Hortlund

Apart from an article on gunnery in "Panzer Elite", can you point us to a source that says US tank sights were "very poor"? All the best, John.</font>

Looking at the raw numbers the T-34/85 had more armor at "better" angles from side and rear. (Comparing to M4a2). Same goes for turret front. The only place the Sherman has better armor is hull front really, but there the T-34 has better slope (depending on exactly where you look though). But I still dont get it. The M4a2 was notorious for its tendancy to brew up. This was improved when the americans started with the wet stowage system. Are you guys saying that the T-34/85 had similar brew up-problems but those never changed? As for the optics. I have no doubt that the quality of the US optics were good, I was just surprised that the Russians thought they were better than theirs. To my knowledge, US sights were...well...bad.

These two puzzled me. I can understand the faster turret, but better sights? US tank sights were very poor, making shots over 800 yards extremely difficult at best (if I remember correctly this had alot to do with the difficulty of estimating range to target through a US sight). Were the soviet optics really that crappy? Better protected ammunition storage? Better protected than the T-34/85? Either the Russians were talking about wet stowage Shermans or they were talking about T-34/85 who must have carried their ammo on the outside of the tank. I simply dont understand that comment. The Sherman was notorious for its poor survivability if hit. The T-34/85 on the other hand have very good armor protection. What am I missing here?

To each his own...

Nah, I doubt it. The red lines seems to be very consistent with the pre war borders of the time (with the notable exception of Ukraine and Beloirussia as mentioned above). If they were rail lines the logical thing would be to see Berlin and Moscow as great hubs.

Returning to the map... What are those borders supposed to represent? (The tiny red lines I mean). My first guess would be "borders", but then I saw that (what must be) Belorussia and Ukraine had borders too. So I became confused. Why present Ukraine and Belorussia as "countries" or "nations"? In a map from 1941-45 I mean. [ September 10, 2002, 09:15 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

Wow... This is the first I have heard about such problems for the APCR rounds. You learn something new every day I'm assuming that you are talking about the 50mm version of the pzgr 40 here? Do you know if this problem was limited to the 50mm version of the Pzgr 40, or if the 37mm and 75mm versions had the same problems? [ September 06, 2002, 05:14 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

Hey Grisha, nice to see a familiar face around here. I've always been a ground pounder first, my odyssey in Aches High had more to do with the lack of new tactical ww2 games at the time. (Im primarily a spwaw-addict by the way). And there is something about the eastern front that has always fascinated me…long and semi-philosophical rant could follow here, but I think I'll spare you Regarding the Red Army. I think it would be wrong to talk about "the red army in world war two", since the difference between the early red army (1939-1942/43) and the late army (1943-1945) is enormous. You talk about the Soviet operational art of war. And I must agree that this is an area where the Soviets were brilliant. I disagree that the Russians were the only ones who mastered this concept though, since I am of the opinion that the Germans too had more than a rudimentary understanding of the concept. I would hold the Soviets first, followed by the Germans, and then a huge gap down to the rest of the combatants in ww2. I would like to talk about an aspect of this that might explain a lot about the apparent discrepancy between German first hand accounts and post-war research. One of the key factors in all successful soviet operations were the combination of undetected concentration of forces in a narrow area of the front, followed by an attack on the German positions. The undetected concentration of forces led to a huge numerical superiority for the Russians in that small sector of the front. But that does not translate to a huge numerical superiority for the Russians in the entire sector, or entire front. So while the statistics show that in various periods of time, the total Soviet numerical superiority was as low as 1.5-1 or 2-1 on the whole front, the numerical superiority at the point of attack could be as high as 10 or 20-1 in infantry and 10-1 in tanks. I think the above has alot to do with German soldiers (or Generals) telling stories about masses of men and tanks charging across no mans land.

Nice to see you too My first set of posts were about the soviet 122mm APBC round and its possibility to penetrate the front armor on the PzV, apparently it was a bad idea to post that...since it "disqualified" me from something. But I think I'll stay...hope that is ok with you.

