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Heresy. I actually don't like fantasy as a genre. Also Witcher lacks this:

Not really. Honestly until the whole Ukraine thing kicked off Russia hardly made the news outside of Putin chasing down homosexuals for sport from a bear, stuff about Sochi, and occasional back page articles about the usual news crap (airplane crashes, major political changes). I'm sure you're getting some sort of "every negative thing said about Russia on foxnews" greatest hits clip, but when taken in the actual context, until again Russia actually invaded its neighbors you guys were largely forgotten. The American media doesn't really do "propaganda" in the regard it markets itself. This is a very important distinction to make in that if saying Russia was great and amazing would draw in viewers, there'd be an American news channel dedicated to describing Putin's prowess at all things. As the case is we have several major news organizations that tend to cater to either end of the American political spectrum (Fox News is the strongest voice on the right, with MSNBC, and CNN being left leaning). All of which have been profoundly critical of the US government, it's interest, etc. We also have ready access to the rest of the world's media and given the prevalence of English news sources, a fair bit of "external" news. This contrasts pretty strongly in which there is one news source, and it is owned by your government, and proliferation of external opinions is limited on purpose. The "Everyone has propaganda!" line is something fed to you by your government to convince you it's okay your options are all government owned because hey, EVERYONE has propaganda so we're just giving you the finest in the homegrown kind. The external media isn't against you because propaganda, it's just the mirror held up to what happens when you follow the course of action Russia has pursued.

Given the new Fallout DLC is out, I'm going to be doing shorter replies. Re: Vlad Things to keep in mind: 1. NATO does not expand in the sense of recruiting new members. It's not like they just showed up to the Ukraine and offered them a free t-shirt to join up or something. It might be worth wondering if your "brothers" as you once called the Ukrainians have a reason to feel insecure about their neighbors, and also why Eastern Europe might as a virtually monolithic block seek security from the west and turn their back on Russia. 2. Russia as pointed out cannot be in many places at once. If it goes to war in the Baltics, it's going to leave itself open elsewhere. If it leaves the Baltics to restore the various little fake republics its carved out of its neighbors it leaves the Baltics open to counter-attack. Etc, etc, etc. 3. NATO and her allies do however have enough forces to threaten Russia in every theater. It doesn't have to be a major presence, just enough to punish the Russian conscripts left as holding forces, and enable the Ukrainians and Georgians to extract their pound of flesh. Re: Destroy and depart. You shouldn't start wars you can't finish. There's nothing Russia can attain through a "quick" war in the Baltics that would not be undone in weeks, if not days from departure.

Perhaps, but that's why NATO is pushing for light rapidly deployable forces. Russia has to seriously commit to rolling up a Battalion of NATO troops in the attack, which really rather complicates the whole mess quite quickly. It's all about denying the easy grab and forcing Russia to either prepare for a war it will lose, or reconsider its actions. Which gets to the heart of why NATO really exists, viable deterrence of Russian aggression.

1. Chechnya is most certainly no terribly happy with being in Russia judging from Russia external sources. Continued terror operations from the Chechens, and counter-terrorism operations by the Russians seem to indicate an insurgency that is either in remission, or biding its time vs a resolved situation. Large scale military operations against NATO would provide an opportunity for Chechens to again visit their grievances writ large. 2. Georgia as part of a larger war would be fun times for Russia, simply because it'd either obligate forces away from the decisive theater to preclude NATO/Georgian attack (and rest assured, tactically bombed would end with a lot of dead Russian pilots and very little else if NATO is in play, whatever Russian air efforts succeed are reliant on massing forces, distributing them across theaters would simply allow them to be killed piecemeal), or invite an undoing of Russia's regional goals. 3. If NATO supported the Ukrainians like Russia supports the insurgents, Donbass would be securely in the hands of the Ukrainians, and the DPR and LPR leadership would be in jail or swinging from lampposts depending on how merciful the Ukrainians are feeling. With a large amount of highly illegal support the insurgents are only holding the Ukrainians at bay. If this support had to go elsewhere, the Ukrainian situation would be settled quite quickly. 4. The only folks who are seriously considering tactical nuclear weapons would be the Russians. Which would certainly end very well for the Russians and I am sure will have no lasting repercussions the next time Russia needs food. 5. China is not Russia's friend. You were traded a long time ago, and the amount of trade that China does with the western powers makes Russia's look like chump change. China's interest in Russia is making money off of you. Once you're not a worthwhile investment (at war with NATO), they'll declare neutrality, implore a return to peace by all sides, stop taking the Russian ambassador's phonecalls, contact the US/UK/etc to reassure them they're sitting this one out, and to offer reduced prices on electronics for customer loyalty or something. Russia would lose in every way possible in the event it provokes a conventional war. I think the interesting what if is if it'd be a civil war or just a failed state that would result.

