Kinophile
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Posts
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Posts posted by Kinophile
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2 hours ago, billbindc said:
Everything about the RUSI assessment screams to me "We aren't hearing about something pretty important" that likely was operative in both Donbas and the Gomel axis.
And still in play. You'd think Russia would have an idea what it is by now, but hey, why give the ****ers free ****. Let them figure it out and then get it wrong, all by themselves.
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
western ISR essentially illuminated the battlefield for them
Yes, Russian ISR failed in its equivalent mission, amplifying the UKR advantage. There is possibly an additional key factor, to articulate further:
1 hour ago, The_Capt said:Russian tactical confusion most definitely was a factor initially but these were the best troops the RA had. If it took them a month of getting hammered to “unconfuse” themselves then we are talking about an historic level of incompetence- which the piece directly counters.
They were good troops - within the doctrinal and cultural constraints of the pre-war AFRF. While the piece notes they should have done better it also notes that rigidity in hierarchal decision making was a key stumbling block. On a WW2 or CW battlefield, moving at the Machine pace, this was wasn't a critical flaw. But at Software pace, which is modern ISR, then it became fatal.
The fight around Kyiv might have comedown to which side could shift to Software pace first - or was even capable of it. A small local drone company enabling SOF slaughter of RUS logistics tails within a days of the invasion is a society shifting into Software pace at the drop of a hat (and which was culturally ready to do so). By contrast the RUS army was maybe fighting the ZSU, its own internal culture of deceit, rigidity and denial of initiative and Ukraine society's mentality as a whole. @Haiduk and others have mentioned the borderland / Kossack mindset, of self-organizing for defense without need of higher-up say-so, something utterly anathema to pre-war AFRF thinking.
1 hour ago, The_Capt said:I can get this in the first 72, and even the first week but at some point RA tactical commanders are going to go “f#ck this sitting on a road and dying noise” and start using all that mass, even if they were sub-optimal with respect to battlefield geometry.
Maybe by then it was simply too little, too late?
Perhaps UKR had an institutional advantage (willingness to devolve command decisions and assets to squad level) that relentlessly pulled them ahead of the Russian info/orders/effects loop. As we've all felt in-game and I'm sure you've seen in RL war, once you have a decision process advantage over your enemy where you're planning your next move as he's fighting/reacting to your last move then that advantage compounds faster than credit card debt.
1 hour ago, The_Capt said:Confused Russians and crappy BTG structure does not explain the Donbas
My personal read of the doc wasn't that the BTG had crappy structure (as you note, its fundamentally an advanced battle group concept, just like the West has shifted down from Divs) but that the higher command assumed all BTGs were essentially equal, were operating at the reported effectiveness and could fulfill the tasks assigned. But BTG #1 with its 7 tanks might actually have had only 4. BTG #2 with its 14 could easily have had only 8. Lying is endemic to any autocratic government and its institutions (and no I didnt just listen to Perun !
)These discrepancies add up to flawed data => flawed understanding => flawed orders => flawed effects + more lying to cover new failures => more flawed data, ad nauseum.
There's plenty of anecdotes of widespread Russian officer "command cowardice" - send the men alone and unaware, blame them for their failures, lie upstairs, send the men again.
Id be interested in a post-war analysis of pre-war Rus Army officer culture vis a vis mid war (Kherson/Kharkiv).
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@The_Capt thank you, interesting analysis of the analysis itself, preliminary as it is.
Red Western ISR early on, and the silence in the report about it: I read in one eyewitness account, from an anti saboteur patrol during Kyiv, how they were able to track approaching RUS teams in real time, via satellite (Sat specifically, they mentioned drone at other times and knew the difference), From I believe the tactical HQ.
Being able to provide orbital coverage to a battlefield security element implies that there was significant margin or bandwidth available to do so, without denying anything to the front line units and fires.
So as you note, Why Kyiv Win is not clearly answered - but might come down to plentiful Western ISR, allowing the UKR decision chain being very short. There are many accounts of decision points being devolved down the ladder to tactical level, as much as possible.
UKR being Tactically (and operationally on that axis) ahead of the RUS in battle event awareness, able to detect quicker, decide quicker, react quicker, shift quicker, it would add up to being constantly outside the RUS loop.
Hell, that's the primary difference even in CMBS, from US to RUS - a RUS player assumes they are being watched, must plan/deceive with that in mind and fight accordingly. And that inversely applies to RUS v UKR.
In Kyiv RUS fought the ZSU as if they thought Ukrainians had no equivalent ISR to them. Technically they were correct, it's not like Western ISR is part of Ukrainian OOBs or doctrine. So, fine, the Ukies do have a billion bloody eyes watching you, what now? Well if youre a Russian General it's Damn the Drones, Full Speed Ahead, RUS Bear go RAWR.
