SPRING 2016 - Volume 5, Issue 2) Out of likes again.

The Pentagon's declaration that Ukraine had received additional fighter aircraft - made to sound almost like a guilty admission - had some interesting theatrics. This was clearly not an amateur slip-up, so why the theatrics and what are they trying to communicate to whom?

Moskva's sinking video (same moments as we saw in the pictures):

I searched for contrarian takes for kicks, and was able to find some striking accounts, though the author himself is not advancing a contrarian agenda. The first from Osprey's US Navy Carrier Aircraft vs IJN Yamato Class Battleships by Mark Stille (pp. 72-3): "The strikes on the First Diversion Attack Force in October 1944 represented the largest air–sea battle in history up to that point. The 29 ships of Kurita’s force were subjected to a series of attacks by 259 carrier aircraft. For the loss of 18 aircraft, the US Navy sank Musashi, torpedoed the heavy cruiser Myoko and forced it back to base, and inflicted minor bomb damage on three other battleships. Clearly this was an American victory, but several issues deserve to be examined more closely. The most obvious conclusion was that Musashi showed itself to be able to absorb amazing punishment in excess of what its designers called for. Even after the first three attacks, Musashi could have returned to port. The fourth attack, when it was virtually unprotected and unable to maneuver, was the ship’s death knell. No other warship in history had taken as much damage – at least 11 and as many as 15 torpedoes and 16 bomb hits, plus many near misses. No other ship then afloat could have survived this type of punishment. Secondly, Japanese antiaircraft defenses were ineffective. Only 6.9 percent of the US Navy aircraft attacking the heaviest concentration of IJN antiaircraft batteries of the entire war were lost. The Type 3 antiaircraft shell designed for the 18.1in. gun was totally ineffective. For doctrinal reasons, the Type 89 5in. guns were used on a limited basis only. This left the main defense to the inaccurate and light 25mm weapons. From another perspective, the 250+ sorties mounted by TF 38 against the First Diversion Attack Force bought the US Navy a relatively poor return. In this respect, Musashi performed a valuable service to the Japanese plan, since most of the carrier air group attacks of October 24 were focused on a single target. ... The effect was that Musashi absorbed the bulk of the strikes launched by TF 38 that day. While it was getting pounded under the waves, the other primary Japanese ships of the First Diversionary Attack Force suffered little damage. Yamato and Nagato received two bombs each and the battleship Haruna easily withstood five near misses, and all three were able to remain in formation." And from US Navy Ships vs Japanese Attack Aircraft by Mark Stille (pp. 72, 76): "Concurrent with the efforts of its carrier force, the IJNAF’s land-based air force fought its own war for the control of the airspace over Guadalcanal and the waters around the island. The great majority of the sorties flown by bombers from Rabaul were devoted to attacking the airfield on Guadalcanal, but on occasion they were directed to attack maritime targets. The IJNAF attempted on several occasions to find and attack the US Navy carriers operating near Guadalcanal but they were never successful in this regard. Large convoys off Lunga Point were considered lucrative targets, and the IJNAF’s “Betty” land-based bombers conducted three large-scale attacks against them. Two of these strikes were made with torpedoes, and thus required the G4Ms to attack at low altitude to penetrate the fighter screen and launch their weapons at the transport ships. This meant that even the short-ranged 20mm guns on the American escorts and transports were now deadly. Each of the three attacks ended in disaster for the IJNAF, with 38 of 66 attacking G4Ms being lost in return for a transport and a destroyer sunk and a transport, a destroyer, and a heavy cruiser damaged. These losses showed how vulnerable landbased bombers were while conducting torpedo attacks during daylight against well-defended targets. Indeed, the attrition was so high in terms of aircraft lost that they were among the last daylight torpedo attacks undertaken by Japanese land-based medium bombers in World War II. ... On November 1, 173 carrier aircraft arrived at Rabaul. The following day, 100 of them attacked a US Navy force of four light cruisers and eight destroyers. The ships had little in the way of friendly fighter support during the opening part of the battle, but they were all new and boasted multiple 5in./38, 40mm, and 20mm batteries paired with the latest fire control. The ships assumed an antiaircraft formation and began engaging the approaching Japanese at 14,000 yards with 5in./38 guns. The task force was well-handled, unlike the dive-bombers, which attacked in an erratic fashion. Gunners claimed 17 shot down, and in return the IJNAF was only able to place two hits on the stern of the USS Montpelier (CL-57), which caused little damage. ... On November 11 the IJNAF was able to launch a full strike against an American carrier force attacking Rabaul. The latter, Task Group 50.3, consisted of the fleet carriers USS Essex (CV-9) and USS Bunker Hill (CV-17), the light carrier USS Independence (CVL-22) and a weak screen of only nine destroyers. After the carrier aircraft struck naval targets in Rabaul in the morning, they braced for the expected counterattack. The Japanese assault was comprised of 67 fighters escorting 27 D3A2 and 14 B5N2s, followed by some G4Ms. American fighter interception was ineffective until the dive-bombers began their attacks, so it came down to the antiaircraft fire from the three carriers grouped together in a 2,000-yard circle, with the destroyers in a second circle at 4,000 yards from the formation center. Bunker Hill was the main Japanese target. All three carriers were near missed by the 20 dive-bombers that attacked, only three of which escaped. The B5N2s followed, and all 14 were shot down without recording any success." The conclusion I am drawing is that when we focus in on a 'revolution,' it is fuzzy and we see expected changes occasionally swinging back.

