sross112
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Posts posted by sross112
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I think where the small UGV concept could really shine would be in your infantry battalion weapons company. Think of that recent video of the UA machinegun nest that the RA had such a hard time with that turned out to be a remote operated BTR turret. If the weapons company had UGVs hauling their weapon systems they could make for great fast tactical fire support offensively or defensively. Still haven't wrapped my head around the bigger UGVs but the light, medium and heavy concept that Steve just put up is making a little more sense to me.
There has been some talk of the vehicle mounted 120mm mortar systems and their uses. Thinking of them, how long until the PGM out of one of those could be a loitering drone? Launch the round, 1000m up on the down path the casing falls apart and the drone activates. The gunner or commander has a visual link, selects the target and the drone executes. 1 shot, 1 kill. Could launch recon drones the same way. Could you have one at your company CP that launches recon drones on demand to the squad or platoon that requests one? With digital communications integration the drone just gets transferred to the Sgt or Lt on the front line and immediately the Company CO and FSO get the video feed of the targets as well?
Man, some crazy sci fi stuff but I don't think it would be impossible.
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29 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
I'd say absolutely yes you need armor to gut the enemy once the knife is through. Nothing destroys enemy formations and morale like having AFV/MBTs rampaging through undefended rear areas. They move fast, can do wayyy more damage in a short time than athm buggies and can firm fighting defenses.
Li and buggies are great and all, but if I can get even a platoon of M1A(Z) and/orBrad 3.0 onto a hostile GLOC i can do far, far more damage in a far large area far quicker than Light Infantry. Sure I'll get attrited but gimme those 120s gorging on a sausage line of tanker trucks, articulated lorries and ammo dumps. Think of the Instagram posts!
So maybe the the new heavy force could be something like LAV based? Now, I'm with you. The 120 vs the fuel tanker does make for the best instagram content, but do you need a 120 to defeat said articulated lorry? A LAV with a 50-90mm gun system could do the same job. With the anti armor systems out there it really doesn't matter if you are in an M1 or an LAV the result will pretty much be the same. Seems like anything vehicle based is suffering from a distinct disadvantage right now so the less logistics and cost for the same result appears to make sense.
14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:I was with you until this war. What Ukraine did via crowd-sourced ISR was frankly terrifying in its potential. We only have a bunch of social media/OS content and a few decent early analysis right now. However, what role did the cellphone and civilian cell networks play in Phase 1 of this war? I saw social media picking up Russian forces and then light Ukrainian infantry/SOF going out and hitting those forces...damn near everywhere at once. That is not a traditional military kill chain, but damn if it did not work - to the point that it led to Russian operational collapse.
This leads to "What is the cost of the killchain?" and "What is the comparative/competitive costs of the killchain?"
That worked great for Ukraine, but not so great for the RA. I believe you are from Canada so your model of crowd sourced ISR would probably be sufficient as Canada isn't known for it's aggressive wars of conquest. However, if you are wanting to warmonger a little and invade someone else the crowd sourcing is generally not going to work in your favor so you will need to spend the big bucks so you can bring your own ISR along. That form of ISR was also only possible due the the RA not blacking out Ukraine right away, which I think we all agreed was a mistake on their part.
So really the kill chain model question is the same as the force composition question for a nation and the answer is very specific to that nation and its intentions.
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
You project this as a series of tactical undecidings of their operational integrity, until their system starts to collapse. Here breadth is likely more important than speed. You project corrosive force along their entire operational system, and when they buckle...then you send in the mech/armor to do the deep stabby work, before they can re-establish a defence line, tempo here will still matter...I think.
I agree that operational tempo will still be one of the keys. The fog needs to eat the snow as quickly and efficiently as possible to keep them on the back foot and keep them from piling in more snow. Once they buckle, do you still need the heavy mech to exploit and chew up the rear? The reserve/exploitation battalion of light fighters get mounted up in their lightly armored, fast, wheeled all terrain vehicles armed with their javelins, NLAWs and manpads and go on safari. Afterall, any resistance or reserve units of the enemy will have to be dealt with in the same manner as the enemy at the front was so your mech exploitation starts off at the same disadvantage that it had that resulted in the light fighters needing to break the line. Then add to that much larger logistic requirements and the 8km bubble that you need to provide for it at all times and it becomes an unwieldly and much slower exploitation, which in turn defeats the tempo that you are trying to achieve with the breakthrough in the first place.
Light forces with excellent long range indirect support and coordinated supporting air would be much more effective. The big mech really doesn't add much and just becomes a big bunch of very expensive slow glow in the dark targets.
41 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:I don't think that Steve's scenario "overweight people fighting wars from the mall" is close at all... securing comms is not a trivial problem (if fixable at all). Droning ISIS bastards (or just poor bastards often I am afraid) is one thing, going after a nation state with significant cyber/EW/anti-satellite capabilities is another matter. I think we will see more things like a "Stugna on wheels" with the operator relatively close but out of LOF (e.g. relaying via a small UAV), and the UGV being semi autonomous to handle loss of comms situations.