Like in all things war, Kyiv might have been a combo of both Friendly use of their organic advantage compounded by hostile inability to adapt along the entire command chain.
Wanting to stay schtum about the former feels like a good reason for its absence in the prelum report.
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32 minutes ago, Lethaface said:
Giving them the weapons requires also giving them the logistics, case in point is the logistics for the western supplied howitzers. Keeping them operational is already a big challenge, let alone if we add brigades of heavy advanced stuff with which Ukraine doesn't have experience / infrastructure in place.
But I guess this topic has been discussed quite a lot here already.
Ah now, of course I'm not saying just pallet drop a bunch M1s and problem solved.
But it is probably more accurate to say:
Give Them The Doctrinal Staff Level Advanced Training, logistical Infrastructure, Systemic Rebuild & Moderninzation, Integration Into Western Procurement Standards & Processes, etc etc
... But I'm lazy
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Making the "first hour" viable for helo evac is yet another reason for GIVE THEM THE WEAPONS.
SEAD is a strategic operational tactical necessity.
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3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
Is it just me, or do people feel the videos show more Russians in one place at one time than in previous points in the war? Seems like we're routinely seeing platoon sized units being hit, but prior to this it was more like squad sized units. Totally unscientific gut feeling, of course.
As for the videos, several of the incoming rounds can be seen apparently entering at a flat angle from several different locations off to the left. But those explosions look too big to be from tank fire. I was thinking maybe direct 105mm fire, but the multiple angles seems unlikely. Thoughts?
Steve
I saw that flat trajectory. Tank? Hitting something 'splodey?
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"Supply by drone has proven to be a bit problematic'[...]Obviously in active combat situations deliveries would be less problematic, and this is being done.
This war, man, this war. Spanish Civil War vibes are strong. Makes me dread what the large scale war slouching towards Bethlehem will be like.
I'll bet the Animatrix will be horribly prescient...
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Per ISW:
QuoteThe Russian MoD appealed to the Russian public’s growing concern over Russian forces’ living conditions on the front in Ukraine, sharing a video of the supposed living quarters of mobilized soldiers on the front in which one mobilized servicemember proclaims that living on the front is just like civilian life: ”warm, nice, and cozy.”
Yes, accurate description - of the inside of a HIMARS fireball...
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2 hours ago, OldSarge said:
This time CNN is likely spot on. A couple of hundred pages back, I dropped in the link to an article that EUCOM was standing up a new command focused on training and equipping Ukrainian forces https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-army/2022/10/03/us-may-establish-new-command-in-germany-to-arm-ukraine-report/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=dfn-rss-zap
Looks like they're ready to begin training.
Yes you did, good reminder!
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2 hours ago, akd said:
Thread / article on conduct of the 27th GSMRB during retreat from Izium:
What a Horrible story. And Just one of thousands. Plus General Scumbag is under arrest for 1) not paying off the right Big Wig, 2) The charges against him are based more in his military incompetence than his moral vacuum.
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Per CNN, sooooooo....
https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/politics/us-military-expanding-training-ukraine/index.html
2500 UKR a month, general training. Add to UK, French et al and in 4-6 months ZSU could be looking at 5,000+ fresh, NATO trained input each month, onwards.
Any RUS spring surge would step into the open arms of this opposing fresh influx on the UKR side.
And something tells me the UKR troops will be orders of magnitude more effective than the 2nd, 3rd wave of Mobiks...
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Id say the ratio early on and for at least 4 months favoured RUS. No technology wizardry, just sheer quantity of shells v. Soft humans. Russia had a massive numerical advantage in terms of guns, overall, and after the tactical failures at Kyiv it was eventually able to bring that advantage into play. As I understand it UKR casualties rapidly climbed from day 1 but really spiked with the Donbass offensive.
Now the ratio is slipping/has slipped in Ukraines favour but there's still a long way to go before it's 2:1 for them. Many hopes are pinned on a combination of improved UKR fires and harsh environmental conditions to improve the ratio.
But even then, unless there is a massive and front-wide anti-artillery campaign then the simple quantity of Russian barrels will always dampen down the ratio, fires v. fires.
We've tracked the degradation of Russian Operational sustainment but any let up in HIMARS suppression of artillery logistics will rapidly impact UKR loss rate.
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RUSI higher level overview of the UKR and RUS performances in the war so far.
Jack Watling et al.
Full Pdf here.
QuoteAlthough critical to competitiveness by providing situational awareness, 90% of UAS employed are lost
I knew it was high, but I thought maybe 75%. So yah, Drones functionally = munitions.
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HIMARS Hour
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1 hour ago, poesel said:
Slovakia delivers 30 BMP-1 in exchange for 15 Leo A2s
lol best value trade of the war so far
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"One time we hit 300 men."
