Kinophile

Ahah, yes but it'll still be a Russian nuclear wasteland...

Ref ammo for fire support in CMBS, we need an "unlimited" option. I've always felt that artillery fire support in CMBS had oddly truncated supply amounts, to wit, that a single battery has a maximum amount available and...that's it. I've always been curious about that, esp with CMs roots in WW2, where continuous and extended artillery support was the expected norm. Obviously there were times when it wasnt possible but it was expected to be available until and combat had ended. With CMBS I often play longer, hour-long games, in real time. I invariably run out of fires, esp as UKR/RUS, because I follow the doctrine - arty the living **** out of your opponent as you move forward. Plus I'm not very good and arty is the first resort of the second-tier commander :). Even so, when playing RUS v US the Russian arty is the only real leveler that RUS has and, as this horrible war has shown, it is their primary battlefield technology that enables everything else. When I create scenarios with Russian forces (and again, I build larger ones, I usually go full battalion level) I find I have to add a ridiculous amount of additional 152 batteries to give Russia the level of fires I've instinctively felt it would use ( a bloody lot) and which has been borne out in real life (even more than I've anticipated). I've one scenario involving a UKR Mech Co retreating 2 Kms under fire and I needed to provide at least 6 x 152 batteries, coming in at staggered intervals, to give the sense in-game of 2 batteries firing continuously at the retreating Ukrainians along their route. Now, I'm no gunner, so I dont know what is the preferred maximum firing time of a Msta battery, but I'm pretty sure they don't run out of shells after 30 mins. I'm not saying CMBS needs to perfectly reflect RL. But we do know that the attitude to fires support is very different between the two sides, with Russian very much erring on the side of quantity. Yet that is fundamentally not reflected in the ammo available to Russian batteries. Please, BFC, can I have some moar?...

Deleted

I'm pretty sure Haiduk et al are more frustrated that the West ****ed them over in favour of Russia since 2014, when properly arming them would have done so much to prevent or even just delay this war, never mind making the first few weeks even bloodier for Ivan. Obviously the pure, unrefined bull**** lines the West consistently trotted out were rationalised/excused by the general fear of Russia's war machine and Putin's sabre rattling. His schtick worked so Ukraine got crumbs and had to make do. But the frustration of how many lives could have been saved will take a long, long time to fade away, if ever. The failure to stand up to Russia, which is perrenial, will forever be shameful stain on Western elites. But its not like they give a **** about that anyway, so given half a chance they'll back out again. But not without 40 million Ukrainians shouting WTF very clearly and loudly...which might just work.

And doesnt blow his trumpet or say dramatic, silly stuff. Consistently low key, analytical and calm.

Yah its mental the long term benefits of running. My wife was a runner in her teens, early 20s. Shes never had issues losing weight, just how her system was formed at that age. Good on yah Dave.

It's basically sliding along on its belly, using the tracks as propulsion.

Nah, private podcast, no monetization, credit given, links back to original, educational benefit, etc I'll probably start with these then branch out to more original stuff.

Hi all, I've gotten very used to podcasts and listening while I do other things, and would love something like that from ISW or UK MoD. Alas no, so here's me taking a fumbling stab at my own idea of what that would be. To that end I'm going to record my own audio readings of other peoples/website various updates and articles on the war, e.g. the ISW's daily assessments, or RUSI's preliminary lessons from the war, etc. I'll post for free on Substack (or similar), link back to the articles, credit etc. I'm calling it "The Spoken War", i.e. a play on "the spoken word". It might go somewhere, we'll see. If you're interested in this, let me know in this poll: https://8f5ev5a2os9.typeform.com/to/w0UpMiLv or PM me. KP

Also, critically, the'yre not complaining about killing Ukrainians in Ukraine, just that they are not being properly trained and equipped to do it right. So the social morale and agreement with the Government line is still very much intact. They buy into Putins garbage and are perfectly OK with attacking an innocent population. Mobiks in the training system get pissed off and leave when they're not housed, fed or paid properly. I've seen absolutely nothing about any of them saying "No I dont Want To Kill Ukrainians In Their Own Land". Just - feed me, drill me, point me to the front line. Good riddance.

AS AN ASIDE: I'm developing a podcast that will focus on Film/TV technical discussions (how to shoot a car commercial, how to film food, etc). As preparation for that I want to first "find my voice" - my tone, pace, style, etc. To that end I'm going do my own private audio recordings of other peoples various updates and articles on the war, e.g. the ISW's daily assessments, or RUSI's preliminary lessons from the war, etc. I've gotten very used to podcasts and listening while I do other things, and would love something like that from ISW or UK MoD. Alas no, so here's me taking a fumbling stab at my own idea of what that would be. I'll post for free on Substack, link back to the articles, credit etc. I'm calling it "The Spoken War", i.e. a play on "the spoken word". It might go somewhere, we'll see. If you're interested in this, let me know in this poll here: https://8f5ev5a2os9.typeform.com/to/w0UpMiLv or PM me.

