Tux

Exactly that - they have deliverately removed all the soft options to make us negotiate with a hard Russian loss. Because we all know it is not just the Russians who will have to deal with the fallout from that. I want to emphasise that I absolutely do not think we should back away from helping Ukraine win this war. I'm all in for dealing with the fallout. At this point it's the least we can do. I just hope (and don't doubt) that we have some extremely bright people mapping the hell out of our potential future option-spaces as we speak.

Yes, quite possibly. I suppose that was part of my point - unless we are very sure about our alternative explanations for their inaction we have to consider their apparent lack of concern when assessing current events. I do think there are persuasive alternative explanations, though, such as the previously-mentioned idea that they are politically unable to act. As always, time will tell.

Indeed. It's just bloody-minded, mafia-style brinkmanship but they've removed their own options for compromise and are now daring Ukraine and the West to push them into the void and see what happens. At the moment, as you say, the fact that they are intent on making their defeat as painful as possible for everyone (including themselves) simply betrays the fact that they are no longer negotiating with their own defeat. Instead they are trying to make the rest of us do it for them. They want us and Ukraine to decide not to win because we don't want Russia to lose. So perhaps what needs to happen is that Putin's Russkiy Mir needs to be discredited in other ways even before Ukraine win militarily, in order to remove that psychological and cultural 'safe space' that he and too many other Russians will otherwise retreat to if and when they lose. How many Stans and African nations can be tempted into visibly closer economic relations with Europe, the US or even (at this point) China? Can Ukrainian/western security services put together an expose and humiliation of Putin himself? What exactly did he and that horse get up to after the famous shirtless ride in the wilderness? Has he been modelling aspects of his private life on Lavrentiy Beria? It's the mythos behind it all that needs to be attacked in order to properly win this war.

As a complete left-field hypothetical I don't think it needs to take up much of the thread's time but, since this is the second time you've brought it up: No. Never. A world in which Putin's Russia accepts this idea, Western European nations accept this idea and in which this idea is even close to workable (not to mention ethical, moral or even legal) just doesn't exist.

Hmmm. I think the last couple of months are tea leaves. Dark, soggy, sinister tea leaves. Unfortunately, as Centurian mentioned, we probably won't know what they foretold until after the fact.

There was the BBC article from yesterday which noted the breakdown in diplomatic relations over the last decade or so and highlighted how utterly futile it became to try and talk to Russian diplomats from December 2021 onwards. Generally I am sure there are some channels open, somewhere. Let's bear in mind though that it's how Ukraine and Russia are communicating which matters more in this war.

In response to the above and the half-dozen other contributions around this same topic: Absolutely, I agree that Russia do not behave in a way that we would consider rational but I don't agree that we saw no signs of panic at other stages of the war. It was probably unhelpful of me to use the word "panic" but I didn't mean to imply that I expect to see people running, screaming through the streets of Moscow or bursting into tears on national TV. What we have seen though is that, when Russia thought their northern front was about to collapse in Spring 2022 they proactively retreated and wrote it off, as you say, as an "operational adjustment" or even a bloody "show of good faith". Russia then kicked off a major (though partial) mobilisation effort last September, when it was all going tits up around Kharkiv and Kherson. They also implemented snap "referenda" in the occupied oblasts and even formally "annexed" them into the Russian Federation. Of course the latter was a bluff and hasn't had any lasting impact but that's the point: it was a desperate attempt to make Ukraine and the West second-guess how Russia would respond if Kherson was taken and a hope-against-hope that Ukraine would consequently halt their advance. It was always going to fall flat but they tried it anyway. I would then also argue that the whole Nova Kakhovka dam fiasco (whether it was accidentally blown or whatever) was probably a response to the threat Ukraine was posing to Russia's probably wafer-thin western flank. The fact is we haven't seen anything like the above more recently. Ukraine seem to have been gradually, painfully fixing themselves up, countering Russian threats and expanding the domains within which they can offer their own. They now even seem to be making ominous (from a Russian point of view) operational progress towards Tokmak and yet for months now Russia has been doing nothing. I just find that really odd. This is exactly the shadow that's been lurking in my thoughts for a few weeks and exactly how I'd have phrased my concerns if I wouldn't have felt like an imposter for doing so. In fact I think I addressed this a few days ago as well, in terms of asking whether theory says there's anything that can be done to help them get moving on this. Because it looks to me awfully like, somehow, Russia are negotiating with their own defeat even less now than they were earlier in the war.

