Tux

Of course. As far as I can tell it’s been a combination of the factors California Dan just mentioned as well as some minor tactical tweaks to the composition of attacking forces (less vehicle-heavy, more artillery/infantry-led). Even without knowing the details for sure, though, we no longer see footage and photos of Bradleys and Leopards taking ATGM hits from 10km away while crossing minefields and I am pretty sure we would do if the Russians had them.

So, in the last few months it seems to be the case that Ukraine have: Successfully countered/neutralised the attack helicopter threat which caused some worrying tactical issues in the early stages of the offensive. Improved their air defenses to the point where it seems like few Russian drone/missile attacks ever actually get through to hit their targets. Apparently resolved a potential artillery ammunition shortage by receiving/using DPICM where necessary. Developed a significant additional threat to ocean-going and coastal vessels/infrastructure almost entirely through the use of unmanned surface drones. Developed a long-range drone/missile threat that now routinely hits targets deep inside Russia. Established occasional small-scale attacks on facilities in Crimea as basically routine. Apparently broken through the Russian forward line in the south, with Western consensus seeming to be that further progress should now be relatively easy to achieve. While, in the last few months, it seems to be the case that Russia have: Tweaked the age limits on existing conscription law, apparently in an attempt to scrape together a few thousand more men without further annoying the populace. Wallowed in internal mafia-politics, eventually resulting in the probable assassination of the Wagner leadership and subsequent apparent efforts to dissolve the rest of the group. So, first of all, is there anything significant that I have missed out from or got wrong about the above lists? If not, what do we make of the fact there seem to be no real signs of serious concern or panic coming from the Russian leadership? Where is the frantic lashing out and searching for solutions that you might expect of a military that appears to be heading towards at least an operational collapse? Is it: We are lacking in the information needed due to fog of war and/or biases in the information we have access to. The Russians are incapable of developing at the same pace as the Ukrainians for practical, cultural or economic reasons. The Russians do not actually perceive any serious threat posed by this summer's offensive, to the point that they are happy to sit in their trenches, confident that they will see it through. Assuming for argument's sake it is not actually #3, what do we expect to see from the Russian leadership in the next few weeks as a response to the worsening military situation? I cannot imagine that the Ukrainians will break through additional lines of defence and begin moving into places like Tokmak without the Russian government trying pretty damned hard to manage that situation both militarily and publicly.

Pretty sure we’ll have to wait until post-war to hear the real assessment of how the various equipment types have performed. Not that I don’t believe the above but I’m sure the UA prioritise buttering up western donors by praising their kit rather than starting a diplomatic pi**ing match over who’s is best, etc.

Ok, so to answer my own question, perhaps Putin has now (very recently) managed to consolidate his power in some meaningful way which has afforded him the security he needs to be able to wipe out Prigozhin/Utkin and comfortably deal with the blowback (I suppose we’ll see how that works out). Have we noticed any statements, movements or signals in the last week or so which might indicate that Putin has secured the support of a hitherto neutral/opposing party within Russia or, I suppose, elsewhere?

So… what exactly do we think Putin’s rationale for killing Progozhin now was, again? Surely this can’t be as simple as ‘he had it coming’: If the above downsides to killing him were always acceptable Putin could have executed him immediately after the uprising as a far more effective way of emphasising his own power and ruthlessness. If the downsides weren’t acceptable back then then what has changed to make the killing sensible now? And if Prigozhin was protected by powerful puppet masters then killing him doesn’t achieve anything vis-a-vis said masters and you still get the downsides. Something still doesn’t add up about this whole business.

Unless I’ve got totally the wrong end of the stick this has been the case since circa March 2022. In theory, then, are there understood to be ways in which Ukraine/“we” can help hurry Russia along with this negotiation? I guess that simply maintaining military, economic and diplomatic pressure ensures that the conditions required remain. Is the rest just a case of propaganda, diplomatic back channels and maybe the odd unconventional security op?

