Tux

Point granted, along with billb’s follow up. Conversation’s moved way on now though.

Not sure the current state of “driverless car” tech supports this. Machines don’t get tired but at the moment they might struggle to see an enemy soldier with a sun tan…

Yeah ok. I guess we’re really talking about whether we can cut up the enemy’s heavy brigades in a heavy EW environment, though? I suppose this hypothetical problem is analogous to Russian spec ops being authorised to fire Shmel rockets at Beslan, where western equivalents would have had to be a little more… tactful. Not sure that counts as the Russians being more effective, though…?

Noted. However, do the devices in your example reliably guide drones to the correct targets? If so why would the West supposedly not permit that? If they don’t then is there any significant benefit gained from their use, vs the added cost each time the drone selects (for example) a civilian target in error?

What sort of rules are you thinking of? Surely a drone that doesn’t differentiate between a tank and a family hatchback, for example, would be objectively a much less effective weapon?

Earlier still, imo. We haven’t seen an Eindecker, yet! As much as I have also long been thinking of today’s drone war as analogous to the first year or two of air warfare (certainly in terms of the likely rate at which development will occur), we should note that there are several key differences: 1. Today’s first generation (or maybe gen 1.5) drones are actually apparently very effective ground attackers. It took until the development of PGMs for aircraft to become anywhere near as efficient. In this sense it makes much more sense to think of drones as munitions than aircraft. 2. The vast majority of development focus seems to be on increasing drones’ offensive potential (again, “munitions”). I’ve yet to see evidence of anyone trying to field a single type of defensive drone ‘fighter’ (as I’ve mentioned several times I think there’s a good chance we will see a modern-day “Fokker Scourge” when one does appear). 3. The entry barrier to effective drone use is spectacularly low, to the point that it seems to have been privately-bought and operated drones that did all the early running in this war. This is very much unlike air warfare and may mean that national armed forces will struggle to maintain a significant qualitative edge over commercially-available drones for the foreseeable future.

Apart from the general logistical principles raised by The_Capt I’m pretty sure DPICM would actually have been particularly difficult to provide at that point in the war, since many of the nations who were making up the supply chain to the Ukrainian border had signed a treaty specifically obliging them not to facilitate the use of DPICM, even by transporting them elsewhere. We’ll all recall that it took a while to find a diplomatically acceptable way around that and I’m pretty sure they/we only bothered because of the lack of alternatives as conventional ammo types ran low.

While the article notes that authorities are trying to close down more of these re-export routes to Russia, I can’t help being slightly frustrated that it doesn’t mention the price Russia may be paying for these chips. If the $1.7-2bn is from “Russian customs service data” then I suspect that’s actually more likely to mean that ‘Russia spent $1.7bn on chips’ than it is to mean that ‘Russia got hold of $1.7bn worth of chips’. Tldr; how many chips did Russia get for $1.7bn?

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68083739 Seems that Ukraine simply didn’t realise there were prisoners on this aircraft. Occam’s razor says a breakdown in communication between sides, imo.

Thanks. “Russian Duma now reportedly prepares appeal to USA to stop supplying missiles to Ukraine.” Interested in what form this takes. We’ve heard basic calls to stop arming Ukraine before but something more formal begins to sound a lot like asking for de-escalation…

Another confusing event reported on the beeb: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-us-canada-68079336 tldr; Russian Defence Ministry claims that 65 Ukrainian POWs, 6 crew members and 3 escorts were on board an Il-76 shot down “by Ukraine”, 70km NE of Belgorod. No real evidence yet but, combined with the strikes on Donetsk a couple of days ago there are definitely some odd noises coming out of the background these days. Or I guess it’s probably all just normal FOW stuff and the inevitable result of lots of shells and missiles being lobbed around the place.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68047144 Civilians killed by a strike on Donetsk market. I’ll be really interested to see what the story behind this ends up being. If it was a Ukrainian error then a quick admission and mea culpa would be the best response, I think. Otherwise I’d like to think it was a Russian strike, if only so I don’t have to think it was a deliberate attack by Ukraine. No evidence either way yet, from this article at least. I dare say, in time, Haiduk et al might be able to let us know what the words in the grapevine is.

I stand corrected. Thanks for the info.

Aye, but if they manage to shape the battlefield to the extent that the Ukrainians can't sustain drone warfare/ ISR over the breach then they probably don't need a nuke to affect the breakthrough in the first place. To my mind tac nukes are 'cheat code' weapons from a bygone era, designed to delete troublesome formations fast without having to engage them in combat. That may work well in a world in which an enemy reaction force would have to walk/drive through your breakthrough's flank security but if they can just fly over it and, as you say, 'flow back in' then the advantage gained from the initial strike has been substantially eroded. As far as a meaningful battlefield response from the West is concerned, I don't think that would be the primary response. I would rather expect it to be open season on Russia's international/diplomatic interests, along with renewed and unprecedented vigour behind the effort to supply and support Ukraine, including lifting any 'ban' that may exist on strikes within Russia's borders. The intention would be to effectively cut Russia loose from global trade and influence, including expulsion from the UNSC, subsequent UN-backed global sanction schemes, etc. NATO boots may well also find their way onto the ground as far as Lviv or so but that would almost be a sideshow to the primary response.