For sure, it's exactly that. I was just trying to think of 'features' of the Ukrainian offensive, or at least the narrative around it, which have stood out and then disappeared. The part played by Ka-52s was one of those.

I am just going to walk past without getting involved in this but, should I drop any thing over my shoulder as I go maybe it can go towards drawing a line under this whole sub-thread? ... Whoops! Clumsy me!

Of course. As far as I can tell it’s been a combination of the factors California Dan just mentioned as well as some minor tactical tweaks to the composition of attacking forces (less vehicle-heavy, more artillery/infantry-led). Even without knowing the details for sure, though, we no longer see footage and photos of Bradleys and Leopards taking ATGM hits from 10km away while crossing minefields and I am pretty sure we would do if the Russians had them.

So, in the last few months it seems to be the case that Ukraine have: Successfully countered/neutralised the attack helicopter threat which caused some worrying tactical issues in the early stages of the offensive. Improved their air defenses to the point where it seems like few Russian drone/missile attacks ever actually get through to hit their targets. Apparently resolved a potential artillery ammunition shortage by receiving/using DPICM where necessary. Developed a significant additional threat to ocean-going and coastal vessels/infrastructure almost entirely through the use of unmanned surface drones. Developed a long-range drone/missile threat that now routinely hits targets deep inside Russia. Established occasional small-scale attacks on facilities in Crimea as basically routine. Apparently broken through the Russian forward line in the south, with Western consensus seeming to be that further progress should now be relatively easy to achieve. While, in the last few months, it seems to be the case that Russia have: Tweaked the age limits on existing conscription law, apparently in an attempt to scrape together a few thousand more men without further annoying the populace. Wallowed in internal mafia-politics, eventually resulting in the probable assassination of the Wagner leadership and subsequent apparent efforts to dissolve the rest of the group. So, first of all, is there anything significant that I have missed out from or got wrong about the above lists? If not, what do we make of the fact there seem to be no real signs of serious concern or panic coming from the Russian leadership? Where is the frantic lashing out and searching for solutions that you might expect of a military that appears to be heading towards at least an operational collapse? Is it: We are lacking in the information needed due to fog of war and/or biases in the information we have access to. The Russians are incapable of developing at the same pace as the Ukrainians for practical, cultural or economic reasons. The Russians do not actually perceive any serious threat posed by this summer's offensive, to the point that they are happy to sit in their trenches, confident that they will see it through. Assuming for argument's sake it is not actually #3, what do we expect to see from the Russian leadership in the next few weeks as a response to the worsening military situation? I cannot imagine that the Ukrainians will break through additional lines of defence and begin moving into places like Tokmak without the Russian government trying pretty damned hard to manage that situation both militarily and publicly.

Pretty sure we’ll have to wait until post-war to hear the real assessment of how the various equipment types have performed. Not that I don’t believe the above but I’m sure the UA prioritise buttering up western donors by praising their kit rather than starting a diplomatic pi**ing match over who’s is best, etc.

Ok, so to answer my own question, perhaps Putin has now (very recently) managed to consolidate his power in some meaningful way which has afforded him the security he needs to be able to wipe out Prigozhin/Utkin and comfortably deal with the blowback (I suppose we’ll see how that works out). Have we noticed any statements, movements or signals in the last week or so which might indicate that Putin has secured the support of a hitherto neutral/opposing party within Russia or, I suppose, elsewhere?