Hi there Being new to a community, acting like an idiot is not the best thing to do. Just thought that I should point that out, in case you were not aware of this. Mattias</font>

Yeah, I have no problem with letting the subject drop. What I do have a problem with is when people are accusing me of saying things I have never said. Especially when there is a nasty undertone to what they accuse me of saying. When you imply that I am defending what the SS units were doing, I am gonna say "whoa, wait just a minute, Ive never said such a thing." If you call this a semantics game, then I suppose we see things differently. Regards

Here: And, oh, here again:

Granted. I suppose I could have been more clear in my statement. What I meant was that Schurezen had very limited protection effect on "normal claiber" AP rounds (with all the variants) and relatively good protection effect on HEAT rounds.

thanks

Uh, when did I make that assertion? Are you talking to me here or are you having some kind of inner conversation and giving me the blame for what is said? [ September 05, 2002, 06:02 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

Well, off the top of my head, US army...1 (might have been more though, but I know that at least one were executed) CW army...lots (they were having huge problems with some of the local units in India and Burma early in the war) German army..I have no idea whatsoever, and I strongly suspect that you dont have a figure either other than some estimation. "a good example of how they worked is in 'Panzer Commander' by von Luck"? Tell me, do you think a reference to a book is a good "example"? Could you perhaps be a bit more specific? Heck, you might even be able to take a minute or two and write down the example you had in mind here on this board? ?? Who are you talking to now? And on what subject? And those with noses and ears smell and listen, the rest live in silence and non-smell. [ September 05, 2002, 05:56 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

I cant get my hypersnap to work, nor can I find any interesting key-combination...

Well its either that, or the person I'm trying to explain something to isnt really open to information. By the tone in your post its pretty obviuous that you have already made your mind up, and I see little reason trying to argue with you. I have had my share of arguing with brick walls on other forums. Let me just say this. If you send your own men unarmed against machine guns, or if you send your men in waves against the enemy with every second or third wave without arms, that is nothing short of murder. Picture if you will a modern US army commander applying that tactic against some Afghan cave...it simply wouldnt happen. To issue such an order you would have to have such a complete disregard for the lifes of your men, that it is hard to comprehend. And if you not only send your men to their deaths like that, but order other units to advance behind the first poor sods, and to gun down anyone in the first waves who tries to take cover or tries to retreat...well, as I said, it is hard for us to even imagine such "tactics". The above has nothing to do with situations where soldiers who have abandoned their units have gotten caught and were executed...nothing. ALL armies in ww2 executed their deserters. Now, if you dont see the difference between those two examples, then you have such a different thought pattern from me, that I cannot possibly explain that difference. I simply would not know where to start.

Really? That the executioners were Aryans, maybe?</font>

Oh, no there were no blocking units at Seelowe, at least not to my knowledge. I thought you were asking for examples of situations where soviet commanders sent their troops running towards the German MG's in pointless human wave attacks. As for the "summary justice" and the executions in the end of the war. Basically there were SS units roaming the areas behind the frontlines. Any soldier found in that area without a very good reason/pass were executed on the spot for desertion or cowardice in front of the enemy. There still is a difference.