Also, if the intent is to somehow profit from the idea that the West has become 'distracted', then I can't think of a better way to make damned sure you get their attention right back than by employing a nuclear weapon. As several posters have noted, the West absolutely has escalation dominance in this war so Russia can only make things worse for themselves by flipping a WMD into Ukraine.

I think the "breach" caused by tac nuke use would last as long as it takes for new drones to arrive overhead and start hitting logistics/providing targeting coordinates to artillery on the shoulders of the breach. So maybe an hour or two? If the frontline is currently being pinned down by the use of largely airborne ISR alongside assorted types of PGM then any breakthrough has to be predicated not on simply removing them from the battlefied but in preventing the enemy from being able to sustain their presence on the battlefield. For that you need a lasting effect, not an impulse-weapon like a big bomb. Powerful and sophisticated new types of EW or asymmetrical drone denial through localised, low altitude air superiority are, I think, better candidates for enabling a productive breach than a tac nuke.

What I find astonishing about this is that Ukraine have got anywhere near matching Russian use rates (when on the attack, at least). I mean, this is the Russian Armed Forces we’re talking about: Fire-hosing artillery shells at the enemy is pretty much the bedrock of their entire military philosophy. I’d love to know more about how Ukraine are using their artillery. Are they trying to use it as bluntly as the Russians or are they being more surgical with their fires and the near-parity in offensive use rates is more about successful CB and attrition of the Russian system generally? If the former, is that due to a conservative regression to their familiar Soviet doctrine or is it rationally justified as the best way to fight this war? How is tube availability affecting fire rates vs ammunition supply? I wonder how low Russian use rates would be without North Korean ammunition?

I don't think it's about bashing; the guy posts short, often vapid but very controversial and antagonistic opinions and "interpretations". On a discussion board such as this one the options are either to flat out ignore him or to pull him up and call out his BS. Doing the latter is not "bashing". If he really is a good-faith poster who's going through a tough time it may even help him to see his doomsaying argued against in a rational way. This is more the kind of info it would be useful to hear more about: What direction is the Ukrainian war effort taking and are there more effective types of help that the US/EU can provide to a maturing combatant nation, rather than just rolling old tanks over the border to be blown up?

The generous response to this would be 'you are reading too much into the article - that's not what it says'. In the UK we have a less generous, single-word response that I think is probably more appropriate, though. Fixed that for you. You do seem to spend a lot of your time intentionally 'interpreting' what people write in order to fit your 'all is lost' narrative. The point of the response you laughed off here was, I think, to ask what Ukraine's plan is? For the first year or so, Ukraine were in panicky, dear-god-they're-invading-help-please-send-whatever-you-can mode. Where is Ukraine now? Two years in, what is Ukraine's strategy for winning this war? Surely it's not to rely on free equipment sent in by foreign nations? I mean, I think Ukraine can rely on US/EU providing as much support as they can (given the various other factors at play) but it would be idiotic to rely on that and make no other plans to defend your country, right? Perhaps if we knew more from Ukraine about what they are trying to do then we could all offer more insightful opinions as to how the US/EU could help. Your apparent understanding of how Western European people think is frankly stunningly inaccurate. To be blunt, people in Western Europe don't give a solitary, flying **** about Russia. They don't. No-one talks about Russia, worries about Russia or even less considers Russia's strength when they go to the ballot box. Ask people in the UK about Russia and they will talk about Salisbury, the World Cup and the ongoing war with Ukraine. Some of them might remember 2014. A few more will remember the Kursk tragedy because the Russians turned down British help to rescue the crew. Beyond that it's probably all Yeltsin and pre-90s stuff. What you think seems to be a reflection of Russia's own internal propaganda line - that the West spends all its time envying and plotting against the mighty Russian people. It's just bollocks (oh, there we are - the one-word response made it into print after all).

https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/us-army-signs-agreement-with-bae-systems-for-new-m777-structures Looks like M777 production is to restart. From what we know of this war I think this is exactly the kind of kit that does need to proliferate (ideally in multiple NATO armies) ASAP. Interestingly, from other reports it sounds like they’re going to have to move significant manufacturing processes from the UK to the US (which will presumably take some time) because Barrow-in-Furness is committed to the Dreadnought submarine programme. One of the perils of being a small, densely-populated country while trying to produce wide-spectrum military equipment at any useful scale, I suppose. “First major structures” due for delivery in 2025. Better late than never, eh?

To those with a better understanding: what are we seeing in the explosion here that makes it look (to my eyes) an unusual colour and… ‘texture’? Are the burning sparks so evenly sized and spread through the mushroom cloud just pieces of metal? Burning artillery propellant? The cloud itself also looks a weird colour, to me. Or maybe it’s just normal burning debris and the glowing, silvery cloud is some kind of compression artefact?