The only winning move in nuclear weapons is not to play. The key to MAD type strategy however is setting conditions that force you to play, or giving your enemy the impression you are crazy enough to play. The US does this by setting nuclear release conditions intended to make it risky to fire off ANY nuclear weapons anywhere (or even Chemical or Biological) because the US policy is not to recognize a difference between a tactical, strategic, or other nuclear device, they all will be replied to with our strategic arms. The Russians do it by ending wargames with nuking Warsaw to save the motherland from defending Polish forces. It's all about keeping the risk perception high enough to make crossing certain lines too dangerous. If you set the lines too low they're going to get crossed, and you're going to lose credibility as in the end I doubt anyone is itching for a nuclear war. Here's a few rapid points in passing as we've danced this dance before: 1. Russian forces in the Baltics would trigger a full NATO response. It's simple as that. By policy, and national interest no NATO powers have any desire to see Russia expanding West, and sitting out a Baltic war is effectively supporting just that. They may not throw all in, or waffle on what part of the bill they'll foot, but frankly it'd absurd to imagine NATO fracturing in the face of effectively naked Russian aggression. 2. Putin is ruthless and an opportunist. He is also not an idiot. Russia is not strong enough reasonably take on the west, and even if it "won" it wouldn't survive such a victory for long.

Oh totally. It's a lot more complicated than I'd dare to actually give much of a estimate on. It's just the Russian narrative usually ends with discussing their nuclear deterrent in regards to off setting NATO's ability to do harm. I don't think many folks who ascribe much power to that position go the second step and visualize a world in which Latvia has been annexed at nuclear gunpoint and what that does to Russia's place in the world. Which then puts the ball back in the court of the Russians, does NovolithaniaRuss people's republic merit starting world war three? And looking at how the Donbass has been supported, I'd contend the nuclear element might be a bluff that gets called. If Russia genuinely was to try to accomplish what it has been attempting to do in Eastern Ukraine, regardless of international attention, pressure, or response, we'd have seen a full scale overt invasion. On the other hand if Russia fails to launch when it threatens to launch, it no longer has a credible nuclear threat. What is more likely is Russia threatens "severe retaliation" leaving it as an implied nuclear threat. If the bluff is called then a non-nuclear response of some kind is done, as the value of nuclear deterrance being seen as still functional is way higher to Russia than likely all of the Ukraine and Poland, with Paris on the side. I don't think people are understanding me. I'm not arguing a post nuclear strike, I'm arguing what happens when Russia threatens a nuclear strike. At this point there are two likely outcomes: 1. NATO backs down. 2. NATO calls the bluff. Both are lose-lose for Russia. Two has been discussed in depth and detail. It either results in a mutually destructive nuclear war that vastly outweighs whatever Russia might have gained by offensive action, or in totally discrediting nuclear deterrence on Russia's part, which undermines the entire Russian defense plan and policy. One while at face value is a victory for Russia and undermines NATO to some extent, it does paint Russia squarely into a corner in which the rest of the world at large will endeavor to keep it locked up in, and modern Russia could not survive that sort of real isolation. So in that, again I've seen a lot of "and then Strategic Forces...." stuff around the web, without really looking at the what next. It's almost like it's being treated as the old "ENDEX" radio call in which the exercise is now over and everything is back to normal. There would be very real, very bad consequences of even threatening nuclear weapons release in support of limited war and they should be discussed.