Yah, it cuts both ways.

Yep, it's the gulf stream that keeps us "mild" - i.e. bloody wet. Plus there's no central spine of mountains so rain just wends its merry ****ing way across the island with nary an obstruction greater than trees in the way.

I'd argue this is far more important than ATACAMS (not getting at you FC, just noting). Patriot is far, far more advanced, complex and demanding than UKRs soviet era systems. Getting Patriot is a real proof of just how much UKR AAD has impressed the Pentagon. Patriot has never been tested against an opponent nominally capable of attacking it from the air. This will be the acid test. Patriot is one of US's flagship systems that only confirmed and strategically vital allies get,. Poland & Romania have Patriot, so giving it to Ukraine implies the three AAD systems talking to each other, now and post-war, creating a strategically relevant band of mutually reinforcing and coordinating AAD, using the same tech and gear. This gives huge operational depth and great tactical flexibility. Europe would now have a continuous system of systems, of the same tech and training, all facing the Russian border. Patriot ranges 250km, about the distance from Kharkiv to Donetsk. A single Patriot battalion could defend Ukraine east of the Dniper, with reserve west of the river. With this system in place, Rus will have definitely lost any advantage in the air, and will never regain it. It plays to proven UKR ability with their existing AAD systems, what theyve managed to achieve has been remarkable and a true testament to their professional ability, technical level and organisational abilty. I'd expect Patriot set up and running in Ukraine at April 2023, absolute earliest. To me, Patriot is the next HIMARS inflection point in UKRs ability to both defend and go on the attack. I'm really, really curious about Patriot's survivablity on a modern, rapidly evolving, near-peer conflict.

Irish winters are wet and cold, and bloody miserable. For all that Canada's winters go on for WAY, JUST WAY TOO ****ING LONG I'll still take their dry cold over freeze/thaw wet, windy, PITA weather every time.

My dad is 70+, hill walks every week and has had a very active, outdoors life (dairy farmer). He can keep pace cross-country with my older brother, who himself is a goddamn Longshanks. Heart like an ox.

Still not an obligation. There is no legal requirement for NATO country A to help NATO Country B/C/D etc that is voluntarily helping one side in a third-party war between non-NATO countries (and B has not itself been attacked). Social pressure sure, but Germany is free and clear in terms of legality. It could stop everything supporting Ukr tomorrow, not interact with RUS and it would be perfectly within its rights and also not in the Vatnik camp.

Every autocratic regime creates highly effective slave-drivers, to keep the masses in line. Either the masses eventually turn on them (Libya) or something external kills off the slave-driver elites (ISIS). Wagner has effective c&c, a cadre that is tech-savvy, adaptable and utterly ruthless. Yet its numbers, the ratio of command elite to driven herd, are its weakness. Not only are they relatively few in number but their current tactics work against a proper and continuous influx of new blood. They have created an elite within an elite, that has a very high threshold of competence and brutality and a harsh filter on who gets to join. This creates a core that is capable and willing to do anything to succeed, but relatively limited in number. That reduced number is the unavoidable downside, as well as the forced slow replenishment. I mentioned previously that a campaign against WG as a force would hit its C&C nodes and networks. No point focussing on the attacking groups, hit the directing commanders. Kill off the upper echelons of command and the control will slip, precipitously. Like the regime that spawns them, slave-driver elites are powerful, strong, very dangerous - and brittle. Once you find the flaws that run through all of them, stick some knives in and twist hard, then they crack like eggshells. By contrast, democratic and Western-styled forces have a far deeper reservoir of talent to draw on, a far more open, broad-based and equal promotion ladder and consequently greater resilience to combat shocks and losses. I hope the anti-Wagner Campaign picks up speed, HIMARS those ****ers into oblivion, then lets see them bounce back. Gotta move fast and hard, they will adapt.

Zero. C'mon, with what? And really, why? At this point its "peacekeeper" forces are hollow shells, anyone remotely competent/regularly vertical is in Ukraine and only the utterly useless/very well connected are staffing the south/eastern bases. Every available shell is needed for the front (we know this because they're buying stocks from North Korea). Kazakhstan et al are very geographically large, have very distinct and clear identities and while allied to/influenced by Russia re certainly not under its yoke. Any attack would be a mirror run of Belarus attacking Ukraine - short, bloody and another huge problem for Russia. Stay back and Fire missiles? At what, and with what? The campaign against Ukraine is absorbing everything they have. Fire a bunch of missiles then ...what? Stand there and yell at each other? There's no feasible force that can back up a missile attack with a ground campaign and last longer than a week. As for air support, good luck. Repo some Ka-52s? to where? to support whom? And all while the Ukies are 777/HIMARSing the main Russian force into fun little bloody-edged jigsaw puzzles?

