Hortlund

Bah, all I'm doing right now is writing small essays on this forum on the battle of Kursk while waiting for you to send me the next turn.

Grisha, sorry for not replying sooner to this post. I wanted to check some details before writing my reply, and it turned out I had to modify one of my theories a bit...you learn something every day. That is really what is so great with discussions like these. Yes, if we are to drift a bit from the subject at hand, my personal opinion is that this is one of the key factors in Soviet operational doctrin/thinking (the other one being achieving complete [almost rediculous] superiority in firepower and numbers at the schwerpunkt). The ability to move your units without being detected, and the ability to pinpoint the exact location of your opponents troops is extremely important in any battle, and since the soviets were so good at this, while the Germans were oh so bad at this, it gives the soviets a very clear and definite advantage in any operation, especially when on the offensive. If you look at soviet operations plans, I think it is a correct description to say that they are rudimentary "attack here on this axis, once you reach this point exploitation units will take over the advance". What made them so lethal during the last two years of the war was the combination of intel advantage mentioned above, and the successful concentration of forces and firepower at the breakthrough point. This meant that any soviet offensive was pretty much guaranteed to achieve a breakthrough of the German defensive lines, and when you take the general German lack of reserves into calculation, it is no wonder that the soviet breakthroughs became so big/successful. I'm still maintaining however, that if the soviet offensive would get bogged down in the initial stages, or if something unexpected would happen, the soviets were generally not able to react to that situation properly. Two examples of this: Zhukov at Seelowe, and the entire offensive operation at Targul Frumos. This is where the difference in small unit tactics and initiative among the lower ranks come in to play, and my position is that on that level, the Germans outshined the Soviets from 41 to 45. If you take the southern pincer as an example, the soviets had 6-7 layers of defensive lines in a depth of up to 50 kms. The soviets knew about the German jump off points, and the knew about the axis of attack before the German offensive started. Not well enough in advance to be able to constuct their fortifications accordingly, but they knew before the German attack started (information about jump off point and day 1 objectives were extracted from German prisoners on the night between 4th-5th). When these lines would not contain the southern attack, I think we can see signs of panic among the soviet commanders. Example: On the night between 11th and 12th, III Pz Corps managed to break through the Soviet defensive lines and advanced 11 km along the Donets, and managed to establish a bridgehead on the western banks of the river. At this point in time, the II SS Pz Corps is standing N of the Psel and S-SW of Prokhorovka. That means that between II SS Pz and III Pz 69th Soviet army is occupying an area extending south like a wedge into the German lines. Here the 69th army is close to being surrounded. As a result, Rotmistrov is ordered to split his tank army and hit both II SS Pz at Prokhorovka and 6th Pz div:s bridgehead on the Donets. The result is horrible for the Soviets with both counterattacks being beaten back with heavy casualties. Well, I'm not sure if the heavy companies were that much larger, but then again, since we are talking about the Tigers, I'll give you that. An interesting number I came across right now reading up on the battle to write this post is that on July 4th, LAH and DR had 298 Panzers and StuGs combined. That means that both these divisions were far from full strenght at the start of Zitadelle. Here we are coming into the what if part. I suppose my line of reasoning goes something like this. If we begin by looking at what happened to 5th Guards Tank army after its failed counterattack at Prokhorovka, we can see that this unit lost pretty much all of its combat strength that day. It would take a long time before it became an effective unit again. Suppose Manstein switches axis and attacks towards Obojan. Facing him is parts of 1st Tank army and 6th Gds army. Both these units are spent, they have suffered heavy losses in the battles so far. Lets assume for arguments sake that Manstein punches through them and reach Obojan. Here the soviets have two options. Either pull out from the southwestern parts of the bulge to avoid encirclement of 40th and 38th army. OR pull another unit from the reserves and do another counterattack. But the problem now is that the main reserve unit is spent (5th Gds Tank and 5th Gds), at the same time, the northern reserve unit 2nd Tank army has also suffered heavy during its counterattacks on the northern flank. Whats left really is 53rd army east of Kursk or 47th army east of Belgorod. But if these units are committed, then the ability for the Soviets to wage any offensive operations in the south is severely weakened. If the Soviets would have launched another counteroffensive, and if that counteroffensive had failed like the one at Prokhorovka, then I am seriously doubting we would have seen any Soviet autumn/winter offensive in the south. And even if we did, I'm seriously doubting that it would have had any serious success at all. That is what Im aiming at. Yes, but dont you see that that is exactly what the Germans were after when they launched Zitadelle in the first place. This was no "lets advance to Moscow" type offensive. This was a desperate attempt to lock the front. By attacking and defeating the soviets at Kursk, the Germans hoped to eliminate the risk of a Soviet autumn/winter offensive and at the same time shorten the front to free units for the west. A stalemate was what they wanted. This is what Im talking about when I say that I see a possibility for the Germans to snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat.

