Lethaface
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Posts posted by Lethaface
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On 7/6/2023 at 12:56 AM, NiceBoat said:
You're quoting me out of context. They treated all drones as hi-tech gear, as evidenced by the fact only US and RU have access to them in-game. This assumption turned out to be blatantly wrong. And yes, it was likely possible to anticipate that development in 2012-2014, as neither the components nor the technology were prohibitively expensive at that point, although it'd be foolish to hold this against BFC because they're game-makers, not drone market analysts.
Still, failing to update the TOE when the kind of warfare CMBS is trying to simulate turned out to be heavily influenced by cheap, readily available drones is something that can be held against them, which is why I'm criticizing them.
As it stands, CMBS simply fails as a modern warfare simulator unless you're willing to go the extra mile and create scenarios that dodge this issue. It's literally impossible to have a realistic UA vs RF game in Quick Battle mode because there's no way to get the kind of transparent battlefield that emerged in the real world. You can kind-of, sort-of get it if you play US vs RF, but the force purchases required to achieve that state are downright ridiculous.
Now, you could argue that this isn't a big deal, but if you play multiplayer it kind of is. Which is one of the reasons people are complaining here.
As a consumer, I'm also flabbergasted by the fact that this issue could've been rectified to some extent by a simple TOE change or a new force selection setting, and maybe the adjustment of the way you can target small drones, but for some reason wasn't. Which is why I said I'm not planning to play CMBS going forward unless this gets fixed (well maybe I will, but definitely not in QB mode) - the game promises to simulate modern combat, but fails to deliver because, again, drones. Unless you put in additional time and effort to design scenarios around the aforementioned issues, in which case it pretty much works.
And the fact that it's so close, yet ultimately broken is what's really annoying to me. I shouldn't have to pump out my own scenario pack just to get the kind of simulation I get out of the box in any mode with CMCW or CMSF.
As a (fellow) human I wonder if your breakfast is on the sour and salty side. I mean I agree that the stuff you mention could be improved upon. But this game was released about 10 years ago and implemented a (at the moment) fictional war in Ukraine.
If you lose the hyperbole and just present the issues as possible improvements which could make the came much more close to the real 2022 conflict, I guess it's more pleasant to read and more chance of getting interaction or being listened too. Or if you like more critical posts: you use an unnecessary volume of words in un unpleasant tone to get your point across. It's really a shame because it was so close to being a good post, but ultimately it sounds like a broken record. We shouldn't have to put in the time to read those extra words, which bring nothing to the table and just clutter up our forum experience with negative vibes.
FWIW BFC has said they don't plan to retroactively update CMBS to be like the 2022 war. But there might come a new game depicting the '22 war.
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I'm glad they do. It can force the enemy TC to button up, cause suppression and degrade optics. Obviously it won't deliver the knock out punch, but it will facilitate it's proper delivery ;-).
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20 hours ago, domfluff said:
The "argument" of "I can believe the CEP should be tighter, but I'd like some data to back that up?"
I have no idea why that "falls apart" or what other argument you or anyone else thinks I'm making there.
The fact there is a discrepancy between the way tripod and vehicle mounted weapons are working is observable, yes. Does that mean the vehicle ones should be more accurate, or the tripod ones less accurate? Does a vehicle mount offer less support for the (considerable) recoil? These are knowable things, and "well, obviously" doesn't mean anything.I'd expect a 'mechanically stabilized' mount in a ROW setup on a vehicle to feature more tight groupings compared to a manually stabilized tripod mount. The weapon itself isn't more accurate mounted one way or the other, but I'd also guess a properly zero'ed weapon 'slaved' to the weapon controls will also be more accurate compared to the general soldier using the iron sights.
That being said, for a suppression type weapon the 'drunken' aspect has some positives as well.
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7 minutes ago, benpark said:
What is the carrot for Prigozhin if this is true, since he has the stick (for the time being, when he has the complete initiative)?
Plus he knows that 'security guarantees' aren't rock solid to say the least.
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1 minute ago, The_Capt said:
So if Putin ran to St Petersburg, anyone think it is weird he is running toward NATO borders? Aren’t we supposed to be the root of all evils?
Perhaps he'd rather surrender to the West for good reasons ;-).
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20 minutes ago, kraze said:
All 11 of them
Don't forget the one that took the picture
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36 minutes ago, sburke said:
Putin: "I don't need ammo, I need a ride"
When I woke up today to the news I first double checked if it wasn't 1 April, after which I had a good laugh. However this ends, it will be favorable to Ukraine at the frontline.