Interesting, so for Ukraine to achieve strategic wins without the un-realisable cost of a strategic campaign it must stay within operational-level boundaries, to maximalist effect. My layman's understanding is Strategic is a function down-to and up-from Operational; so Ukraine could achieve strategic damage without a specific strategic campaign per se. I mean, a strategic campaign is composed of operations, of course. But true Strategic success against a state the size of Russia would require a US-led WW2+ level of commitment, so its simply not going to happen and is a waste of discussion. But Ukraine can still achieve a strategic effect through operational means, without directly threatening Russia's global threat balancing load. The destruction of the RUS army in Ukraine, though a year-long, continuous succession of offensives could achieve that dissolution by the summer. For it to be a strategic effect it must be long lasting at a national level? If so then the AFRF must be comprehensively defeated both materially and psychologically, outside the borders of the Russian motherland. It cannot be a WW1 style, German Army marches away to the safety of the borders; the main RUS grouping in Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhia must be cut off, cut up and destroyed, without rescue from Russia proper. The defeat must be total, irrecoverable and relatively rapid in its end phase. This goes back to Steve's line on killing as many Russians as possible, and TheCapt's addendum on killing the right ones, which this idea delineates as every resisting Russian inside Ukraines 1991 (mainland) borders. Personally, I starting to think Crimea is a red herring. UKR talks about it a lot, Russia frets about it a lot, it is a significant logistical hub - yet it is also extremely vulnerable to isolation, a la the Pacific campaign. The destruction of the mainland Russian forces is really what matters. Do that, and Crimea inevitably falls. Do the opposite and you still have a massive fight on your hands, plus Crimea with Russian interference/partisan campaigns, missile strikes and the burden of supporting its population & garrison at very extended logistical lines, sucking away manpower, effects and material from the mainland fight.

True, I'd heard that. That could point to the "wrong person" idea, ie. a less experienced/over-promoted person or one dumped into a position they're simply not ready for, due to losses of the vets.

I dont think his ego could allow it. For him to leave, to abandon a society that he has very literally bound to his personal presence through the re-tzarisation of Russia, would be a soul-crushing moment. He's a pyschopath, and he's a tough one. And it's a big country. I'll take odds on this one

Absolutely. He'll never leave Russia.

Im surprised.... 128th are no second tier, turkey-stuffing type unit. It sounds like either the hand off was rushed/badly led or that maybe the 128th didn't realize what they were up against, weren't ready for the intensity and tactics (which points back to a flawed hand off, wrong person taking point for 128). There were numerous examples in WW1 of newer units taking over a part of the line and the transition bring a critical weak point for the enemy to attack. The simplest solution was two-fold: longer handoff and acclimatization of the new unit, followed by keeping the old unit in the locality to respond/reinforce. If I remember correctly, for the British & Americans it was the higher echelons of command that were usually the points of failure, due to overconfidence and (for the Brits) classic British demeanor of playing-down of issues/events. The casual, non-dramatic way a British officer* would describe a dangerous situation ("yes, bit of a tricky situation, that trench, something to keep a half-eye on, eh?") could be later described by an American AAR in more accurate terms ("an extremely dangerous weakness manned by inexperienced and badly lead second-rate troops opposed by highly effective and attentive Germans"). Along with the cultural verbal tangles, for the US it was the lack of battle experience and brash over compensating, to fend off being looked down on as the newbies. With the Germans I think it was the quality (and later simply the quantity) of the incoming troops themselves. For the French I think it was an slowness/inflexibility in adapting to new, suddenly applied, German tactics, which made handovers particularly effective Windows of opportunity. To be clear, I'm not casting aspersions on any particular nation, just highlighting the many and varied ways a hand over can go horribly wrong. Sure, the above were cultural issues sometimes, but the key aspect always was that someone forgot that The Enemy Is Always Watching. *A relative (Irish) was in the Irish Guards (British Army) and noted this cultural tic. He said once you got the hang of it that it was actually a useful group coping mechanism in battle, Esp with newer guys but as a Signals NCO it drove him bonkers. He found Gunners far more to-the-point and practical, as you can imagine. Staff dweebs were the worst, the absolute WORST for it. Like bloody Jeeves & Wooster, he said. Maddening. Perhaps @Splinty can confirm?

https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/agency/mo-budget.htm @sburke at its height Soviet Russia spent max 20% on military budget (mid 1980s). Afghanistan cost an extra 10-12% I think. A decade later buh-bye USSR. So a 33% of the national budget on a much harder, bloodier and larger war makes sense. Still crazy to think that Putler is willing to throw away a third of his national budget for... What? A stalemate? Christ, his ego.