If you are unable to see any interesting what if situation on the southern pincer before the offensive was called off, I suppose we just see things differently. I must admit that I dont really understand your point of view though, because in my opinion, every battle, operation or offensive have hundreds of possible and interesting what if situations during the cource of that battle, operation or offensive. "What would have happened if 6th army had attempted to breakout from Stalingrad? What would the effects have been for 6th army but more importanty, for the German units in the Kaukasus?" Personally I find questions like that interesting and intriguing. Apparently you are of a different opinon. Fine, in the future, I will try not to discuss any what if situation with you then. I find your statement "Kursk offensive was supposed to be a blitz, it just didnt happen" interesting though. When you say that, do you mean that the entire offensive, Zitadelle, was envisioned as a blitzkrieg offensive? And if so, then what are your sources for that statement? Model on the northern pincer tried to use infantry divisions to pierce a hole in the Soviet defensive lines, and his intention was to reinforce that breakthrough with his panzer divisions. That is the direct opposite to the "normal" blitzkrieg-schwerpunkt tactic the Germans had used previously. Is it your opinion that the Germans had modified their view on blitzkrieg by 1943? Same in the south. III Pz Corps had a bridgehead on the Donets at Michailovka where 168th infantry division was located. Breith (CO III Pz Corps) intended to use 168th infantry to punch a hole through the Soviet defences, and then send in 6th Pz division to exploit that gap. Again, the exact opposite of blitzkrieg. What we are seeing here is two German commanders attempting to use the soviet breakthrough method. In both locations the tactic failed though. Model only achieved a break in in the soviet lines after he committed panzers to reinforce the infantry divisions. And 168th infantry was repulsed by the soviets, forcing 7th and 19th Pz divisions to make forced crossings of the Donets. Nevertheless, in the south the first day of the offensive was successful. By nightfall II SS Pz Corps had penetrated the first Soviet line of defence and had made contact with the second line. The day saw II SS advance 8 kilometers. Day two the advance continued, and by dusk on July 6th, LAH and DR had advanced some 30 kilometers. The only reason Im bringing this up is because I want to know what your opinion is about this rate of advance. That is a 30 kilometer penetration in 36 hours against a numerically superior enemy in heavily entrenched positions, behind extensive belts of minefields. Not only that, the soviets knew the exact time of the German attack (thanks to taking prisoners during the night between 4th-5th, pioneers clearing mines), and most of the attacking units were hit by a preemptive artillery strike from the soviets as they were moving towards the assembly areas. In the south, the German attack plan called for 4 corps advancing line abreast. You had 48th Pz Corps to the left, then II SS Pz, then III Pz, and then Corps Raus. These four corps were to steadily move forwards, pushing all opposition aside in the process like a gigant ice-breaker. Now I ask you, IF the Germans had envisioned a blitzkrieg type of attack, then why did they use their panzer divisions this way? If they wanted a blitz-type offensive, then why did they not use one of the pz corps to punch a hole, and then have the other two pour through to exploit? I can tell you why. Because they knew that they were facing 6-7 layers of defensive belts. You cannot blitz defenses like that, that is why they didnt try. The only feasable way to break through such a defensive line is to do it slowly and methodically, like they did. But if you feel I am somehow misstaken here, it would be very interesting to hear your arguments. [ January 05, 2003, 01:24 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

Since I feel this is directed at me... Seriously, have you seen anyone in this thread argue that Zitadelle was a German success? I thought we were talking about the reasons why the offensive failed to achieve its objectives. That and some (in my opinion) interesting what ifs.

The sad story of the white T-34 The story so far. A German PzVIB has been terrorising the soviets, killing something like 5 T-34s and KV-1s. One of MGs few remaining tanks tries to hide behind a building. Little did MG know however that a German SiG33 was covering that particular building in case any soviet infantry would be foolish enough to try to enter the village. Here we can witness the effects of a 155mm HC round on T-34 and surrounding realestate, Boris the farmer who owned the fine villa was not so pleased however... Lessons for today, 1) beware of big bad SP guns if you are a soviet tanker. 2) dont stay indoors if the war comes to your little house.