'Russian' or in some cases 'previously Russian' forces advancing to the rear might leave some of the in depth defenses and obstacle / mine fields in such a way Ukraine can breach through them relatively safe / leisurely and allowing them to create a sturdy bridgehead for exploitation behind the front.
Interesting to see how Kadyrov will roll as well; how long will he standby Putin and what does that mean for his position at home. One can hope he makes a mistake and is himself ousted in another coup.
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This (pri) seems significant cq interesting news
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13 minutes ago, TheVulture said:
I think that the reality is that the 'cost' either way is more of less fictional. These are items from deep reserve storage that were never going to be used short of a major land invasion of the United States (which, obviously, isn't on the cards). They don't need to be replaced. They are just stuff that has been obsoleted out of service or withdrawn due to changing budget allocations, and they get 'replaced' naturally over the course of time as new procurement programs update and replace currently in-service equipment and it gets moved into permanent storage.
I think we agree but in accounting terms the cost can never be fictional, unfortunately there are only 'legal fictions' ;-). So while you are of course correct that the real/intrinsic value of such stuff is up in the air at any given moment, it is actually in the books somewhere. But indeed that doesn't mean one has to now actually find 6.2Bn somewhere. Just change the books and credit the 'Ukr aid' for 6.2Bn and debit it the amount to the general 'replacement costs provisioning' tab. Voila, more funds made available for aid to Ukraine. If pulling from (revalued) existing stock those 6.2Bn could be milked out for quite a bit I'd say.
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27 minutes ago, Huba said:
There are some good news coming from the ammunition department today:
Apparently there's a way to feed 2S7s with US 203mm ammunition:
US is ramping up its 155mm production, Rheinmetall is reportedly even further ahead in this regard. In the thread following the tweet below there's a quote from Reznikov about UA using 110K shells per month, and asking for 250K/ month. It is more than official number for RU production, which Shoigu himself said is 200K per month, and in reality probably a fraction of that. Arsenal(s) of democracy are really starting to work, and IMO going froward UA will be in better and better position ammunition wise.
If true and in place 'in production' could be significant for CB fires and more limitation of Russian ability to effectively use artillery.
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33 minutes ago, dan/california said:
I think the biggest limitation is artillery ammo/pgms. They can't maintain this level of fires indefinitely, so it is a tricky calculation to decide ow much you can afford to degrade any given objective before you have to push.
Ideally one has discovered all the 'options' (as theCapt says) available to the defender and ran out of good / worthwhile targets for PGMs/fires before starting 'the big' push, if you even need to do a big push.
Maybe it will be most wise to culminate with a lot of successful small pushes :D. -
On 6/21/2023 at 5:51 PM, Battlefront.com said:
More evidence that Ukraine is far more focused on grinding down Russia's forces than it is taking territory. This is the correct strategy! We've been saying over and over again that Russia's lines are thin and reinforcements at any scale unavailable. Yet a relatively small number of defenders can be a real problem with all those mines and fixed emplacements. Mines and fixed emplacements without capable defenders, though, are a different thing
So it looks like Russia is stuck. They have to stay in their positions and there's very little it can do about the attrition. Attempts to counter attack are just going to make it worse. And if there's one thing the Russians are consistently good at doing is taking a bad situation and making it worse!
The big question, then, is how long will Ukraine keep this grinding up before it makes major moves forward?
Sorry for regurgitating yesterday again, but thought this was an interesting post and my thread pace is lacking.
Shooting up the defenses before trying to occupy objectives sounds a bit like the lessons I've learned from CM over the years. What is the time limit for this 'scenario'? :-). If they have a couple of months left before the muds put an end to this phase, while they still have a good number of fresh reserves/reinforcements available for insertion, why would they need to rush moving forward unless it is clear that a position is basically smashed?
Of course sometimes one needs to do a bit of risky pushing to assert whether it is 'safe' to move forward, but other than that I don't see why they would go for a determined move into strong defenses (and or into counter attacking mobile reserves) / unfavorable terrain unless there is a need to take stuff at any cost before a certain cut off.
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On 6/21/2023 at 4:52 PM, Battlefront.com said:
Correct. In accounting terms an asset is depreciated over time according to a schedule. At the end of the schedule the asset has no value from an accounting standpoint. If the item is sold the gain/loss is the difference between price paid and the current depreciated value. IIRC you can elect to NOT depreciate an asset, at which point the gain/loss is based on the original booked value. Nobody does that as a matter of routine, though, as it is not likely to benefit the taxpayer.
The key thing is that once an asset is depreciated then it is depreciated. You can NOT use the original value for any accounting activity, including as collateral on loans, insurance, or anything else that concerns the value of that asset to the holder of it.