Will try to keep OT minimum and relate to Ukraine wherever relevant: RE: Russia and Turkey As I posted before, after killing 37 Turkish soldiers in Idlib in February 2020, Russia will not be able to normalize relations with Turkey without something truly major. In the very least, considering they required Erdoğan to apologize publicly and pay tens of millions of dollars as compensation for shooting down the Su-24 in 2015, there would need to be some sort of public performance by Putin. Even then, going back to an earlier post, there would remain the question of how Russia could offer to replace Turkey's strategic partnership with Ukraine, which is more than two decades old, going back to the secularist governments before Erdoğan (The Oplot was going to become Turkey's first national MBT as the Yatagan, which didn't happen because Russia refused to sell the license for the APS). Even Erdoğan's son-in-law, Bayraktar - Yes, THAT Bayraktar - is counting on Ukrainian deliveries of engines for his future drones. Even if the Russians were to offer: "Let's build Su-57, T-14, and S-500 together," it means little without a history of mutual trust. RE: Cyprus I have no intention of belittling the suffering of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and would like to thickly underline that Turkish Cypriots have their own, distinct identity. They are overwhelmingly secular, Westernized, and highly educated. They would, if anything, look down on the religious fanatic types who support Erdoğan, and would likely be quite unhappy if Turkey wanted to annex them - in this sense, their case is very different from Donbas. Another example of the difference is that the previous president of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akıncı, publicly and vocally criticized Turkey's operations against the YPG in Syria. I refer to Turkey's military 'intervention' in Cyprus because it had the right to do so, as per the Treaty of Guarantee. In fact, Turkey approached the other guarantor, Britain, to launch a joint operation, but the British said they would only defend their own bases; many Turkish Cypriots who were cut off from the Turkish military saved their lives by finding refuge in the British bases. I firmly believe that had Britain taken part in the operation, the outcome would have been better for all the parties involved. The legality of Turkey's operation became questionable with its second stage, though the truly long-term problems that hinder a resolution result from policies enacted by Turkey's own military junta after 1980. As I wrote on the forum years ago, I think it was a huge mistake that Greek Cypriots were told to vote 'no' in the 2004 Annan referendum - when Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' - with the expectation that a better 'deal' for reunifying the island would become possible as Turkey strove for EU membership. Had the referendum passed, there would now have been already a new generation of Cypriots who had grown up in a united country. It is a lesson that Ukraine should heed with regard to negotiating its occupied territories: Gaining control of the territory should top all other considerations of concessions.

This was Russian military analysts' hubris about the Ukrainian Neptune missile before the sinking of the Moskva: And an interesting coincidence: If the last picture of the Moskva is indeed from April 15, this means it sank on the same day as the 110th anniversary of the sinking of the Titanic:

It is claimed by this (serious) account that the Moskva used an unusually large quantity of aluminum in its construction which led to a catastrophic fire. Someone replying to him claims that the mother of a Russian sailor stated only some 200 sailors made it to Sevastopol and that her son is MIA:

The US cooperating with the YPG and Russia wilfully killing 37 Turkish soldiers are in different leagues of 'complicated'. As a side, I think Russia had the chance of a century to turn Turkey to its side with the tensions over the YPG, but chose to bury this chance in the olive groves of Idlib - IMO, that was already a sign of an irrational foreign policy. It was amusing to watch pro-Russian Turkish accounts on Twitter go from "let's buy Su-35s instead of F-35s" in January 2020 to "we shall avenge our fallen" in February. Continuing from my reply above, the scales already shifted in February 2020. If Erdoğan and his Islamists cannot make truce with the West - and there's a presidential election coming in 2023 with the secularist opposition currently easily winning in polls - they'll have to strike a deal with China.