This thing strikes me as two things: vulnerable and LOUD. If they are used as part of an opposed assault then they will likely be massacred by automatic gunfire either in transit or as they decelerate in order to land (try landing a fully-loaded infantryman at even 10-15mph and see how few walk away from it afterwards). They will also, by the way, have to land each infantryman in a safe spot. Not in a tree, not in a lake but somewhere flat and ideally soft - though not too soft! if the crossing/assault is not opposed well then it soon bloody will be with the racket a swarm of these things would create. And in any case if the crossing is unopposed you’d be better off doing it more safely and quietly. Just walk, or row, or crawl. Whatever. Chill out. Even if successful what is the anticipated benefit here? Are these guys just supposed to get in and silence the enemy frontline defences so that minefields can be crossed by every other unit (armour, heavy weapons, supplies, etc.) without coming under direct fire? If so it seems an awful lot more dangerous than a good old friendly artillery barrage to keep the enemy gunners’ heads down… Maybe there would be some extreme edge cases where special forces use these to insert half a dozen men rather than a helicopter but otherwise I really think this will be limited to non-combat uses only.

Duplicate

I don't think I disagree with any of this; we might just be talking about different strata of behavioural patterns. My comment was referring to the absolutely fundamental drivers behind emotional states, capacity for rational thinking and altruism, etc. at the level of individual human beings (and many other animals, no doubt). I think that everything you describe is accurate but also that it is ultimately emergent of the underlying, resource-based dynamic which operates within and around each individual. When someone is tired and hungry, they are inclined to feel anxious and irritable. We know this. Now ask that person to answer a moderately complicated problem which they don't already know the answer to and they will likely snap and tell you where to shove it. They lack the energy to react in a more sophisticated manner or to solve your problem. You could get the same reaction from someone whose abundant energy reserves are being drained due to a sense of accute social/emotional insecurity. Their basal brain, as it has done successffully for billions of this person's ancestors, is in overdrive to heighten their alertness and 'keep them safe' and there is therefore not much energy to spare. The above are trite examples, I know, but I'm convinced that the reality of the larger scale situations which you accurately decribe is that they emerge from a possibly indissoluble substrate of behavioural cause-effect scenarios that are just as mundane. Take your example of this war being about social power. I would very much agree and would argue that the root of the need for that social power lies in a sense of insecurity in its absence. If we're talking about insecurity on the part of an entire population of people even that is driven and shaped by the cocktail of individual physiological states which comprise the whole. So, yeah, when I spoke about resources I didn't mean iron mines, wheat fields and oil wells; I meant the biochemical constituents of a human being in rude health, all being in the right place, in the right quantity, at the right time. The link between the two is fascinating but I only intended the above to articulate why our comments may have appeared to be at odds. So, while this is the kind of conversation I'd happily dive deeper into in a different forum, I will once again cede the floor to Ukraine war talk.

Wow… and just like that the question of “free will” arises, as well! I’m not going to bite. Too far OT.

From a biological/naturalistic point of view (since we’re going there) I think you can boil it down even further into a question of resources, whether physical (food, water, money, etc.), emotional (in large part linked to nutrition/food and other physical resources) or intellectual (knowledge and understanding or cultural substitutes for understanding, e.g. dogma). And then even these resource types can be reduced to a question of energy (e.g. rational thinking being energy-intensive, well-fed people being able to ‘afford’ it, etc.). The more basal parts of our brain ensure that, when we don’t have the energy or resources to support complex rationalisations and investment in the greater good, we revert to angry/fearful/aggressive states which at least work to ensure the individual’s survival, perhaps alongside immediate family and a few others. When we do have the resources required to ensure that survival and comfort are not in doubt (or, at large scale and in a democracy, when enough of us do), we start to invest in relative luxuries like longer term thinking/actions and the greater good. And when we do that we make slow, very irregular progress towards greater overall well-being. Work to eliminate all types of poverty and watch humanity thrive. Trivial, no?

You mean in the same sense as the landscape has been “defined by nuclear blackmail” since 1949? Honest question. It’s ultimately a factor, of course, but I’m arguing that I don’t think it’s actually considered a serious, imminent threat by ‘the West’ as much as Russia going all Mad Max is. I think we’ve gone “astray” in the sense that nuclear weapons are strategic assets which guarantee the survival of a state but we know we’re not intending to threaten the survival of Russia so, unless we do something stupid that gives the impression maybe we are trying to destroy Russia, nukes should basically be irrelevant to the conduct of this war. What I think we are probably aiming to do is change the Russian leadership and so that’s more likely to be the area of risk we use to fine tune most day-to-day policy decisions at the level of this war. The above is obviously, largely and necessarily based on speculation so I absolutely expect it to be wrong to at least some extent. All I am doing here is trying to articulate the way I think things may be working and how that might better explain some of the decisions we see being made.

