Tux

Please remember that the positions taken by those 'old NATO countries' were taken because they are aware of what happens in their absence. I don't buy this whole 'goldfish' theory of Western European social and military policy, any more than I do the implication that only those who were most recently traumatised can 'think straight enough' to opine on the morality of war. For right or wrong, experienced countries made informed decisions about the shade of grey they wanted to implement. By all means choose your own shade but then stop calling everything else black.

Yes, I understand. I'm not sure if our wires got crossed somewhere but surely anything which makes it even more probable that Ukraine will join NATO post-war (than it already was, I mean) ratchets up the imperative in Russian thinking to hold on to something at the end of this war? Having said that maybe it's beyond the point of making any difference. Even if Russia evacuated southern Ukraine now and triply-reinforced Crimea before suing for peace I'm not sure it would succeed.

Of course our house is built on sand as you describe. That's why we have to fight to preserve it. The morals that our 'preachy' house is made of aren't supposed to make life easy; they are the best ideas we can come up with to allow us to play at judging 'right' from 'wrong'. They are there to keep the old red gods out for as long as possible because history and experience tells us that things do not go well when you give up, let your guard down and let those gods run riot. I, for one, am comfortable with the fact that our collective morality (insofar as one exists) is highly variable between individuals, populations and over time and in different circumstances. That doesn't change the rationale for an anti- or reluctantly-pro DPICM stance vis-a-vis this war. I feel like we are better than this. We credit our 'pro-DPICM' contingent with not being mindless, bloodthirsty animals who couldn't care less about collateral damage as long as more Russians are killed. I hope we can credit our 'anti-DPICM' crowd with not being weak, self-righteous pearl-clutchers who don't know they were born.

I agree this will be interesting. Will the US produce replacement DPICM or pivot towards 'pure' dumb rounds and PGM?

I am sorely tempted to buy CMCW just to find out! (Only reason I haven't got it yet is for lack of time to play)

Is your argument that Western European nations in World War 2 were simply too nice to fight against the Germans and that their more-or-less united stance against the use of DPICM today is a further display of the same 'lack or moral fibre'? Really? Is it just for convenience that you omit the fact that the only nation to fight Nazi Germany for the entirety of the war was Western European, as well as the fact that the same Germany that most of Western Europe simply 'couldn't bring themselves to fight against' now also opposes the use of DPICM? Not to mention anything of the myriad nuanced reasons behind individual nations' reasons for surrender in 1939/40 (hint: none of them surrendered because fighting the invaders 'wouldn't be nice'). Sorry mate, some of your points are useful but this is the closest to trash you've posted for a while. Imo.

If correct do we think it's a good idea to publicise this? It seems to raise the stakes on all sides without too much obvious benefit. It certainly sounds gratifying but it also adds some surprisingly hard lines to the circumstances around the war's end, doesn't it? This announcement would effectively set in stone wherever Ukraine's borders lie at the 'end' of the war, so on the one hand it is a further guarantee that whatever Russia lose from here, they will never regain; on the other hand it puts extra pressure on Ukraine to unambiguously regain everything they want/can before hostilities cease, or lose it forever. Have NATO decided that Ukraine must give up Crimea or is this a surprisingly strong vote of confidence in Ukraine's ability to regain it before the war is brought to an end?

No-one is claiming to know better than Ukrainian Generals any more than anyone else is claiming to know better than the 123 states who have signed up to the CCM. Ukraine, Ukraine's decision-makers and indeed Ukraine's Generals are in a unique position and that position does bring additional weight to the decisions they make. Personally I think there's a good argument to be had that that weight is almost entirely emotional, but that's not to suggest it should be dismissed as such. 123 other states came to the opposite decision to Ukraine. I imagine very few of them were fighting pitched defensive wars at the time but neither were the signatories the kind of simpering, pearl-clutching snowflakes that some on this board seem to want to portray them as. Among the signatories of the CCM you will find some of the most brutalised and war-torn states of the last century. A great many experienced warfighters considered this issue and decided that the utility of cluster munitions was not worth the post-war consequences and that they would stand by that decision in perpetuity. So, now that our respective 'argument from authority' rounds are spent, perhaps we can recognise (as I think most do) that this is a deeply grey area. There is no unambiguously correct answer that we can discover, given how thoroughly ambiguous our information is regarding true dud rates, likely usage rates/locations, how diligently records of such will be kept, etc.. That, to answer Twisk's earlier question, is why we're still discussing this issue. For my part it seems that the utility of DPICM simply doesn't justify its use in 'normal' circumstances. If it did then I would expect such a case to be quickly and easily made and agreed upon by the kinds of knowledgeable people we have contributing to this thread and the discussion would be over. However if Ukraine (and their allies) are running out of better ammunition types then clearly that cannot be allowed to be 'normal' and it is preferable to use what is available. I don't expect the above to move the needle on the opinions stated on this thread but I'm happy to understand that my preferred shade of grey isn't the only one available. For what it's worth it makes me feel very uncomfortable (world's smallest violin time, I know) to cast doubt on Ukraine's decision under these cirumstances. I only hope that those energetically supporting the decision now will feel half as uncomfortable when the piper gets paid.