This 'news' - which appears to have originated in the Greek press - was refuted by Russia. Russia will only enlarge its existing unofficial mission for expanded consular services - supposedly, Northern Cyprus has seen a large influx of Russians fleeing Russia: ??? - All NATO bases in Turkey are open and operational, including the major US airbase at İncirlik with B61 nuclear bombs and a Spanish Patriot battery, and the Kürecik radar station. Turkey intervened in on-going fighting between EOKA-B, Makarios loyalists, Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriot Communists after EOKA-B carried out a coup to facilitate the annexation of Cyprus by the military junta in Athens; Turkey's NATO membership had no relationship to the operation itself. However, Turkey did face a years-long arms embargo by the US afterwards because of using US military aid that had been intended for NATO operations; this forced Turkey to create a new, 4th Army, which is not under NATO command and does not use NATO aid and funds.

Grognard objection: The Italian battleships were at anchor; the British were underway: Big difference for the RN. From "Death of a battleship: The loss of HMS Prince of Wales" (p.63): "Prior to the deployment of the Prince of Wales and Repulse to the Pacific, the Royal Navy had been operating for over two years (September 1939 - December 1941) in the Mediterranean in the face of intensive attacks from German and Italian land-based aircraft. These airplanes were able to damage the convoys but not totally stop them. British battleships had been repeatedly attacked but never sunk. Based on that recent war experience, it certainly appeared risky but possible to operate in waters covered by enemy land-based air. What was not understood, due to a serious intelligence failure, was the fact that the Japanese bombers based in Indo-China were not an ordinary formation of aircraft but were a force especially trained and equipped for "ship killing". These planes were specifically stationed there because of the predicted arrival of Prince of Wales and Repulse in Singapore. No other enemy or allied air force had this equivalent capability at the time. As the war progressed, ordinary land-based bombers (US B-17s, the Germans and Italians in the Mediterranean) continued attacking ships at sea with limited success. The RAF, using torpedo and rocket-equipped twin engine planes against German coastal convoys, and USN carrier-based planes (using torpedoes and bombs) and USAF B-25s, using skip bombs against Japanese coastal shipping, would finally gain the equivalent potency of these Japanese land-based aircraft later in the war."

A bizarre anti-Polish protest in Russia: 'Supporters' of the war in Ukraine gathered to destroy the Katyn memorial, but demonstrated their majesté by not doing so:

More Moskva-related: Talk of a formal declaration of war by Russia: The US has confirmed the Ukrainian account of the sinking: One for the meme-war:

Mourning wreath for the Moskva in Sevastopol - I believe Russia has yet to acknowledge loss of personnel:

Amen.

It's more complicated than the differences between the calendars: In the Orthodox Church, Lazarus Saturday is a moveable feast, which results in the requirement that the Orthodox Easter has to follow the Jewish Passover. See here: "Orthodox Easter: Why are there two Easters?" "Also in the eastern Orthodox Church, Easter must happen after the Jewish festival of Passover - as in the Easter story, Jesus celebrates Passover before his death." https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/48067272

Erm, the parallels we've been drawing on the forum with the Russo-Japanese War are bizarrely becoming closer: What are they going to do now - send in the Baltic Fleet? Oh wait! It wasn't just nukes that sank with the Moskva:

And that - rather than acting as a distraction - may have been the key mission of the TB2.

I'm tempted to revisit the Russo-Japanese War - hopefully not going too much OT - not least because @Kinophile has also been musing about it, and @LongLeftFlank has posted the racist cartoons that preceded the Russian defeat. Certainly, the fact that Russia provoked that war with nothing but racist hubris, and got dealt a decisive defeat that lead to quasi-regime change, invites comparisons with the current situation in Ukraine. However, that leads us to the teleiosis [I canz use big wordz] of the Russian defeat: Tsushima. What I find most fascinating about Tsushima isn't the fact that an early industrial fleet got obliterated after sailing halfway through the globe, but that the 2nd Pacific Squadron was ordered to sail forth from Madagascar AFTER Port Arthur had already fallen: They were supposed to sail to Vladivostok and continue the fight against the Japanese from there, but... If you've played Norm Koger's Distant Guns, you'll know that this was a hopeless strategy. The Russian leadership at the time gambled away their nation's decades-long gains in becoming a naval power for a face-saving operation that would not have brought back Port Arthur, and Russia gave up its international status as a naval power after Tsushima. TL;DR: Russians are bad losers, even if they like to recast this in their movies as being 'hard learners' *cough* The Barber of Siberia *cough*. It's one thing that the forum and a host of experts have concluded that Russia has been defeated in Ukraine; it's another thing when Russians themselves will be able to acknowledge that.