Very interesting source! How did you get your hands on that one? Is it in English or German? I have been looking for something like that for SSDR (What Im using now is Otto Weidingers "Division Das Reich" combat diary, its in German and my German is not what it should be ) ---- *edit. Opps, just saw that the source I was talking about was something footnoted in that Soldiers of destruction book, sorry. --- ANYWAY, over to your question. I'm sure all of the SS divisions were in "not-100% condition" by July 15th. Das Reich for example had been more or less constantly in battle since early January (parts of DF) with short periods of rest and refit. As for Totenkopf, that division had bore the brunt of the fighting during the latter half of Zitadelle, and the division took heavy casualties when crossing the Psel. I am not saying that these divisions were as good as new or anything like that. I have no doubt whatsoever though that they would have been able to continue the offensive had they been ordered to. You have to remember the track record of these divisions. During 41 and early 42 they practically blead themselves to death either on the offensive towards Moscow (DR) or on the defensive during the soviet winter offensive (T and DR). If you look at the casualty figures for DR for example during the defensive battles of Jan-Feb 42 it is amazing that the division survived at all actually. 11 Reg was disbanded to stengthen D and DF, and during the defensive battles of Rzhev, DF was reduced to 80something men. They never ceased to function though, and in the end DF was the regiment that held the line that saved 9th army. If you look at T in the Demyansk pocket, you will find a similar story. Why bring that up? It gives an indication on what kind of punishment these divisions would take and still be able to get the job done. At dusk on July 14th SST halts its push to the NE. During the 13th, the division was hit from the north by 24th Gds tank bde, 10th Gds Mech bde and units from 5th Gds army. In order to counter those attacks the Germans had to take units from its "attack group" (Consisting primarely of Pz Companies together with the SPW Battalion) and shift them north. This led to a weakening of the "tip of the spear", and on the 14th it was decided that the push NE should be dropped in favour of Mansteins axis shift N. That axis shift did not mean that the divisions would just turn north and attack that way, instead II SS Pz were to regroup some miles to the west while units from III Pz Corps took over the positions around Prokhorovka. Anyway, Im drifting from the subject again. The reason SST spent "several weeks" resting and refitting after the 15th is because SST was taken from the frontline and put in reserve on that day. If the attack had continued, they would have kept going with what they had, if they were in worse condition than anyone else, they would presumably get "light" duty, like flank protection. Personally I see no reason to doubt their ability to continue the offensive though. [ January 04, 2003, 04:24 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

realistic scale, normal tree density. I want the game to look realistic. For a while I tried playing with unit bases off, but after a while I realized that was a bad idea since I kept forgetting about half my force all the time. I have seen screenshots from guys who play with +5 (or whatever the max is) scale and no trees etc...looks very very silly with huge huge tanks and gigantic men that could swallow the houses wandering around on a naked map. But to each his own I suppose.