First, the spaced armor on the PzIII might have been better at resisting the Soviet 122mm APBC round on a mm by mm penetration-calculation-basis. But this does not translate to PzIIIs being more surviveable on the battlefield. The PzV has very sloped front armor, the effect of such high angles is not only that enemy shells have more armor to penetrate, it also increases the probability that the enemy shell will richoshet (sp) either completely (i e deflecting away from the tank), or partially (i e some kinetic energy is spent when the impact force changes direction). Second, I would love to see your sources on that penetration data. I hope you are not using the "Report on the results of testing of the 100mm and the 122mm tank guns at the KUBINKA proving grounds" from 1944? Because if you do, you should know that the Panther tank used as target was of poor quality, and the test results are dubious at best. If the results actually happened, then the Panther tank used as target had armor defective enough to be only 85% of "normal" armor. Consider the source...suppose you are on the staff of the armaments production facility, what report is more likely to get your butt shipped to a Gulag? "Yes comrade Stalin, our armamnets are seriously deficient and this is probably why we are suffing sometimes 10 to 1 losses to Facsists" or "Yes comrade Stalin, our tanks are clearly superior to the Fascists and able to kill them to nearly the limit of their effective range. The losses at the front must be do to poor tactics in the untrained ranks." Having said that, the 122mm APBC round was the best AT round the Soviets used in ww2. Lets do a test fire against a PzV. The PzV front had 80mm armor at 55 degrees slope. First, armor penetration is not a step function where penetration fails if you are a mm short and is not assured if you are a mm over. It can occure anywhere down to .85 pen/armor and can fail up to 1.15 pen/armor ratio. So how do you get the armor ratio? The actual "effective armor is a function of thickness to diameter ratio and the above estimates of effective thickeness are based on the (base/(cos(angle))^1.4) estimate. The PzV glacis is 85/55 of varying quality. This means a variance from a bit over 200mm equivalent to 150 or so for a T/D ratio of .7. The early 122mm had a penetration (50% probability or deformation of backing plate vs BHN 250 RHA) of about 189mm. The later model of the 122mm was improved to about 206mm. This all means that the PzV glacis was potentially vulnerable anywhere from 0 to about 1200m range when being shot at by a 122mm gun using APBC ammo. (the 0 figure above indicates that in some instances, the 122mm gun could not penetrate PzV front armor from any range). (source:Bird and Livingston, WW2 Ballistics) Now, I dont have the numbers for the PzIII armor readily avaliable here, so I cant make the same calculations for the PzIII. Strictly speaking, this does not make the PzIII a threat to "all existing Soviet tanks", it only makes the PzIII a less threat to its own crew. And Schurzen doesnt really help that much against AP or APBC ammo. Schurzen was designed to detonate HEAT rounds outside the main armor. The effects on AP or APBC rounds are slim. First, the key phrase here seems to be "where avaliable". Tungsten rounds became increasingly scarce in Germany from 1942 on. After the loss of the Donbass region (the area around Dniepropetrovsk), Germany had extremely limited access to rare minerals, and those they could get their hands on were often used in other parts of the German war industry. The most likely scenario would involve a PzIII entering the battlefield with one or two rounds of APCR max, and the rest being normal AP. Best case scenario would see that same PzIII with 4-7 APCR. If you want to do a fair comparrison you should compare the standard AP of the 75mm KwK 42 L/70, with the standard AP for the 50mm KwK 39 L/60. (Standard AP for 50mm at 100m=67mm) (Standard AP for 75mm at 100m=138mm) or, why not compare APCR penetrations, just for fun... (standard APCR for 50mm at 100m=130mm) (Standard APCR for 75mm at 100m=194mm) These figures speak for themselves. Lets just say that I question this conclusion. [ September 05, 2002, 09:30 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

Count me in. stevehortlund@hotmail.com

Well, and when was the last time that was used? Care to explain to me how that was different from the random hangings and shooting on the spot that went on in the German army during the last few weeks of the war? Hanging from a lamp-post with a sign around your neck 'Ich bin ein Deserteur' or being shot in a backyard after some flying judgement detail determined you were a deserter - the German way of caring for their troops?</font>

What about sending troops in to attack in waves, and having every second or third wave attack without weapons (the idea being that they could pick up weapons from those fallen in the first waves). To keep the units motivated, throw in a "blocking unit" behind the attackers with orders to gun down anyone moving in the wrong direction. Care for the troops...the Soviet way?

I like this idea. And such a campaign is definitively something I would like to play in. A suggestion would be to start with one battle first. One interesting, well know, and well balanced battle... not too big, not too small. (My choice would be something like the battle(s) for Mozhaisk in october 1941) If you can get that to work with 4-6 players on both sides, then we can start making plans for the big one. I thinkn it would be best to focus on the real operations. It would be very interesting to play a large operation with 10-20 players on each side, with a CO on both sides giving orders and allocating reserves etc...Kursk anyone?