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Kinophile

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Posts posted by Kinophile

  1. 7 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

    Video of action of the Tanks from 17th Armoured Bg. Krasna Hora near Bakhmut, probably rather new. If one looks closely small figures of Russian soldiers visible in the field try to escape the tanks.

    I think nobody successfully geolocated this palce so far (no reason why...) but some people suggested it could be staging place for this company, slightly behind the front. Also a lot of speculations what killed them, as they seem surprised- candidates were 155mm salvo, Grads, captured termobarics or even concentrated granade launchers fire (least possible). Perhaps our Ukrainian friends can tell more about this episode.

    Staging area in a wide open area,  zero cover or visual obstructions? 

  2. Ref Leo 2 coalition,  what can Scholz do to stymied it? I assume there are some export/sales restrictions? What are the penalties? 

    Could the Leo coalition use legal slipperiness and beaurocratic maneuvering to reduce member exposure to penalties, for transferring Leo2's without permission?

    Eg by offloading/concentrating legal exposure on 1-2 members and pooling resources to cover the financial penalties occurred by them? While the transfer marches ahead... 

    There's a point where Poland et al are just going to say "GTFOOTW,  Scholz, there's a war on. " They'll start ignoring legal squawking and do what they need to do,  no matter what the Germans say.

    Which gets quite tricky within a cooperative military alliance...

  3. 1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

    These are all behind-the-curtain machinations of this fishy individual called Tom Bombadil. Probably a Mordor spy anyway.😎

    Give us a song,  Tom!

    -- 15 mins later - -

    Lovely, thanks Tom, very ni-

    -- 1 Hour Later - - 

    ...aaaand Thank you, that was unique and extensive. 26 verses long,  wow. Now,  wher-

    -- 2 hours later --

    Ok,  Tom,  that's very detailed,  lots of interesting and extremely unusual words there, lots to a so,  well we should be go-

    -- 3 hours Later - - 

    Tom.  TOM.  TOM!!  Stop,  stop STOP!!!!! 

    -- 5 hours later - - 

    Gimme a knife,  a spoon, quick Man,  quick,  anything! WTF do you mean, he's "immortal" !?? Why do this!? Who's bloody side is he on,  anyway!? 

     

  4. 1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

    Well come on Copernicus, next you'll be That Guy asking why Thorondor didn't just carry Frodo and Nazgûl-repelling-beam-of-light-Maia Gandalf express to Mount Doom and save books II and III?

    ...Or why the well-greaved Achaeans didn't do that horse thing straightaway, or just burn all the crops and starve out Troy, saving ten-odd years of repetitive 'and his hand clutched the earth, and the darkness came before his eyes' blahblahblah in between....

    Or why have Indiana Jones in... Indiana Jones & the Ark of the Covenant. 

     

  5. 18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

    Absolutely.  All war is sacrifice.  I use that term deliberately and it does not mean to simply be willing to "give something up".  Sacrifice actually means "to make holy" or "sacred".  This is a point Clausewitz completely missed.  War is extremely personal as we literally sacrifice people for something bigger.  The real question is just how much we believe in that "bigger" thing.  This is more than "cost", it is the fundamental changes that happen at both macro and micro cultural levels as a result of any war.

    Ukraine is sacrificing - making holy costs - in defence of their ability to be free to chose their own future.  Russia is sacrificing - making unholy costs - in defence of some false vision/narrative being sold to them by a kleptocrate and his cronies to stay in power. Sacrifice negotiates with Certainty, now whose certainty is more righteous?

    No society can withstand endless sacrifice without breaking.  However, when I see Ukrainian boys holding wooden rifles better than a lot of western soldiers, I can only see a society that has a pretty deep cultural zeitgeist right now - killing Russians.  The Ukraine that went into this war, will not be the one that comes out.  Russia and Putin have likely created a regional power pole in all this that will change the face of Eastern Europe, just to add to the bafflingly bad strategic outcomes they constructed in all this.   

    However, after all that we are back to "when does it end?"  Well I think that is directly tied to the point when the Sacrifice gets close enough to the Certainty.  Kherson was painful.  There will be other operations that are just as painful.  Hell we may see a Ukrainian defeat before this is all over.  But to my mind, the average Russian's ability to "change the channel" is waning everyday - e.g. a lot of the middle-class Russian's left.  And the Russian Sacrifice-to-Certainty equation is very different then Ukraine's - time is not on Russia's side. 

