LUCASWILLEN05

As I understand it that is how it works in the real world

The game is called Steel Beasts. My intention was to show the possibilities for additional combat engineering capabilities which, as you will probably agree. are tactically important on the modern mechanized battlefield https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m60a1-avlb.htm This will be what we would likely use in most scenarios https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M104_Wolverine Wolverine seems to be quite rare (only abou 40 in service accordn to the link belowThere is also the Joint Assault Bridge but this does not seem to be in service yet https://tankandafvnews.com/tag/joint-assault-bridge/

Whether BF have the coding skills to actually feature the AVLB deploying a bridge is another question. However, if hey can solve that one a couple of these vehicles might in principle feature in scenarios. Which would be kind of nice

There are plenty of rivers in Ukraine,not just the Dnieper, In some areas you will find ravines locally known as balkas. Small scale bridging equipment capability would be useful for dealing with some of these obstacles as well as man made obstacles. Regarding the top video, did you stop to consider that was probably just a training exercise rehearsing how to deploy the bridge before doing it on a real obstacle? You probably also didn't watch the other four videos!

From WW2 history accounts of Kursk indicate he incidence f heavy summer thunderstorms. This is supported also by Nipe's Decision n Ukraine. These sources indicate that heavy downpours can occur and that these have highly significant effects on ground conditions. Another condition to watch out for would be high temperatures particularly over July and August Some possibly useful data http://www.climate-zone.com/climate/ukraine/ hthttp://www.weatheronline.co.uk/weather/maps/city? WMO=33345&INFO=0&PAG=0&LEVEL=160tp://www.ukraineconnections.co.uk/Ukraine_weather.htm https://weather-and-climate.com/average-monthly-Rainfall-Temperature-Sunshine,Kiev,Ukraine

That and the fact that the AVLB is a real US capability (the Russians and Ukrainians have similar capabilities) which would certainly b useful in aiding the crossing of small streams, ditches etc thus allowing additional tactical flexibility as John points out. No use fr crossing the Dnieper which obviously requires a very large pontoon bridge the construction of which would require hours of engineering work far beyond the time scale In fact you could even build a whole scenario around this

I know what you mean. For me a company size combat team is usually enough with a couple of thousand meter maps to allow for maneuver, Given the maximum possible map size more than a couple of combat teams is over crowding the battlefield in any case, However, trying to micromanage this is not possible, nor should one try to do so. Remember you can always stop the action at any point and give any new orders you wish. The work involved at the combat team level is different. Here we are required to co-ordinate a small combined arms force using air and artillery support appropriately. The challenge of mounting a hasty or deliberate attack through a defended position with mine fields and perhaps an armoured counter attack, perhaps in or partly under the cover of darkness would be an interesting game

Would it be possible for the US to have AVLB capability in game, Also similar Russian capability

I tend to prefer company sized games most of the time. For what you have in mind I think two hours might be too long. A tighter time limit (eg an hour) requiring the wood to be cleared so that it is safe for, let us say an armoured company that will be conducting a passage of lines in this sector might be a more reasonable objective. You need to strike a balance between completion of the mission and force preservation. Remember, you are not required to stick to he initial forces only. Perhaps a small scale counter attack by Ukrannian reaction forces might feature later in the game

Wouldn't a sapper platoon be a more appropriate force for the mission? Regarding the size of game it might be better to have a larger map and a company size engagement. The mission as I understand it is essentially a breaching operation requiring the marking of lanes through the minefield followed by the passage of forces through the cleared lanes followed by the defeat of he defending force to allow for the advance of the follow on forces. Ideally this would be best done at night. Depending on how long you want your scenario to be there may be scope to run the early stages at night with the later fighting potentially taking place at dawn

