sross112
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Posts posted by sross112
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3 hours ago, paxromana said:
Of course, the unstated problem even with having 'hundreds' of First Line tanks in reserve is ... crews ...
Unless all the crews of all the destroyed tanks survive uninjured ... which is extremely unlikely (with manned tanks, at least, and the issues with 'drone' tanks have been alluded to here already).
How long does it take to train a Tank Crew from scratch? Many months, I expect. Retraining already experience Ukrainian Tank Crews on western equipment seems to have been much quicker.
So those 100s of tanks aren't necessarily as useful as they might seem.
I think that the best way to do this (and to increase available mass of all types) for most countries is by expanding their reserve forces. Personnel costs are one of the major inhibiters to a large standing army, so maybe some sort of system like Finland or a hybrid of it. I think almost all western nations have dropped the conscription/draft, but especially those next to Russia or other belligerents should consider stockpiling equipment and trained reserves.
All across the spectrum should probably do this and not just the army. Pilots, airframes, ships, etc pretty much everything that a country can afford. If it is truly the age of you fight the war with what you have and won't have time to train and produce then some serious consideration is merited.
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6 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:
This is a popular opinion coming from the active US or UK military personnel, but people who are more familiar with the post-Soviet system (or other systems) are sceptical of it.
Actually, if a necessary function in the unit is taken care of, it does not matter if the person doing it is called an officer, NCO, warrant officer or however you name him. It is just that in the US/UK system the NCO is someone who his appointed for his post for a long time and may generate lots of experience, while a junior officer is someone who does this function briefly and then in a relatively short time goes on to more senior things. But this is just a quirk of the military career path adopted in some (maybe most) Western militaries - equally well one could have the same job fulfilled by professional junior officers of long standing.
Yep, whether it is a NCO or an officer who fills the position, it is the first line leadership. I understand that there are different systems used by different armies, but it is the general lack of good first line leaders that I was pointing out. The main qualifier I am using is "good". They certainly have some sort of leader, but they are missing the experienced or trained to professional standards type of leadership that comes with what we in the west would call the NCO corps.
The most junior Corporal should have security set, crew served weapons placed, and entrenching tools working overtime in the first five minutes of setting foot in those trenches. Within a couple days you should see multiple fighting positions with overhead cover, firing steps, maybe some obstacles and cleared fields of fire, and grenade sumps all over to negate or at least minimize the drone bombing effects. I don't think it is because they are lazy, I believe the mobiks don't have a clue and there is no leadership at the first or even second line level making it happen.
There have been those complaint videos from units saying they were just dropped off and forgotten about. It seems like that might be the norm in a lot of places. Maybe it is 30 guys mobilized, vote on a leader, get gear issued, and then dropped off on the front line with a "good luck and good by" from the higher ups. Pretty morbid and wasteful on the RA side if that is how it is being done. It's a good thing for the UA so I hope that is how it is and how it stays, but on a human level it is almost unconscionable.
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2 hours ago, womble said:
The isolation of the mobik probably starts in their training period, if they have one. Given the "training methods" traditional to the RA, and the, ahem, "accelerated timescale", there's probably little or no cultivation of the attitudes that lead to the development, once deployed to unit, of the "bond between squadmates" that remains the primary motivation to fight of an infantryman. And there's no leadership at the low level with the competence to compensate.
This might contribute to the execrable treatment of casualties, fatal and otherwise: there just isn't any motivation to waste any effort on the guys around you, since you barely know them from Adam.
What I read from it is a lack of professional first line leadership (NCOs). I know it is something that we discussed here from day one as the RA just never had what the western forces would consider a capable NCO corps. To me that explains a lot of what we see beyond just the Mobik. Mobiks with proper leadership would probably be a much greater obstacle for the UA. Good NCOs would result in properly sited defenses and heavy weapons, developed fighting positions, ongoing training or increase in individual soldiering skills, and a much higher morale.
The limited initial training is definitely a problem for them, but the lack of effective leadership at the lowest levels is really telling.
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I think a lot of us are looking beyond the grisly stuff in most of the videos. That is probably because most of us are beyond our prime. The young and the dumb watch them for the gorey factor, but I think at least a majority of the people here are looking at the rest of the information provided.
Personally, I have found that I am watching the evolution of the drone more than the actual "kill shots". The complexity of drone operations continues to evolve and watching the videos is how you see that. Think way back to the early days and it was a solitary drone used for artillery observation and now sometimes we are seeing three levels of drones being used in the same videos, so at the same time and place. Used for overall command awareness of the battle, recon up close, and actual attack. And that is just what we are seeing. Then the advent of the FPV drones working in concert with the recon drones. Now whole dedicated drone warfare units are being trained up so who knows what all levels and capabilities they will bring with them with evolving tactics and platforms. Watching the videos gives some insight into these things that would otherwise be a few years away in the books that will cover it.