    This war will end when Ukraine and the West have won enough, and Russia has lost enough.  A lot of people post that "this war will end when Putin decides", or "it will end when Ukraine decides" - this is incorrect.  A war is a living breathing entity, it carries its own weight and influence.  History is filled with wars that should have stopped but didn't.  Or ones where the job was not finished but stopped anyway.  Wars have stopped on executive decision.  They have stopped on broader public decision.  They have also stopped because of weather events and eclipses.

    In the end this war will end when it makes sense to end it. The "making sense" part is the hardest thing to determine as it is filled with relative rationality, emotion, power, culture, relationships and human failings/strengths.

    Very nicely put. 

  6. 1 hour ago, Kinophile said:
    4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

    I wonder...

    Does UKR intend to keep up the corrosive, tactical raiding/long range fires pressure on Russia, but no major offensive over Jan,  Feb? There's certainly no signage.  Kremina feels more like a steady push,  but there seems to be sustained (and sustainable) Ivan resistance. 

    Say UKR start ramping up in March as their US  vacationing pilots and NATO trained ground pounders return and integrate,  gain some experience and iron out logistical/technical kinks, then go for the jugular in April/May? 

    That gives them 3 months of relative rest/refit of worn out units, keep torturing the Ivan's logistics into funny shapes and solidify their own AD defenses (incl. versus any Iranian SRBM crap).

    It plays to the UKR preference for corrosive shaping of Russian units and plans while they themselves gain in strength, then attack. 

    It's what they've done each time and it's worked,  solidly. There's no tech the Russians can get that will counter this basic approach.

    There's certainly nothing systemic they can do, or rather,  succeed at that will stop this plan. Mobiks won't be in better shape after 3  months if winter exposure...

    Also, by March, supposedly Russia will be at/just about at peak shell-hunger....

    Hah, and Kyrylo Budanov agrees. 

  7. 2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

    I wonder...

    Does UKR intend to keep up the corrosive, tactical raiding/long range fires pressure on Russia, but no major offensive over Jan,  Feb? There's certainly no signage.  Kremina feels more like a steady push,  but there seems to be sustained (and sustainable) Ivan resistance. 

    Say UKR start ramping up in March as their US  vacationing pilots and NATO trained ground pounders return and integrate,  gain some experience and iron out logistical/technical kinks, then go for the jugular in April/May? 

    That gives them 3 months of relative rest/refit of worn out units, keep torturing the Ivan's logistics into funny shapes and solidify their own AD defenses (incl. versus any Iranian SRBM crap).

    It plays to the UKR preference for corrosive shaping of Russian units and plans while they themselves gain in strength, then attack. 

    It's what they've done each time and it's worked,  solidly. There's no tech the Russians can get that will counter this basic approach.

    There's certainly nothing systemic they can do, or rather,  succeed at that will stop this plan. Mobiks won't be in better shape after 3  months if winter exposure...

    Also, by March, supposedly Russia will be at/just about at peak shell-hunger....

  8. 48 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

    And there-in lies the issue. I would ask that someone who says they are tanks, or someone who says they aren’t tanks, to provide a definitive definition of what constitutes a “tank.” I wager that, in reality, a definition doesn’t exist!

    Oryx certainly has a simple opinion:

    FlpRZwFXkAEDDPl?format=png&name=900x900

    FlpbdY_WYAAEoWa?format=png&name=900x900

     

     

  9. 1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

    Seems like major development. What is source?

     

    An article about Bakhmut from usually well-connected reporter. Heavy casualties on both sides, but author states that Wagner creeping offensive seem to be loosing impetus:

    https://kyivindependent.com/national/as-battle-of-bakhmut-nears-culmination-ukraines-artillery-gasps-for-more-ammo

    The KI and Ponomarenko in particular must be up for some sort of Journalist/Paper of the Year award. He's been really excellent (from an English speaker POV).

    Who do our UKR friends on here recommend?

  10. I wonder...

    Does UKR intend to keep up the corrosive, tactical raiding/long range fires pressure on Russia, but no major offensive over Jan,  Feb? There's certainly no signage.  Kremina feels more like a steady push,  but there seems to be sustained (and sustainable) Ivan resistance. 

    Say UKR start ramping up in March as their US  vacationing pilots and NATO trained ground pounders return and integrate,  gain some experience and iron out logistical/technical kinks, then go for the jugular in April/May? 