Well, first you have to take into account that the SS divisions did not start Zitadelle at full strenght, otherwise those numbers will be misleading. Then you have to remember the nature of the fighting on the southern pincer. You cannot hold Zitadelle up to blitzkrieg standards and compare the two. The Germans were attacking while tactically outnumbered more than 2-1 against a heavily entrenched enemy who on top of everyhting knew exactly when and where the attack would come. When II SS Pz Corps were moving to the jump off points during the pre dawn hours on July 5th, they were hit by a Soviet barrage...that tells us something on how good the Soviet intel was, and it should give a clue as to how desperate the Germans must have felt. Frankly, to me it is surprising that the Germans made any progress whatsoever. The northern pincer gives an image of what you should expect when attacking under such conditions. Nevertheless, the southern pincer managed to make some excellent progress under these conditions. Anyway, if we jump to July 15th we have a very interesting situation on the southern pincer. I disagree that it was fragmented. Because as I was saying earlier, during the 13th-15th, SSDR and 7th Pz managed to link up almost capturing 69th Army in the process. This linkup consolidates and shortens the German front enormously, now army detatchment Kempf can cover the right flank of II SS Pz Corps all the way to S Prokhorovka. Meanwhile ever since the failed counterattack on the 12th, the Soviets have been reinforcing Prokhorovka and the area NE of SST (SST is roughly directly west of Prokhorovka, but if they want to get there they would have to cross the Psel again). This is when Manstein decides to shift the axis of attack. Now say what you will about the Soviet abilities on the operational level, and I might be inclined to agree that generally the Soviets had the Germans licked on the operational level in 44 and 45 (we might disagree on the reasons why though), but Manstein was probably the most able operational level leader Germany had during the war. And on the operational level he was a really tough opponent for the Soviets. And he succeded many times to turn seemingly hopeless situations into brilliant victories (2nd and 3rd Kharkov would be two examples of this) This axis shifting is something that the Germans were good at, and at the same time it was something the soviets always had problems with countering. I suspect the general quality of lower level officers and general initiative ability comes into play here. At the same time, Soviet operations rarely included such axis shifts in case they were becoming bogged down. Drifting a bit from the subject here I see, back to July 15th. If Manstein had shifted the axis of attack N and at the same time committed his reserves, July 16th-17th would have seen a force of two panzer corps (possibly more if Manstein had chosen to commit 48th Pz corps too) hitting north towards Obojan. The II SS Pz Corps had suffered casualties in the offensive so far, but they were far from spent (something that the battles following Zitadelle shows if nothing else). And they would be reinforced by two divisions from 24th Pz Corps (Wiking and 17th Panzer). Against these units the soviets only had two spent units who had suffered severe losses in the previous fighting, 5th Guards Army and 1st Tank Army. This situation, where the Soviets have spent/are spending their last reserves "in the wrong place", and where the Germans seem to have identified the key moment to commit the panzer reserve is a very interesting one. And I for one am far from sure that the Soviets would have been able to halt that attack before Obojan. And once passed Obojan, the Germans would actually have broken through all the Soviet defensive lines. From there, anything could happen. I know many think that reaching Obojan would mean little in "the big picture" or they stare themselves blind at comparative numbers of the forces involved. But those same people might fail to realize that warfare is as much about psychology as it is about hardware and numbers. The two failed Kharkov offensives all ended with numerically inferior German forces encircling and destroying superior Soviet forces. Lets just say that the situation on July 15th is far from decided, and if the offensive had been allowed to continue the Germans might very well have been able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. [ January 03, 2003, 08:16 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

I dont think anyone is arguing that Zitadelle was a German victory. Zitadelle should not be held up as an example of how the Soviets managed to defeat a German blitzkrieg offensive though.

Yes, I was going by Hortlunds first law of combat #1 An enemy tank or SP gun that fits inside the gun barrel of your tank or SP gun should not pose any threat to own tank or SP gun's front armor. Apparently I have to re-write that one some day. What was that anyway? It looked like a Marder III from my end. [ January 03, 2003, 06:21 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

muahahaha I see he opened the latest film in our battle and discovered yet another T-34 shot to bits by my brave Tigers. Now he only have one KV2 left (hiding somewhere presumably thinking he can flank me) and one T-34 (desperately moving around trying to avoid getting into LOS from one of my Tigers)...oh and some pathetic scattered remnants of ski infantry hiding in the woods trying to hide their skis so they wont have to advance any furhter...and little do they know I have a SP 150mm zeroing in on them. AAAHAAHAHahahahaahahahaHAHAHAHAAHHAHAhahahahahahAHHAHAha.. AHAHAHahahahaaHahahahahaha...hahahahaaHAHAHAhahahahaha hahahaahahahahaHAHAHAHahaha...AHHAAHAHAhahaHAAHAH hrm carry on

Because they didnt survive long enough? Compare if you will individual probability of survival in a T-34 and in a PzVIB. Anyway, that is not what we are discussing now (but we can if you want). You are indeed correct, the Soviets excelled at deception, intelligence and counterintelligence. These are operational level considerations. And they were indeed very good on the operational level. On the tactical level they pretty much relied on superior numbers and/or superior firepower. The Tiger. You just have more of the inferior tank. How did this turn into a "pros and cons of the Tiger tank" discussion? Lets just say that tank vs tank mattered alot on the tactical level, and not very much on the strategical level and leave it at that. Everyone knows what tank is good and what tank is bad. No new lessons learned on the German side from 1941 to 1945? What kind of memoirs do you read anyway? [ January 03, 2003, 01:24 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

Mr Einstein I presume?