Oh totally. It's a lot more complicated than I'd dare to actually give much of a estimate on. It's just the Russian narrative usually ends with discussing their nuclear deterrent in regards to off setting NATO's ability to do harm. I don't think many folks who ascribe much power to that position go the second step and visualize a world in which Latvia has been annexed at nuclear gunpoint and what that does to Russia's place in the world.

Wrong direction. Russia threatens total nuclear war in the event of Kalingrad being hit/THE BALTICS ARE NOW RUSSIA AND IF NATO TROOPS TOUCH NUKES FLY. What are the consequences of this? I don't think NATO will spin up and risk nuclear retaliation. I do think the second and third order effects of that sort of Russian action will be as disastrous as a losing war with NATO.

Of course, the interesting caveat no one seems to ever talk about is the "what next?" after nuclear escalation is employed.

Preventing a Russian takeover of the Baltic states is something that is difficult simply because as the invader Russia holds the initiative. It can mass as many green men as it cares to, and whatever reinforcement NATO sends will have to play catch up, or be stationed there full time at the expense of readiness elsewhere. However the real question is in the event of a Russian takeover, could it be sustained? And the answer is no. Russian commitments to the Baltics would overwhelm its ability to keep the country and Russian interest reasonably safe, but whatever "Baltic People's Free Democratic Republic of Soviets" government would require that degree of commitment to not simply be rolled up. A Russian conquered Baltic region is not an outcome supported by the rest of the world, or one that there is any sympathy for. Placing more forces is just a way to reassure the locals, and to dissuade Russian attempts to politically isolate its neighbors. Long term Russian aims revolve around being able to manipulate and engage with Europe as individual states vs NATO or the EU in the hopes of being able to play off those independent actors against each other to bolster their own position. This is historically how Russian foreign policy has operated. I don't think it's going to get much traction however given the lack of coherent anti-EU/NATO/Western narrative beyond Slavic-Russian nationalism.

Well thanks for that support antaress! (Kidding aside, I started a reply, changed my mind, deleted it, but the quote box remains hence the filler). That said, in relevant news, it's looking like we're still cruising for high oil production in 2017. OPEC's new focus is trying to regain market share which makes price increases, or restoration of historic oil prices doubtful for the near term. While we may see increases, there's now an effective threshold for "too high" that will return excess production into service and bring the price back down. Re: Car Doors You don't buy Russian equipment for quality. That's for sure.

It might not be useful in CONUS, but again in terms of keeping trained, mostly ready crews and tanks in the event of a large conflict or contingency, the National Guard offers a very good value. It's also a way to hold onto experienced officers and NCOs who might leave the Army, but be willing to serve part time like yours truly. In regards to ratio to armor/mech infantry: If you're asking about how the formations look, National Guard units are mirror images of the Active formations, an ABCT looks like an ABCT, although I think most of the Guard ABCTs are still two CABs instead of three. When we were going to be an ABCT for a while though we were going to augment our ARS with a Tank Company, but that never got off the ground as the SBCT conversion orders came down like, the month after we started looking into the whole process. As far as Guard ABCTs to regular ABCTs, there's 11ish Regular ABCTs (10 "real" ones, and 11th ACR has all the troops and equipment, it'd just need to ironically do a train up to really be ready to go), and looks like six Guard ABCTs as follows: 55th ABCT (Pennsylvania, possibly being deactivated), 30th ABCT (West Virginia, North Carolina), 1st ABCT (Minnesota) 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team (Idaho, Oregon, and Montana. Cavalry Brigades/Regiments are identical to ABCTs in modern army), 155th ABCT (Mississippi), 278 Armored Calvary Regiment (Tennessee). About a year ago there'd have been the 81st BCT in there (Washington, North California) but it's undergoing transformation to an SBCT (including some really complicated inter-state unit adjustments).