So… what exactly do we think Putin’s rationale for killing Progozhin now was, again? Surely this can’t be as simple as ‘he had it coming’: If the above downsides to killing him were always acceptable Putin could have executed him immediately after the uprising as a far more effective way of emphasising his own power and ruthlessness. If the downsides weren’t acceptable back then then what has changed to make the killing sensible now? And if Prigozhin was protected by powerful puppet masters then killing him doesn’t achieve anything vis-a-vis said masters and you still get the downsides. Something still doesn’t add up about this whole business.

Unless I’ve got totally the wrong end of the stick this has been the case since circa March 2022. In theory, then, are there understood to be ways in which Ukraine/“we” can help hurry Russia along with this negotiation? I guess that simply maintaining military, economic and diplomatic pressure ensures that the conditions required remain. Is the rest just a case of propaganda, diplomatic back channels and maybe the odd unconventional security op?

This thing strikes me as two things: vulnerable and LOUD. If they are used as part of an opposed assault then they will likely be massacred by automatic gunfire either in transit or as they decelerate in order to land (try landing a fully-loaded infantryman at even 10-15mph and see how few walk away from it afterwards). They will also, by the way, have to land each infantryman in a safe spot. Not in a tree, not in a lake but somewhere flat and ideally soft - though not too soft! if the crossing/assault is not opposed well then it soon bloody will be with the racket a swarm of these things would create. And in any case if the crossing is unopposed you’d be better off doing it more safely and quietly. Just walk, or row, or crawl. Whatever. Chill out. Even if successful what is the anticipated benefit here? Are these guys just supposed to get in and silence the enemy frontline defences so that minefields can be crossed by every other unit (armour, heavy weapons, supplies, etc.) without coming under direct fire? If so it seems an awful lot more dangerous than a good old friendly artillery barrage to keep the enemy gunners’ heads down… Maybe there would be some extreme edge cases where special forces use these to insert half a dozen men rather than a helicopter but otherwise I really think this will be limited to non-combat uses only.

Duplicate

I don't think I disagree with any of this; we might just be talking about different strata of behavioural patterns. My comment was referring to the absolutely fundamental drivers behind emotional states, capacity for rational thinking and altruism, etc. at the level of individual human beings (and many other animals, no doubt). I think that everything you describe is accurate but also that it is ultimately emergent of the underlying, resource-based dynamic which operates within and around each individual. When someone is tired and hungry, they are inclined to feel anxious and irritable. We know this. Now ask that person to answer a moderately complicated problem which they don't already know the answer to and they will likely snap and tell you where to shove it. They lack the energy to react in a more sophisticated manner or to solve your problem. You could get the same reaction from someone whose abundant energy reserves are being drained due to a sense of accute social/emotional insecurity. Their basal brain, as it has done successffully for billions of this person's ancestors, is in overdrive to heighten their alertness and 'keep them safe' and there is therefore not much energy to spare. The above are trite examples, I know, but I'm convinced that the reality of the larger scale situations which you accurately decribe is that they emerge from a possibly indissoluble substrate of behavioural cause-effect scenarios that are just as mundane. Take your example of this war being about social power. I would very much agree and would argue that the root of the need for that social power lies in a sense of insecurity in its absence. If we're talking about insecurity on the part of an entire population of people even that is driven and shaped by the cocktail of individual physiological states which comprise the whole. So, yeah, when I spoke about resources I didn't mean iron mines, wheat fields and oil wells; I meant the biochemical constituents of a human being in rude health, all being in the right place, in the right quantity, at the right time. The link between the two is fascinating but I only intended the above to articulate why our comments may have appeared to be at odds. So, while this is the kind of conversation I'd happily dive deeper into in a different forum, I will once again cede the floor to Ukraine war talk.

Wow… and just like that the question of “free will” arises, as well! I’m not going to bite. Too far OT.

