Tux

I agree (hence the admittedly late edit to my previous post), with perhaps two minor tweaks: 1. There is no meaningful difference between what people fight for and what people think they are fighting for. Ask them both questions and see if you get a different response. Perhaps we’re just getting tangled in semantics here but, to me, what a person fights for is what they think/believe they are fighting for, by definition. Why the war is actually being fought at all is the different question. 2. Religion is still very much part of what Putin is selling the Russian people at the moment. Not as much as it would have been 200 years ago but it’s still there.

Perhaps the distinction to be drawn between The_Capt’s and chuckdyke’s perceptions here is that between “why most wars are fought” and “what most people fight for”. It seems clear that religion (and, latterly nationalism) has more influence on a widespread micro-social basis than secular government structures have ever had. It is therefore the perfect tool for converting a ruling elite’s micro-social incentive to war into a macro-social narrative which auto-resolves into new and powerful micro-social incentives for almost everyone else. People fight for what they believe they are fighting for. The reality of the cause and whether it is related to the original reason for the war doesn’t come into it.

I get that you might be having a bad day but there is so much unwarranted angst in this post: absolutely nobody in “The West” argues that children should have the right to choose their gender. No-one is emptying our churches (though there are many fewer people heading in) and less than nobody is “emptying churches so they can be turned into mosques”. Reconsider the merits of whatever media source has told you these things. You rightly identify that we are in a collision of systems but make no mistake: it is the enemies of our Western system who promote misinformation such as what you posted above in order to foster the very division you warn against. Seeing through that, being less angry about things that aren’t happening and therefore being a part of a secure Western system is the best way to maintain focus and win.

I can see your point, economically-speaking. However I think that strengthens an argument for pressing the vast majority of whatever economic capacity you do have for producing drones into the production of effective drone killers. We are clearly at the beginning of the drone revolution that we all regularly discuss but we have only just got past duct-taping hand grenades to Mavic 3 Pros. There is a hell of a long way to go before this domain resolves properly and we are able to clearly see what we need and how to use it. There will almost certainly be a catalogue of false-start designs and dead-ends which sap countries production resources to little benefit (think multi-turreted tanks, turreted fighter aircraft, etc.). My argument is that, while the above situation is ongoing, a smart country will absolutely engage in the general melee of drone and doctrine development (especially China, the US and anyone else for whom economic capacity isn’t such an issue) but will meanwhile maintain laser focus on a dirt-cheap design to hunt down and kill any small, airborne rf-emitter within 10km. As has been noted by many already, if you lose the drone war in a future symmetrical, conventional conflict, you likely lose the war. An efficient ‘drone fighter’ intended purely for area denial to all drones (except its own kind and until proper discrimination is practical) goes a long way towards mitigating that risk.

The more I think about it, isn’t producing a cheap, mass-producible “dalek” drone actually the top priority, at this point? If all else fails a fleet of daleks at least lets you wipe the sky clear altogether. You could then even resurrect a few tanks and go all manoeuvrey again, if you wanted.

First of all this was really interesting and clearly-written. Thank you. Secondly, while solving the IFF issue will clearly confer an advantage, I’m not sure it’s necessary for early-generation drone fleets. Instead I imagine a world where a fleet of Anti-Drone Drones (ADDs) is released to ‘purge’ the sky over a battlefield at a set time on a set date, designed to catch as many enemy drones in action as possible. Orders to ground all friendly drones will ensure that the vast majority of ‘kills’ are of enemy drones. All the ADDs need to be able to do is to tell ‘an ADD’ (so one specific image) from ‘not an ADD’ (nADDs?). This could obviously lead to all sorts of efforts to spoof the enemy into deploying their observation/FPV drones en mass so that you get a solid opportunity to “hit them in the nADDs” and hopefully achieve a short period of drone superiority for your own forces. In that world IFF lends a significant advantage, enabling you to go for full drone supremacy over the battlefield, but it’s not absolutely necessary.

Wow. This is a much larger deficit than I had assumed. I can’t imagine that the US and European countries don’t already have a plan underway to reverse the above ratio over the next year or so, though.

Looks like a coypu to me. Maybe part of the softly, softly Dniepr crossing operation?

If we know anything about North Korean engineering that indicates their tolerances and standards are lacking vs western equivalents, that’s all we need to reasonably propose that their ammo will be less safe, predictable and reliable than western ammo, at least. Having said that I can’t recall having seen any examples which prove that, myself.