As well as sburke’s point I think this sort of thing has to be timed carefully in order to send the right message to the right people. At the moment I think it’s correct that the entire focus remains on getting Russia out of Ukraine and we refuse to talk about anything else. Until that goal is secured beyond doubt I fear any offer of ‘a way back’ would very much be interpreted as a sign of weakness within Russia. Once things have gone so wrong for the Russian leadership that sburke’s people start to appear in plain sight, looking for a way out, the time will have come to offer them one.

I'm not going to stay involved in this particular discussion if it really has descended into an 'us vs. them' shouting contest (that's intended as a reassurance, not a threat) but, just in case there is still the germ of a useful conversation to be had, here's my two-penneth response to the below: Right, so I'm pretty sure this misrepresents how things happened: Never once did the Russians explicitly and reliably (i.e. Medvedev doesn't count) threaten to 'nuke us' if we provided a certain type of equipment. They certainly regularly reiterated that they have a red line and would respond if it was crossed but it was always left up to 'us' whether to escalate by delivering a new type of weapon or not. If we did so we would find out whether the red line had been crossed or not; simple as that. If you think about it that is the only way it can be since nobody would never make public the precise location of their red line. If they did that it would be a free pass for the enemy to immediately march right up and moon them over the top of it. So the point is we never knew precisely where the red line was and we still don't. That means the above argument that 'none of the previous steps crossed the line therefore the next one won't' is logically incoherent. In fact: 1. If you assume that the red line hasn't moved since the start of the war, then each escalation we have made since then has gotten us closer to the red line. That would suggest that each subsequent step is actually more likely to cross the red line. 2. If you assume that the red line has moved (as a useful side effect of the 'slow-but-steady' approach the West has taken) then we hope we still have plenty of room to escalate further but still have to consider each move very carefully. I will come back to this. 3. If you don't believe there is a red line then you're welcome to make that case and prove the whole thing is a storm in a teacup. And to reiterate: we don't know which of the above is the case. I'm sure I speak for everybody on the thread when I say I couldn't agree more. Pointless and unhelpful strawman - literally nobody on the thread has said this. Right, so coming back to 2. from my list above, I think it's self-evident that the red line is mobile and that there is more than one way in which it can be moved: We ('the West') are obviously trying to move it 'backwards', away from us, to allow us more freedom to manoeuvre in the conventional domain but also because it is good for literally everybody's health. Other things can also move the line backwards, such as political coercion by Russia's 'allies' or changes in Russian leadership. The line can also move 'forwards', making it easier to cross or even, in a worst-case scenario, tripping it immediately and without warning. Things that might cause this include NATO declaring a Ukrainian no-fly zone and then starting to wipe out all Russian aircraft and anti-air systems within range of the border; a second serious threat presenting itself in a different thatre (e.g. the PLA marches into Siberia); or changes in Russian leadership. Why did I put "changes in Russian leadership" in bold, twice? Because that's exactly what the West (including Ukraine, now) are ultimately aiming to achieve* and so you have to be really careful to make sure you get the right change or it can all go very, very wrong. All of which is to say (and god knows I wish it was simpler) that I don't think nuclear weapons are directly the issue at all, here. They are a convenient shorthand for 'things going pretty badly' which is easy to explain to tabloid journalists but then leads us down pointless rabbit holes when it all gets taken too literally. The West is 'boiling the frog' not because they think Vlad's hand might be hovering over the Big Red Button but because they want to try and make sure they get the right change in Russian leadership, which could hopefully result in long-term peace and start Russia on the long, difficult path to redemption. If the West get it wrong, however, we could instead see the disintegration of Russia into a violent, multi-state sh*tstorm which has been discussed previously here and which might incidentally end up with red lines being plastered all over the place to possibly catastrophic effect. If you want evidence for this, did anyone else notice that during 'Prig's Putsch' both the Western world and Ukraine went deathly quiet? Everyone stepped well back and Ukraine even very clearly declined the opportunity to launch an immediate, full-scale assault to try and take advantage of the sudden Russian instability. That instability is the threat, not nukes. We do need Russian leadership to be destabilised to the point that it falls but every effort is being made to ensure it falls the right damned way. Ok, I truly apologise for how long this post is but I think that's a reflection of how far astray we've gone with the 'nuke' discussion and every issue that is being argued around it. Unfortunately I obviously don't have any actual answers to the problem to round it off with. So I guess I'll leave it there and look forward to the next update from the front. *Yes, regain Ukrainian land and extract reparations, etc., etc. but we all know that unless Russian leadership is changed, a temporary ceasefire is the best that can be hoped for.