That has been my opinion of the weak link as well. And the closer you have to move the control center to the front the more vulnerable it becomes. Not to mention the control centers will be horribly expensive as each control cubicle will have to be greatly enlarged and painstakingly recreated into clones of the operator's mom's basement so they don't have anxiety attacks from having to leave their safe spaces. Then the use of 70+ year olds and gen z gamers will severely affect your tempo of operations and limit your operational window from 1200 to 2000 hours. The old guys won't be able to stay awake past 2100 and the young ones won't get out of bed until 1100.
Edit:
From @The_Capt : Finding. Finding two humans in cover on the a conventional battlefield is still the third hardest ISR challenge that exists. Even with TI, which is not designed to find people it is designed to find vehicles, is going to be severely challenged in doing this.
I forgot to relate to this. I've been blessed with being able to operate a FLIR on multiple occasions from a helicopter on search and rescue missions. Mostly looking for lost hikers or assisting rural law enforcement looking for bad guys in badlands, forested hills and open plains. Vehicles are super duper easy to spot from very long ranges but people have a pretty small cross section from the top down. If they aren't moving they look like another rock and boy howdy are there a lot of freaking rocks on the surface of this planet. Not to mention all the man made clutter. So Thermal Imaging is really cool and really useful but is not a magic wand that will allow immediate identification of all enemy infantry in the grid with a simple fast fly over.
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3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
And 10-20 years later Ukraine would win the war outright after the US withdrew and whatever proxy force it left behind was overwhelmed. Drones, satellites, PGMs, particle beams, hover tanks, etc. won't ever defeat a population determined to never stop fighting. This is why the US needs to pull its head out of its arse and spend as much money as needed to figure out how to win another protracted war against a determined enemy. Drones can be a part of it, but if that's all the Pentagon comes up with... defeat is inevitable.
Steve
3 hours ago, sburke said:Simple - don't invade a country if you don't have an exit plan and don't assume you can change the nature of a country just because on face value you'll make the average person's life better. People aren't logical.
sburke pretty much has it, I'm just surprised there is no reference to mobile multi-level parking establishments.
I think Steve made his own answer as an offensive war against a population that doesn't want you there is pretty much unwinnable with the transfer of advantage in defensive man portable tech. So the US and every other country just needs to stop trying to control ground. The Gulf War is a good example of how it needs to be done. If there is a good enough reason to go to war, have clearly defined objectives and then go home. If any sort of occupation is the goal, rethink going to war.
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3 hours ago, chrisl said:
And to get that precision you need a lot of resources - it's not just making a missile with a 5 cm CEP. You need all the ISR to precisely find targets, the sensors for moving targets, the communication systems to convey that information to the control room or missile, etc.
You still need some mass, or at least ROF+retargeting speed. Kind of like late in a game of Asteroids when there are a zillion asteroids coming at your one ship - if you can't fire and retarget fast enough, all the precision in the world won't help.
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:3 hours ago, chrisl said:Precision is a big part of the solution to the energy problem. The less stuff you need to accomplish the task at hand, the smaller the logistic tail and the less total energy you need, and the less energy you need to haul that energy around.
B.I.N.G.O. And in a war of exhaustion the side that makes better use of energy has what now?
I'm so glad to be able to be part of this board as there is so much insight and technical knowledge here. One of the big themes that we've been discussing for over a 1000 pages is the future of warfare and also how what we are seeing here affects it. I've had a pretty simplistic view of combined arms for a long time, probably because the majority of my reading and wargaming is around WW2. So rock (armor), paper (infantry), scissors (arty). This has been very educational on modern war and I see that it is now so much more complex, like rock, paper, scissors, hedge trimmers, chainsaw, metal pipe, crow bar, machete, etc, etc, etc.
From what I gather, the single most important factor on the contemporary battlefield is ISR. The side with the best recon is going to be able to dominate the other side even if outgunned and outnumbered. This in itself isn't a new concept but what is new is the scope. With the precision strike capabilities of hundreds of kms you also need the ISR to support those systems. If you don't have that you end up looking like Russia in this war and hitting stuff, well at least trying to, that you "think" "might" be there instead of Ukraine that is hitting stuff that actually is there. The more precision your weapons have and the greater your ability to have good ISR the more effective your campaign will be. Either without a corresponding ability in the other results in a lot of ineffectiveness or wastage of resources.
Having the accurate deep strike capability with missiles greatly enhances the ability to shape the operational and even strategic goals. If we work our way back from the front lines with priorities of AA, Radars, HQ's, logistics hubs and LOCs/SLOCs and airfields/bases. Several hundred km ranges really presents a plethora of opportunity. Maybe there will be a whole new missile arty arm in the western forces.
Then you need the air power to gain and maintain air supremacy over the operational area. This shouldn't be hard if you've mastered the first part and reduced their AA capability and probably even air capabilities with missile strikes. With control of the air those assets can target the heavier static stuff with large ordnance and interdict anything that moves. With the good ISR, the rear pounded with missiles and the air controlled it shouldn't be hard to kill any arty within the operational area with your air, arty and missiles.