The fact that North Korea will also recognise the above means they have an unholy amount of leverage in that ‘relationship’. If we’re right (obviously we’re all speculating so far) and they can turn off the ammo tap at a moment’s notice to throw the RA into an almost immediate starvation situation… wow. Just wow. I mean, to be honest I start to ask myself how long Russian nationalists would tolerate such a situation before Putin starts to be seen as weak for allowing it to continue.

Although it doesn’t specify, I assume the report means that North Korean production rates + Russian production rates will keep up with Russia’s current usage? In which case I think I would back US + Ukrainian + other allies’ to exceed such a rate and leave the UA better off, in the long run at least. If that’s not what they meant then ISW must be making the assumption that North Korea are willing to run down their own stocks of artillery ammunition which… I dunno… doesn’t sound like a very North Korean thing to do, to me. It would be great to know what Kim is getting in return. I think it might tell us a lot about all sorts of things.

Thanks for the reminder. I knew I’d seen something along those lines somewhere.

Fair point, in which case maybe infantry would be a more reliable indicator?

I think there's a third one: * Internal/domestic politics demands that Russia are seen to be making progress - the Army has therefore been instructed to attack and take a named settlement for Russian media to draw big red arrows around and then stick a flag in. Love this question. Imo it's a variety of things: Russian media/propaganda messaging: Do they start showing maps with gains around Avdiivka as evidence that Russia has 'retaken the initiative'? Do they simply stop talking about the 'Tokmak front' and focus on Avdiivka as if that's the new nexus of the war effort? Both might suggest the offensive is a planned media distraction. Artillery and infantry employment at Avdiivka: all else being equal I think evidence of truly heavy Russian artillery and infantry deployment on the offensive with no apparent reduction around Tokmak would suggest your first option. Both resources are apparently in short supply overall so, if that's the case, we shouldn't expect Russia to be able to mass them at Avdiivka without seriously starving themselves elsewhere. Duration and/or escalation profile of the Avdiivka offensive: If the offensive fizzles out after an intial spike in activity, or if it flares up in fits and starts over the coming days and weeks while Ukraine continue the grind towards Tokmak I think that would suggest the Russians are struggling to keep up the pretense or are not happy with the level of distraction they are forcing upon Ukraine. Diplomatic activity: any changes in diplomatic tune could, as one example, be evidence that Russia are trying to snatch at a stronger bargaining position on the ground around Avdiivka before ringing the bell for ceasefire negotiations to start. Those are the ones that leap to mind, anyway. I'm very interested to know what other tea leaves people think we could look out for.

I’m not going to get too involved in the US political discussion but I will say it’s hard for me not to laugh every time I hear American people refer to “the far left” of the American political establishment. I’m sorry but by the standards I’m familiar with American politics really doesn’t have a left wing to speak of. From an external point of view American politics starts about as far to the right as exists in any western country and finishes with “the squad” somewhere around what would be considered the centre or maybe centre-left anywhere in Europe. Are attempts to appeal to the US “centre” maybe failing because the political “centre” has in fact drifted so far to the right?

The Beijing Winter Olympics didn’t finish until 20th Feb, either. I remember at the time reading that Xi had not been amused by the way Russia’s Georgian adventure overshadowed the opening of Beijing’s 2008 Summer Olympics and so he may have played a part in Putin delaying the 2022 invasion. Can’t say I’ve managed to find a reliable source for that, though.

“If it were done when ‘tis done, then ‘twere well… it were done quickly.” If it were done… Unfortunately, as you say, there doesn’t currently seem to be any other choice.

Thank you for reminding us all of this again. I have to revisit this so often in 'real life' discussions about the war. I think the assumption has crept in to the public sub-conscience that rules of war and weapons treaties, etc., were dreamt up by bleeding-heart, liberal wokerati in order to stop those good old warfighters from doing their jobs. The rules (and weapon-restriction treaties) were written by the people who had experience of war without them and fully understood the consequences. Also, this: Absolutely (yet another) part of the importance of "avoiding escalation" is that we must be able to convince ourselves that, if Russia does eventually respond as above, it wasn't our fault. In that case it's far more likely that more member states will rally to an Article 5 call. Support has to be provided to Ukraine as carefully as the most cautious country you want to keep on-side wants it to be.

Yes, I understand and I meant more to add to what you said than to imply that your point was lacking. I did note that you specifically spoke of acknowledging people’s insecurities and I agree that’s the key, whether they actually exist or not. We all just have to hope the sensible politicians in as many countries as possible can keep a firm hand on the tiller and avoid giving populists a meaningful gap to fill.