From a biological/naturalistic point of view (since we’re going there) I think you can boil it down even further into a question of resources, whether physical (food, water, money, etc.), emotional (in large part linked to nutrition/food and other physical resources) or intellectual (knowledge and understanding or cultural substitutes for understanding, e.g. dogma). And then even these resource types can be reduced to a question of energy (e.g. rational thinking being energy-intensive, well-fed people being able to ‘afford’ it, etc.). The more basal parts of our brain ensure that, when we don’t have the energy or resources to support complex rationalisations and investment in the greater good, we revert to angry/fearful/aggressive states which at least work to ensure the individual’s survival, perhaps alongside immediate family and a few others. When we do have the resources required to ensure that survival and comfort are not in doubt (or, at large scale and in a democracy, when enough of us do), we start to invest in relative luxuries like longer term thinking/actions and the greater good. And when we do that we make slow, very irregular progress towards greater overall well-being. Work to eliminate all types of poverty and watch humanity thrive. Trivial, no?

You mean in the same sense as the landscape has been “defined by nuclear blackmail” since 1949? Honest question. It’s ultimately a factor, of course, but I’m arguing that I don’t think it’s actually considered a serious, imminent threat by ‘the West’ as much as Russia going all Mad Max is. I think we’ve gone “astray” in the sense that nuclear weapons are strategic assets which guarantee the survival of a state but we know we’re not intending to threaten the survival of Russia so, unless we do something stupid that gives the impression maybe we are trying to destroy Russia, nukes should basically be irrelevant to the conduct of this war. What I think we are probably aiming to do is change the Russian leadership and so that’s more likely to be the area of risk we use to fine tune most day-to-day policy decisions at the level of this war. The above is obviously, largely and necessarily based on speculation so I absolutely expect it to be wrong to at least some extent. All I am doing here is trying to articulate the way I think things may be working and how that might better explain some of the decisions we see being made.

As well as sburke’s point I think this sort of thing has to be timed carefully in order to send the right message to the right people. At the moment I think it’s correct that the entire focus remains on getting Russia out of Ukraine and we refuse to talk about anything else. Until that goal is secured beyond doubt I fear any offer of ‘a way back’ would very much be interpreted as a sign of weakness within Russia. Once things have gone so wrong for the Russian leadership that sburke’s people start to appear in plain sight, looking for a way out, the time will have come to offer them one.

