sross112
-
Posts
452 -
Joined
-
Last visited
Posts posted by sross112
-
-
21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
I mentioned this before but casualty ratios are only one metric (and frankly a squishy one). The question is one of combat power attrition. So in Feb we saw tallies of RA logistics, C2, engineering etc. This is stuff Russia cannot get back easily, while the UA is being pushed this stuff from the West. I expect the combat power attrition is still acceptable to the UA, hence why they hold onto Bakhmut.
I stopped into Oryx for the first time in a long time the other day. The majority of what we see is the front line stuff being whacked, but there is a pile of support assets in there. You see a picture here and a video there but it has really piled up in the last year. I'd suspect that the numbers on there are just a slice of the damage done by the deep strikes over the last few months. Even though it is just a slice that is confirmed the numbers are really staggering when you think about it:
233 Command Posts and Communications vehicles
287 Engineering vehicles and equipment
24 Radars
28 Jammers and Deception units (EW)
And for @LongLeftFlank since we all know how much he likes dead trucks;
2330 Trucks.
Again, this is just the known and confirmable slice. That is a lot of high end fancy stuff that can't roll off of production lines easily or be sourced somewhere else. Stack sanctions on top of that and these things are just gone from their inventory for the foreseeable future.
-
I was watching a Kofman presentation yesterday that someone linked on here in the last couple days. I got to thinking about the analysts and their predictions. How much did their consensus on the Russian ability to prosecute a 3 day victory affect the actual decision to invade? If they had properly predicted the course of events would the Kremlin still have pulled the trigger? Did it affect their planning? Did it add to their air of overconfidence? Or did it not play any part?
-
5 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:
I am surprised we haven't seen some sort of camera/scope with a tablet or phone type display attached. Heck, you could get something pretty useful by duck taping a small drain camera to a rifle.
Or even 4" PVC through the berm for observation and shooting or modern day sandbag crenelle.
I find the lack of firing steps, firing positions, and crew served positions in a lot of these videos disturbing. Without good observation and control of approaches with fire, a trench is a grave.
-
2 hours ago, The_Capt said:
What struck me is the underlying end-game dichotomy - “we know we will never dominate the world but we have to dominate something”. There is a tone of insecurity and compensation for that throughout. This is beyond all the social and physical metrics rubbed all over everything, it speaks to the Russian certainty. It is too easy to simply write this off as “duh, see Russia”. It speaks to something we spoke about earlier, the theory of Russian defeat. So how do you get a nation that is built on that certainty to renegotiate with itself peacefully?
I don't want to be understood wrong or people think that I am equating these countries or their people to the cesspool that is Russia. It is just that the Russians once were one of the two super powers so there is a correlation between having been at the top and then not so much. Not trying to insult or ruffle feathers, just looking at a historical comparison to maybe get some insight into answers to @The_Capt 's question.
How did the UK, France and Spain renegotiate their role in the world with themselves? All were dominant powers at one time. Germany and Japan are different scenarios (defeated and occupied) so don't fit this category. The others were once THE major players and knew it. How did they cope with the transition to becoming 2nd or 3rd power tier countries?
-
1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:
Oh, I am NOT optimistic at all. There are two reasons why China will retain a disproportional amount of industrial production no matter what the West does to "on shore" manufacturing. The first is cost. A tectonic shift in baseline costs would have to happen before normal market incentives lined up to justify domestic production. The second is capacity. Even if a Western country could somehow make the cost structure work, it would have to deal with the volume issue. There's no way a country of a few dozen millions or even a few hundred millions can compete with the capacity of a nation with a billion people. Not until we get into some seriously different manufacturing processes.
I agree in that I don't see the west being able to totally replace the manufacturing output of China for quite awhile. However, we are already seeing displacement in certain things back to the west. You mentioned the chips which is pretty high profile (intel started up two big factories in the US two years ago), but I think we will see the cheap stuff be the majority in the short term, then the heavy stuff, and lastly the tech stuff.
I say this because where my folks live in the upper midwest a Ramen noodle factory got built last year. It replaced the one they had in China. The labor costs there have increased significantly over the last ten years, supply chain issues, and cost of shipping all come together to the point that it is now cheaper to make it here stateside. This will probably become more and more of a trend due to pricing and others have said that China and Xi have become harder and harder to work with as well.