That leaves the front lines. ISR again. Any vehicles that aren't basically underground should be able to be targeted and destroyed. The infantry can be degraded but eventually you will have to dig them out with bayonets. Considering the lethality of the infantry AT and AA weapons you aren't going to want to do that with tanks and helos and that is where your ground pounders come in. Highly trained, well equipped light mobile infantry with coordinated heavy supporting elements and great ISR should make short work of the defenders with minimal losses. Then the breakthrough and wholesale destruction of the enemy's rear echelons.
Does this next step fall to the heavy mech forces? I'm thinking that these are just not cost effective with the modern AT weapons. Javelin type weapons that kill MBT's from 4 km away with a 90% probability make our contemporary tanks and IFV's not cost effective. So is the transition back to infantry, fog eating snow, slowly grinding forward, or is our new model of infantry more akin to a rebirth of dragoons? Each squad mounted in a lightly armored, high speed, all terrain capable vehicle with a crew served weapon for each fire team? Each fire team having their drone, Javelin, AA and a crew served weapon for mounted or dismounted support use. Cheaper, more versatile and a much lighter logistic tail than heavy armored formations.
The problem with this future war is that there is only really one country that can support the military assets needed to wage it. You need to have every facet covered from space on down. It will be hugely expensive and manpower intensive. A coalition might be able to pull it off, but that is only if every member agrees on their role and the ALWAYS agree to fight together so they have all the pieces.
When you don't have all the pieces you get what we see in Ukraine. Both sides are missing key capabilities and it has shown since the beginning. Ukraine is slowly getting the pieces. When they get the pieces and the right amount of pieces I believe we will witness the wholesale destruction of the RA.
Well, there's my comblaberation of random thoughts for the week.
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36 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
Jeepers. Double HIMARS...
That's like steak, with a side of steak!!
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3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
Oh, this was a good way to start my day
Look at the results of the confirmed (by Ukraine) special ops attack on Dzankhoy. The ammunition is cooking off over time vs. the all at once (or nearly so) hits at the Saky airbase. If I had only seen the video from Dzankhoy I would have suspected an SOF attack. ATACMS might have produced the cooking off, but it's outside of ATACMS range (i.e. even if the US sent some over it wouldn't be them) and it's not the sort of huge all-at-once explosion I would have expected from Hrim-2.
What I'm saying here is that the visual information we have for the two attacks does seem to indicate that the first one was Hrim-2 (or something near the same), likely with a SOF component, and the second attack SOF only.
That said, I disagree that it's unrealistic to think Ukraine could have mounted two sophisticated SOF ops this close to each other. The facilities attacked were not likely to be any more or less difficult to attack today as they were last month or the month before that. This is quite different than a time sensitive SOF operation such as going after an individual (like Bin Laden), a moving target (like Muskova), or a target of opportunity (oh, say Wagner HQ being ID'd, but outside of artillery range). Therefore, Ukraine would have been planned well ahead of time and could have been synched to be done fairly close to each other for maximum psychological damage.
All fascinating stuff.
Steve
Back to the airfield. Didn't someone recently give a load of laser guided bombs to Ukraine? They degraded air defenses a day or so ahead of the airfield attack. If there was an open corridor could SOF had laser designators and a lone high altitude fighter bomber dropped bombs for them? That could explain the lack of hearing missile strikes or seeing them come in (missile is much bigger than a bomb). Also plays into the extreme range and pinpoint accuracy. Of course this assumes that the RA didn't have air defenses on or near the airfield, but with all the other oversight I wouldn't be surprised.
Not a big air guy so there are probably a lot of holes in this hypothesis but just thought I'd throw it out there as another option.
EDIT: Normally you'd think that Ukraine would put a press release out if it was an airstrike and then slap the RA around with some good memes, but if there is/was an SOF component on the ground they wouldn't want to compromise them. I think someone a few pages back advised that the UAF didn't have airframes that could use laser guided munitions on their own so they would have to have ground assets. This also plays into the west denying they made the weapons as I think they came from Turkey or somewhere in that area.
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38 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Very strange indeed. However, it is a good reminder to everybody that just because something goes boom doesn't mean it was the result of an attack.
After the war is over I hope Ukraine publishes a list of all the "smoking accidents" it was responsible for. I doubt they will, but I for one am really curious to know how many things in Russia that burned during this war were the result of Ukrainian activities. I bet the number is greater than zero
Steve
There was some discussion here the last couple days about the possibility of SOF/Partisan/Spook activities of Ukraine in Russia and Russian controlled areas. Some people thought it would be very hard for Ukrainian operatives to move throughout Russia without being caught. After some thinking about it and then your reference to all those fires across the country I doubt it would be direct action or actual operatives, but it could certainly be their developed assets.
Think about the Soviet policies from 1917 to 1991. The gulag archipelago. The mass deportations and relocations of populations. Just how many Ukrainians were moved into the hinterlands? Out of those, even though in some instances several generations have passed, how many still consider themselves Ukrainian and have a chip on their shoulder (that they conceal well day to day) and would love to do their part to hurt Russia. If the SBU isn't/wasn't as corrupt and inept as the FSB turned out to be they should have a huge network of assets within Russia. The more Russia doesn't win this war and the longer it goes on the bigger that asset pool should grow. Might get really interesting before it is over concerning all the possibilities of what could happen within Russia.