For completely boring, unsexy reasons: 1. Automotively, the various M1s, M1A1s, or even earlier run M1A2s still used a lot of common automotive parts and fairly modest electronics outside of the FCS, C3 equipment, and optics. The M1A2 SEP V2 introduced a lot more electronics. Which unfolds into a two part problem, one being the expense of restocking the various spares supplies, and the other meaning tank repairs just got a lot more expensive. 2. There's still some ambiguity how to best use the Guard. Some corners of the Army, both active and Guard believe the Guard is better served as a lighter force, basically ready to respond to domestic emergencies, or augment the active side as economy of force type measures (basically freeing up "better" forces for the more important missions, and using the Guard to secure rear areas). The other portion of this is that if your State's Guard is an ABCT type unit, it doesn't have much useful equipment to do its Domestic Operations Mission*. On the other hand, Guard ABCTs are much cheaper to maintain than the active side armor units, and are capable of being quite proficient (this year's Sullivan Cup winner was a National Guard crew). And many Guard units still have enough wheeled transport options to conduct domestic missions even if they're armor units. *For non-Americans, the National Guard belongs to a specific state, and falls under the control of the State Governor. The Guard may be called to federal service such as in war time, or responding to a National level crisis, but generally outside of those missions the Guard serves as the force in waiting for major disasters in their home state or the local region. My Guard unit for instance was activated to provide medical and logistics support for firefighters, and to relieve local police in securing evacuated towns during my state's fire season last year. These sort of operations are a major part of any Guard unit's mission, and as a result Guard units tend to split their time preparing to go to war if called, and also preparing to deal with regional emergencies. Where this is relevant to tanks, is tanks have no value to a Guard unit outside of going to war. A Stryker Guard unit for instance, could actually use its ICVs as basically big heavy trucks, or at the least deploy response teams straight from the armory without needing additional transportation.

It's directed at people who don't have Abrams tanks. The last M60A3 left US Army active duty in 1993 if I recall correctly, and National Guard units in 1996. There's still a few countries that have M60 fleets though that might be down for an improved version. For US National Guard units it's mostly ensuring the M1A1HCs are up to M1A1SA standards, although many Guard units are receiving M1A2 SEPs (v1 and v2s) although it's not an entirely popular transition.

Pretty much. I just think the players in the game at this point are aware of the odds and limitations. I'm concerned for what happens next though. It's a lot like North Korea, in that it had a leader who knew how to juggle aggression vs "soft" diplomacy in opposition to the wider world. He has been replaced with someone who cannot juggle those different attributes and as a result is making rather a mess of things.

Eh. I'm not interested in the providence of the video simply because it's irrelevant what THIS one says nearly as much as it's been a bit of a theme ongoing in RT/official Russian media. I think the Russian regime is aware of two things: 1. A direct confrontation with conventional forces against NATO will end in some sort of defeat (hence the strong focus on asymmetric assets and hybrid warfare). 2. A need to answer to their own people if Russia is strong or not. There's a strong nationalist wolf that needs to be fed, lest it devour it's handler. My concern is a population brought up on "The Russian military is strong" starts asking for those promises to be cashed in regards to long standing grievances or someone less able to skirt the edge of what's possible than Putin starts painting himself into a corner. We can see evidence in this thread, indeed the Russian Navy is merely in refit and that is the only reason it is not able to challenge the US fleet (not that it is in fact, a broken poorly maintained force that continues to decay as we talk), the belief that Europe is fractured* and indeed possibly favorable to Russian actions, it's all products of a world view that's been filtered and screened to show a Russia that's both strong, and internationally respected....instead of the much less rosy reality. All nations do the fluffing. But I can easily and readily look outside of US media to see the feces show my nation can be sometimes. I just think however in the absence of other sources its important to challenge the Russian narrative when it presents itself.