    That gives them 3 months of relative rest/refit of worn out units, keep torturing the Ivan's logistics into funny shapes and solidify their own AD defenses (incl. versus any Iranian SRBM crap).

    It plays to the UKR preference for corrosive shaping of Russian units and plans while they themselves gain in strength, then attack. 

    It's what they've done each time and it's worked,  solidly. There's no tech the Russians can get that will counter this basic approach.

    There's certainly nothing systemic they can do, or rather,  succeed at that will stop this plan. Mobiks won't be in better shape after 3  months if winter exposure...

  11. 1 hour ago, Grossman said:

    In July 2022 US Congress gave approval for the US Air Force to train UKR pilots on F15's, F16's and other US aircraft. There's about 600 UKR folk hanging around in Texas at various Air Force bases.  With a 3 month minimum training period the first cohort should be ready for service. 

    Do those "other aircraft"  go-

    bbbBBBBRRRRRRRRRTTTTTTTttttttt!.... 

  12. 1 hour ago, Huba said:

    I came across something extremely interesting - a transcript from the French National Defense
    and Armed Forces Commission, from November 16th. It concerns various subjects, but let me paste here the most juicy bits (Google translated):

    On the RU losses:

    On the monetary value military support from US vs UE:

    And a bit about training UA forces and their plans:

    Full document is available here:

    https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l16cion_def2223022_compte-rendu#

    Wow very nice find @Huba.

    Link? 

  13. 23 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

    Russian ships would have to go through a choke point into the Mediterranean. The reason why a navy is constructed is for sea control in the first place. Again, a blockade is a  last resort to put added pressure on Russia and dry up their cash flow as much as possible. If a blockade does not phase Russia, then they will not fight to break it. I fear this war will never end and normalcy will never return to Ukraine unless Russia's capacity and will to lob buzz bombs is ended. Closely monitoring all Russian imports and exports would help enforce a strict ceasefire if one ever comes about. Let's not kid ourselves. The US and the West is at war with Russia. Would a blockade instigate a WMD attack? If not, there really is no downside. Those accepting Russian energy or other favors are becoming more and more complicit with Ukraine's hardships. Enough is enough already. 

    An economic, militarily enforced blockade on the largest country in the world? For how long?

    Sanctions already blockade by proxy, attempting to impose a cut-off at source, using domestic legal threats via cheap & infinite Lawyers rather than at the destination ports, via expensive and limited Warships. Sure, closely monitoring would work -  if the Russians allow it, which they won't. If you begin stopping Russian trade ships with Western warships in the Black Sea,  Baltic, Artic and,  on the other side of the world, the northern Pacific (just to remind ourselves of the scale of the problem) then someone will press the wrong red button real quick, and then whole keyboards of red buttons will start getting mashed. 

    The US and West are not at war. We're in a geopolitical struggle for influence and propaganda narratives, but last I saw on MSM there were no NATO tanks plinking Russian mobiks in Poland. 

    Russia doesn't need a nuke to make a naval blockade rapidly unfeasible. It has an entire navy in the BSF,  it has very long range Islanders etc. I'm not saying it would fight very well or effectively but it could easily make any Western naval force very uncomfortable for very little gain on our part. 

  14. 59 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

    That's true. Maybe just drop the name NATO and go it alone with willing partners. In 2023, Naval Blockage as a trigger for a formal declaration has far less meaning for me. In the end a blockade  might save lives all around. We want to cripple the Russian economy, a blockade would be a last resort tool if they don't stop fighting. 

    Who's "we" in this particular reality? How do you enforce a Naval blockade in the Black Sea?  How do you slip through the Montreux Convention?  Whose ships do the stopping and boarding? Who thinks the Black Sea Fleet will agree for one hot second to allow NATO vessels to stop them, to fire shots across Russian bows? Do you really think a Russian frigate is not going to fire back? What about the BSF submarines,  their naval ace-in-the-hole via a vis any potential adversary? How do you blockade them?

    So who's ship's will do the sinking, and be sunk? The US? So, War then. Britain? War. EU? War. Turkey? ROFL. 

    All it would do is play exactly and perfectly in Putin's bull**** about "fighting NATO, not Ukraine". He'd have a supposedly existental external threat,  that was real this time and I'm pretty sure would gather far more active national support than his nasty little jaunt into Ukraine. No more molotovs at recruitment centers, for one thing. 

    And bye-bye any chance of this war ending in 2023.

    Yer 'avin a laff, guv' nor! 