Thank you, both. So, to summarise, I was wrong and almost the entire benefit of the NATO/UKR training is in fact in the resources and facilities provided (as well as taking on NATO-specific equipment, naturally), rather than necessarily in the quality, etc. This is mainly because any ‘cultural’ benefit with regards to absorbing experience into new doctrine would only really bite at the operational staff level, which NATO are not involved with. Hopefully I’ve got that right because it makes good sense to me and I consider myself fully educated!

When we hear that Ukrainian troops are being trained by NATO forces, would I be right in thinking that the main value of that (apart from basic fieldcraft, it being free and in a safe location, etc.) probably comes from the ‘cultural’ side of what the Ukrainians are being taught? By which I mean are troops and units that are trained to NATO standards potentially more flexible and able to rapidly integrate lessons learned than a force trained in the Soviet model would be (more emphasis on lower-level initiative rather than top-down micromanagement-according-to-doctrine)? I could be getting this completely wrong but I have to admit I’ve been assuming the above is the case for some months now and that all the emphasis on training of mechanised forces in large-scale manoeuvres has been a bit of a red herring. To my mind NATO training can be a war-winning contribution if it catalyses the absorption of the harsh lessons of war into general Ukrainian battlefield practise and doctrine. Indeed I hope that’s precisely where the emphasis is being placed. I’m tired and not as articulate as I’d like to be at the moment but does that make sense?

To be honest, while I would always try to avoid letting that spill over into a post on this thread of all places, you might not be entirely wrong. I appreciate the consideration. Noted and I now understand where you're coming from. I think the fact that people on this thread have previously opined that Ukraine should be yanked into NATO and the EU as soon as the war is over probably primed me to interpret what you wrote the wrong way. Again I better understand your thought process now but I still struggle with it a bit: We actually have no real idea whether the West have a coherent strategic plan or not because, if they did, it would be idiotic of them to publicise it. Even the impression of 'reacting instead of acting' may be a part of such a plan. 'Remain calm and mature, forestall any attempts by Russia to portray us as the aggressors and seal the deal as regards Russia's utter political isolation on the matter by letting the world see how they act'. Maybe. Maybe Ukrainian F-16 pilots in fact are trained and ready to go and there are other good reasons why they will not yet be deployed. All of the above relates to the fact that we are dealing not only with a dearth of the information we'd like but we are only receiving the information which people let on. And when they tell us they tell the world so there may be good strategic reasons to downplay how much they have actually already invested. Or not. Now despite what it might sound like above, I'm not advocating for us all to become philisophical solipsists. We do have information and we do have brains and we can and do use those things to point out, for example, that the 'boiling the frog' strategy seems pretty clearly to have been deliberate: There has been a steady, almost regular pattern of particular equipment first being openly denied to Ukraine, then being repeatedly asked for by Ukraine, then being hinted at for a month or two before finally being announced as part of the next aid package (sometimes clearly a significant time after it was actually sent). Each time regarding slightly more potent/emotive equipment. Either this is a deliberate pacing strategy or it is the weirdest combination of repeatedly 'trying to avoid sending stuff' and then 'quickly being persuaded to send said stuff' I've ever seen.