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4 hours ago, FancyCat said:
I've seen this video posted a couple times now and what grabs me the most is the disparity in human qualities between this work force and the pics and videos we see of the conscripts and volunteers. Heck, these guys look like Spetsnaz quality compared to the stiffs volunteering. Maybe they should just quietly go home without pay before they are picked up by the LNR/DPR "recruiters".
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16 hours ago, Billy Ringo said:
So...who is no longer posting?
I've been missing @LongLeftFlank's postings.
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8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
This is possible, but I at present I'm seeing unconnected events.
The gruesome torture/murder videos were unlikely state sponsored events or released by Russian services. These sorts of things have been happening since February 24th and likely filmed by the people doing them, so it was only a matter of time before they got out into the public.
The obvious murdering of Azov POWs could just be a way for Russia to "dispose" of a liability they haven't yet figured out how to deal with. Public trials and executions don't seem to be a good idea, sending them back to Ukraine already proved a bad idea. So what to do with them? Quietly murdering them en mas is likely going to be discovered at some point (Katyn Forest is something Putin is well aware of). So murdering them out in public and claiming Ukraine did it seems to be a pretty good solution. It serves other purposes as well.
Or it could be that the murder of Azov prisoners was, as reported in some circles, a way to cover up other crimes that were at risk of being uncovered. Financial crimes by Wagner Group, for example.
And I think the attack on Sevastopol might be an excuse to get out of doing Naval Day (see above).
As for the murder of the Ukrainian business man, this is more akin to the strikes on Odessa right after the deal is struck. This sends a message to Ukraine and the West that if you compel Russia to compromise on one thing, they'll extract payment in some other way. "OK, you have convinced me to sell my car. I don't want to do it. Shame it got 4 flat tires on its way to you. Really bad luck. And honestly, I have no idea how your dog was killed and wound up in the trunk. Truly a mystery".
Steve
The other piece of the puzzle to consider is the activities in the US and UN attempting to get Russia listed as a Terrorist State. By doing these false flag operations it could be an attempt (although juvenile and transparent as hell) at trying to shift the finger pointing around like they have before.
Also someone stated that the Kremlin is more concerned with internal propaganda than external propaganda so it all could be just for internal consumption. Galvanizing support against the evil Ukrainian nazi terrorists.
It can also be preliminary shaping for the blame game on their real targets. Example the oligarch. Now they can kill off half a dozen Russian oligarchs in fiery explosions and blame Ukrainian terrorists.
Have to keep watching and see how the dots connect!!
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2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
Not yet, for sure. But under ideal circumstances (good condition Federal highways with decent weather) my impression is they are already pretty damned good. Where they fall down, rather badly, is in complex dense areas. There's just too much stuff to process too quickly. For some reason even moderately competent drivers are able to handle it, not so much AI.
Which gets back to my point about a universal predictive model for warfare. I think we can get excellent modeling for limited, carefully controlled battlefield environments. I'd say Combat Mission fits that quite well.
I agree with The_Capt though. If we can get a predictive tool that can get even over the 50% mark, that would be quite valuable. I think that's possible. Predictive modeling for controlled battlefield environments can definitely be much better than that. Again, I say CM is excellent at this. As long as CM is asked a question it is capable of answering, it could maybe get a customer into the 85% territory. My professional bias aside, I really do believe this to be true.
Steve
I've been following this back and forth on computer modeling and AI predictive tool stuff the last couple days. I just don't see how a computer could manage to do this sort of thing. Think about how much data you would have to put in on all the different factors and variables. Take this current war and try to put in all the data and variables that have already happened to bring it to the point it is right now. Even if you knew and were able to quantify everything that would have to be put in to get the exact model of everything that has happened so far you'd need such massive resources it is just not practical. For future predictive stuff, how could you possibly model the impact of the Audie Murphys and Chesty Pullers? The computer will tell you every time that a well entrenched chain of mg nests will stop that infantry platoon, LT William Deane Hawkins and many others like him would disagree. How would a computer model ever be able to quantify the individual valor, tenaciousness or audacity that has turned the tables, overcome the odds and thwarted the perfect plans in so many wars? At best a computer is going to be able to give us the same answer that so many pundits and intel specialists did before this current war. They, just like a computer, could never factor in the actions of men like Ukrainian Marine Vitaly Skakun Volodymyrovych.
You can't just look at the numbers and equipment and get a good model either. A computer would have predicted the Char B's slaughtering the inferior German tanks and France winning in 40. How can it quantify the Lafayette Pools, Kurt Knispels or the numerous successful UA tanks that actually started this war as RA tanks? How would the data to plug into the computer even be accurately obtained given the huge amount of variables? A piece of equipment in one person's hands can never be quantified the same for any other person. Simo Hayha with a M/28-30 is totally different than me with one (he would be considerably better for those that are wondering). So every piece of equipment relies on the human factor and on top of that you have to accurately model the leadership, logistics and political influences along with somehow figuring out the average amount of Sacrifice for the individual soldier, civilian and collective nation. How would a computer ever be able to model the 101st at Bastogne or the 1st Marine Division at Frozen Chosen? Or better yet the VC or Taliban?