Here's where my lack of relevant experience bites: what are 4 and 5 getting you, here, which can't currently be achieved? If you've carried out 1-3 and breaching is to be completed in 5 mins anyway, can't you roll straight from 3 to 6? Or are you thinking that the bridgehead JTA(G)Cs will be able to do something which the forces on the 'friendly' side of the mine belt couldnt just by flying recon drones?

This really isn't my area of expertise either but, for what it's worth, I think you're describing a decent 'snowglobe' situation in which your layered defences against the enemy's drones and C4ISR (with attendant PGM-lobbers) move with the attack. I don't think it's necessarily attack-specific, either. Most of what you describe will need to be permanently attached to any formation (combat or support) which wants to survive when moving within 50km of the front line. Even if you manage to establish and maintain your localised protective dome well enough that you can break into the enemy's lines I think you're asking for trouble if you then try and shove 'traditional' forces through the gap. The one thing you won't be able to do is hide the fact that your attack is taking place and where, so the enemy's reserves are on the way almost as soon as you start. To my mind 'bite and hold' could be a solution: take as much territory as you can in 1-2 days, while your dome is intact, then dig like maniacs so that you can adequately protect yourself once the enemy inevitably manages to burn through the dome and gets all up-in-the-grill of whatever it finds inside. If you actually manage to break through the enemy lines, that might be where semi-/autonomous UGVs really show their worth. Unleash hundreds of the little scalliwags to basically run outwards and establish as wide a perimeter as possible to the salient you just created. Some of them can be 'mines with legs', some can be remote listening posts, some can carry ATGMs or massive explosive payloads and cause as much hunter-killer chaos as possible before they are located and neutralised. Should buy you enough time to get settled in for the counterattack, at least... Or design and field an Anti-Drone Drone good and numerous enough to maintain drone supremacy for a few months and, you know, just take your time. Flying: If you can create a good enough bubble to protect jet-troops I think you might be better off just putting them in a helicopter.

I mean the trite answer is it's their combination that hurts most but I still think this is a useful question. I would argue that defenders dug in to fortifications with artillery support has been solved and aren't causing many new problems in this war. The unholy pair in this war is laaaarge minefields and plentiful drones. Without the minefields today's drones could be partially defended against by moving fast and/or light. The Capt's ink-blots would work to neutralise lines of defense. Without the drones you might be able to leverage stealth and operational confusion to effect a breakthrough in at least one or two places. As it is though the mines don't allow you to move fast and the drones let the enemy watch you do it. That then multiplies the effectiveness of artillery and mobilising reserves and, well, here we are. For this war I would warn against trying to come up with a solution that carries out the entire attack for you. This hell-swarm idea may be a thing in a few years but it's more than is needed now. The minimum solution that we need today is to undo the effect that attack drones and drone-assisted C4ISR have had, then let your legacy units attack as they were always meant to. That means finding a way to neutralise the vast majority of enemy drones, at least over a localised area and for at least a day or two. As OBJ points out (and as others have theorised over the previous 70,000+ posts) the solution could be technical or doctrinal. Doctrinal might be more efficient (I like LLF's Army-of-Rangers thinking) but would require re-training and potentially re-organisation which would take months, if not years to properly carry out. A technological solution could theoretically be fielded within weeks of design freeze.

As much as I love a good airborne solution I really struggle with how this could be effective. Just a few starters-for-ten: Presumably you either fly low enough that incoming artillery is arguably more effective against you than if you were on the ground or you fly high enough that you can be shot at by anything bigger than a light machine gun from kms away. Any higher than that and maybe you start struggling to find enough volunteers... You generate a godawful cacophone throughout the assault, even compared to a ground-based one. Everyone within a few kms knows you are airborne and roughly where. The assault would not be as fast as you might hope due to the need to find a suitable landing spot and gently slow to a hover before landing. Otherwise expect a lot of broken ankles and drowned jet-troops. How difficult would it be to mass-produce mines with a light-sensor on top? If a shadow passes over the mine one charge launches it into the air and then another wipes out nearby jet-troops. S-mine+. Yes, absolutely this. This has been bugging me for ages, too. Even insofar as this is just a topical discussion on a computer game forum I hope we can try to identify lessons which are Ukraine-specific vs those that should be applied more widely. How about these? The curious state of airpower: both sides have significant capability but not enough with respect to enemy AD to establish air supremacy and proper subsequent air support campaigns. Rasputitsa and its characteristic division of the year into viable/non-viable campaign seasons (and the concurrent time for rest and reorganisation that all sides can rely on). The enemy. Russia's combination of materiel quantity, technological competence (if not outright excellence in certain domains) and sheer, fatalistic bloody-mindedness in the face of the traumas of combat is probably unique. They will lash out at you with high-potential combat power everywhere, all the time.