With the heavy industry I expect it will shift back to the west as a lot of that was sourced out of Russia (pig iron, steel, aluminum, etc). The same factors of labor, shipping, politics, and supply chain issues apply to China sourcing. Mexico has been industrializing the past 10-20 years and might be able to absorb a lot of the manufacturing not to mention South East Asia. South America also has a lot of potential. India? So it isn't that China is irreplaceable, it just isn't replaceable in the short term. Give the rest of the world 10 years and a lot of what has made China important could be shifted to other sources.
-
48 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Very interesting extended length video that shows Ukrainian forces taking some trenches and defeating Russian counter attacks.
Lots of interesting things to see, but the one that struck me is that the Russians had only a half dozen guys (at most) defending the trenches, but about a platoon sized group to try and retake it. To me this indicates that the larger unit (company?) tasked with defending this sector of frontage had woefully inadequate manpower to do so. My guess is they divided up most of their forces into half squad sized units to hold positions while a platoon sized force sat in a central area ready to reinforce where needed. This would also allow for rotations over the course of a day. However, this plan didn't work in this case as the Ukrainians took the trenches faster than the Russians could react and that meant the reinforcements, effectively, had to mount an assault on a fortified area. Very different than reinforcing!
Note that a Ukrainian drone appears to drop a marking flare at one point. I've not see that done before.
Steve
That was good and thanks for sharing. This video really highlights something that I've seen multiple times but this one really shows it well. I can't wrap my head around constructing a defensive position adjacent to wide open fields that allows the opposing forces to close within grenade range before they are engaged. Failure to have LP/OPs. Fighting positions without LOS along approaches or crew served positions covering the wide open terrain.
Then the old spray and pray. Just stick the AK over the top of the trench and empty a magazine in the general direction where you think the attackers are. Nothing like telegraphing your position while hoping for Powerball odds to actually hit something or someone.
What all this conveys to me is a serious shortfall in professional leadership and professional soldiering. I'm assuming these are probably mobiks that were dropped in a tree line without a clue by leadership that either didn't have a clue or if they did they didn't care. Also helps explain how armored vehicles can drive right up to their positions and blast away. Makes me think of sitting in the chair reading the paper and the Mrs. asking if somebody just pulled up to the house.
"Hey Ivan, did someone just pull up?"
"I don't know Igor, let me check. Ahhhhh hell Igor, we got company and it isn't the good kind!!"
-
51 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Interesting thoughts. It could be, though for me I'm still most puzzled by the lack of light AT weapons evidenced in the battles with light infantry.
In any case, these guys saw the drone and knew they were spotted. That has got to be a bad feeling. One thing they could have done was have someone "flank" the drone and try shooting it when it was stationary for a bomb drop. When the drone is hovering you're safe as long as you're not directly underneath it. They also have to be relatively close to the ground for reasons of accuracy, so you'd think in such an environment it would be possible to hit the drone with small arms fire. I mean, if you're not hiding that is.
Steve
I am surprised that each squad doesn't have an AA gunner with a shotgun by now. Especially with all the videos of drones dropping ordnance. Sure won't help against the spotter drones and 155's but we do see a lot of closer ones dropping grenades or doing fairly close in recon work. Guys and gals with experience shooting sporting clays and trap should be able to knock them down on the move from a pretty good distance. Shotguns are also a good trench weapon so it wouldn't be a one trick pony adding extra weight for no other purpose than drones. Body armor? That is what the 3 1/2 inch rifled slugs are for. They really don't care if you are wearing armor or not.
-
Seen a ton of videos showing ordnance dropped from drones on infantry and vehicles. This one shows the destruction of an ATGM. A few days ago it was thought that some of the close up attacks with vehicles by UA forces may have been proceeded by extensive drone recon showing lack of anti armor systems. Does leave a dilemma for a defending unit: set up your heavy systems and have them exposed to attack or don't and give the attacker however many minutes are needed to set it up free advance on your position.
If this is common it could account for us not seeing as many ATGMs on the RA side as a lot of us thought there would be. Anyways, found it different from the usual and a little thought provoking so I thought I'd share it.