Even with tons of data and mountains of computing power I don't see how the predictions could ever get better than the CEP for the RA's 1 week wonder 152mm crews, definitely not a chance of HIMARS accuracy or precision.
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So there has been some talk about how the UA should proceed in Kherson and elsewhere for maximum effect on the RA and Russia. I think we need to look at what has provoked the largest reactions so far. I came up with 3 things:
- Moskva - however I think there wasn't such a great reaction to be seen as the greatest effect was a stunning blow. Kind of a wake up slap. Something that really got people's attention and made them look a little more at what was going on. It was a big loss but in and of itself it was more of an awakening to the fact that the UA was going to hit back and it was going to hurt.
- River Crossing debacle - This really lit them up. If you remember there was much teeth gnashing and calls for answers when the footage of all those wrecks and broken bridges came out. Unlike the Moskva, there was no way for the Kremlin to spin its failure into a fire in the magazine. It was apparent to the Russian people that the RA was fallible and that great losses were occurring even though they were being denied. But mostly it showed the RA getting its butt whooped and that was very very hard for a lot of Russians to comprehend.
- HIMARS - These have been very successful in shaping for the UA, but the most interesting part is how much debate and finger pointing they have caused in Russia, especially in the ultra national rants. Because this is pretty much the the confirmation for anyone who was still in doubt as to the superiority of the RA and their vaunted weapons systems.
So if the UA wants the most bang for their buck out of Kherson they need to make sure they have a Putin's Precious Pocket that they completely destroy. Nibbling and gentle pushing may eventually take back all the contested territories, but that is just boiling the frog for the RA. The catastrophic destruction of some RA formations will create large internal reactions both in the RA and the Kremlin. Dodging responsibility for that will be like try to avoid shrapnel from a grenade in a phone booth. There is no way to spin it into something that it isn't.
Something along those lines could be a trigger for many events including political upheaval or collapse of the RA. I don't see nibbling as being a trigger like that but I guess it could be over a long period of time.
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4 minutes ago, panzermartin said:
So what is this from the early days , a lucky shot? Aaa yes, another shopping mall hit by inaccurate dumb russian missile that some corrupt official looted the guidance system.
There is a certain wishful thinking here and the effects of the echo chamber are not doing justice to otherwise very interesting and informative thread. Haiduk has all the reasons to be a wishful thinker here but his posts are mostly grounded to reality, good or bad.
It will probably never be possible, but the only way to know for sure about the RA "superior accuracy" would be to have their target list and compare it to the damage assessment. If they actually have this ability to hit what they are aiming at then they are the worst terrorist state in recent times. The list of civilian targets that have been hit is very very long. That leads most of us to conclude that there is no sense in hitting the stuff they have since there are perfectly legitimate targets all over the place that would increase their likelihood of military success. That makes us figure that either their ISR is horrible and they are rolling the dice on google earth targets or they are aiming at one thing and hitting another.
Yes there are a handful of successful strikes like the one above, the hit on the training center early on, umm, well, I'm sure someone could find 3 or 4 more in the last 5 months. You can say that it is all being covered up by UKR, but we know in this day and age it is very hard to cover up anything. Beyond that, if it was true that the RA had good ISR and was shellacking targets they would definitely be showing everybody the results. After all, if they have good enough ISR to find and fix targets they should have good enough ISR to provide BDA.
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8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
Here's one theory about what is going on around Kherson:
Ukraine tried to retake Kherson the conventional way... bring up forces, assault, take terrain, make life increasingly difficult for the occupiers, repeat until Russians are gone. This initially worked pretty well. Ukraine regained quite a lot of terrain and basically nixed Russia's ideas of expanding on that side of the river.
Russia was obligated to put in significant reinforcements to continue holding what they had. They tried some counter attacks and they failed, but they did arrest Ukraine's counter attack.
Ukraine tried again when it took Davydiv Brid. This unnerved the Russians and they flooded more stuff in as well as getting very serious about reinforced static positions. Ukraine got itself beat up pretty badly in the end.
Things remained like this since then, with Ukraine nibbling at the edges but not able to do much more than that.
The artillery Ukraine had throughout this time was not sufficient to take out the bridge with a surgical strike. The only systems that could reach would not likely destroy the bridge, yet would expose a lot of systems to air strikes or counter battery fire.
This changed with Western precision systems becoming available. I don't know what hit the bridge, but it was almost certainly guided. The equation has now changed.