"With one howitzer?"
"Yes. We hit them with a string of, I think, nine shells. That event made us very happy".
Weather really 300 men or not, even if you halve it that's still over a hundred. So a RL example of @The_Capt's notes about Precision (1 gun!) beating Mass (and obviously with drone aid). Not just in 1v300, but that just one gun from a battery was able to handle a serious tactical situation all on its own. On the RUS side it would take the entire battery.
In my own BS games as US I've often assigned 1-2 guns to even platoons. 1 to initial fires, second gun to adjust/adapt to enemy reactions to the first gun impacts.
https://www.rferl.org/a/howitzer-donetsk-ukraine-russia-precision-m777-morale/32154117.html
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24 minutes ago, rocketman said:
IIRC youtuber Jake Broe or Reporting from Ukraine did an update just a few days ago.
Thanks!
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Those charts haven't been updated since
RUS is certainly still able to build missiles but what I've read is that they've heavily depleted their prewar stockpiles of components (Esp. Chips) and current sanction busting efforts are not enough to maintain the ROF. Not new news for us of course.
So Iranian BMs are on the way and possibly in serious numbers. They'll continue to damage Ukraines infrastructure and try to basket-case its economy, but I've read of quiet but significant efforts by the EU to organize a long term rebuild and sustainment of the UKR energy grid. So Ukraine will eventually get a rebuilt modernized power grid.
Like with many things about the RUS Way Of War, it's attempts at intimidation only end up making Ukraine more structurally resilient in the long run.
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1 hour ago, Haiduk said:
UKR General Staff claimes UKR forces damaged railroad bridge through Molochna river near Starobohdanivka village, Zaporizhzhia oblast. This is beteween Melitopol and Tokmak. This will delay for some time supply of Russian frontline units in Zaporizhzha oblast and southern part of Donetsk oblast.
Here, yah?
https://goo.gl/maps/ScYb3pzng5vnVWEK7
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1 hour ago, FancyCat said:
Tho in hindsight, before the Kharkiv offensive, Ukraine had amassed a good cadre of units to launch that, they may well be doing it again waiting for Spring
That's a long time for a unit to "wait" in a very hot zone. Bahkmut feels like Russia's next Pesky - UKR could let them impale unit after unit while drip feeding in reinforcements and using now-peer levels of arty to accelerate the bleed. As a killing zone until the spring it works great (albeit heavy on the UKR as well - but still a contained and "manageable" loss*).
As a springboard to anywhere East it's a dead-end. Its too built up, leads into even more built up areas, the terrain is awful (the mud is bad now, but wait till all the snow melts...) and is more logistically useful for the Ivan than UKR. I'd say there are areas with far great potential reward for the ZSU than slogging across a 21st century version of Passchendaele.
*...from a bluntly and emotionless operational perspective. But heart-breaking from a bereaved daughter, son, father, mother, brother, sister's viewpoint...
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13 minutes ago, Huba said:
Why all the eggs in one basket though, unless you are flying it in a penetration mission, which the multicopters are not well suited to do. Strap a battlefield radar system under one, and zap the everything it finds with NLOS missiles or artillery/ mortars firing PGMs.
I like it.
The drones aspect is possibly why it'll be a long LONG time before we see BS2. They're such game changers that any new iteration of the game will need heavy development of the drone ideas/tactics to be in any way relevant. Even BS right now feels aged... Still good, but, well behind the times....
)These discrepancies add up to flawed data => flawed understanding => flawed orders => flawed effects + more lying to cover new failures => more flawed data, ad nauseum.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
A crux is ISR. Which pushes into orbital conflict as a possible solution - soft and hard killing LEO assets esp. Once that gets messy I'd say it gets VERY messy VERY quickly.
The inability of RUS to affect UKR's proxy space assets is possibly a major guarantor of its eventual defeat. How can you ever get ahead of the enemy loop if their data acquisition is massively more widespread, in depth and advanced than yours - and you cant degrade theirs?
Yep, re USCW v WW1 is interesting, in that technically the Europeans did do everything better - better weapons, infantry, good mobilization, coordination, etc. But their overconfidence in Mentality over Machinery doomed millions to die in doomed attacks against symmetrical forces.
With your forward-casting, its the overconfidence in Western tech to solve anything symmetrical in tech but is fundamentally vulnerable to asymmetrical posture (even though sharing same type & level of tech). The apparent Jointness of modern GHQ thinking, supposedly offering wider freedom and latitude, possibly masks a deeper rigidity in thinking - everything out there is a nail or something like it and by golly we have the best titanium hammer, when the reality is more that the damn nail moves and can see you coming. Or sumfink...