-
2 hours ago, billbindc said:
And to repeat...the experts who are talking are all saying that the Russian nuclear forces are up to date.
We should put our faith in the "experts" on Russian military readiness, training, equipment, and capability? Since all of this has kicked off they have about the same success rate as 19th century meteorologists. Not real sure that anything they say should be given any credence.
At the same time I totally agree with your point of view. Even if there is a 99% failure rate in the nuclear forces that still leaves more than enough to pretty much get the job done. So it still needs to be respected. Now if rocket fuel could be snorted with the same effect of cocaine I'd bet a body part it had all been sold years ago and replaced with sawdust.
-
1 hour ago, Probus said:
Can't China support a coup in one of the Russian states and take over that way?
Or just hold a referendum? You know, fair and impartial like the ones in Ukraine. There is a significant Chinese population in their old territory that houses Vladivostok. Would also actually play very well to the Chinese population. My understanding, not an expert, is there is still a pretty sore spot among the Chinese about the unequal treaties forced on them by western powers. This could be Xi's chance to rectify one.
It would be so fulfilling to see Russia's games turned against them. I get all giggly just thinking about it.
-
22 minutes ago, kevinkin said:
I agree. In addition the UA needs to finds ways to increase the firepower against RA supply networks even the distribution points for tactical formations. If they can get a mix of direct and indirect fire on those tactical points, along with long range destruction of operational points, the UA can maneuver the Russian out of their prepared defenses. So it's movement not so much to occupy, but to gain a strategic barrage. (Old Napoleonic term) Get the Russian on the move and into the open and good things will take place.
So if we look at the successes that Ukraine has had, the common denominator is disruption of logistics. Kyiv and Kherson for certain. The RA had plenty of potential combat power left in both of those areas, but it was unsustainable due to their sub par logistic model that was further degraded by kinetic intervention. In the Kharkiv area I'm not so sure about it, but it appears that the RA spent everything they had there making their gains and then were unable to consolidate them with what they had left. I suppose their inability to do so would be considered another logistics fail. A little different model but maybe the root of it is the same?
Defensively in Bahkmut I think we see the same thing. The RA is crying out for ammunition and the UA says the arty is a trickle of what it once was. Considering that massive arty was the trump card for the RA it has made the continued defense tenable this long. Success at Vuhledar may be the same. Nice work on the UA side no doubt at the tactical level, but the lack of support on the RA side may have actually been the deciding factor that made it possible. Hard to say for sure on a lot of this with the limited facts that we have though.
Now when we try to extrapolate these models onto the land bridge and Melitopol, how does that work? How does the UA create Kyiv conditions in that large area to get the RA to fold and run for it? Or do they do more of a Kharkiv advance; degrade, displace and pursue until the defense congeals, try to repeat? Or does the UA have the mech brigades ready to exploit a hole and push deep? If they do, how do they solve for air denial over the penetration groups?
I agree that the degradation of logistics is the primary goal in order to set conditions for UA success. I'm still trying to figure out what the success looks like, how it unfolds, and how the UA has solved for the other problems.
-
8 hours ago, Lethaface said:
Thanks for this.
After reading the first paragraph in the article I looked up the author and he's a US journalist with imo, a political agenda, using selective sources to project a framing he wants to put forward. So I stopped reading it
Not that I'm saying all is going as fast as possible in Germany, I don't really know to be honest but probably nor does he.How to wisely spend 100 Billion Euro out of the blue is not an easy task. Last few days I did hear rather clear language from Scholz / Germany and I understand he is on his way for a private meeting with Biden as we speak. So things are happening at least.
Way back there was talk about the procurement problems with the German Army. I think there might have also been a Perun video that outlined a lot of the difficulties because of a flawed system. The fact that even though money was made available there hasn't been anything to show for it up to this point is not surprising considering the messed up bureaucracy that has to be worked through there.
It is surprising to me that NATO has so many players that have let their military so out of whack. As you and others pointed out, during the cold war every one pretty much had their mission and focused on that. I suppose nobody thought Russia would be the threat that they are to Europe now. The lack of coordination between NATO countries and militaries is still rather surprising as you would think they would have maintained better vision and cooperation over the years.