Clearly Ukraine didn't think this one strike would take out the bridge. It's too little HE to make that happen. This means they did the strike for one of two, perhaps both, reasons:
- to test their capabilities so that they know they can bring the bridge down when the timing is optimal
- send a message to Russia that they should think about retreating
The devious part of my brain says it's both. The optimal military situation for Ukraine is to have Russia start to withdraw its forces and catch them out in the open. Unlike the retreats around Kyiv and Kharkiv, Ukraine knows where every single Russian soldier is headed for a withdrawal. It only needs to do a Bilohorivka focused artillery operation with focused artillery fire at the right time. Get panic going big time and hopefully the rest of the Russian forces will surrender instead of fight. Or, as I said in my previous post, surrender sufficient positions that make the remaining ones untenable.
And the ace up Ukraine's sleeve is it is probably very certain that it can bring down the bridge within minutes of deciding it's the right time to do it.
I'm really liking where this is headed.
Steve
There has been quite a bit of discussion on the dropping of the bridge at Kherson recently here. Even though a big bridge like that would be hard to "drop" it can be made unusable for almost all vehicles easily with 3 or more hits on the decking. Same effect. Militarily there are advantages to both rendering it useless or leaving it open and hitting anything using it.
Personally I think the UA has been within arty range for long enough that if they wanted to they could and sure this single hit was probably what Steve says above. As for the decision not to hit it hard I think it is humanitarian in nature. All the supplies for the people of Kherson have to come across the bridges and dropping them now creates a humanitarian crisis on their own people. Until the UA is ready for offensive actions that will definitely take the area west of the Dnepr they should probably leave them in place so they don't hand Russia a propaganda win. Once they are sure they will be successful they can choose to drop it or leave it for a highway of death scenario but they have to be sure that they will control Kherson city when the dust settles.
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44 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:
Anyone else get the feeling whoever made this video watched Full Metal Jacket too many times?
Seriously what is this guy even aiming at?
Kadryovites must have got their first helicopter?
36 minutes ago, acrashb said:The US system is designed to be fractious, and it is; party discipline is completely different, for example, than in Westminster-based systems. The 18 'no' votes don't constitute meaningful dissent nor can they be spun that way - it's business as usual.
Also as others have pointed out the media needs a story. 18 is less than 5% of the House of Representatives. So instead of a headline reading "95% of lawmakers vote in support of Ukraine!!" they can attack the less than 5% dissenting as negative headlines get more reaction than positive nowadays.
Edit: Also, this should be taken as a huge positive for Ukraine. This type of bilateral support on an issue from both sides of the aisle in the US Congress has been absolutely unheard of for a long time. It should show almost unanimous support for Ukraine to Russia and the world. Actually a big deal and a good sign if looked at from this perspective and not the media focus on the negative.
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2 hours ago, womble said:
I would go so far as to judge the opposite: they have (at least upon occasion) actively tried to inflict civilian casualties.. Not every salvo has been aimed to cause civilian casualties, but it certainly looks like some of them were intended solely for that purpose. There was a point near the beginning of the war where it looked like the published "Do not bombard (because they're hospitals and schools)" list was being used as a target list for RU ordnance.
Or their intel is so egregiously bad that they should just not use artillery at all (especially missiles), if they want to try and minimise civilian casualty collateral damage.
I think there is a combination of things going on. I totally agree that it looks like they actively targeted civilian buildings and civilians themselves (train station, hospitals, etc). With their track history it is about 99.9% likely that they did. To top it off though I believe that a lot of the hits on civilian targets are simply due to them grossly missing legitimate targets. Like the hit on the shopping center next to the factory. We have a hard time understanding how you can miss a factory when we have been putting guided munitions down ventilation shafts for more than 30 years, but the Russian Army showed us that such a thing is possible. Not just possible, but repeatable time and again. Lack of accuracy and precision.
It's not just the army either. Look at the video of the RuAF bombing run on Snake Island. 25% hit rate on an Island. An ISLAND for &$@%s sake! In uncontested air space and taking no defensive fire they still managed to miss with 3 of the 4 bombs they dropped. This isn't a WW2 Marauder after a Japanese destroyer cruising at flank speed and shooting every gun it has at the attacking plane. This is 2022 and they missed an ISLAND 75% of the time!
Again, not defending them or trying to diminish the ongoing atrocity perpetrated by Russia. Just thinking that 3/4 of their strikes were probably actually meant to hit something else. I guess it all comes around the circle again to the RA sucks at war, but if the shoe fits.
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FIRMS is totally lit up in the south around Kherson:
https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.0,47.1,9z
Then this twitter post says UA is within sniper range of Kherson suburbs. Not sure if it is correct or not but sure am hopeful.
And if the above isn't true, at least there is good news with CanadianUkrainian finally being outed as an airsoft poser. His account is now gone from twitter.
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1 hour ago, FancyCat said:
Also, holy ****, I did not realize the UAF has less than 100 aircraft, wtf, why isn't the Russian Air Force just flooding the entire airspace with planes
The RUAF tried in the early days but they don't have the SEAD capability that we are used to seeing from the USAF. I think it was The Capt that advised the US is the only nation that trains extensively for SEAD and has dedicated planes, pilots and formations for the mission. I'm a ground pounder so I'm probably not explaining it as good as others could but basically the RUAF is not capable of neutralizing the UA air defense and has been relegated to launching cruise missiles from long stand off range or operating only right on the front lines.
