Tux

If we're talking about AI which could theoretically wage warfare entirely in our place (my concept - I understand it's not what OBJ intended to imply) then I think it is past the point where you'd know what 'decisions' it was making. As The_Capt put it, AI would be expected to "solve for humanity" and guide us without our knowing how. It would have to be able to understand us better than we do ourselves, so would necessarily be an emergent variety of AI rather than one we 'write'. Think Foundation rather than robot overlords.

The term "AI" is doing a lot of legwork in this discussion and, I think, is being used to refer to different things a lot of the time. As previously noted, "AI" of sorts is already integrated into weapon systems at the level of smart munitions and augmented feedback to operators of FPVs, for example. The "AI" I think most people are concerned about/interested in in the context of the next few years is the kind of AI that will be able to meaningfully automate processes which have, to-date, been too complicated or nuanced to take away from human beings: mainly target selection and prosecution within a defined combat zone. That's all fine and those are the types of "AI" which will (I think inevitably) be integrated into our next generation fighting systems. Beyond that there is the kind of AI that starts beying employed against the enemy's AI. For me, this is where things start to get interesting. I think at this point AI is at least as heavily employed in deceiving death swarms and Terminators as it is in driving them and that means that warfare will become extremely dynamic: the best way to defeat an AI-driven war machine is to make sure it doesn't recognise you in the first place and there are countless unimagined ways of making that happen. War, warriors and weapons will only appear recognisable to our eyes for as long as AI doesn't get too good. Once it does start to get there, we will simply change what they looks like (hold that thought). And then we start saying things like: Now please don't misunderstand me; I think that this is an interesting thought and idea to discuss but I also think that, in an effort to scout ahead, it has not-altogether-deliberately strayed a bit off-map. "AI" does not mean the same "AI", any more. If we ever get to the point when "wars are fought exclusively by AI systems" or when people are not involved in warfighting then I see that world reflecting one of two possibilities: People no longer exist. If they did exist then they would still throw shade, b***hslap each other and get into large scale brawls which would take the sociological place of whatever warfare is now that AI has excluded us from in the future and that would then become the new, real warfare. In other words if we are ever excluded from "warfare" because AI is just too damned efficient and lethal then that will suddenly solve absolutely nothing and we will go somewhere else and start fighting again, without it. The people who are unsatisfied by AI-controlled warfare will simply change warfare to be something else entirely. Or; People get imaginative enough to realise that AI isn't best used to target enemy machines with explosives any more than a nuclear reactor is best used to heat the cavalry's stables. If AI is in such a derivative state that wars could theoretically be fought by it to the exclusion of actual people then we should find a far better use for Marvin than what convention would currently consider the military domain. If AI is this powerful it should be working primarily in the information domain, ironing out conflicting certainties (thanks for introducing useful terminology, Capt) at the level of the information people absorb and believe on a day-to-day basis. In this way AI should be winning wars before we even know they've begun and yes, that means that, as far as we're concerned, AI should be preventing warfare altogether. To the extent that such a thing may not be possible, AI should work to mitigate whatever level of conflict turns out to be necessary between human beings but that will probably still mean allowing us to do it ourselves in order to make sure something actually gets resolved in the process. Tldr: I think that, if AI advances to the point that it could exclude us from warfare altogether then the political and natural sciences, healthcare and economics will be the fields upon which those wars are won, not the trenches and treelines around Avdiivka.

Point granted, along with billb’s follow up. Conversation’s moved way on now though.

Not sure the current state of “driverless car” tech supports this. Machines don’t get tired but at the moment they might struggle to see an enemy soldier with a sun tan…

Yeah ok. I guess we’re really talking about whether we can cut up the enemy’s heavy brigades in a heavy EW environment, though? I suppose this hypothetical problem is analogous to Russian spec ops being authorised to fire Shmel rockets at Beslan, where western equivalents would have had to be a little more… tactful. Not sure that counts as the Russians being more effective, though…?

Noted. However, do the devices in your example reliably guide drones to the correct targets? If so why would the West supposedly not permit that? If they don’t then is there any significant benefit gained from their use, vs the added cost each time the drone selects (for example) a civilian target in error?

What sort of rules are you thinking of? Surely a drone that doesn’t differentiate between a tank and a family hatchback, for example, would be objectively a much less effective weapon?

Earlier still, imo. We haven’t seen an Eindecker, yet! As much as I have also long been thinking of today’s drone war as analogous to the first year or two of air warfare (certainly in terms of the likely rate at which development will occur), we should note that there are several key differences: 1. Today’s first generation (or maybe gen 1.5) drones are actually apparently very effective ground attackers. It took until the development of PGMs for aircraft to become anywhere near as efficient. In this sense it makes much more sense to think of drones as munitions than aircraft. 2. The vast majority of development focus seems to be on increasing drones’ offensive potential (again, “munitions”). I’ve yet to see evidence of anyone trying to field a single type of defensive drone ‘fighter’ (as I’ve mentioned several times I think there’s a good chance we will see a modern-day “Fokker Scourge” when one does appear). 3. The entry barrier to effective drone use is spectacularly low, to the point that it seems to have been privately-bought and operated drones that did all the early running in this war. This is very much unlike air warfare and may mean that national armed forces will struggle to maintain a significant qualitative edge over commercially-available drones for the foreseeable future.