I really do hope that the European nations figure out how to do a better job going forward. If China ever kicks anything off and the US is embroiled in a conflict in the Pacific they will pretty much be on their own defending Europe from Russia. Luckily Russia shouldn't be able to mount a credible threat for some time, but eventually they will be back.
-
1 hour ago, Chibot Mk IX said:
not to mentioned it is much more harder to exploit the holes today compare to 41-42. Back in 40s , you will have an unchallenged freedom of maneuver behind the enemy line after achieving the breakthrough. German just needs to defeat a Tank division (in early war) or a couple tank brigades (in mid war). By the end of the war, Soviets have a large truck fleet that can quickly ferry infantry formation to block the hole, although these infantry units have limited Anti-tank strength , combine with the armored force counter-attack, they can quickly stall the German's attack momentum.
nowadays the defender can easily ferry mechanized troops to block the hole, and at tactical level, even a platoon of infantry with advance ATGM weapon can block the attacking side's advance for half a day. RA not only needs logistic support but also other stuff added into the equation. Something RA is unlikely to have any improvement in a short period of time, like suppress/destroy enemy C2, effectively counter artillery , Air interdiction etc.
And in addition to all that, back then you had a much easier time hiding your mass behind your own lines. Now it seems as though if more than a platoon of RA congregate in the same place they eat a HIMARS. So somehow being able to concentrate the mass needed for the breakthrough, then the mass needed to exploit the breakthrough and the logistics to sustain it all need to be hidden from multi-spectrum ISR to avoid PGM breaking it all up before it even gets the chance to start.
This modern war stuff is getting complicated!!
-
2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
I think the guy might be caught between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea at this point. Radicals on one side you need to keep you in power, and the Russian population outside of Moscow on the other. All balanced on an autocratic framework of plate spinning - isn't this the perennial Russian political dilemma?
He really is in a pickle. I think the measure that he will regret forever will be the referendums in the occupied territories making them "Russia". If they hadn't done that they would have a lot more options and have at least a chance of cutting a peace deal with Ukraine. Ukraine may have settled for the Feb 22 borders in a peace deal but I can't imagine they will entertain any more than that. Now they have to either give up parts of "Russia", beat Ukraine or settle in for perpetual war. I don't think there is a way to sell giving up parts of "Russia". I don't think they can beat Ukraine. So that means perpetual war, and I don't think Russia can do it at this scale.
The only play I see for Russia is to get a victory of some sort, claim all goals of the SMO are met, freeze the conflict, and try to get the rest of the world to pressure Ukraine into a ceasefire. This makes sense to me with their hyper-focus on Bakhmut. It has been the focus for months so they can't just stop now and admit defeat. They HAVE to win before they can stop offensive actions. All other actions can be construed as operations to draw forces away from there, but since they have focused so much on that location they need to see it through until the end. Maybe it also explains why Ukraine has invested so heavily in holding it. If they see it in this light it makes much more sense to do everything you can to not let Russia have a "win".
I don't think there is a high percentage chance of it working but it could. By working through the UN with China and maybe India helping schmooz all the little members they could start getting UN resolutions for ceasefires. I don't doubt the continuing support of most of the western players, but how do they react against the UN? They built it, they've used it for their means, how could they now ignore it? Would the US have the testicular fortitude to veto? Others like @billbindc probably have better insight into this arena and hopefully can enlighten me on why this route wouldn't work. I would personally hate to see Russia get any kind of a win or even something they can sell to their people as a win.
-
6 hours ago, The_Capt said:
I think what is killing the RA is DC at the operational level. We have not really discussed the differences here but one can do MC at the operational level and DC at the tactical - Soviet doctrine was kinda built for this...theoretically (I kind of think this was BS as the entire Soviet system was pretty tightly controlled but...).
War is multi-dimensional. So even if you have Gunny Sergeants going all Clint Eastwood and exercising initiative it won't matter if the operational level is doing more conservative DC style C2 - tactical level just becomes fireflies in a jar. But vice versa can work, again in theory. The RA can move and control their troops like proper killbots, but if the operational level is able to exploit opportunity and keep the killbots moving towards that opportunity....well you have a solution.