This is one of the biggest pieces missing from both side's ability to conduct maneuver warfare. Neither of them can operate above the other and neither has the ability to neutralize the other's air defense. If either of them could it would be a game changer. Most of us thought, like you, that the RUAF was very capable and would dominate the skies with air superiority in all aspects within a matter of days when this war kicked off. Apparently the RUAF is pretty much ran like the RA where a lot of their capabilities have proved to be overstated.
If either side had capabilities approaching what the USAF or USN has there would be a serious bloodbath for the opposing forces. The RUAF has no chance of developing it at this point. Again, I don't know much about this but from what I've read here it takes awhile to get a pilot competent on an airframe and awhile longer to get competent with weapons, tactics, etc. So conceivably the UAF has a chance if the war drags on over a year? maybe longer? There has been a lot of training going on for extended periods without it being publicized on different weapon systems and there has been talk of Ukrainian pilots being trained in western countries so it is possible. One of the 1st squadrons I remember being sent to Europe was F18 Growlers so they could already be working on it in Germany. I know that it is all probably wishful thinking on my part but it is possible. How probable, maybe some experts on here could enlighten us?
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Interesting article on AP:
It says the US is permanently stationing V Corps headquarters in Poland and adding 20,000 troops back into Europe. It is also increasing rotational deployments of troops to eastern European countries. It references the 1997 agreements not to permanently station combat formations in the eastern European nations and that is why we see the units there on rotational deployments instead of permanent basing. Additionally 2 squadrons of F-35s will be moved to the UK and more AA assets moved to Germany and Italy. Overall a pretty big commitment although not up to Cold War levels, but building up that way again.
A statement from the article that I liked:
“There has been no communication with Moscow about these changes, nor is there a requirement to do that,” John Kirby, a spokesman for Biden’s National Security Council.
Seems the West isn't trying to play nice and talk to Putin about such things, which is a good sign of stiffening in the stance.
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41 minutes ago, poesel said:
I don‘t want to disagree with you but I don‘t think that that is completely right.
I‘d like to take post-WWII Germany as an example how you can convert a fascist country into a working democracy. That was not Germany fixing Germany - at least not in the beginning. It was a decisively lost war, no questions open. Then there were trials which judged the most obvious criminals and especially those who ‚just followed orders‘.
After that, something happened what many probably wouldn‘t like to happen in Russia: there is a country to run and you need people for that. If every German who deserved it would have been hung or imprisoned, the country would have collapsed. So those got away because a functioning Germany was needed against the Soviets.
But: from then on it was impossible to publicly state nazi ideas so a new generation without those ideas could be raised. The old thinking died when the people who had them died.So, Russia can fix itself but only after some outside help makes this process possible.
The biggest difference is that Russia will need to fix itself whereas Germany was "fixed" by the occupying nations. Russia is not going to be occupied and a western style constitutional republic type government applied to it by an outside force.
Not saying it couldn't happen. There are those here that know vastly more about the dynamics of the Russian population but that would take a pretty radical turn and have to come from the people and not just a replacement head to a corrupt regime. Something along the Maidan lines would have to happen where the population has had enough and does sweeping democratic reforms. Possible, but not sure how probable that outcome is.
Personally I think if Russia suffers a resounding and unquestionable defeat in Ukraine we are more likely to see the collapse of the federation before a revolution. The revolution may follow that when Russia proper is about all that is left of the federation and it is looking a lot like North Korea. Even then, who knows? Could just be a little bigger North Korea with Putin or Putin's replacement dictating over the starving masses.
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12 minutes ago, Grigb said:
For sure RU elite are better on average. Regular infantry is also somewhat better on average after all LDNR losses. However, this war is not elite units war. Neither is it infantry war. In Donbas it is hard drone-artillery slog.
Artillery and drone wise LDNR is far better due to sheer experience and much better flexibility + they have hard core infantry cadre who is on pair with RU elite.
Or is their apparent better success because they have the larger numbers of infantry? That has been a limiting factor since day one for the RA. Also, the artillery offensive model is deemed to be adapted by the RA because they have a lot of arty and not much infantry. Their good infantry formations (VDV and Naval Inf) have suffered pretty bad attrition since day one as they have been the shock troops and in many cases sacrificed unnecessarily. Regular formations didn't start with enough infantry and the replacements for the manpower have basically been coming from the LDNR conscriptions.
To say the LDNR is above average is questionable. Their units folded pretty quick north of Kharkov. They also attacked north and south of Donetsk daily for the first 3 months of the war without hardly any results. The gains around Lyman and Popasna were orchestrated by RA forces and in particular Wagner, Naval Infantry and VDV remnants. So far the LDNR troops haven't really carried the day anywhere that I'm aware of.
It is possible that there are examples and I would ask them to be shared. Seriously, if I'm looking at this wrong please share and let me modify my perspective.
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7 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:
Ukrainians are fighting and praying for their freedom for centuries. They know what suffering is. It's a tragedy, I agree, but that has been most of their history. They have something worth fighting for. The alternative is endless misery and terror. I know what I would chose.