There is clearly truth in what you write but there are also (at least) two major problems if such a position is prioritised: There exist politicians who are uninterested in the truth or what will benefit their countryfolk (heresy, I know) and who won’t think twice about inflating almost totally unfounded fears and insecurities in their voter base. Sometimes it is little more than these ‘problems’ which are held up as being more important than the nearby generation-defining war being fought. The universe doesn’t care if your populist base is, for example, more worried about immigration than climate change. The latter will still bite just as hard if you do nothing about it.

Best one yet. I was trying not to cry thinking about this on a work call…

The fact there’s smoke coming from both(!) massive holes in the hull doesn’t exactly scream “superficial damage only”, does it?

Actually, I think that (again) if a problem appears among Western audiences it will be constructed upon the tragedy of Ukrainian casualties. Even on this thread a certain type of anti-war position has been presented as 'the Ukrainians are dying for us because of our putting them up to this proxy war'. There is enough post-imperial guilt among Western European nations, at least, that the idea of encouraging Ukrainians to die for our benefit will not sit well. And make no mistake, that's how it will be portrayed by those who want to gain clicks and/or undermine Western support for the war. As regards the narrative shifts you describe, they are hanging an awful lot on the definition of "winning" and that's actually what I meant by needing a cultural shift in the West - not just that casualties happen but that you can take heavy casualties and still "win". As many have said before it is not reasonable to present total expulsion of Russia from everywhere that was Ukrainian ten years ago as the only definition of victory. If this was ever an existential war for Ukraine (as no-one would have said it wasn't on Day 1 of the invasion) then Ukraine have already won, since this war is not going to extinguish them as a nation state. So I agree that a narrative shift from "this war will be won easily" (if that was ever truly "the narrative") to "this war will be won with high losses" is entirely sensible. I don't agree that the narrative of this war will ever have to shift to "this war cannot be won", though. Also, negotiation is always happening (even diplomatic negotiation, if you don't like The_Capt's "war is negotiation" definition). Currently, Russia's position is that they want control of Ukraine (which they will clearly never achieve miltarily). Ukraine's position is that they want back everything they've lost since 2014 (which they theoretically might still achieve militarily), plus reparations, etc. Difficulties encountered during this year's fighting may result in Ukraine softening their demands but it will never result in them agreeing to Russia's current terms. So, for all that we would all love an immediate end to the suffering that really isn't in the West/Ukraine's power at the moment. Russia are the only ones who can possibly make that happen.

I don't think you'll get any argument that the Ukrainian offensive has fallen short versus what a lot of people hoped for. Naturally, as you imply in your second paragraph, we don't yet know the final results and so it's difficult to judge whether it has "failed", per se. I do agree that there's a risk associated with how the Western public perceive the offensive, though. For me it's mostly about how much traction the inevitable alarmist narratives from fringe outlets will gain because I credit most people with the ability to understand that war is tough and to get on with it (largely because they usually seem to have done so in the past). However, if it does gain traction and become a problem I think it will not be because of the 'low gains' made by Ukraine but because of the high losses. It seems clear that, starting after the two World Wars, we in the West have culturally internalised a correlation between low losses taken and military success. At our memorial services we focus on the fact that the dead died and we mourn them. There are many reasons for this and it hasn't helped that our most recent war or three has seemed to confirm this correlation. It does mean that we try really hard to avoid casualties and therefore we do better than most at achieving that but it might also leave the general public prone to asking pointed questions if they are served up a high-loss, low-gain offensive and asked to consider it a positive. Interestingly, in the USSR/Russia, the Great Patriotic War led to them internalising a correlation between high losses incurred and military success. In their memorial services they focus on the fact that the dead won and they celebrate them. This seems to have bedded in to the extent that they almost seem to seek out losses of men and materiel in order to reassure themselves that they're 'doing it right'. And, again, their most recent war or three has seemingly confirmed this for them. Unfortunately that means the general public are not phased by high loss rates (potentially even the opposite) and so it makes them more immediately resilient in the face of 'bad news from the front'. All of which is to say it's probably about time we understood war a little better in the West; a slightly more 'warts-and-all' cultural understanding of warfare could serve us all very well in the weeks, months and decades to come.

I know the above isn’t the place to look for rational arguments but I found this one extra funny: ‘Britain deliberately provoked Barbarossa and then spent the next four years sending war materiel to the USSR and fighting Germany in Western Europe, Southern Europe, North Africa and the Atlantic - ALL IN ORDER TO HURT RUSSIA!!1!’. Honestly I have so much respect for someone who can say that with a straight face.