A socioeconomic dive into the Russian army ranks: "What do we know about background and social position of #Russian soldiers, who are deployed in #Ukraine? BBC analysed publicly available info about 1083 Russian servicemen, who were killed in action. Here are some tendencies were found out." "Regions that reported the highest number of the losses are so called depressed or semi depressed, ie areas with high unemployment and a low standard of living. In Dagestan (93 reported deaths) or Buryatia (53 rep. deaths) it’s very hard to find a job (let alone well paid job)" "In #Dagestan unemployment rate is 15% (compared to average 4% in #Russia), average salary - 400 USD. If one joins army as private they can around 500 USD, but army also provide them food, uniform and a place to live. So a bigger part of the salary remains in your pocket" "During “special operations” salary of a private infantryman of Russian army can reach 2.200 USD because of bonuses. Or even 2.600 USD if you are a sergeant or corporal. This is huge money for those living in the regions" "20% of officially confirmed losses come from 10 Russia's depressed regions (plus Dagestan). If we add numbers from semi-depressed regions - it will be roughly 80% of all losses reported by Russian official sources (ie local officials, media and schools)." "Striking example - there are zero(!) reports about military casualties from Moscow. Even Ukrainian sources never mentioned anyone from Moscow city, who was captured or killed in Ukraine."

Surprisingly 'sophisticated' reporting by the Beeb: "Ukraine conflict: Why is Russia losing so many tanks?" https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61021388 "Nowadays, the Russian army operates through Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), which are self-contained combat units made up of tanks, infantry and artillery. The precise composition of these units may vary, but generally they comprise a large number of armoured vehicles but relatively few infantry troops. "Russia has relatively few troops to call on," says Phillips O'Brien, a professor of strategic studies at St Andrews University, "so BTGs are a way of creating a fighting unit with lots of punch. "They're designed to attack quickly with lots of firepower. However, they have very little protection in terms of infantry personnel to escort them and to retaliate if the armoured column comes under attack," he says. "That makes the Russian army like a boxer who has a great right hook and a glass jaw.""

Here's Eduard Basurin, spokesman for the 'people's militia' of DPR, stating that they'll need to use chemicals to dislodge Azov in Mariupol:

More evidence for 'guerrilla' TB2 operations: A mobile ground control station out and about in Odesa region:

RE: Russian production capabilities Orlan-10s will now be hard to manufacture, because... they require a commercial Canon photo camera. (OK - They can probably switch to some Chinese camera - and you guys were mocking the bottle lid. )

Claimed to be more Ukrainian marines surrendering in Mariupol. I'm guessing they put up a defense in small pockets, and are having to surrender as they run out of ammo and supplies:

New video of Igor Girkin - he seems to be reading Steve's posts: "Without mobilization, including mobilization of the economy, the Russian Federation will not be able to win this war. No way. But Ukraine can, because it has mobilized, and will be receiving weapons without a limit. And when they fully mobilize, they will have a half-million strong army, and what will our group be able to do to that even with additional professional soldiers and volunteers? We will be able to add at most several ten thousand troops, which we will still have to train, because soldiers lose their combat and weapon skills without practice. In this respect, the mobilization in Donbas serves as a good example, where they sent to the line people who did not know how to load their automatic rifles, on top of which they gave them bolt-action rifles. And even if some agreements are signed, if we do not mobilize, we should expect an invasion of Russian territory. And believe me it will happen. Therefore, we cannot count on Europe. And we cannot count on China; China can help if we stand strong and fight hard. However, China obviously will not be holding up our generals' pants who, as we have seen, totally do not know how to fight, and those of our government, which cannot say in strong terms what it wants from this war. We're on our own." Interesting - and ironic - that Girkin is thinking along the lines of Chiang Kai-shek when he committed his best troops to the Battle of Shanghai to show potential allies the Chinese Nationalists' will to fight.