"I would rather die on my feet than live on my knees." - Euripides
There is no guessing what is in store for their people and their country should they lose. If anyone needs more detail on the machine Ukraine would be subjected to read the Gulag Archipelago.
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11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
We must avoid our own Western baggage with respect to casualties and war because the framework we use to make those assessments does not apply here.
A lot of the things talked about the last day or so need to be looked at in a similar way. We look at everything through our personal lenses that are constructed by what we know. This forum is populated by a bunch of really smart people with lots of experience and input in so many interesting and informative areas, however a lot of what we look at is from a wargaming/military history nerd perspective. Two cases to illustrate the point.
Analysts. Well, they sure did get a lot wrong and there were a couple outlier voices that were closer to reality but weren't in the main stream media. Luckily there are amazing Monday Morning Quarterbacks and Armchair Generals to point all of it out now. But did anybody really know? Did anyone know how bad the soft factors of the Russian Army were? How much corruption there was and to the extent that it crippled the RA? How their Air Force wasn't going to be able to dominate the skies? How their Navy would be ineffectual at best and a liability at worst? This wasn't supposed to be a near peer conflict. It was supposed to be a 1st class huge military versus a 2nd/3rd class underdog using Cold War equipment. No one had seen the RA in a big conflict since WW2 and everyone believed the Russian rhetoric about how awesome they were, mostly because there was no real evidence to the contrary involving a conflict of this size and intensity to base any other assumptions on. The closest comparisons that the western analysts had were probably Desert Storm and Iraq 2003; superpower vs outdated regional power. They didn't know it was actually outdated regional power vs. middleweight contender of the year. So I'm pretty forgiving of their mishaps, plenty of historical examples out there of analysts getting it wrong before the first shots are fired. At the same time I'm with @The_Capt and @FancyCat with the frustration of most of them refusing to rethink their analysis, come up with a little humility and try to put forth a more accurate analysis based on contemporary and existing facts.
The second one is the assumption that the Russians can not win. Now, bear with me. A military full conquest is out of the question. Full destruction of the UA is out of the question. A Dnepr line is out of the question. But, do any of us have a wire tap on the Kremlin and know what they consider a "win". A win for the Kremlin doesn't have to look like a win to us. A political win can come from what we would consider a military defeat. If Putin's original goals are out the window, which I believe they are, and he decided that control of Luhansk and Donetsk are the goal where he can announce a win to the Russian people then it is still possible for them. Severdonetsk is the last bite of Luhansk. It is a political objective not a military one. Think of it like Stalingrad for Hitler. Even though the RA controls 99% of Luhansk they have to take the city in order to declare control of the whole province. The river becomes the line and forces are shifted south to Donetsk. Grind away again with as much arty as they can bring and take a small bite at a time until they control Donetsk. Then Putin can declare the war is "won", totally switch to the defensive and play the victim every time the UA kicks the RA in the nuts. The RA will be a smoking dumpster by the time it is over but that actually helps Putin stay in power. He doesn't care about his pixel truppen the way we do so it is hard for us to wrap our mind around what we see happening.
If nothing significant changes on the ground this could be a real outcome in 6 months. Neither side has the capability to overcome the other in a meaningful way and restore mobility to the battlefield. Both sides are eating the elephant one bite at a time because whenever they mass they get hammered. If the UA breaks in the RuAF pummels them. The mobility is determined by fire support at this stage and the battlefield moves at a WW1 pace. Both sides are missing pieces to the puzzle that allow the operational mobility that we are used to seeing. I don't believe the RA will be able to get those pieces due to attrition, sanctions and time. The UA can because of western support but the opportunity is controlled by the western powers.
It is frustrating to watch and more frustrating because we really don't know what the west has up its sleeve or in the pipeline. A lot of people have referred to the western arty as game changers, but they really aren't. Better arty and missile arty will increase RA casualties and make life more difficult but arty doesn't take ground or solve the problem of getting your breakthroughs bombed. It just makes it a deadlier WW1 battlefield. If the west wants the UA to take back the lost ground and push the RA out they will need to supply it with the capabilities to either totally deny the airspace to the RuAF or gain air superiority. Denial capability is much easier, faster and cheaper than the superiority option and the Gepards are a good start. Is there more missile AA systems in the pipeline that aren't announced yet? Rolands or similar? Something to protect the mobile battlegroups? If not the status quo on the ground is unlikely to change.
Which goes back to the above quote from @The_Capt. If the UA has to rely on lots of infantry and artillery to make their gains it results in a LOT of casualties. Can and will it be done? Probably, but it will be danged hard for us to watch.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
If I remember right I think the UA 5th and 17th Tank Brigades are on the northern shoulders of the RA in Kherson. I'm thinking that the attacks on the western flank are just the beginning and we will know the hammer is falling when we start hearing and seeing the armored brigades moving.
Either the fog eating snow attrition will open an opportunity for them or these attacks are meant to pin deployed RA forces and draw reserves so the armored fist can break through with minimal interference. I agree that we are really early and need to manage expectations but that is my prediction for when we will know it is full on.