Also, like @The_Capt said, looking at all the other stuff gives good insight into a unit's field craft. That gives you insight into their training and discipline levels. I think it was just yesterday on the surrendering video that people were talking about the bodies laying around and what that means psychologically and even professionally about the unit occupying that space. You can tell a lot about the overall quality of a unit from how they move individually and as a group, how they maintain their equipment, what equipment is observed, etc. These observations help with the overall understanding of the situation in that area.
Overall I think there is a lot of value from the video footage of this war. There is a lot of nasty stuff posted out there as well and sadly a bunch of it is just about the grisly side of it. Almost everything I've seen on here has some value to it, whereas on other sites it seems to be much more of the nasty shock value stuff.
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4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Help me out here. How does this make Putin look strong? His dog threw a public temper tantrum and threatened to walk away from a military offensive and take his troops with him. The guy gets pulled into Kremlin and promised whatever he wants, essentially giving into blackmail.
Why on earth would Putin “stage” this? The optics are terrible. Like what is the angle here?
Externally to us it looks like a sh*tshow, but it's not about the external view. Internally it shows father Putin in control of his squabbling underlings. These stunts also give him the "evidence" that the failure lies on MOD when the UA wins this. It appears to me that Wagner is seen as an extension of Putin so he gets to be seen as the guy with the best troops, that made the most progress, and would have won if not for the bumbling MOD. These "incidents" can later be used to prove that Prig, and by extension Putin, did their upmost, but were harried at critical junctures that made them fail. This is just Putin getting the narrative laid out in advance for all the finger pointing that will certainly happen when it all falls apart.
Others on here have a much better grasp of the internal politics in the Kremlin, but this is how I see it as a move to make Putin look strong in the chaos that follows.
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4 hours ago, Taranis said:
Perun's last video was on hypersonic missiles. In it he talks about their development, cost, and use. The US had a program, but they ended it awhile back. Could it be that they are super expensive and they knew from testing that they were vulnerable to interception by the Patriot and maybe other systems? It would make sense that you would stop dumping a bunch of money into a system that wasn't going to give you a lot of benefit over what you already have if you know they are more vulnerable to interception than most people think. It also makes sense that the US and UA leadership would want that knowledge contained as China and Russia are dumping big resources into their projects that they think aren't interceptable. That would explain the hush hush attitude when normally it would be broadcasted as pretty big news.
This sort of thing can also explain some of the hesitation to give the UA some systems. Russia, and China by osmosis, is learning a lot about HIMARS, Starstreak, Javelin, and now Patriot capabilities that the US and allies probably didn't want them to know. Might be that ATACMS has some abilities that they don't want to show off or technology that they don't want to risk falling into potential enemy hands? It only takes one dud.
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55 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
My thoughts on maneuver warfare cutting off and destroying large enemy forces:
Both sides have repeatedly failed to achieve anything resembling force destruction through surrounding and reduction. Like others, I wonder why this is. I think I have a glimmer of an idea as to the underlying cause. And The_Capt is going to be pleased to know that I think it is corrosive warfare
What does a force require in order to conduct an encircling operation? The ability to move faster than the enemy can withdraw. What is the most important element for achieving that speed? Vehicles. What is the second most important element? The defender having little warning or knowledge of where the enemy's "pincers" are. Historically speaking nothing was more destructive than a force trying to withdraw and finding the enemy already blocking its route of retreat.
Corrosive warfare makes it quite difficult for the attacking force to achieve rapid movement because loitering munitions, long range ATGMs, mines, and the ability to direct accurate artillery fire (PGM or dumb) at the right place at the right time. Both sides have these capabilities, therefore both sides know they have to advance far more cautiously than in previous wars because bold moves are more likely to result in disaster than in the past.
There is a solution to this, but neither side has it. Yes, I'm talking about TacAir. Much of the corrosive warfare concepts I mentioned above require the defender retain some degree of flexibility in redeploying assets, in particular artillery, to thwart the advancing forces. If the attacker has the ability to find and destroy those assets while they are on the move, then the defender's ability to effectively confront bold advances is decreased. The destruction and disruption of such efforts also creates significant command and morale challenges on top of the stress that comes with withdrawing under pressure.
Since neither side has effective TacAir, the defender has the opportunity to conduct retrograde ops with a fair number of variables in its favor. A bold attacker may get lucky, but is perhaps more likely to suffer significant degradation instead.