  15. 34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    Y14up.  The infamous destruction of a battalion of 72nd Mech (IIRC) as it was about to cut off the main border crossing.  The first documented use of Russian artillery from its own soil.  Someone from the unit called into a live Ukrainian TV channel as it was happening and pleading for help.  The pictures of what was left of the battalion were awful.  All deployed out in open fields as if they were going on parade the next day.

    Steve

    Was that hit due to "loose lips" on the UKR side, though? IIRC it was more that they were observed going into position (pretty hard to miss them) but then, as you note, not emplacing, spreading out or anything to minimize damage from potential fires.

    So was it more tactical opportunism by Russia, than in-battle EMS surveillance with stand-by, on-call fire support? I think it was later, with the proper invasion by Russian forces with EMS supporting units that lead to hits on undisciplined UKR units?

    11 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

    Except it also possibly caused the missile strike on the foreign volunteer barracks in March. I read a personal account of a more experienced volunteer who was so appalled at what was happening there that he left before the strike.

    I read that too. Makes sense, esp as the Foreign volunteers seemed to get the C-string leadership at the start (naturally - why send your best & second-best command to the rear during an invasion?).

    Plus, it proves the point - the UKR regular forces had learned and enacted the lesson: GTFO your phone when on or near the line.

    Also, as we all saw, the TD forces were initially more lax with their digital discipline at the start of the 2023 invasion. Thankfully that seems to have tightened up.

     

  16. 31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    But your point is also fun to consider, provided it isn't Ukrainian recruits doing it near Russian EW detectors.

    Steve

    I believe they did during 2014, there's several accounts of RUS arty hitting UKR units based off cellular use.

    The difference of course is that UKR learned from their mistakes, making cellular use and social media foot-printing deeply anathema in the defense forces. By contrast the Ivan assumed in arrogance that the same danger would never affect them, didn't absorb the reverse lesson for far too long when it did start hitting them and lacked the lower-rank discipline to maintain control.

    And then they added 200,000 mobiks with even worse discipline, motivation and NCO quality.

    Expect repeats, I'd say.

     

  17. 8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    That and back in 1941 there was no Internet ;) 

    Yup, put hundreds of ill-disciplined conscripts in one place and at least tens of them are going to have active phones. Any EMS surveillance unit will immediately spot the concentration and relay it. The beauty of HIMARS is that they can swiftly change intended targets and react to the opportunity.

     

  18. 5 hours ago, Offshoot said:

    A short article on the defence of Sumy by largely ad hoc citizen groups at the start of the war. Zelenskiy called Sumy a bone in the throat of the Russians in his New Year speech.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/02/how-sumy-residents-kept-russian-forces-out-of-their-city

    The defence forces might have felt it was chaotic but it was lead by someone, some small tight group of people. Even if your forces are inexperienced, so long as theyre in the right place at the right time then you maximise their effectiveness (true with regular troops of course). Without western ISR but very detailed and timely local ISR the coordinating group was able to receive, digest and prioritize locations at speed, making them able to be where they should be and to shift away when needed. They also struck back and hit the weakest link of the Ivan, the fuel trucks.

    Very smart work, for a "civilian" force. But that HQ group must have had people with experience from 2014 onwards, no? Maybe not the top leaders but you could not mount an effective defense (with counter attacks) without some military/battle knowledge in the group.

    If so, then it underscores that additional data point against the success of the invasion - while Russians were doing stupid scripted "maneuvers" for show, a percentage of the Ukrainian population was getting shelled, shot at and veteranized on the Donbass front. Not a large percentage but time and again a margin that existed and was often enough and, crucially, was spread throughout the entire population and by inference its geographic extant. So wherever the Feb 24th invasion force struck there were bound to be people with battle experience, motivation and discipline to organize, resist and fight back.

    By contrast the D/LNR veterans were concentrated in the Donbass and stayed there - their experience was thus not disseminated throughout the Russian forces. The RUS MoD doesn't seem to have been remotely interested in any lessons learned and, post-ceasefire, seems to have deliberately kept its personnel back from the front lines. The rebel forces were structured similarly but kept separate and not properly integrated into the AFRF until the invasion started, and then just as cannon fodder. Their knowledge of drones and how to use them was ignored for at least two months. I think It was May that we heard of DLNR instructors training Russian forces on the use of Mavics? 

    @Zeleban or @Haiduk do you know more of this episode? Do we know who lead the fight and where they are now?

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