Of cource not. But I dont attribute some mythical skills of war at the operational level to them either. For some reason, many people seem to be almost idolizing the Soviets during 44-45. I suppose this is a counterreaction to the mindeless horde-image that was prevailing after the war, but the current image is equally one sided and wrong.

The reason II SS Pz Corps comes up in any discussion about Kursk is because the southern pincer was the only one making any real progress. The unit leading that progress was II SS Pz Corps. That has got nothing to do with any wishful thinking on my part at least. WW2 ended 60 years ago.

Again, you are drawing conclusions that just isnt based on the facts. You are using hindsight to motivate Soviet desicions. "Oh but there were a counterattack on Dec 6th just outside Moscow, and that counterattack lead to the front line being pushed several miles to the west. Therefore, the soviets were just waiting for the Germans to overextend themselves before they struck." Suggestions like that gives the reader the impression that this was all parts of some Soviet master plan...first to lure the Germans to attack and exhaust themselves, and then to attack. This is not how it was in reality. The counterattacks outside Moscow were desperate attacks to push back the Germans. But they were not deliberately planned any more than "attack west". Then you had the Soviet offensive to encircle AG center which was very much planned. That one ended in an abysmal faliure though, with most of the Soviet units surrounded and eliminated. As for Stalingrad, the main Soviet winter offensive in 1942/43 was directed at AG center. But since that one too failed miserabley, and the offensive directed at 6th army in Stalingrad succeded better, not many people know that. Anyway, the Soviets did not lure the Germans to Stalingrad so they could surround them and defeat them. The situation simply arised when it was clear that Stalingrad would not be captured in days, like Rostov, or weeks like Voronezh. Suddenly the Soviets realized they had a golden opportunity to strike at an overextended foe, and they grabbed that opportunity, but it was not something they originally planned. I find it utterly pointless to argue over semantics here. The fact remains, Zitadelle was aborted by Hitler. When Zitadelle was aborted, II SS Pz were still advancing. Well, lets see shall we...could be interesting. Lets take a look at what really happened around Prokhorovka. July 12th At dawn on July 12th, 5th Guards tank army under Rotmistrov has over 800 tanks and SP guns. Roughly half of these belongs to 18th and 29th Tank Corps who attack LAH positions at 0830. LAH has roughly 80 tanks in the lines. At the same time 2nd Guards Tank corps attack DR to the south of LAH, and further to the south east Group Trufanov with 150 tanks (units from 26th Guards tank Brigade from 2nd GT Corps, 11&12th Guards mech brigades from 5th Guards mech Corps) attacks 6th Panzer division. Casualties: II SS Pz Corps reports 850 casualties, where 522 is from LAH and DR. LAH claims 192 Soviet tanks knocked out or captured. Soviets reports losing 300 tanks and 5 500 men. 48th Pz Corps was in the process of regrouping on the left flank of II SS Pz Corps. A Soviet counterattack led by 184th Rifle division was beaten back with heavy soviet casualties. Germans report 500 men and two tanks lost. Soviet casualties 4 700 men, 30 tanks. Army Detatchment Kempf was in the process of consolidating a bridgehead on the Donets near Rzjavets on the right flank of II SS Pz Corps when Group Trefanov (mentioned above) attacked. German casualties 600 men, 2 tanks. Soviet casualties 7 400 men, 16 tanks. Combined, the soviet losses on the whole southern flank on July 12th were at least 21 000 men and 334 tanks and SP guns. Note that these are the total write offs, i e the ones that are either captured or burned out, the rest are not counted. Using normal knocked out-burned out ratios, it becomes very clear that the soviet tank losses on July 12th were appaling. The Germans on the southern flank lost 5 500 men and 25 tanks and StuGs (total write offs). In these counterattacks, the Soviets failed to gain any ground in. SST continues to advance NE from their position north of the Psel. July 13th. North of the Psel, SST is continuing its advance north, effectively outflanking 5th Guards tank army. On the 13th, 24th guards tank brigade, 10th guards mech brigade and units from 5th guards army are regrouped to a line NE of SST to halt that advance. SST spends the 13th fending off various Soviet counterattacks. Meanwhile, SSDR attacks east to link up with 7th Pz division attacking west from Army detatchment Kempf. Between the two units, the Soviet 69th army is holding a wedge-like position extending south. This attack continues over the 14th, and on the 15th of July SSDR and 7th Pz link up. 69th Army has withdrawn from its positions though, so no pocket is formed. THIS is the interesting point in the battle. Right here the Soviets are reinforcing their positions in and around Prokhorovka. The link up between SSDR and 7th Pz had secured the German right flank. Manstein decides to shift the axis of attack from NE to N towards Obojan. Manstein can use II SS Pz Corps together with the completely fresh 24th Pz Corps taken from army reserve to attack north against 1st Tank army and 6th guards army, both these soviet units are spent after heavy fighting. 24th Pz Corps consists of SS Wiking and 17th Pz division. This is where it would have become interesting. But as SST is regrouping from the north side of the Psel to shift focus north, Zitadelle is called off. On the 4th of July the soviet forces facing the southern pincer numbered 625 000 men and 1 700 tanks. During the battle these forces were reinforced with an additional 300 000 men and 1 200 tanks. The German forces on the southern pincer numbered 330 000 men and 1 500 tanks. So you have a situation where a numerically inferior attacker is attacking a heavily entrenched opponent, who is prepared and waiting. And that defender is inable to halt the advance. I disagree. In fact, I have no idea how you reach the conclusion that the movement or non-movement of II SS Pz Corps is irrelevant. I do not know where you get the idea that it could achieve anything more than a local gain. You have to base your statement on something more than just your word.