Hard DC is a symptom of an autocratic political body. One does not give a lot of empowerment in people who have all the guns when you are a dictator. But you can make it work if you allow higher commanders to run with the ball (or at least did) but you risk them getting too "uppity". This is what created the whole "Joe Stalin is threatened by Zhukov dynamic".
I personally don't think it is really "easier" one way or the other. It affects more than simply how we give orders. It lays down a foundation of just about every aspect of what follows - from force generation through sustainment, to employment. MC has different bandwidth requirements than DC - how enablers are packaged and organized. Even how much fuel they burn. So it is not a simple as "ok. now you are all empowered/not empowered." Now re-designing a force to be able to quickly do both is an interesting concept.
So if I am thinking through this right, the MC/DC ratio is going to be very dependent upon your communications ability and C4ISR. If you can't trust your communications for real time changes or updates you need to be more DC. The more real time C4ISR or situational awareness you have and the lower it goes the more reliant on MC your forces can be. Of course the ratio will also depend greatly on the knowledge, skills and abilities of all the leaders from junior NCO's on up. So that goes back to levels of training and confidence. So the amount of MC is proportional to the technical capabilities of the force but tempered by the cultural factors of training, trust and information sharing.
-
7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Interesting idea but I am not sure it stands up entirely. An extreme DC "drone" mindset takes a lot of discipline, brutal discipline in fact. MC has discipline in a form as well but gives freedom of thought and action by its very definition. So when shifting from one system to the other: DC is pulling back from hard muscle memory that has been beaten into people and telling them "now think and see" , while MC is asking people to unthink and unsee.
Neither one of these is a small ask and would take a lot of practice and training. Further Commanders would need to be selected for their abilities to do both and knowing when to apply them. You are now talking cultural reform, which is really hard to do.
I suspect that the metric of advantage is the agility of the system to swing between C2 models.
Isn't it more of a ratio or a mix than just MC or DC? Complete MC would be herding cats as every platoon is just making it's own decisions all the time based on what is right in front of the LT. Complete DC is hugely resource intensive for planning every single thing going on. So in the west for instance, the ratio is more MC, but still moderated and controlled at the higher level DC (phase lines, coordination of elements, etc).
Even then it seems to me that different units and different missions have different levels of MC and DC. An infantry Bn in fixed defense has a lot more DC from the levels above it than the ACR Squadron and spearhead of an advance would.
By all means correct me and educate me, your experience and training is from a much different level than mine so my perception is certainly subject to being wrong.
-
6 minutes ago, dan/california said:
Xi hoped the Russian attack on Ukraine would cause the Western Alliance to completely fail. If it had he would quite likely be holding a parade in Taipei as we speak. Instead he has has to evaluate not just what he would pay for Taiwan, but the possibility he could lose most of his Navy, and still not get it. I don't think he wants to join Putin on the list of fools who thought they were launching "a short victorious war", and wound up with an extended stay in a yellow jacket nest instead.
When you really look at it, China is almost as big of a loser as Russia. Yep, Russia is paying the blood price, but the changes brought about by the war really hurt China in the sense of losing strategic options or advantages they had or could have capitalized on a year ago. Just making the world laser focused on autocratic aggression puts everything they do now under a large microscope. Add to that the production increases of the western nations that take a lot of time to spin up that are now in motion. Even the actual tactical lessons learned or reminded (arty ammo needed) from the battles on the ground. Think of how much the west should be gleaning from everything and already getting the wheels in motion for the next generation of warfare when China, although probably ahead of Russia, is not totally caught up to where the west was before the first shot was fired.
Also has to be a lot of talk among the leadership of every smaller country around China about how apparently wars of aggression aren't a thing of the past. We will probably see strengthening of militaries and maybe even more robust alliances around China.
If this was a master plan by China and Russia to draw US forces out of the Pacific and into Europe to contain a newly vitalized and threatening Russian bear, then it failed. Russia has degraded itself to the point where the US could pull everything they have out of Europe and Russia still isn't a true threat with what is left of their army. This "proxy" war has actually freed up US assets and for the next generation allows it to focus more on the Pacific than it could have otherwise. The longer it goes on and the more Russia emasculates itself the more negatively China is affected as well.