Rinaldi Get a map. Find the United States in the map. Then find Russia on the map. Then find Eastern Europe including the Baltic States. After that google Russian Military Districts and also take the trouble to find out how many US troops are deployed to Europe I will make that last bit a bit easier for you out of the kindness of my heart http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/04/05/us-station-armoured-brigade-eastern-europe-2017.html It should be very clear hat Russian forces in the Military districts have much less distance to travel and shorter lines of communication. Assuming that this is a limited war for the Russians to seize thwe Baltic States The Russians could do this in 60 hours .http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/revealed-russian-invasion-could-overrun-nato-60-hours-15112 By the time that has happened NATO might, possibly, have invoked Article 5 assuming od course the politics runs smoothly which is not guaranteed. it will take time to mobilize and get forces to Poland. Which, unlike the Baltic States,NATO might be able to defend.To deploy sealift forces from bases in the US will take rather longer. You are not just shipping men and tanks. You are moving all the bullets and beans needed for them to fight when they do get here. And by the way, you are not expecting the Russians to allow Atlantic convoys to simply roll over to Europe without at least trying to interdict with aircraft and submarines.Those convoys wont be ready to sail from US ports immediately. You have to move from bases to ports first, then lad everything in the right order. How long that might take is certainly a closely guarded secret but the deployment times for Desert Storm might give some indication You also need t consider that many US forces are not combat soldiers but logistics types, technicians etc. Who are certainly very important but are clearly not intended for frontline combat. Maybe you would like to consider all of the above issues next time - raw numbers don't tell us the whole story. hence looking at overall force sizes can be deceptive

You don't see why the history of the 1980s is important? Remember the old adage abut learning from history? My point is that the Reagan buildup did muxch to deter the Soviet leadership then from any unwise plans The other pt of my point, and i don't think we need go into it too deeply here is that wars often happen through political misunderstanding, bad intel etc. Look at the events leading up to both the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars Issues like flawed intel, mutual suspicion and misconception regarding the other side's intentions. This, as we now know almost led to disaster in the Able Archer incident. Human frailty being what it is might very well lead to similar situations n the future and that can lead to a 21st Century "Sarajevo Moment" . Regarding size of arm and budget. Yes it might not be possible to afford 1980s size armies. On the other hand it may be that the US army really is too small for expected or contingency missions. Perhaps more of it does need to be deployed to Europe and some inactive divisions be reactivated considering the international situation the conflict in the Middle East and the Cold War like situation with Russia) "the worst!" in this case simply means a great power war of the sort we might have seen in the 1980s had the Cold War ever turned hot. Hopefully the worst will never happen but maybe we should think of being prepared as insurance in case your house burs down - which I hope never happens either :-) You don't come across to me as being condescending in any way unlike some other people. In fact ypu make very good and intelligent points and that is what gets the best out of me. even if we coma at this from different angles (I admit to taking an academic approach which may well differ from some of the military types :-) )