Steve
I'm going to wear my optimist hat again today.
I think we have identified C4ISR as one of the most important things in this war. We've seen that the UA has what could really be viewed as C4ISR supremacy. Corrosive warfare will most likely be what is used in the initial phase to create an exploitable weakness or even to clear the breach. We've discussed a lot about the fact that the lines are held by too few troops. If the RA does have available reserves the UA most likely knows what they are and where they are at. With the low headcount defending the very long front it isn't like there are many areas that have a defense in depth. So once the crust is broken there shouldn't be much to stand in the way. If the RA is operating with a severe deficit of C4ISR like we think then the advantage should be to the UA. If the RA doesn't know where the UA is it makes it a lot harder for them to contain or even move against a breakthrough.
A good case to show this is the Great Raid of 2014. A UA force was able to travel 470km behind the lines, complete their mission and get back out over a course of 22 days. So in 22 days the RA was unable to find, fix, and destroy a raiding force of a couple battalions. Not some 4 man Force Recon team, a couple battalions. This sort of situation gives me lots of hope, especially in the south.
If the UA does have 9 or so newly staffed, equipped, and trained brigades on a leash and can get them through a breach, will the RA be able to deal with that? The corrosive type slow warfare all along the lines gives the RA a situation they can somewhat handle as it is really slow. How will they handle fast? I'm betting it will look a lot more like Kharkiv than Kherson.
So there you have my sunshine and rainbows for the day.
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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Expected - my guess is the main effort will initially be difficult for Ukraine, but steady progress and major Russian casualties will eventually cause that section of front to rip open and allow for larger advances. Russia mobilizes and, like Kharkiv, throws enough cannon fodder at the tired and worn down Ukrainian force that it slows to a crawl and the front stabilizes. However, I also think Ukraine will launch at one other significant effort somewhere else after the main one draws forces away. This should also achieve gains for Ukraine, though I'm thinking not as big as Kharkiv last year. Mostly because I expect this secondary attack to (again) be in the northern part of the eastern line. And like Kharkiv, piles of dead mobiks will slow and then halt the advances.
Most of the thought seems to be that the UA will unleash everything into the big push right away. Most of the rumormill has talked about the newly trained, equipped and formed brigades being the force that will be used. With these new brigades, might we see a series of smaller ops; destroy a BTG, take this general area, etc before we see a big push? Wouldn't the UA want to give the brigade's troops and especially their staff a little real world training and experience before committing to a big plan? @The_Capt has stressed how the staff side isn't easy to build and integrate on short notice. I'd think they would want to establish that the new units could complete the fundamentals before throwing them into larger and more complicated operations.
Opinions?
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When we are looking for the beginning of the UA offensive and looking for where the main efforts are, I think there will be some different tells than what we would historically look for. One of the big ones will be a drone campaign. A couple months ago there were articles about the UA training up a bunch of FPV pilots and creating units of them. Then there have been a couple links to stacks of FPV drones being built or delivered to the UA. Followed up by a few videos of their use, but nothing concentrated or repetitive in a concentrated area.
It is my thought that this unit will be committed to the area that the UA wants to seriously attrite prior to unleashing the assault elements. I'm not sure of the range on those FPVs, but I would expect to see them hammering the logistics and support elements while the drone bomber units are working the front line in conjunction with arty. Basically doing what we saw in that trench clearing video in the last couple days; work it until everything is wounded, killed or located and suppressed, then close with and destroy. Essentially emptying out a section of the front trenches for the mobile groups to be able to drive through while simultaneously wrecking as much as possible with the FPVs along the support tail.
Of course the flanks will probably see the historical approach with arty suppression and holding actions until the target area is cleared and breached. Then rolling up the flanks and defending the breach.
Or maybe I'm wrong and they use a tactic like that trying to eat a BTG a day on another section of front for a couple weeks. Making it look like the main point of attack to draw in reserves and reinforcements from the rest of the line, then smashing a breach more conventionally where the line has been thinned and there are better opportunities for operation goals.
So many unanswered questions....
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3 minutes ago, danfrodo said:
I agree they need a big win. What I've been wondering is whether they go all-out in May/June or do more local stuff initially. There's ~5 months of good weather so UKR might not want to risk everything on big initial push until they have punched around a bit to see what RU has & how it responds, attriting when RU moves stuff.
And the other side, RU will probably be throwing more mobiks into the line so UKR may want to win before those troops show up.
I think one of the big factors that will come into that decision is whether or not the UA feels that they have a solution to the Russian air power. Back during Kherson it was said that the main thing that hurt and stopped the UA was Russian air. Granted we don't have a lot of information on that, but it was widely reported. So if it is a big factor, recent build up of airframes by the RuAF would point to them thinking that heavy air interdiction will be their card to stop any break throughs.