Yes, they are magic.

But the point is flawed. I'll just say this about your statement on Waffen SS. Maybe the 25% figure is correct, Im not sure. But from reading your post one gets the impression that the Waffen SS divisions had a core of Germans and a number of "expendable" voulonteers. That is wrong. The "classical" Waffen SS divsions, LAH, DR, T (and later H, F and HJ) had a vast majority of Germans, with some individual men coming from other western european nations. Then there were Western european divisions, primarely Wiking and later Nordland, Nederland, Charlemange and Wallonien these divisions had men from scandinavia and Benelux mostly. Then you had the other divisions like for example 14, 15, 19, 20, 29, 30, these divisions were specifically manned with people from the east. 29 and 30 with Russians, 15 and 19 latvians, 14th Ukranians etc. I suppose if you add all the numbers of foreign volounteers together, and then calculate how many were from the east, that 25% figure might be accurate, but as I said, the way you present it is misleading. And these divisions that I mentioned now were used as "normal" divsions, not some cannon fodder. While the whermacht made plentiful use of hiwis from the east, I dont think that even them put the hiwis in the front line. I know it happened, but I dont think it happened on the scale you are suggesting. [ January 03, 2003, 08:26 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

So now Kursk is the first step on the road to Berlin? You know, I am always fascinated by people who want to draw conclusions like that. Personally I find them a bit far fetched. As I said, if you want to lable Kursk a failed German operation, then go ahead, but it is wrong to lable it as such, just as it would be wrong to lable Fall Blau a successful German operation (it was a strategic offensive). Kursk was a strategic offensive, nothing else. It doesnt really matter whether you want to call it strategic or operational though, Germany still lost the war...right. While I agree that you might say that the Soviets suffered a tactical defeat against II SS Pz, I do not agree to the conclusion that Kursk was somehow all a part of a successful Soviet offensive operation. As you say, Zitadelle was followed by a series of successful Soviet operations. That is not the same thing to say as "zitadelle was the first step in a successful soviet operation". You are attributing insights and capabilities to the Soviets that they did not have. Zitadelle failed for one reason; it was called off. There are two reasons why it was called off, the inability of the northern pincer to gain ground, and the allied landings in Italy. Have you ever heard me argue that Zitadelle was a German success? Are you a politician by any chance? Let me ask you this then: Was the southern pincer (or rather II SS Pz) still advancing when the offensive was called off? And as I said, the hypotethical "what if" questions are interesting, but at the end of the day they are just that...hypothetical what if discussions. You have no possible way of knowing what would have happened on that southern pincer if the offensive had been allowed to continue. If you want we can go into a long discussion about our various hypothesis about what would have happened, but I object to statements such as "without hope for real success". Military history is filled with examples of units achieving their objectives despite horrible odds stacked against them.

Does anyone of you retards want to play Royal opponent against me? (I'll be the Krauts naturally).