I am not an accountant, therefore I might have missed nuances, but there could be no "error" at the Pentagon about this. Either they are routinely using fraudulent accounting practices to "cook the books", and decided to correct it for this one purpose, or someone indeed made a major and fundamental mistake. If it was the latter, then there's probably a room full of accountants that need to be fired and prevented from ever handling books ever again. Then again, accountants that cook the books should also be fired and prevented from ever handling books ever again
This is a scandal in the making, but I'm sure Congress has more important things to do like fight over gender affirming healthcare. Grr.
Steve
The interesting bit imo is whether the replacement cost (which do actually need to be paid in full one would assume) had come out a specific budget 'jar' labeled 'Ukraine mil support' and now needs to be refilled from another jar outside the defense budget (creating a deficit somewhere else), or are these just labeled costs which are all credited against the overall US Defense budget.
In the latter case they can just 'change the label' retroactively, which will then also impact the fulfillment of the allowed balance sheet expenses for 'Ukraine mil support' for the difference (and thus open up the difference which seems to be 6.2 Bn).In other words, it might be just a simple balance sheet correction exercise. AFAIK the US Mil budget is a sort of current account backed by a large virtual $ printing machine where 6Bn is pocket change.
But indeed not a good impression on the accounting side of things for the Pentagon, one would expect these things to be checked by teams of controllers and accountants; if you cook the books cook m good :D.
PS I'm neither an accountant, although did learn a couple of things about it. -
3 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
That clears it up. Strange that they choose to call it an "error".
The US is moving from the most strict way of counting the amount to the loosest. From replacement capacity cost to the equipment's value on the accounting books.
'Creative bookkeeping' for the political reasons you stated earlier I guess.
Although I agree from an accounting pov that the value of things send should be calculated using the actual value those things where in the books; not for the value the 'replacements' (which might be not 'same') are being ordered.
If you donate a car to charity and then deduct the replacement value off your yearly taxes, the tax service won't agree.
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On 6/10/2023 at 2:21 PM, wyskass said:
The tedious nature of MOUT is sapping all enjoyment of SF2 from me, and I end up getting sick of it and quitting. I know this is reflecting reality and this is more a simulator. But what's the point when going house by house for hours, especially the Marines in Syria missions, specifically Crossroads in the city. I return to Shock Force 2, to only be reminded how annoying this is. I like the idea of this more than actually doing it, and am trying to find a way or reason to enjoy it.
It requires intensive micro but yes I do enjoy MOUT. Sight/fire lines, suppression, smoke, flanking, breaching; proper application makes all the difference. .50 is king, at very close range the 7.62x39 AK cartridge does better in house2house fighting than the 5.56.
Bringing AFVs inside also brings new dynamics; autocannon or 120/125mm HE does a good job of house clearing, but become extra vulnerable to handheld AT weapons.
All in all, I like it but yes it can be 'tedious' or feel like 'work'. -
4 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
Those could have been some daring scouts with fire under their buts
Agreed, but someone/something else might have done the deed. I'd like to believe some of the vehicles from those piles can be recovered and I'm sure they'll do it if possible; I'm not assuming they are now recovered because there were no pictures of their demise. There are also no pictures of their recovery yet.
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47 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
The Tokmak axis is expanding according to the Ukrainians:
Now the infamous Bradley pile is on the Ukrainian side of the line. We have not seen Russians releasing photos where they destroy the abandoned equipment (only a couple singles). I presume most of the equipment is now on the Ukrainian side of the line and being recovered.
There was some footage of Ru soldiers close to one pile of Bradleys, I'd normally expect those to be destroyed by now but maybe the Russians couldn't be bothered about it? Let's see.
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45 minutes ago, dan/california said:
This whole war happened because of unclear communication, and Putin thought he could get away with it. The red line around that nuke plant needs to be visible from nearby star systems.
AFAIK USA already made clear what would be the consequences if Russia went nuclear/chemical/biological weapon. Apart from those being 'dire', there was no further information released to the public.
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1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:
A classic example of Russian "doublethink" in action.
"Doublethink is a process of indoctrination in which subjects are expected to simultaneously accept two conflicting beliefs as truth, often at odds with their own memory or sense of reality.[1] Doublethink is related to, but differs from, hypocrisy. "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doublethink
George Orwell might have understood this sort of thing better than any academic thinker on the planet. And he did it in the 1940s, without the benefit of decades of Cold War examples to draw from.
Steve
He did have some close encounters with the Soviet apparatchik and their influence in '39 in Spain though.
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Russia can has lots of artillery and even have (local) artillery dominance in number of barrels/shells fired while still sucking 'at it' comparatively / relatively.