Re: Navy A lot of the Russian navy is still in some extended drydock/mothball status. It has been for decades. What has sortied has demonstrated very low mechanical reliability, and Russian drydock/refit/maintenance facilities are not adequate to the task. Further there's realistically no such thing as strictly a defensive Navy. The advantage of a large sea-going fleet like NATO has (mainly the US, but helpfully augmented by our partners) is that it could mass on the various geographically separated Russian Naval units, destroy them, and if need be accomplish missions ashore without interference from the remainder of the Russian naval fleet. Which is really why it's irrelevant, there's no war that Russia could start that major surface combatants are not simply a liability for, and yet here we are. As far as suppliers, a lot of your aerospace industry uses parts, and components from countries that have either embargoed Russia, or are the Ukraine. While there might be an easing of tensions, it will remain a chokepoint for likely decades to come given the state of Russian industry and lack of meaningful investment in same. If Russia adopts a more aggressive position, the taps will turn off, the modernization will stall, and it'll all repeat again. Politics are inseparable from military affairs dude. That's like Art of War/Vom Kriege 101. Russia's historical role, and modern actions are instrumental in understanding its insecurity.

If you look into the Armata you'll see it's already dropping capabilities, and the production facilities are claiming another 5-6 years to prepare a workforce to build the things. Where there's a will, there certainly is a way, but the amount of will vs the realistic capabilities in this case, appears to be somewhat imbalanced. If Putin adopts a military first policy, then it's certainly possible. However you only have to look back to the 1980's to see the outcome of such a policy. And that was with a stronger Russian state with captive economies and trade partners. You can only run on bullets so long before someone finally gets fed up with the lack of toilet paper and it's 1991 all over again. It'll be interesting to see who comes next. I don't think there's a credible successor, and Putin's leadership style will make introducing one easy. His personal popularity plays a great part in what he can do. It's not exactly a "he dies and the whole corrupt system crumbles!" but he is keeping a bit of a lid on several groups that all could make a pretty clear grab for the throne if he was no longer sitting in it. The Russian navy is mostly scrap iron at this point. It's been in "overhaul" since I was playing with toy tanks in the sandbox. It's not just the ships either, the Russian Navy still has not recovered from loss of facilities due to the dissolution of the USSR, and a lot of the infrastructure, and ship building expertise is just not there any more. This is further true with the Russian air force considering how well and alienated the parts suppliers are these days. Russia however has well and truly earned its sanctions. Also the French are not "rolling back" anything. There's talk of offering to lift some of the sanctions in exchange for Russian good behavior in accordance with the Minsk agreements. Your relations with the west remain frosty to say the least.

I'm not sure about oil going back up. Here's why: 1. Oil has gone low enough to cause higher cost extraction operations to go into mothballs. Reactivating these when the price goes back up will at the absolute minimum slow the increase of the price, but stands a good chance of simply absorbing much of the increase leading to a much more modest return. 2. The dynamic of oil production has fundamentally changed, between new suppliers (as a rather dramatic example, Iranian oil going above the table), and new technologies, it just isn't as reliant on the historical oil exporters. 3. Many historical oil consumers are reducing their oil needs. Regardless if this is through green politics, or simple economics, when oil hit its highs, it made alternates or more efficent options more economical. A lot of the oil demand historically can be seen as running equipment and technologies that were adopted when oil was cheap (or at least much cheaper), now that we've seen much of that going by the wayside, there's a strong indication in the developed world at least, oil will be a major commodity...but not to the degree that could command historical high prices. Russian modernization is also set against a general decay of pretty much everything Russian post 1991. The "wide industrial base" is not an exception to this. Do think about what sort of Russian industrial products you see that are "new" relative to historical Soviet products. The factories are there, but they're the finest the 1970's-1980's could offer in terms of industrial technology, with an aging and largely uneducated (in the sense of "modern" industrial tooling and automations). You're not going to crank cutting edge tanks out of factories that haven't changed that much since the fall of the wall. Russia's problem isn't simply having T-72s and MIG-29s when it needs more modern equipment, or poor training and readiness, or no effective conventional regional reach, it's that the whole country has been neglected as a result of the sort of collapse rampant Soviet military spending led to, followed by an economic base that remains almost entirely resource extraction oriented, with a healthy helping of the fact the crooks are now running the store if you get my drift. Modest modernization when oil was high was reasonable. Now? I will be very interested to see what progress occurs. If only you and your countrymen would take such a stance on abusing your neighbors, your nation would certainly be much closer to finding the security it seeks.

