Archibald

Is it possible to change the colours of bases? A friend of mine is red/green colour blind, and finds it difficult to find Russian units against the green of the terrain in the CMBB demo.

Sogard, I think you've posted on the the wrong thread.

Absolutely on the button Brian Rock.

Although the real point of the increasingly baroque Great Air Power Thread has often been lost, the main concern of Brian Rock, myself and very many others is that the game's playability is compromised by air power as it stands. The worry that this is ahistorical is a secondary concern. I'd like a more historically realistic game too, but not at the expense of playability.

I'm sorry for getting your name wrong Mr Benning. It won't happen again... Immer Etwas, your post made many excellent points, but I have to take issue with your figures. Gugliemo Leghorn in his magisterial account of "Flying Feathers - Reflections on the Bombing Offensive" (ISBN 0-330-34019-0) states the following: "The bombs floating down from a cerulean sky all but destroyed a coop already ravaged by fox attacks over the course of several days. 31 chickens had succumbed to the depredations of smooth talking anthropmorphic foxes and by time of the air attack it was a coop in name only..." In line with then current bantam doctrine, the rooster had continued peck peck pecking throughout the fox attacks. I hope this clarifies things. Iam the Alpha Grog! Hear me roar!!!

Is there a statistician in the house? I just like the phrase "well placed bomb". It really rolls off the tongue. The point that I was trying to make is that it is faulty logic to infer that if a bomb falls on one platoon then every single other platoon will necessarily get a bomb too. They might if you drop enough on them, but then we get into diminishing returns as we discussed in an earlier post. Hope that made sense. Tired... Need Coffee...