If the UA is confident that they can provide an air denial bubble over any rampaging columns then I'd bet we see them try the break through and exploit option. If they aren't then the bet is on the corrosive/attritional approach.
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1 hour ago, womble said:
Are there any systems that can reliably break the rather sturdier rail link without "house-of-cards"-ing the eminently tippable road bridge deck sections? In the last instance, there was the assistance of a burning oil tanker train, too... I guess you could stop one of those with loitering munitions to the cab/locomotive set, and then set it alight however you like...
That is a very legitimate concern if we want to leave the road bridge intact. Maybe it wouldn't be necessary to actually drop a section. Just damaging it enough to make it unusable so it has to be replaced before a train can travel over it. Especially if you could do it to multiple sections.
48 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:There is nothing I know that exists currently that does this out of the box. To degrade the system without the pain of destroying the rail:
- If you knew where all the signals and control boxes were (gps) that are difficult to replace, and had suitably long range small drones with 1kg HE, you could cause significant degradation to the rail network, but that's because you are knocking out difficult to replace stuff all over.
- Alternatively, hit the rail yards and destroy enough locomotives, again with your long range drones/cruise missiles/saboteurs.
I'm not a train expert, but maybe the loading/unloading facilities would be easier to target/destroy? I'm sure some ingenuity would still get the job done, but it would inject a huge amount of friction and slow the process immensely. Along with your suggestions of hitting some of the technical parts to create as much chaos with the system as possible.
These things would probably be more resource intensive as they would most likely be faster and easier to repair than replacing a span, but may be more damaging overall to the whole rail system. If the technical parts are hard to source Russia has been known to strip other parts of systems for replacements. If this was done to the rail system over a period of a couple months it could cause serious issues in other parts of the country that they get the parts from. Again, adding to the overall friction or even cascading failures if kept up long enough.
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5 hours ago, womble said:
Doesn't he have the Kerch Bridge in the wrong slot in that OOB? Is it worth leaving up as a rat-escape-route, vs dropping it to deny rail and road supply?
The Russians use rail for the majority of their supply, so I'd say drop the rail right away and leave the road open for exodus. Also, leaving the road open so they can use wheeled supply will put a lot of friction into their already strained logistics. It would look better in the end as Ukraine would be seen as humanely leaving open a corridor for civilian supply and movement.
Crimea is a possibility this year if the RA suffers some catastrophic collapses. I don't see it happening if the offensive is the slow and controlled type, but that could still result in a large collapse. If the RA runs and the UA pursues it could snowball and be a fairly bloodless conquest for the UA. As others have said, it usually goes slow until it goes fast. We'll just have to wait and see how it all plays out.
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8 hours ago, panzermartin said:
I've watched quite a few of those close action videos posted from both sides and I'm coming to the conclusion that modern soldiers have become even less densesitized firing at the enemy than what was described in the book "on killing". Some of you might have read about it. There was a theory that in WW2 most soldiers didn't fire their guns at all or didn't shoot to kill but mostly injure the enemy. That changed the coming decades, particularly from wiki :
0thers have said it pretty good about the Marshall Study, 0n Combat, and 0n Killing. It has been awhile since I have read them, but the other caveat that Marshall and Grossman had was that it depended on the unit as well. Airborne, Marines, Rangers, etc were pretty much inversely proportional in their participation. Those that joined these "elite" formations were ones that wanted to fight, were aggressive by nature, and generally received a much higher level and intensity of training. Experience also calculates in (in December of 44 the Big Red 0ne was a different animal than a division fresh off the boat).
So overall, there are a plethora of variables that can and do affect the percentage of participation in combat. There is no set rule or formula that can be applied across the board. Kudos to Marshall and others for their work, but when boiled down it becomes an anecdote or rule of thumb that will probably be wrong more times than it will be right.
These are just my opinions with no scientific backing, but I believe the main factors for how a small unit performs in combat are Motivation/Morale, Training/Experience, and leadership. I agree that the UA in general shows a high level of motivation, especially in units like the one in the video (Da Vinci's Wolves). Throw all the atrocities and war crimes on top of the basic motivation to defend their country and people and it is pretty easy to see higher levels for the UA. The leadership from that NC0 made a world of difference as well. Take him out of the scenario and it could have easily went the other way. At the same time a senior NC0 or officer needs to have a conversation with him that he'll never forget about how the Russians were able to approach to grenade range in daylight on a flat open field without being seen and engaged.