From the O'Reilly Report P6 General Shinseki’s vision came from a period during which the future of the Army seemed to lie, in the main, with peacekeeping – Operations Other Than War. He did not change it after 911 although the requirements changed dramatically because the United States was, is, and will continue, to be at war. P126 from the same report During the Nineties, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the US Army became pre-occupied with Operations Other Than War, which in turn induced a careerist mindset, and a Leadership timidity, much more concerned with Force Protection than with accomplishing the mission (and here I am quoting various US Army General Officers in addition to the observations of many). The facts, even at the time, did not support this mindset, and 9/11 finally illustrated the obvious which is that we were at war, whether we knew it or not, and had been for years. The reality is that there are no neat demarcation lines between Peace, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and War; and War itself comes in numerous shapes and sizes and degrees of violence. The Korean War, for which we were dismally prepared, was called a ‘Police Action’ yet killed millions. Somalia was a ‘Humanitarian Mission’ yet must have looked remarkably like war during Black Hawk Down to those involved. The lesson in all those, where the fielding of military vehicles, such as the Stryker is concerned, is that we should make sure that whatever we field can handle the full realities of modern combat – even if such vehicles are temporarily employed in only a peacekeeping role. It should be further stressed that the transition from peacekeeping to a war situation can happen as fast as a crowd can turn ugly – which means seconds P32 Speed in combat is only remotely related to road speed. The much praised dash to Baghdad over about 350 miles actually took about two weeks. You could walk to Baghdad in that time. True, the first 300 miles were done in about five days but that is still only 2.5 miles per hour by the most powerful military in the world backed by total air dominance against no serious opposition (which is not to see that there were no serious firefights). Speed in combat is a matrix of political will, combat leadership, brainpower, willpower, training, intelligence, terrain, maneuvering capability, logistical support, weather conditions, vehicle reliability, vehicle speed, and the enemy’s will and capability to resist. Theoretical top speed on a well surfaced road under peace time conditions is not a big factor in this equation. If it was, the Army would drive Ferraris (which would still be much, much, cheaper than Strykers). Oh an then there is the question of roads - which in Ukraine are often likely to be dirt tracks. You d get sudden and heavy summer thunderstorms in Ukraine - as the Wehrmact found out during the summer of 1943 - and many of their vehicles were tracked. Here is what wheeled vehicles can expect and why should Stryker expect anything different. Now take one of the rural maps, set ground conditions to Muddy and run few Strykers cross country. It would be interesting to see ow many bog down :-) https://uk.images.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search;_ylt=A7x9UkvUJiNZLD4AkqR3Bwx.;_ylu=X3oDMTBsYWhiN2NvBHNlYwNzYwRjb2xvA2lyMgR2dGlkAw--?_adv_prop=image&fr=sgm&sz=all&va=russian+roads&hspart=SGMedia&hsimp=yhs-sgm_fb I think it would be a good idea if you studied the O'Reilly Report

I hope you are correct about that. It could be that the Kargil War (1999 might be a model for the way conflicts between nuclear armed states might go Likewise the Cold War can be seen as another example That said there is room for human stupidity and misinterpretation. Remember we have the unstable looking Donald Trump in the White House and he calculating risk taker Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. Putin has taken military action before and Trump as shown his preparedness to do so as well. The risk is misinterpreation and misreading of actions and intentions starting something by mistake that quickly escalates before anyone knows what is happening. It is far less likely that anyone will commit a deliberate act of aggression though i would be unwise to rule that out For instance, remember how close the Soviets came to misinterpreting Able Archer

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1606.pdf

If you read my conclusions I did not say I felt that a future war was unwinnable for NATO. I did however suggest that it might be an ugly slugfest with NATO suffering some early battlefield defeats. The Baltic Sates would be hard, if no impossible to defend If you read the report on the Global Security website it actually confirms much of what I have been saying. If Herrtom you choose to ignore that link which is in fact a detailed report written by Victor O'Reilly to Congressman Jim Saxton. You might take the time to actually read it before you dismiss it out of hand. In regard to political issues I hope you are well aware of NATO's political weaknesses as an alliance when ut comes to Article 5 - and the implications this may have for NATO mobilization. You might take some time to read General Shirreff's book - the man was Deputy SACEUR after all - so he probably knows a few things about these matters. Certainly more than all of us put together! http://www.coggs.polis.cam.ac.uk/events/shirreff-2017-war Regarding whether some of these articles are alarmist. It would be best to assume the worst case scenario and be prepared for that, as we were during the 1980s Cold War. Right now even US and NATO generals do not seem to feel that there i enough capability to deter Putin from misguided and dangerous military adventurism. If you remember the Cod War it can be argued that the Reagan buildup, conventional and military did make the Soviet leaders think twice about invading Western Europe. With luck the same will work with Putin and thus this war will never have to be fought