Do you know the reason behind the Kursk offensive? It was not "lets surround the Soviets at Kursk and then march on to Moscow" the offensive had a completely different motivation. The Germans (I never know whether to say "Hitler" or "the Germans"...I think Im going to go with "the Germans") wanted to encircle the Soviets at Kursk and destroy them for two reasons. 1) Shorten and stabilize the front, 2) Remove large portion of Soviet attack capability. Both these measures are defensive in nature. The Germans knew that the Allies were coming in the west, and that soon troops would have to be shifted from the east to the west. Meanwhile, the front had stabilized after Stalingrad, and thanks to IISS at Kharkov, the situation was not really as desperate in the south as it might have been. In the summer of 43, everything was pretty much balanced...even. If Kursk had succeded, the Germans would have a quiet autumn and maybe even winter on the eastern front, this period could be spent fortifying the lines ala AG Center did in 42 (and they would later defeat Zhukovs offensive outside Moscow thanks to these preparations), a strategic reserve could be built up, and preparations could be made to meet the allies in the west. The alternative would be to defend the front as it looked in spring of 43. Taking a look at the relative numbers and the nature of the frontline, it is quite clear that any such attempt would simply lead to numerous situations compareable to the crisis at/after Stalingrad. But more importantly, that would mean surrendering the initiative to the Soviets. The strategic reasoning behind the Kursk offensive was sound. It all depended on that successful offensive though. When the offensive failed, the front crumbled. It did not collapse however, but the Germans were steadily pushed back.

instead what we see is a slow but steady advance led by II SS. No, not similar at all. If you want to make a comparrisson with the Somme battles, you would have british troops advancing well past the German defensive lines every day inflicting something like 7-1 casualties on the Germans in the process. I suggest you take a look at the combat losses for II SS during Zitadelle. And (try to) compare them to the (still classified) Soviet losses. [ January 03, 2003, 06:05 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

The key phrase here must be and elsewhere otherwise I cannot get that sentence to match Zetterlings book. Because if you compare the Soviet losses to II SS Pz losses the difference is enormous. Especially for the July 12th battles around Prokhorovka. I dont have the book here right now, but if I remember correctly Zetterlin/Franksson argues that for example LAH lost something like 5-10 tanks on July 12th. Well, I dont really want to dispute Glanz, since many people hold him like the authority figure on eastern front history. BUT having said that, it is my opinion that your answer will depend on the question you ask. If you want to define victory/defeat on the operational level, you will undoubtedly reach that answer. Personally I think that is the wrong level to judge the outcome at Kursk. Would you agree with this statement: The southern pincer was not halted by enemy resistance before the offensive was called off? As for the previously unidentified units. Sure, but you also had an SS Pz Corps just SW of Prokhorovka, and by now they had better contact with the units on their flanks. I think it is an interesting question "what would have happened if the offensive had been allowed to continue", but I fear that question can never be answered. As I said, I agree that the Kursk offensive failed. It was a strategic offensive that failed due to the inability of the northern pincer to meet any of its objectives. The offensive was cancelled due to strategic considerations (Sicily). But the advance on the southern pincer was never stopped by enemy resistance, therefore I think it is wrong to hold up Kursk as an example on how the blitzkrieg failed. Frankly, I dont think Kursk has anything to do with Bitzkrieg at all, since there is no German attempt att "blitzing" or how you want to put it. Manstein knew he could not blitz those defenses, instead what we see is a slow but steady advance led by II SS. [ January 03, 2003, 05:43 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

Im not arguing that the Germans won at Kursk, that would be as pointless as arguing that the Germans (somehow) won ww2. Interesting question you raise about II SS Panzer (corps) however. I suppose it is because Kursk primarely is known for the tank battle outside Prokhorovka, and the only German unit involved in that one is II SS Panzer Corps. Another reason why it might be valuable to take a closer look at the results of the southern pincer is because many hold up Kursk as the definitive end to the Blitzkrieg. That the Soviets had managed to contain and control a dedicated blitzkrieg-type offensive. The truth might be more complex than that.

If one looks at the combat returns reports for II SS Pz Corps during the battle, a very interesting kill/loss ratio emerges. Have you read Franklin and Zetterlings book on Kursk? It is a controversial topic though, for some reason I dont really understand, many people want to keep the old image of a German defeat at Kursk. Now when they cant use the combat losses as an argument, they have chosen to include Kursk in some "larger operational plan" masterminded by the Soviets. Therefore the battle at Kursk was a Soviet victory despite the horrible losses because after the battle the Soviets managed to launch several counteroffensives and push the Germans out of the Ukraine... Anyway as I said, the topic is very controversial still.