The Training/Experience factor is something that I have payed a lot of attention to over the course of this war. There has been a pretty steady rise in the professionalism of a lot of the UA units over the last year. While watching bunches of videos I found myself cringing a lot due to the lack of muzzle discipline, spray and pray marksmanship, and poorly sited and prepared fighting positions. For example I don't know how many times I've subconsciously panicked when seeing a soldier sitting or standing with their muzzle in the dirt or mud. My pulse starts to quicken and all I can think of is that the UA version of Gunny Mendoza is going to come around the corner, see that, and promptly make a popsicle out of that soldier with his rifle as the stick.
There does seem to be a trend though of seeing less and less of that untrained/undisciplined behavior. I have high hopes for this summer and believe the UA will impress us by seriously out-classing the RA when they kick off their offensive.
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48 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
Nah, I'm still not convinced. Bottle up Crimea creates a "situation", not a media win. No one in the general public knows or cares about Melitopol. It's a purely military objective. Western People hear "Melitopol" and they say, "oh, that horrible theatre bombing* and Ukraine says, " nono that's Mariupol", and then Western pundits will say:
Zelensky, and the Ukrainian war effort, needs a clear, easily messaged and instantly understood geopolitical & moral win that they can use to shore up Western support and, ideally, beat Putin over the head with.
Bottling Crimea and putting Melitopol (no, not Mariupol) under a logistics interdiction campaign does not fit that nominal criteria. It's too vague, there's no immediate emotive effect and it takes too long to explain.
Thinking that the 2023 ZSU offensive(s) will be purely military in nature is a fallacy, I personally believe.
I think it really depends on who the audience is. If it is for western support then a large chunk of real estate that preferably has something the western populace will recognize (I'm with you on Mariupol). If it is to stir up problems in Russia then they should focus on cauldrons eliminating RA units. If the UA could nab a couple brigades with hundreds or thousands of POW's being marched to the rear, I'd expect there to be significant internal backlash in Russia. More than that, it would have a very demoralizing effect on the RA. The bigger the hit to the RA, the quicker the morale drops. That is the biggest condition that needs to be set for any kind of collapse. The snowball effect could really end up being devastating to the MOD and maybe even the Kremlin.
The biggest variable for any of these plans though is how much the UA can commit to them. If they have 10 brigades they could probably make it happen. If they don't, then Steve's general offensive is probably the most doable. Until we know what they have waiting in the wings all we can do is speculate. I like the idea of going for the coast as it physically splits their southern forces. Drop the Kerch bridge once they reach the coast and everything to the west is bottled. I'd expect a Kherson redux within 30 days if the UA keeps those forces under the fog eating snow and opportunistic advances. Having those forces cut off gives the RA a very large dilemma; a) try to keep them supplied by ship and air b) withdraw everything they can while they can or c) eventually (60 days?) surrender.
I also expect the RA to attack as hard as they can everywhere they can to try to take the pressure off of wherever the UA decides to strike. Lots of troops in the Kremina area and along the eastern front. I don't expect them to be able to do a lot, but the UA won't be able to strip too much without taking a pretty big gamble in some of those areas. Or maybe the RA will finally whip out MacGregor's magic wand and surprise us all.
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2 hours ago, Lethaface said:
In our country we had an example of this problem during the covid pandemic. Some samba dance teacher turned into a 'virus expert' and his misinformed ideas (or cognitive dissonance) gained massive traction because he said what some people wanted to hear. I was all for locking the man up until after the pandemic, but our own checks and balances made that difficult. Probably for the better, when looked at what happened in the '30s of the previous century not that far from here.
This (our 'freedom' being used against us by less free nation states) is a weakness of all democratic countries and probably needs to be addressed in this century if we hold democracy dear.Benjamin Franklin once said: "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."
It is also a good thing that most western nations are not true democracies. They are republics that guarantee the rights of their citizens.
"A democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what's for dinner. Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
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13 minutes ago, Astrophel said:
The politico article is well worth a read. Thanks for bringing it to our attention.
I am surprised how far China is with their construction of an ideology and vision for competing with the west. We should do some deep thinking about the effectiveness of our democratic models, especially the two party systems in UK and USA particularly. A number of democracies in the world are teetering on the edge - South Africa particularly, but Brazil, India, and several others including some close to home like Hungary.
I'm curious. Are you advocating a one party system like China, Russia, (enter monarchy or totalitarian dictatorship here), or one with literally dozens like South Africa, Brazil and India? Curious as to which success story we should model ourselves after.
Personally, I am a very big fan of a monarchy in the US, but only if I get to be the monarch!
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10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
The second thing is how many grenades it took to knock this position out! Despite Ukrainians accurately dropping a half dozen grenades directly into the position there was still some resistance at the end.