The title of the first video is "We are ready for World War Three." My statement was that Russia is not ready for World War Three. You disagree by commenting on the usual paper tiger line, but then totally agree Russia is abjectly unable to fight World War Three which was my point in the first place. Russia can't sustain any sort of meaningful conflict outside of against non-NATO countries. It's part of the logic of being in NATO. You're either on the periphery and subject to Putin's moods, or you're part of a defensive alliance that will grossly overmatch Russia's ability to fight a global war. Why do you think NATO memberships are so popular given the Russian Empire/USSR/Russian Federation's treatment of it's neighbors?

Dunno man. Might want to look at a mirror and ask yourself if your country could win in a fight against the rest of the world.

I have a pet hedgehog. He's really adorable, but quite grumpy. When he's upset with being disturbed (which is pretty much whenever anyone enters the area he lives in) he poofs up and growls. He wants to make it very apparent just how dangerous he is because he's super scary for reals. Russia pumps out a lot of media poofing itself up. Literally no country on earth is ready for anything approaching World War Three. It wouldn't likely be in the same kind of standard cold war total nuclear exchange, but "phase two" of World War Three would likely be the second Russian civil war, societal and political sea changes in the West to a degree not seen in frankly centuries, and likely an end to the world as we know and understand it. Russia isn't "ready" to fight NATO, any more than NATO is ready for a full fledged war with Russia. If it came to it, I'm of the mind Russia is going to get the worse of it, but the cost of any major conflict is so far beyond reasonable cost as to virtually preclude it. But it is important for Russia to poof up and look scary. It's weak economically, and the military in many regards is a paper tiger, or at the least it has an imposing set of spikes, but they're not enough to fend off someone determined to give the small woodland creature underneath a bath. Videos as above exist solely to sort of viral media this impression of an imposing unstoppable red horde, while disguising very real and very deep problems. You'll note NATO does not go to such ends simply because it does not need to, most of what it puts out is largely domestically directed with the intention of maintaining support for large military expenditures in a climate where the common westerner is less concerned with Red Dawn and more concerned with making sure they get their government subsidized insert benefit here. NATO has no need to posture simply because Russia knows what will happen if it pushes too hard, and it will not be pretty.

From my experience, there's an almost cargo cult aspect to government in the Arabic world. Simply having a minster and vice minster, with a vice minster's aid is sufficient to ensure functional governance, with the greater amount of paperwork generated by each of those functionaries directly contributing to the overall health of the country.

Addendum: One of the things the Army was getting big into was sort of blending all the different training events. If I recall correctly things were basically: 1. Real life training events as we know them. 2. Events held in simulators 3. Traditional map type events So if you envisioned a Battalion scaled operation, one company conducts an air assault mission with real helicopters against an objective in the training area. A tank company then establishes defensive positions using the same terrain as simulated in CCTT. The Battalion command post is established in it's tents and command vehicles on the parade field across the way from their normal offices, and they're commanding and controlling both the air assault, the mission in the CCTT, and then the other two companies in the battalion exist only exist as markers on the map with their battle losses/successes determined by some sort of observer-controller team. Where simulators break down is once you really get past about company or so, your direct hand of god control pretty much goes out the window, like between tank D32 and the Battalion Commander there are numerous commissioned officers and NCOs all handling most of the actual on the ground commanding and controlling. So Battalion Command is less walking with a swagger stick and pointing out what must be done, and a lot more managing a series of units that largely can control their own affairs, but ensuring they all work in unison to achieve your overall objective, which really needs humans in the loop, or to be very abstracted to simulate humans to be a good training aid (vs just a good game).