Apart from the general logistical principles raised by The_Capt I’m pretty sure DPICM would actually have been particularly difficult to provide at that point in the war, since many of the nations who were making up the supply chain to the Ukrainian border had signed a treaty specifically obliging them not to facilitate the use of DPICM, even by transporting them elsewhere. We’ll all recall that it took a while to find a diplomatically acceptable way around that and I’m pretty sure they/we only bothered because of the lack of alternatives as conventional ammo types ran low.

While the article notes that authorities are trying to close down more of these re-export routes to Russia, I can’t help being slightly frustrated that it doesn’t mention the price Russia may be paying for these chips. If the $1.7-2bn is from “Russian customs service data” then I suspect that’s actually more likely to mean that ‘Russia spent $1.7bn on chips’ than it is to mean that ‘Russia got hold of $1.7bn worth of chips’. Tldr; how many chips did Russia get for $1.7bn?

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68083739 Seems that Ukraine simply didn’t realise there were prisoners on this aircraft. Occam’s razor says a breakdown in communication between sides, imo.

Thanks. “Russian Duma now reportedly prepares appeal to USA to stop supplying missiles to Ukraine.” Interested in what form this takes. We’ve heard basic calls to stop arming Ukraine before but something more formal begins to sound a lot like asking for de-escalation…

Another confusing event reported on the beeb: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-us-canada-68079336 tldr; Russian Defence Ministry claims that 65 Ukrainian POWs, 6 crew members and 3 escorts were on board an Il-76 shot down “by Ukraine”, 70km NE of Belgorod. No real evidence yet but, combined with the strikes on Donetsk a couple of days ago there are definitely some odd noises coming out of the background these days. Or I guess it’s probably all just normal FOW stuff and the inevitable result of lots of shells and missiles being lobbed around the place.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68047144 Civilians killed by a strike on Donetsk market. I’ll be really interested to see what the story behind this ends up being. If it was a Ukrainian error then a quick admission and mea culpa would be the best response, I think. Otherwise I’d like to think it was a Russian strike, if only so I don’t have to think it was a deliberate attack by Ukraine. No evidence either way yet, from this article at least. I dare say, in time, Haiduk et al might be able to let us know what the words in the grapevine is.

I stand corrected. Thanks for the info.

Aye, but if they manage to shape the battlefield to the extent that the Ukrainians can't sustain drone warfare/ ISR over the breach then they probably don't need a nuke to affect the breakthrough in the first place. To my mind tac nukes are 'cheat code' weapons from a bygone era, designed to delete troublesome formations fast without having to engage them in combat. That may work well in a world in which an enemy reaction force would have to walk/drive through your breakthrough's flank security but if they can just fly over it and, as you say, 'flow back in' then the advantage gained from the initial strike has been substantially eroded. As far as a meaningful battlefield response from the West is concerned, I don't think that would be the primary response. I would rather expect it to be open season on Russia's international/diplomatic interests, along with renewed and unprecedented vigour behind the effort to supply and support Ukraine, including lifting any 'ban' that may exist on strikes within Russia's borders. The intention would be to effectively cut Russia loose from global trade and influence, including expulsion from the UNSC, subsequent UN-backed global sanction schemes, etc. NATO boots may well also find their way onto the ground as far as Lviv or so but that would almost be a sideshow to the primary response.

Also, if the intent is to somehow profit from the idea that the West has become 'distracted', then I can't think of a better way to make damned sure you get their attention right back than by employing a nuclear weapon. As several posters have noted, the West absolutely has escalation dominance in this war so Russia can only make things worse for themselves by flipping a WMD into Ukraine.

I think the "breach" caused by tac nuke use would last as long as it takes for new drones to arrive overhead and start hitting logistics/providing targeting coordinates to artillery on the shoulders of the breach. So maybe an hour or two? If the frontline is currently being pinned down by the use of largely airborne ISR alongside assorted types of PGM then any breakthrough has to be predicated not on simply removing them from the battlefied but in preventing the enemy from being able to sustain their presence on the battlefield. For that you need a lasting effect, not an impulse-weapon like a big bomb. Powerful and sophisticated new types of EW or asymmetrical drone denial through localised, low altitude air superiority are, I think, better candidates for enabling a productive breach than a tac nuke.

What I find astonishing about this is that Ukraine have got anywhere near matching Russian use rates (when on the attack, at least). I mean, this is the Russian Armed Forces we’re talking about: Fire-hosing artillery shells at the enemy is pretty much the bedrock of their entire military philosophy. I’d love to know more about how Ukraine are using their artillery. Are they trying to use it as bluntly as the Russians or are they being more surgical with their fires and the near-parity in offensive use rates is more about successful CB and attrition of the Russian system generally? If the former, is that due to a conservative regression to their familiar Soviet doctrine or is it rationally justified as the best way to fight this war? How is tube availability affecting fire rates vs ammunition supply? I wonder how low Russian use rates would be without North Korean ammunition?