Will China supply Russia? I'd be surprised if they aren't selling small arms and all sorts of old ammo along with other non-lethal stuff to Russia. Anything bigger I really doubt. Xi is pushing for resolution as none of this helps them in the long run so I can't see them doing more than making a quick profit while they can.
Overall, if there was a plan between China and Russia, I'm pretty sure it has been an epic fail.
-
1 hour ago, kevinkin said:
You are right when it comes to a huge continental land war. However, this is the first in many years and NATO and US have fallen asleep using expeditionary warfare to project power. Ammo consumption and production was OK for that and we never seriously contemplated overstocking to arm Ukraine. I am not sure where else in the world such an expenditure of bullets and shells would take place over this length of time. Pretty sure the belt way will have countless AARs on this. If there ever is an after.
The first one that comes to mind is Korea. It actually surprises me that the stocks and production capacities are so low when there were real possibilities of conflict in Korea that we should have been thinking about. I just read a book on the battle of Pork Chop Hill and the US forces expended over 30,000 artillery rounds in 3 days supporting a reinforced company sized defensive position. That is a crazy amount of ordnance for such a small area, but it was a pretty intense fight.
Anyway, I'd think that someone in the Pentagon would have it figured out that they need x amount on hand for y expenditure rates in a conflict like Korea in order to sustain high intensity ops for z amount of time before production could ramp up to provide n amount of ammo per day. Probably like you said though, 50 years of low intensity expeditionary conflicts skews what is seen as "realistic" needs. Couple that with the expense and it probably explains the lack of logistical preparedness for a conflict like this. Just surprises me though and please don't make too much fun of me for having faith in our military/government to have thought and planned ahead. I know that sometimes I'm blissfully naïve.
-
21 hours ago, billbindc said:
If this is as hard as you gents make out...which I believe...then what exactly is the Russian air campaign that's being telegraphed supposed to accomplish? Tactical bombing to spring the mobiks? A banzai attack to show the boss that the air force is just as all in as the army?
I'm thinking that it will be a flood of tactical aviation designed for limited frontline objectives. Probably something along the lines of smashing up and taking Bahkmut or Vuhledar or something. They will most likely take horrendous losses in doing it, but so far that hasn't stopped them on the ground. If they lose 50 planes but can take the little piece of ground they will sing their "victory" from the rooftops. I think that is what the Kremlin is howling for, a victory of any size at any price. They just need a victory to feed the people no matter how insignificant it truly is.
Just my prediction for the impending offensive.
-
5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
No matter what, though, Russia will not have the near term (5-10 years minimum) ability to threaten its neighbors the way it has under Putin. It can still murder, hack, misinform, corrupt, etc. but it won't be able to swallow up territory like it has since 1990. Even after it reconstitutes its military I doubt it would be able to do much externally because of the quality gap.
Steve
If this war continues for another year with even similar amounts of equipment losses for the RA and the political shift of their neighbors, do we think they will ever be able to threaten them again?
Sweden and Finland in NATO, some sort of NATO end for Ukraine. Russia has China and Japan to the East and Europe to the west. With their military stocks pretty much destroyed and what is left is proving to be very inferior, so useless in the future. They need to build to a level that they can contest NATO or China. Can they do that industrially or economically? Ever? That is if they aren't walled off as a Mordor as well.
Their power prior to the invasion was based on everyone thinking their tech was good and their numbers were game changers. These things have been proven wrong so they will need to build an entirely new military pretty much from scratch at a technological level to be on par with the other big boys. Is this even possible?
I don't know. I'm not as well versed in these things as some on here, but my gut tells me no. So that might be the biggest catalyst of change for a post war Russia. If they pragmatically look at it and decide that there is just no way they can compete as a big boy in the future and decide they have to change. Not sure if their egos can handle that one, but it actually might be the best hope for a shift in their thinking and political stance.
-
9 minutes ago, Kraft said:
M777 with anti-lancet netting, I wonder if that is all that effective (not against lancets, they get caught good) but once a gun position is found it shouldnt take too long to get artillery on it and finish it despite the netting - atleast in theory.