Steve
Seen several videos where multiple grenades were needed. I've been wondering when the return of the satchel charge will be seen.
Then with the drone centric warfare I remembered seeing a video of this baby awhile back:
Chase them into the bunker with the dropped grenades and then send in the flamethrower. I shudder as I type this, but kind of surprised we haven't seen these used already.
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1 hour ago, akd said:
One of the more brutal Russian disassembly by drone compilations (I warned you):
Drone warfare is accelerating at an exponential pace in this war. I remember early on we talked about what the future war would look like with drones and if this war continues for another year or two I think we will see it first hand. There was a post within the last week or so with a larger drone mounting an MG and I think yesterday reference to a drone with a Claymore. Some of the large agricultural drone models can carry 50kg, so 2.75" guided rockets for truck hunting, ATGMs for armored vehicle hunting, AA missiles for plane hunting; the possibilities are endless.
Instead of a HMMWV with an ATGM mounted on it that you need to move into LOS for engagement, you can have a landing pad on the back deck for a large drone carrying a Javelin that you only need to get the vehicle to a point where the drone will have LOS when launched straight up to X altitude. Pop up, lock on, fire, land. With fire and forget systems like the Javelin there would be a very small window to even react or engage the drone.
Watching this video posted by AKD and some other recent ones, it shows just how devastating drones dropping munitions have become. We have seen the evolution from a few here and there with varying success to these that are just wrecking havoc. When I think of the drone carrying the MG or AR the old ground pounder in me puckers. Take some of these videos, change out the drone dropping grenades with a drone sporting a sighted in AR pistol with a 100 rnd drum and think of the carnage that could result.
The other recent development we are seeing is the FPV kamikaze drones. How long until we see the first drone swarms? I'm thinking about 90% of R&D money needs to be funneled into drone defense because drone offense is definitely here and improving at a very fast rate.
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Looks like the M1's timetable has been pushed up a bit. Still not quick enough but will be refurbished A1's instead of new production A2's.
Along with our China conversation, Japan has really been putting itself out there in support of Ukraine and polar opposite to China. Seems like they are coming out of their shell more and more on the international stage.
Haven't see anyone else link Perun's newest video of analysis on the RA winter offensive. Lots of points very similar to what has been said on here but also does a good job of showing each of the different areas. Worth the hour watching if you have the time.
Favorite quote from Perun:
9:21 "Generally speaking if the other side can't tell if your offensive has gone in or not, that's pretty embarrassing."
maybe @The_Capt can give us the military acronym for the age old question "Is it in yet?"
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36 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
A specific example of the tidy unit position was the guy that used a stick to pick up the (hot) spent casing to get it out of the way. I've noticed a lot of sloppy piles of casings around the breach in many videos, for both sides, since the start of the war. Granted these guys are firing single shots so it's easy to keep up with the casings, I should think if the unit was lazy this is exactly the time for seeing them pile up. "Yeah, I'll get that later" attitude.
These guys keeping it clean can also be a contributing factor to them not being as easily spotted by the Russian drones. A position with trash around it stands out and points to where the people are. Just another possible addition to the otherwise noted reasons why they have been able to stay in position that long.
There has also been mention recently in some of the interviews posted on here about the Russians getting better field craft. I've noticed that in several of the drone perspective videos and trench assaults that there is a lack of trash in the Russian positions in comparison to what we have seen in the past. I'm sure it isn't completely gone everywhere, but it is a sign that they recognize this gives away their positions and are trying to conceal themselves better.
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21 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
A Russian Mil Blogger perspective:
As with much of what I've found on this site, and with other better informed Russian pro-war sources, the author pretty accurately sums up the basic situation; China has a difficult choice to make because either way it gains and loses. He also made it clear that China is out for itself and can not be relied upon by anybody, as it will switch strategies the minute it feels it isn't working for them.
His conclusion (surprise surprise) is that Russia is more valuable to China than the Western aligned countries, therefore China is going to provide Russia with a large amount of stuff. He then lists all the potential stuff and reasonably rules out large swaths of it for various practical reasons. However, the stuff he thinks of as possible would violate what he himself thinks China might do, which is to try and covertly supply Russia. So his list of possibilities is overly optimistic if he applies his own logic to it.
Interesting to note that the comments section seems to think the author is wrong and that Russia is not as valuable to China as he thinks. Which means Russia won't get meaningful support.
On a side note, I find it so amusing that the RU Nats can talk about the need for China to supply the Russian military in order for it to succeed. I've listened to RU Nats for decades talk about how it has the military might to take on the entire world if it chose to. And yet, apparently it can't even take on a bunch of backwards, racially inferior "little brothers" who are being armed with Cold War era equipment.