Well, I didn’t mean to start (and don’t wish to prolong) a ‘pissing match’ so I will also leave it at this. Know also that it’s nothing personal. Ok so, assuming the West has a weapon that can do as you say, surely the most likely Russian response would be to either ignore the threat or maybe even loudly call the West’s bluff, possibly with an extra wave of attacks on civilian infrastructure that they weren’t originally planning? The West then delivers the specific-but-unnamed wunderwaffe and Ukraine use it to try and strike every base/platform that Russia launches civilian attacks from for the rest of the war. Russia obviously do their damnedest to protect those bases and make a point of continuing the attacks and crowing about it to their citizens and the rest of the world. Meanwhile the war goes on, to be won via the strategic military, political and economic damage caused by means which are already pretty much fully engaged. And we all remain unhappy about it. This sounds like a variation of the ‘Western European nations surrendered to the Nazis because they were too nice’ opinion we had a few pages ago.

Apparently the West's 'boil the frog' strategy has been so successful even some of its own citizens haven't noticed how much they've committed... Russia crossed a red-line on February 24th, 2022. It's been discussed on this board that, despite the obvious failings in the Russian invasion plan, they probably would have eventually succeeded if they has been fighting against Ukraine alone. Historic levels of Western support have turned that into what will almost certainly be a crushing defeat for Russia. What about that makes you think Russia are getting away with anything at all, here? What exactly do you think the Russians have control of? They are still humans, they still have agency of their own and they do not seem to be in the mood to compromise. They will therefore continue to do stuff we don't like for a while, yet. That's life. No stopping it. Fixed that for you. EU membership is not a prize owed to anyone. That's not how it works. If you want to join you have to meet all the strict economic entry conditions, regardless of which war you just fought. Being a good friend isn't enough; just ask Turkiye. And I must have missed the bit where someone belonging to either NATO or the EU argued that we should let any warcrimes slide...? Seriously, I get that the war is frustrating and we'd all like it to be over tomorrow but that just isn't going to happen. Please, unless we have specific, realistic ideas to add to the discussion can we dial down the daily temper-tantrums and lashing-out at the West for not snapping its fingers and making the bad man go away? Also, as a genuine aside, has anyone else noticed that parties who are accused of being "spineless" in almost any context often seem to end up winning?

Surely in this scenario the lesson that Ukraine would have taught the world would be that, with the proper support from allies but without nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-armed state not only repelled the nuclear-armed state but damaged it to the extent that the latter disintegrated? Combined with Womble’s response I think there should be a good case to be made after this war that nuclear weapons don’t offer the same security as proper alliances do.

Ben Wallace is resigning. He’s expected to stick around until the next cabinet reshuffle, circa September. Personally I don’t think this will change much at all but I know he’s become a character of discussion on this thread so thought it might be relevant.

Yes, true. The wider coordination effort that they had to ditch sounds like a perfect example of the kind of thing we all wish countries would do but which even the EU can’t make them…

The V1 vibes are ridiculously strong with this one.

EU member states have been welcome to increase their own ammunition production rates at any time. If any of them have failed to do so because they were waiting for a subsidy from EU coffers to pay for it then that’s on them.

Ok, well if you think I see this as a hard "pro" or "against" situation then the whole point of several of my recent posts has been totally lost. The inverted commas I used in the post you quoted were the only defence I put in that sentence to defend against such an impression. I guess that's on me. I totally agree. As I have tried to say, my particular shade of grey is nudged into the 'pro-DPICM' half of the spectrum (there I go 'making it a binary' again...) in this instance by the lack of alternative solutions to Ukraine's ammunition shortage. To my eyes the only arguments based on principle, such as you describe, have been written to counter similarly binary points raised on 'the other side'. In other words they are there to redress the balance and ensure the discussion doesn't just discard principle altogether. For what it's worth I can see how that could come across as somewhat patronising or 'preachy' to someone with your background. However I don't think I have seen a single person argue that their principles should actually over-ride all other considerations. In fact, have we seen a single opinion yet from someone firmly against DPICM use in the current situation? If we have I think I missed it... Understood, and I don't just mean the self-deprecating part. I always look forward to reading your informed opinions and explanations on this thread. They are among the ones that do 'move the dial'. I'm going to step back and get some work done now, anyway. I think my posts are starting to rock the boat more than stabilise it and I want to let some of more up-to-date posts get some air.