I think the point is that cluster munitions are not much good at clearing trenches. However their supply may allow Ukraine to avoid firing what may be scarce standard artillery rounds at targets caught in the open (which cluster munitions are better suited for). As regards potential damage to the western alliance, I think the fact that many friendly nations have signed the treaty means they have committed not to encourage, aid or be any part of cluster munition use. That’s why we see allies of Ukraine currently struggling to properly condemn this move and avoid being part of the supply chain while maintaining support for Ukraine generally. For what it’s worth I think this is also why the Ukrainian Defence Ministry are releasing statements acknowledging the concerns of most/many of their allies and articulating what they’re going to do about it.

Now this is a comment from someone who understands the risks of using DPICM but, rather than take offence when people point them out, coolly articulates how the weapons’ use shall be controlled in order to mitigate those risks. Never expected anything different but still, this is satisfying to read.

Re: DPICM, I don’t think anyone is arguing that Ukraine shouldn’t have the last say on which weapons they do or don’t ask for while fighting their own existential war. However neither do I think that the fact they are under such colossal stress at the moment necessarily makes their judgement they only thing that should be considered. JonS and others are correct here in that use of DPICM by Ukraine will almost certainly come at the cost of more civilian injuries/fatalities post-war. The Ukrainians will know that just as well as anyone else and they may have all the practical reasons they need to justify using them anyway. That’s fine. However it means that the discussion around that risk kind of isn’t between Ukraine and ‘the West’. It’s between Ukraine today and Ukraine post-war. Given what we know about the merits of humans making short-term decisions under extreme stress and at the expense of longer-term considerations; given that the war probably isn’t actually existential any more; and given that a better, freer post-war Ukraine is actually what Ukraine are therefore now fighting for, I think there’s a good argument that sober, well-meaning advice from allies who have the luxury of looking more clearly (or at least from a different perspective) at the long term is extremely valuable. That’s not to prejudice what Ukraine should decide. It’s not to say that it shouldn’t be their call. It’s just to say that, like points raised by Human Rights Watch, at some point post-war Ukrainians will probably appreciate that such advice was at least taken into account.

Yeah, that is a defence that does not expect to be attacked, if ever I’ve seen one.

I think that’s irrelevant. They may not ask the same of Russia because Russia aren’t signatories to the Ottawa Treaty, or because they don’t think Russia will listen (basically a compliment to Ukraine), or because they’re corrupt and incompetent, etc. and so on. None of those reasons affect the validity of the request.

You may be right but I guess our main concern is whether the words they post are right or wrong?

Actually I might even go further than my last post: I think HRW’s plea is an example of the kind of thing which must be heard during the war. Hearing and considering these things is how Ukraine will guard the humanity which it is ultimately, ostensibly fighting for. It is naturally up to Ukraine how they respond and what they prioritise but there is zero benefit whatsoever to not hearing such things and every benefit (particularly post-war) to not losing sight of them. Listen to Human Rights Watch. Take a breath, remember who you are and consider what they say. What you then decide is up to you. In my humble opinion.

They have a job to do I suppose, and in the long-term they have a point. I think I understand both their request and the likely ‘response’ from Ukraine. Both equally valid in their own ways and contexts.

If that’s what makes a nuclear-armed cluster**** in post-war Russia unlikely to happen then, I mean… yeah? Surely you wholeheartedly agree that said cluster-situation is worth avoiding? So all that might be disagreed upon is how best to do that. What’s your solution? You don’t get to just say ‘Win the war ASAP!!’ and then put your fingers in you ears and pretend time stops at that point. What does the real-life post-war Russia look like in your scenario and, critically, does it have sober control of its nukes? If the answer is anything other than a solid ‘yes’, then we need to try harder, don’t we? Russia invaded Ukraine. They are to blame for Ukraine’s suffering. There is nothing we can do that will eliminate that suffering, now. All we can do is honestly and determinedly try to navigate the best path we can find from this point on.

Short piece from the BBC today: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65921377 Nothing too groundbreaking but I think it’s the first time I’ve heard explicit mention on drones being used to drop smoke grenades at precise spots. It’s an obvious use for them I suppose and hopefully something we see in future CM titles…

It would explain why Andrew doesn’t sweat, as well!