That point apparently just zips by them.
Steve
Xi needs to ask himself if Russia is worth more to China and its goals dead or alive. The thinking a year and a half ago was definitely on the alive side. Russia brought a lot to the table for their shared goals. Since that time their military has been shown to not be a threat even to a single country 1/3 of its size. Its political clout and credibility has been shattered. If some of the experts are right, by the end of the year its economy will collapse and especially its fossil fuel infrastructure will struggle to produce anywhere near what it has. So what "advantage" does Russia give China from here on out, at least for the next 10-20 years?
If the goal is for China to become THE world leader then this visit needs to be the beginning of political positioning. Siding with Russia and trying to help or save them would degrade China's position. Looking like they forced an end to hostilities where the west couldn't improves their position. The only way an "alive" Russia benefits China is if Putin agrees to cease hostilities, withdraw to the 2014 borders and start making amends with the world. Putin is not going to agree to that. It is suicide, probably literally, for him if he does.
If Putin refuses that, what is the best end state of Russia for China? Dead. Broken up and non-threatening. A China with an independent Yakutsk and Siberia with military guarantees for their security in exchange for access to their mineral and oil resources gives them the "gas station" that they need without the ball and chain of Russia dragging them down. China is very good at expanding infrastructure quickly and would be able to develop a lot of energy and resource independence in a short time.
From the Guardian picture that was linked by Dan, Putin doesn't look overjoyed by whatever Xi had to say.
Right now if China goes to war they have to go to war with someone that doesn't have the ability to sustain blue water naval operations in the Indian Ocean. I believe over 80% of their oil is imported from the Persian Gulf area so it doesn't take much to choke them out. You cut the oil and you cut everything; military, agriculture, economy, energy, everything. That would be pretty catastrophic really quick. So China needs to have a 3 day war with Taiwan or it needs energy independence. Ukraine has foiled the 3 day war concept so if China ever wants to take back what they think is theirs they need that independence.
With all that being said, I don't see China going all in to support Russia. It just doesn't make sense for them. All in is the only thing that would possibly save Russia from being defeated at this point and it does more harm to China than good. It doesn't really help them on the world stage at all and does nothing to improve their territorial or political desires. I'm betting that Xi has promised to help with uniforms, kit, small arms, rations and maybe ammunition at most. Enough to keep the appearance of a supporting friend but it will all be done through intermediaries like Kazakhstan. This meeting isn't going to give Putin what he wants or needs.
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Would it be possible that the Russian pilot dumped fuel on the drone and then came back in close thinking he could ignite it with his exhaust? All the aeroplane guys and engineers don't need to explain to me that this isn't possible due to the dissipation rates of JP fuel on a drone moving XXXkph with the sun at XX degrees, etc, etc. I know it isn't possible. You know it isn't possible. Did the Russian pilot think it was possible, miscalculated his approach as he was trying to get as close as he could and inevitably struck the drone? We have witnessed a string of sub par cognitive decisions from representatives of Russia for over a year now....
I can see a pilot going for contact to flip a V2 or nudge another aircraft, but that would be done just like PITing a vehicle. Catch up, off set, match speed, slow movement to contact, then push through. This was more of a lack of skill or miscalculation on the pilot's part as no matter how much larger you are in the air you shouldn't ram another thing in the air.
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4 hours ago, chrisl said:
The AWACS and JSTARS seem to reliably fly over NATO countries, unless they're flying with their ADS-B turned off over the BS. So an attack on one of them by Russia would be a much more overt act of aggression and likely leave them with an undeclared no-fly zone.
Right. Which would lead to the US and Russian planes duking it out and probably losses on both sides. Which escalates further and the Black Sea Fleet sails out to support and gets sunk. Russian AA engages US planes so US SEAD starts. Escalates more. Russian rhetoric explodes and Kremlin threatens nukes. Ratchets up the readiness, opens the silos, etc to the finger over the big red button.
2 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:Difficulty with this scenario is that there are no international means for China, the UN or any nation to require anyone to stop doing anything, short of war. If there were, this war would already be over.
China and about 5 seconds later every nation that has a bullseye on it is screaming for everyone to stop. Screw the ineffectual UN. This is about the actual countries and partners yelling at the US to stop. Then 10 seconds later every other country in the world starts hollering too when they realize they don't have a bullseye on them, but they have to live with the consequences of a nuclear exchange. China gets to play the leader of everybody not involved because they are the big guy that has the clout, but they are supported by everyone. They call for an immediate cessation of ALL hostilities, Ukraine included.