I'm not going to stay involved in this particular discussion if it really has descended into an 'us vs. them' shouting contest (that's intended as a reassurance, not a threat) but, just in case there is still the germ of a useful conversation to be had, here's my two-penneth response to the below: Right, so I'm pretty sure this misrepresents how things happened: Never once did the Russians explicitly and reliably (i.e. Medvedev doesn't count) threaten to 'nuke us' if we provided a certain type of equipment. They certainly regularly reiterated that they have a red line and would respond if it was crossed but it was always left up to 'us' whether to escalate by delivering a new type of weapon or not. If we did so we would find out whether the red line had been crossed or not; simple as that. If you think about it that is the only way it can be since nobody would never make public the precise location of their red line. If they did that it would be a free pass for the enemy to immediately march right up and moon them over the top of it. So the point is we never knew precisely where the red line was and we still don't. That means the above argument that 'none of the previous steps crossed the line therefore the next one won't' is logically incoherent. In fact: 1. If you assume that the red line hasn't moved since the start of the war, then each escalation we have made since then has gotten us closer to the red line. That would suggest that each subsequent step is actually more likely to cross the red line. 2. If you assume that the red line has moved (as a useful side effect of the 'slow-but-steady' approach the West has taken) then we hope we still have plenty of room to escalate further but still have to consider each move very carefully. I will come back to this. 3. If you don't believe there is a red line then you're welcome to make that case and prove the whole thing is a storm in a teacup. And to reiterate: we don't know which of the above is the case. I'm sure I speak for everybody on the thread when I say I couldn't agree more. Pointless and unhelpful strawman - literally nobody on the thread has said this. Right, so coming back to 2. from my list above, I think it's self-evident that the red line is mobile and that there is more than one way in which it can be moved: We ('the West') are obviously trying to move it 'backwards', away from us, to allow us more freedom to manoeuvre in the conventional domain but also because it is good for literally everybody's health. Other things can also move the line backwards, such as political coercion by Russia's 'allies' or changes in Russian leadership. The line can also move 'forwards', making it easier to cross or even, in a worst-case scenario, tripping it immediately and without warning. Things that might cause this include NATO declaring a Ukrainian no-fly zone and then starting to wipe out all Russian aircraft and anti-air systems within range of the border; a second serious threat presenting itself in a different thatre (e.g. the PLA marches into Siberia); or changes in Russian leadership. Why did I put "changes in Russian leadership" in bold, twice? Because that's exactly what the West (including Ukraine, now) are ultimately aiming to achieve* and so you have to be really careful to make sure you get the right change or it can all go very, very wrong. All of which is to say (and god knows I wish it was simpler) that I don't think nuclear weapons are directly the issue at all, here. They are a convenient shorthand for 'things going pretty badly' which is easy to explain to tabloid journalists but then leads us down pointless rabbit holes when it all gets taken too literally. The West is 'boiling the frog' not because they think Vlad's hand might be hovering over the Big Red Button but because they want to try and make sure they get the right change in Russian leadership, which could hopefully result in long-term peace and start Russia on the long, difficult path to redemption. If the West get it wrong, however, we could instead see the disintegration of Russia into a violent, multi-state sh*tstorm which has been discussed previously here and which might incidentally end up with red lines being plastered all over the place to possibly catastrophic effect. If you want evidence for this, did anyone else notice that during 'Prig's Putsch' both the Western world and Ukraine went deathly quiet? Everyone stepped well back and Ukraine even very clearly declined the opportunity to launch an immediate, full-scale assault to try and take advantage of the sudden Russian instability. That instability is the threat, not nukes. We do need Russian leadership to be destabilised to the point that it falls but every effort is being made to ensure it falls the right damned way. Ok, I truly apologise for how long this post is but I think that's a reflection of how far astray we've gone with the 'nuke' discussion and every issue that is being argued around it. Unfortunately I obviously don't have any actual answers to the problem to round it off with. So I guess I'll leave it there and look forward to the next update from the front. *Yes, regain Ukrainian land and extract reparations, etc., etc. but we all know that unless Russian leadership is changed, a temporary ceasefire is the best that can be hoped for.

Thank you, both. So, to summarise, I was wrong and almost the entire benefit of the NATO/UKR training is in fact in the resources and facilities provided (as well as taking on NATO-specific equipment, naturally), rather than necessarily in the quality, etc. This is mainly because any ‘cultural’ benefit with regards to absorbing experience into new doctrine would only really bite at the operational staff level, which NATO are not involved with. Hopefully I’ve got that right because it makes good sense to me and I consider myself fully educated!

When we hear that Ukrainian troops are being trained by NATO forces, would I be right in thinking that the main value of that (apart from basic fieldcraft, it being free and in a safe location, etc.) probably comes from the ‘cultural’ side of what the Ukrainians are being taught? By which I mean are troops and units that are trained to NATO standards potentially more flexible and able to rapidly integrate lessons learned than a force trained in the Soviet model would be (more emphasis on lower-level initiative rather than top-down micromanagement-according-to-doctrine)? I could be getting this completely wrong but I have to admit I’ve been assuming the above is the case for some months now and that all the emphasis on training of mechanised forces in large-scale manoeuvres has been a bit of a red herring. To my mind NATO training can be a war-winning contribution if it catalyses the absorption of the harsh lessons of war into general Ukrainian battlefield practise and doctrine. Indeed I hope that’s precisely where the emphasis is being placed. I’m tired and not as articulate as I’d like to be at the moment but does that make sense?