Sometimes it might be better not to set arcs

This also is an interesting overview of some of the issues. http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/us-vs-russia-what-a-war-would-look-like-between-the-worlds-most-fearsome-militaries While suggesting that the U airforce will be "annihilate" is clearly over hyping the issue Russia has invested in advanced air defenses The US might not be able to count to the air dominance it has had in recent wars and may not be able to achieve this state for some time into the conflict. It seems possible that the problems will be in some ways similar to the operational problems expected during a 1980s war in Europe had that ever taken place or by the Israelis during the early phases of the Yom Kippur War. Such problems may be eventually overcome although it may take some time to do so. It is what happens during that time that will potentially cause problems for NATO. Problems that ground commanders will have to ovecome. http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/us-vs-russia-what-a-war-would-look-like-between-the-worlds-most-fearsome-militaries Higher casalties on the ground and some early defeats could well be among the consequences of failing to adequately address the issues in a timely manner before such a war breaks out. Hopefully it will not - and addressing military weaknesses might very well be among the best ways of deterring Putin from taking any misguided actions that could lead to hostilities.Much like the 190s miiary buildup deterred the Soviet leaders from doing anything stupid

And here is one possible weakness. A very detailed report dated 2003 from the Global Security website http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_rpt/stryker_reality_of_war.pdf While there are Stryker variants with AT capability Stryker would be fighting, not in the peacekeeping/COIN environment they were designed for as the above article demonstrates but in a high intensity armoured warfare environment. Obviously a very different kind of war As this article indicates a war in Europe could well be "a bloody mess" and this would appear to confirm the assumptions made n the design of CMBS which certainly amply demonstrates US strengths and weaknesses - as well as those of Russia and Ukraine. If such a war were to occur a bloody "slugfest in the steppes" could occur - much like the "slugfest in the sands" which was much feared at least in the press prior to Desert Storm. It might well be that Russia wins some early victories and inflicts heavy losses before being driven back. However, both sides may suffer heavy losses as suggested in the scenario outlined in the CMBS manual. Quite plausibly the war might end in a military stalemate even if Russia is forced to withdraw, militarily or through political agreement from any NATO territory still held when a ceasefire is agreed. This of course is among the best case scenarios for NATO

An interesting, thought provoking article here. While the writer may go too far in arguing that NATO would lose he does highlight a number of perceived weaknesses that would likely lead to early battlefield defeats and heavy casualties. The Baltic States, considering the Geography are almost impossible to defend in the early stage of the conflict and NATO forces attempting to do so clearly risk being trapped there much as the Anglo French armies that advanced into Belgium in 1940 were trapped by the German Blitzkrieg. That does not mean that NATO should not commit some forces to defend the Baltic States. For military and political reasons a tripwire force might be committed to a delaying action to gain time for NATO to mobilise and to deploy to defend the Polish border and to show political commitment to NATO allies. By definition however such a force could not be a large one - only large enough to achieve the mission and survive. Although NATO could lose the war it may be more accurate to say that NATO would lose the first battles off the next war. However, articles like this remind us not to be complaisant and to remind us that NATO and the US have weaknesses https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/09/16/five-reasons-the-u-s-army-will-lose-its-next-war-in-europe-maybe-in-2017/#2eedc6452043

Except of course the enemy might, just possibly. have a say in the matter! Let me rephrase what you are saying. You would not like to have too take on tanks with APCs - but in the real world bad things happen from time to time

Have you considered the possibility that it might be about the limitations of the Stryker?

Just suggesting that specific forums might be a good idea. For instance an item on a specific type of equipment might be easier for others to locate in the future in an Equipment subforum. Does one want to trawl through many efferent types of post on the general forum or is it easier to find whatever you may be looking for on a dedicated forum. Just a point to consider

That is fair enough. What I will say is that, when I took my History and Politics degree many yeas ago I learned that any source had too be treated with a degree of skepticism. You wisely distrust Sputnik which is Russian state owned and therefore likely to be a mouthpiece for Putin, They say the camera does not lie but you can be shown only what someone wants you to see Given the evidence so far I think it is likely to be true that the T80 is being re-activated and upgraded to modern standards. Other armies will upgrade their older tanks in this way (such as the US Abrams) instead of paying the costs of a whole new tank. Most likely this is what is happening here