War stops and is frozen in place. Ukraine is smart and when everyone supporting them tells them to stop or immediately all support stops,....they stop. They full well know that it is just an intermission until they have to fight Russia again, but they also know they can't do it alone. Putin gets to save himself because he has faced down the evil west and will claim it as a win. The war that they are losing horribly is over and eclipsed by the new big news. Russia survives and the new Cold War is on.
Just a theory but fits the escalate to de-escalate theory and probably saves Putin.
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54 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Follow up to my comment about how the attack on the drone can be spun to support US isolationists and pro-Russian lobbies...
I was listening to the BBC today and they had a Russia academic and former advisor to Putin on the air. He stated very clearly, as in VERY CLEARLY, that the whole world knows that Ukraine isn't a country, that the Kyiv regime is a puppet of the US, and that the US drone was actively seeking information in order to kill Russians. The anchor, thankfully, called BS on all of this and focused on the neutrality of the airspace.
The guy acknowledged this, then quickly went on to say that it didn't matter because Russia has a right to defend itself. When pressed about if the actions of the pilots was aggressive and irresponsible, he admitted that it wasn't really a good idea for them to have taken down the drone (he said clearly that it was deliberate, BTW), but because the US is insistent on killing Russians then what do you expect Russia to do?
When asked what should be done about the situation, he said that both sides should descalate starting with the US withdrawing its aggressive military posture supporting the deaths of Russian soldiers.
So there it is, the sort of talking points aimed squarely at elements in the US and elsewhere that are too confused to understand what is really going on. I expect to see the hard right and hard left in the US blathersphere repeating this sort of nonsense.
Steve
I was thinking about this incident last night. I'm wondering if Russia was escalating with the US and will continue to do so with the intent to instigate an actual exchange of shots. Maybe mess with unmanned a couple more times and then go after an AWACS or JSTARS or something with the same rationale as above (they are enabling the killing of Russians so we killed them). Hoping to provoke the US into a response of sinking the Black Sea Fleet or something similar. Russia could ratchet up the nuclear forces to pre-launch. Then having China with the UN standing up like the teacher over a playground brawl, "Enough!! EVERYBODY stop!!" Requiring everyone to stop fighting to make sure there is no nuclear exchange. Hoping to freeze the conflict where it is.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
The Cyclops series of videos highlights a lot of their issues. In the early ones the armored vehicles drive up well within RPG range and aren't engaged, so lack of AT assets. Then the defenders are holed up in the bunker from the beginning, not retreating to it under pressure. Their lack of security in the trench allows the attackers to get inside the trench system before they are engaged. The position was obviously originally constructed by the UA and the bunker's firing apertures are facing in the wrong direction, but no work has been done to correct it or build a new position on the opposite end of the trench to face the direction of their attackers. Then you also observe that in multiple attacks there are zero supporting fires helping them defend. So there is either an inability to communicate with supporting fires, no supporting fires available, or they are available but so slow to materialize they have no impact on the fight.
My thoughts about them holing up in the bunkers is that they are afraid of the bomber drones. Otherwise it could be poor first line leaders, but the amount of video evidence of the drone bombers attacking them in their trenches has to be affecting their mindset. If that is the motivating factor, why aren't they building more overhead cover? Or stringing cammo netting over the top? Not a perfect solution, but knowing that the trench is occupied vs knowing exactly where everyone is and being able to accurately drop grenades on them makes it better than their current options.
I read a good book on Pork Chop Hill not too long ago. So 70 years ago the US Army built their bunker system on that hill and connected them with fighting and communication trenches. When the NK and Chinese attacked heavily they defended from both the trenches and bunkers (bunkers were mainly for the crew served weapons). Once a section of trench was lost everyone retreated into the bunkers and had their own artillery plaster the position with air bursts. Then counter attack, clear out any survivors, and back for the next round. I bring this up because it was possible 70 years ago, but the RA seems to be unable to do these sort of coordinated actions even today. Puzzling.
Then you contrast with the videos that you see of the UA defenses. They are fighting from the trenches (forget the name of the guy that was dropping attacking Russians and hammering their BMP with RPGs while the other guy was loading and handing him whatever he needed from the bunker) and in the last Cyclops video they had indirect fires breaking up an attacking platoon before they even got started. Seems like the UA has a much better understanding and superior abilities to make war than their invaders do.
I know we can get carried away with Russia Sucks at War stuff, but from the outside looking in it just seems like their entire system is completely broken. Have their successes over the last 30 years (Georgia, Ossettia, etc) just been from swamping the problem with mass? Just being able to overwhelm with sheer volume so they made their goals even though they had all these problems? Or has the RA actually managed to get worse over time?