I've been wondering about this as well. It just doesn't seem like either side is all that concerned about counter battery fire. There was a video on here a couple weeks ago that showed a 105 that looked like it had shot a 1000 rounds from the one position. You know they are fairly close to the front due to their limited range and yet they had obviously been static for an extended period. Several other videos and pics like the one you posted seem to indicate fixed positions are pretty common.
I'm surprised at this as there was so much talk earlier on about counter battery and the radars used to locate firing positions. I had thought that if it didn't move in a couple minutes the gun crews could realistically expect to receive fire.
For the arty guys or others in the know, is the counter battery game not as lethal as a lot of us thought? Is it done more optically with C4ISR? Why are we seeing the fixed positions and not constant movement?
Thanks for any insight.
-
With the mention of the 60mm mortars in the last couple days I got to thinking about the old "knee" mortars. The British, Germans and most other large armies had them and then they seemed to fade out from most everyone except the USMC over the years. A little reading seems to elude to the thought that they were replaced by the grenade launchers; M203, M79, etc. Now some armies are bringing back the light mortar, I believe the UK brought back a 60mm a few years ago. I think that most people that have been around both know that the 60 gunners were way more capable for most targets than a 203 gunner. I know, I know, your uncle's best friends second cousin could shoot a VC out of a tree at 1200 yards from the hip in the thick jungle with his M79, but not everyone's uncle's best friend's second cousin is Chuck Norris.
Then I see that the USMC has a GPS guided 60mm mortar round now. @Vet 0369 gave a good testimonial as to the viability of the 60mm mortar, but a GPS round? Man, that is a game changer for company level fire support. Tie that into the drones for observation and you have a very fast, accurate and nasty sniper team on your company front. I'm thinking that the UA needs a large freighter crammed full of those rounds as soon as possible!
The big guns are great and their PGM's do wonderful work, but they are big, expensive and burn out. I think an M777 costs around 3 mil and Excaliburs cost $65,000ish. A 60 mortar is around $10,000 and a GPS round $18,000 when first manufactured, probably a lot less now. If the tech is there for the 60, it has to be there for the 81s and 120s as well. Seems like a good investment considering. Still need those big guns, but we could send a whole lot of the little ones to have a great pay off for a small investment. Save the big stuff for the big and far away targets. Another plus would probably be a pretty light logistics and maintenance tail.
-
2 hours ago, Butschi said:
I don't know, really. But basically every country that still has beef with Ukraine (Hungary, maybe?) or doesn't think it gains enough for an increased danger of getting drawn into a the next conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a candidate. Or any country that after the war thinks it can gain more by pleasing Russia than by defending Ukraine.
I think the stop gap between the end of hostilities and full NATO membership is the creation of a separate defensive alliance. Poland, Sweden, Finland, Baltics, Czech, UK and maybe France, US, some of the Balkans, etc could easily sign a defense pact that wouldn't be as strong as a full NATO, but it would be strong enough. Then if it takes 10 years for full NATO membership, the day after Ukraine is in the separate alliance can be dissolved as redundant.
-
14 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:
Well, some parts of the Russian Army may be starting to get some of their ideas right
I'm going to be the optimist again today. Wouldn't it be nice if the UA cut off that northern pincer and liquidated most of Wagner group? I think it was Dan that said the weather is supposed to be a good freeze for the next week. There are several salty UA formations in the area. The RA troops have got to be getting worn out from the non-stop attacking (unless fresh ones have moved up).
Not sure if it is possible, but sure would be fun to watch!!
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
I don't believe the 1:1 ratio for two reasons, but they are both anecdotal.
First, we see a lot of figures up to 40,000 casualties for the RA in the fighting around Bahkmut. Even if you halve that number it is multiple brigades totally chewed to nothing. Yet we don't see or hear anything for months about this? Doesn't seem probable to me. So I go with the maybe in isolated instances or individual battles here and there, but it can't be for the entire op over the entire time.
Second, there is a metric boat load of video out there showing the UA getting very favorable results. If the RA was getting favorable results we would see it. They have constantly made a big deal out of anything they can claim as a win so I don't see why now would be any different. Prig would have been putting out videos standing in a field of UA body bags and not Wagner body bags if it was at all possible.