That doesn't mean all their fires will be effective or ineffective.
One observation one could make imo is that Russia could have made much more effective military use of their artillery /indirect capabilities since the start of the war, while Ukraine seems to have been achieving a lot with little (at first at least) and thus are showcasing a better bang for their buck.
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On 6/10/2023 at 11:17 PM, slysniper said:
a good point, it has been awhile since I have been in the scenario. I recall setup being pretty safe with a expectation that the Americans were going to be on the move from the get go, but you are correct that they can move right into firing area on that first turn. And there might be a portion in the set up area that could be spotted also.
I think it was the best scenario adapted for mirrored tournament so far :). Both scoring wise, no reinforcment inside LOS wise and both sides having several options as how to deal with the challenge wise.
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13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
ISW's June 12th report gives some high level information about the Russian counter attack to retake Makarivka:
I am not inclined to disbelieve something based on nothing but faith, but I am willing to do it based on past history.
The Russians have shown no aptitude for attacking, not to mention counter attacking, since this war started. Their successes after restarting their offensive in the Spring 2022 were limited and mostly due to obliterating Ukrainian positions with artillery. Even then it was a slow process.
For the last 6+ months we have seen Russia make some limited tactical gains, a little here and a little there, but only after extensive fighting for the same ground. In the case of Bakhmut, generally with massive casualties. There's been very few examples of a coordinated attack, even on light defenses, that has gone favorably for Russia. Attacks have also generally, nearly always in fact, been very small scale with minimal coordination with other arms or supporting units.
Now all of a sudden we're supposed to believe that Russia is capable of mounting a large scale counter attack right into the teeth of fresh, well armed Ukrainian forces in the beginning of a major counter offensive? These Ukrainian forces are not being supported by a single 120mm mortar with 10 rounds for the day like some of the TD units Russia could barely make a dent in.
So what I'm thinking here is that Russia's counter attack got the stuffing knocked out of it and that, not the weather, is why they didn't secure their objective.
And even if Russia takes back a village from Ukrainian forces, it's going to be like the 6th SS Panzer Army taking a Hungarian village in the Spring of 1945. Not really a game changer.
I'll happily revise my thinking of Russian offensive capabilities when I have solid proof that they are doing something militarily significant.
Steve
What we, at least imo, also should expect to see (and or are seeing) is Ukraine 'learning' to do large scales mech offensives against well prepared positions. All the talking heads have been saying 'we' for a large part have lost that capability since the 90s. Ukraine are humans like all the rest of us, so it won't be 'easy' for them either.
Ukraine's forces have much more experience with defense / counterstrokes compared to large offensive operations. And AFAIK they are now trying 'new things', as in large scale mech offensives the NATO way more or less. Apart from whether the doctrine is suboptimal/aged or not and the consequences resulting from the absence of dominating air support; it is normal if a couple of attacks fail because of 'mistakes', difficulties arising from coordination / whatever; the road from textbook to practice isn't smooth usually.Also In CM coordination between forces is key for battlefield success. The 'learning curve' to properly coordinate stuff using the CM system is steep but rewarding, especially in H2H play. I have probably lost a good number of brigades worth of AFVs, not to mention troops, while playing CMs since 2007.
I have also played battles in which I suffered ugly casualties at first but came back with a major victory in the end.
The one thing we could perhaps learn from Russia is 'loss resilience'; in war the things in play are human lives (unfortunately) and military hardware, so we better have a stomach for taking losses (or shouldn't play at the table).The worry would be if Ukraine doesn't learn, but so far they seem to be much better at that compared to the Russians so I'm feeling optimistic about limited successes for Ukraine.
So far no sign of really collapsing Russian lines though, I still hope to see those but let's see
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5 minutes ago, Chibot Mk IX said:
Just wondering why the right column take a zig-zag route, and turning in front of enemy line.
Any possible explanation on this?
My Guess: Using the treeline as the concealment, and later, after suffering casualty, trying to turn to center and regroup/combine with the friendly force there?
I guess only the driver will know why.
Maybe he was trying to dodge arty fire or had consumed a bit too much of 'spirit enhancing' vodka to suppress nerves ;-). -
29 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:
I highly recommend looking at this Wolski's reconstruction of events, regardless of various quirks of his reporting here he made a very good job comparing data and geolocating. They seem to find traces of 2nd and 3rd column, too. Hard battles were there, undoubtedly.
I found it too and thought it was well analyzed / prepared.
Efficiency of artillery on AFV´s, and tanks in the war.
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
It was already confirmed that artillery effects on armor will be changed (to be more 'deadly').