Yes, point taken. Again as far as I remember that was the blanket assumption on Telegram and elsewhere at the time. Not sure what else they could have been intended to defend against at that point: PGMs had been around for years, drones weren’t yet a major threat. Javelins were Ukraine’s new toy at the time. Anyway, I’m as reluctant as the next man to clutter the thread while an actual offensive is underway, so I’ll step back at this point.

Yes ok, you may be right, although as far as I remember when they first appeared last Spring they were very much ‘justified’ in the context of the Javelin threat. I think it was before attack drones became a significant factor. Either way I’m not sure the case for the efficacy of the original examples was very convincing.

I agree but it can only be the reader’s responsibility to identify and be clear about which type of post they are responding to. Again agreed but the key word here is “challenge”, as opposed to just ‘doubt’. You challenge by discussing weaknesses in the theory or by building a good case for an alternative. Simply expressing doubt might feel healthy but is not helpful and can be insulting to the person who has worked hard to establish a case.

I think the conflict in this thread might have arisen because there's a difference between politely reminding everyone that we don't know enough to be 100% certain and telling people that their conclusions are "copium" because of that fact. "Copium" is a potent cocktail that leads to conclusions based largely on (very) selective reasoning, hope and a deep aversion to a particular alternative. Copium is some structural steel bars welded over the top of your T-72 because 'Ukraine have Javelins; Javelins attack from above; I just can't bear the thought of how horribly vulnerable to Javelin attack I am in my tank; Steel is hard and can be used as armour; QED'. Copium is "Intelligent Design". The majority of the useful opinions and positions expressed on this thread are not copium-fuelled. They are properly and more-or-less rationally built upon a firm base of relevant professional experience and critical analysis of both available data and historic trends. That does not (and cannot) lead to a 'certain' conclusion but it can (and does) lead to a 'most likely' conclusion. Implicit in the work done to establish such a 'most likely' conclusion should be an understanding of where the weaknesses in the assessment lie and it is welcomed when people politely remind everyone what those weaknesses are. That is partly because it demonstrates an understanding and appreciation of the work done by the person who carried out the assessment in question. It is even more welcome when someone steps in and offers an equally or even more well-founded alternative assessment and conclusion, especially if it challenges the previous 'most likely' case. That's because it adds to the conversation and can be educational and important to think about. So while I would agree that 'group-think' can be dangerous that doesn't mean it should be challenged for the sake of it; it should be challenged based on the merits of the position that is being 'group-thunk'. One's confidence in a position/the imperative to challenge it should always be proportional/inversely proportional to the strength of the case made for it. That leads to the fact that the position itself should actually be irrelevant when deciding whether it needs to be challenged. If you really are concerned by the fact that positions in this thread are "constantly undermining Russia", rather than that they are poorly-constructed, then you are the one letting your aversion to that "habit" drive your thinking. You are the one getting too close to the copium fumes. Finally, if being collectively in agreement in the absence of 100% proof is one of the most dangerous things in society then we are all doomed, since there is no such thing as 100% proof. I would argue that it is actually disagreement with the collective simply due to a lack of 100% proof which is far more dangerous, since it leads to indecisiveness and passivity in the face of important challenges. See the climate change "debate". See any number of the "debates" that spilt all over the place in 2020-21. See the crippling paralysis that struck the collective West when definitely-not-100%-proven-to-be-Russian "Little Green Men" appeared in Crimea in 2014. Forget 100% proof. Search for 'most likely'. Understand why it is considered 'most likely'. If you agree, cherish collective agreement. If you disagree, then explain why and you will be thanked for it.

So many pages of bickering between people who seem to fundamentally agree with each other: 1. Russia’s continuous and deliberate assault upon Ukrainian civilians is a militarily counterproductive war crime. 2. If Ukraine deliberately targeted civilians with their recent attacks on Moscow (which we all think and hope they probably didn’t) that would also be a militarily counterproductive war crime. That’s true regardless of how morally justified some may think it would be. 3. Very recently we’ve seen some evidence that the Ukrainian strikes may have been a careful message designed to puncture the Muscovite sense of invulnerability and widen any cracks that may exist between Russian socio-economic groups. The drones may even have been deliberately unarmed or otherwise designed to ensure minimal risk of accidental civilian deaths. All the better and a clever move, if so. I agree that oil tanks, mobile phone networks, internet infrastructure and other visible/impactful targets might be more productive in the medium/long term, though.

Is that so? I don’t remember reading that. Was it ‘just’ OBOE pathfinders and H2S that enabled that or am I forgetting something else?