I don't think it's about bashing; the guy posts short, often vapid but very controversial and antagonistic opinions and "interpretations". On a discussion board such as this one the options are either to flat out ignore him or to pull him up and call out his BS. Doing the latter is not "bashing". If he really is a good-faith poster who's going through a tough time it may even help him to see his doomsaying argued against in a rational way. This is more the kind of info it would be useful to hear more about: What direction is the Ukrainian war effort taking and are there more effective types of help that the US/EU can provide to a maturing combatant nation, rather than just rolling old tanks over the border to be blown up?

The generous response to this would be 'you are reading too much into the article - that's not what it says'. In the UK we have a less generous, single-word response that I think is probably more appropriate, though. Fixed that for you. You do seem to spend a lot of your time intentionally 'interpreting' what people write in order to fit your 'all is lost' narrative. The point of the response you laughed off here was, I think, to ask what Ukraine's plan is? For the first year or so, Ukraine were in panicky, dear-god-they're-invading-help-please-send-whatever-you-can mode. Where is Ukraine now? Two years in, what is Ukraine's strategy for winning this war? Surely it's not to rely on free equipment sent in by foreign nations? I mean, I think Ukraine can rely on US/EU providing as much support as they can (given the various other factors at play) but it would be idiotic to rely on that and make no other plans to defend your country, right? Perhaps if we knew more from Ukraine about what they are trying to do then we could all offer more insightful opinions as to how the US/EU could help. Your apparent understanding of how Western European people think is frankly stunningly inaccurate. To be blunt, people in Western Europe don't give a solitary, flying **** about Russia. They don't. No-one talks about Russia, worries about Russia or even less considers Russia's strength when they go to the ballot box. Ask people in the UK about Russia and they will talk about Salisbury, the World Cup and the ongoing war with Ukraine. Some of them might remember 2014. A few more will remember the Kursk tragedy because the Russians turned down British help to rescue the crew. Beyond that it's probably all Yeltsin and pre-90s stuff. What you think seems to be a reflection of Russia's own internal propaganda line - that the West spends all its time envying and plotting against the mighty Russian people. It's just bollocks (oh, there we are - the one-word response made it into print after all).

https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/us-army-signs-agreement-with-bae-systems-for-new-m777-structures Looks like M777 production is to restart. From what we know of this war I think this is exactly the kind of kit that does need to proliferate (ideally in multiple NATO armies) ASAP. Interestingly, from other reports it sounds like they’re going to have to move significant manufacturing processes from the UK to the US (which will presumably take some time) because Barrow-in-Furness is committed to the Dreadnought submarine programme. One of the perils of being a small, densely-populated country while trying to produce wide-spectrum military equipment at any useful scale, I suppose. “First major structures” due for delivery in 2025. Better late than never, eh?

To those with a better understanding: what are we seeing in the explosion here that makes it look (to my eyes) an unusual colour and… ‘texture’? Are the burning sparks so evenly sized and spread through the mushroom cloud just pieces of metal? Burning artillery propellant? The cloud itself also looks a weird colour, to me. Or maybe it’s just normal burning debris and the glowing, silvery cloud is some kind of compression artefact?

Here's where my lack of relevant experience bites: what are 4 and 5 getting you, here, which can't currently be achieved? If you've carried out 1-3 and breaching is to be completed in 5 mins anyway, can't you roll straight from 3 to 6? Or are you thinking that the bridgehead JTA(G)Cs will be able to do something which the forces on the 'friendly' side of the mine belt couldnt just by flying recon drones?

This really isn't my area of expertise either but, for what it's worth, I think you're describing a decent 'snowglobe' situation in which your layered defences against the enemy's drones and C4ISR (with attendant PGM-lobbers) move with the attack. I don't think it's necessarily attack-specific, either. Most of what you describe will need to be permanently attached to any formation (combat or support) which wants to survive when moving within 50km of the front line. Even if you manage to establish and maintain your localised protective dome well enough that you can break into the enemy's lines I think you're asking for trouble if you then try and shove 'traditional' forces through the gap. The one thing you won't be able to do is hide the fact that your attack is taking place and where, so the enemy's reserves are on the way almost as soon as you start. To my mind 'bite and hold' could be a solution: take as much territory as you can in 1-2 days, while your dome is intact, then dig like maniacs so that you can adequately protect yourself once the enemy inevitably manages to burn through the dome and gets all up-in-the-grill of whatever it finds inside. If you actually manage to break through the enemy lines, that might be where semi-/autonomous UGVs really show their worth. Unleash hundreds of the little scalliwags to basically run outwards and establish as wide a perimeter as possible to the salient you just created. Some of them can be 'mines with legs', some can be remote listening posts, some can carry ATGMs or massive explosive payloads and cause as much hunter-killer chaos as possible before they are located and neutralised. Should buy you enough time to get settled in for the counterattack, at least... Or design and field an Anti-Drone Drone good and numerous enough to maintain drone supremacy for a few months and, you know, just take your time. Flying: If you can create a good enough bubble to protect jet-troops I think you might be better off just putting them in a helicopter.