Quick Robin to the Grogcave... Look on the bright side, at least we've reached the magic 100-post level. Where's your hurtful taunts now Russ Benning? Eh? EH!? I'm afraid I'm going to have to disagree with you again husky65. Anyone interested in how the game's playability could be improved should skip the rest of this thread as it's time for the grogs to get down and RUMBLE! Brian Rock: "Scale: I can destroy a platoon with one well-placed bomb. It doesn't follow that I can just as easily take out a company with three well-placed bombs, a battallion with ten well-placed bombs, and so on." Your reply: "Actually it does follow that you can." By that logic if a badly placed bomb can miss a platoon then three badly placed bombs can miss a company and so on... That's a lot of pressure on poor young Dwayne from Idaho at the Norden Sight of his B24. In reality each unit and sub unit under attack would face a probability rather than a certainty of taking that well placed bomb. Many would succumb to it, but not everyone. I'm reminded of a rather callow subordinate of mine who was espousing the "if you can make no mistakes for one minute, you can make no mistakes for one hour" line so beloved of poor leaders. I took him aside and gently asked him that if he could urinate for one minute did it necessarily follow that he could do so for an hour? Thankfully, he replied in the negative. Brian Rock: "A larger formation not only means more targets, it means a much larger footprint. They are vulnerable, but not to the same degree." Your reply: "A battalion is more vulnerable to scaled up air attack than a platoon, it and its supporting echelon are easier to find than a platoon." It's ironic that someone whose initial post contained the comment "Yet again someone forgets the scale of the game" is now arguing about the relative densities of the TAOR of a platoon and a battalion. Being easier to find makes them more liable to attack, but not necessarily more vulnerable. WWII iron bombs were not smart weapons capable of riding a laser beam down onto Panzer Lehr's "goulash cannons" and thereby rendering the division instantly useless. Having said that, maybe they would be at tech 5! Lars made a very good post to this effect. Everyone caught under an allied bomb carpet faced much the same chance of getting hit as bombs rained down indiscriminately. If anything, first and second echelon troops are generally much more spread out than platoons, as the latter's TAOR is constrained by the need to provide mutual support between sections. A good QM fearing air attack would disperse his echelons as much as possible to avoid that most feared of allied weapons; the well placed bomb! Yourself again: "Also you seem to be of the opinion that you need to kill all the troops to destroy a unit, a destroyed unit is one that is combat ineffective." Go back to your sources. In his initial post in this thread Brian Rock stated the complete opposite: "I am not aware of any units that were destroyed (by which I mean made combat incapable, as opposed to annihilated) by air power alone." He shares your own opinion. Your inability to realise this does not demonstrate a rigorous knowledge of what Brian Rock has actually been saying. Brian Rock: "Circumstances: All of the examples put forward have involved air in conjunction with ground forces: [1]Cobra: air and ground forces [2]Montelier: air and ground forces [3]Falaise: air and ground forces" Yourself: "Again your confusion between unit destruction and occupation of land - infantry are of course needed to occupy ground, however airpower is quite capable of destroying units (as it did historically)." He's not confused between unit destruction and occupation of land, in fact he's demonstrated he understands the distinction. Brian Rock: "History: It never happened. I'm still waiting for an example of a corps or army destroyed by air power alone." Yourself: "Examples have been provided already, the fact that you don't understand the difference between destroying a unit and occupying the ground it held does not change the fact that airpower did it." Your argument again contradicts Brian Rock's demonstrating in a previous post that he does understand the difference. The impression this gives to a dispassionate reader is that an understanding of the facts (in this case Brian Rock's actual posts) comes second to the need to validate your own opinion. Yourself again: "The fact that entire columns of troops attempted to surrender to ground attack a/c in Falaise suggests that the airpower had destroyed the units." This is the "well placed bomb" argument again. Airpower had destroyed those units surrendering, not necessarily the whole division. No one has ever disputed that Panzer Lehr was so badly shaken that many units surrendered. As I stated in a previous post, elements of Panzer Lehr were still capable of providing resistance. Rather than quoting Zaloga again, I'll refer to another source. This is from Roger Edwards's "Panzer - A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945" (ISBN 1-85409-208-1): "Despite this debacle, Panzer Lehr faced US First Army with unexpected opposition, but with no reserves to call upon, Seventh Army was about to collapse..." Panzer Lehr itself lacked reserves to counter Seventh Corps not because of the bombing but because they had been depleted by several weeks of ground combat and FGA. I covered this in another post, so I won't labour the point. Brian Rock: 1) We know there was ground fighting after the bombing. Yourself: "The div was destroyed, the fact that sub units were able to fight does not suggest that it was not" Panzer Lehr had been effectively destroyed as a division long before July 25th, a point which I will return to later. The point is not that it had been destroyed as a division, but that elements were still fighting. A division is considered to have lost combat effectiveness when it has lost the ability to control it's units and divisional support assets. This certainly happened to Panzer Lehr when most of it's comms were destroyed. In effect this is the "well placed bomb" argument in reverse. Panzer Lehr's loss of cohesion as a division does not necessarily imply that every unit under it's command lost their own cohesion also. Kampfgruppe Heintz, for instance, was unscathed by the bombing. What was lost rather was Panzer Lehr's ability to command and support them. For Seventh Corps this meant that their objectives were now contested by individual kampfgruppen unable to call on support from division. This made them a much easier proposition to attack, but a ground assault still had to go in. Brian Rock: 2) Elsewhere Bayerlein puts losses due to air at 50%: Yourself: Bayerlein to Wilmott 70% I presume you're referring to Chester Wilmott's "Struggle in Europe", which was published in 1952. Wilmott wrote superbly, but was also a journalist rather than a trained historian. I've no doubt that Bayerlein said to him that Panzer Lehr took 70% casualties on 25th July. I would assess that Wilmott inferred incorrectly that this was all caused by the bombing. More detailed analyses that have been carried out in the fifty years since Wilmott's book estimate that Panzer Lehr took 50% casualties to the bombing. Both Brian Rock and I cited references to support this in previous posts, indeed Brian Rock gave an excellent breakdown of the percentage of casualties Panzer Lehr suffered from artillery, air and ground attack. Brian Rock: "It was sufficient to limit American advances until the following day." Yourself: "ie it was not a significant force on a Div scale (and since SC runs on a minimum 1 week turn would not be noticeable in game) - the allies were renowned for their lack of boldness in advance, any opposition tended to make them halt." An SC corps written down to 2-3 strengh is not a significant force either, but it is still physically in existence. This was also the case with Panzer Lehr. I've laboured this point already however. There is a fundamental contradiction in your statement. Your whole thesis hinges on the argument that what happened to Panzer Lehr in a day could be applied to an SC army in a week. You have conceded Brian Rock's argument that Panzer Lehr limited the American advance. Extrapolating this to an SC scale means an army limiting advance into it's hex even after devastating bombing. It effectively contradicts everything you've been saying up to now. I loved the blaming of the limited advance on allied timidity rather than Panzer Lehr's resistance. Does this mean that in the game allied advances into bombed hexes should be forbidden? I especially loved the phrase "any opposition tended to make them halt". You stated earlier in the thread: "The div was destroyed, the fact that sub units were able to fight does not suggest that it was not." In effect you admit that Panzer Lehr had sub units still able to offer resistance to an advancing army which tended to halt in the face of any opposition. This flatly contradicts your argument that Panzer Lehr could not have stopped Seventh Corps. Brian Rock: "]Husky65, the Panzer Lehr was not destroyed. It stayed in the line for almost two weeks before being reorganisation and refitting." Yourself: "PL was destroyed, the fact that sub units remanined in the line just meant that the Germans were grabbing at straws, PL was combat ineffective - the Germans were still using Div names but the units deployed were not Divs in anything but name." "If I call a surviving Rifle Squad the 2nd SS 'Das Riech' Panzer Div that does not mean Das Reich survived, it just means I am kidding myself." I've already discussed the faulty logic behind ascribing a loss of cohesion at divisional level to every unit under it's command. I referred in an earlier post to Panzer Lehr's battered state on 25th July. By this time Panzer Lehr had been in action since 8th June, or almost seven turns in SC, and in that time they had received no significant reinforcements. Panzer Lehr had entered Normandy with 188 tanks and just prior to the allied bombing attacks was down to 31 operational tanks. This represented 16% of their original tank strengh. husky65 is adamant that the battered remnants of a division can no longer be regarded as a division in any meaningful sense. I agree with this wholeheartedly, by 25th July Panzer Lehr was a division in name only. This fact further dilutes the argument that Panzer Lehr's bombing be extrapolated to army scale. It took 1,800 bombers to inflict 50% casualties on a formation which probably had the effective power of at best a regiment. To use the SC analogy again, Panzer Lehr would go into the line at full strength on D+2 and be reduced to 30% - 40% strength after 6-7 turns of combat. The allied bombing attack would knock at least half of this remaining strength off while a ground unit would polish off the rump. I'd have no problems with this happening to me in SC. I certainly wouldn't use it as a justifcation for the current problem of fresh units succumbing immediately to the all conquering mega air assault that is affecting playability for me. Brian Rock: "I am not, ever have, and probably never will argue airpower has no combat effect. The point I've been arguing since my first post is that airpower alone - note the "alone" bit - did not destroy corps or armies." Yourself: "And you have been shown to be wrong - airpower has destroyed armies, what airpower cant do is occupy land - two very different things." I certainly don't think he's wrong and feel my analysis of your arguments support this view. I welcome your constructive criticism. Could you also please tell me which armies in WWII were destroyed solely by air attack and nothing else? The German armies in Normandy probably suffered as much from air attacks as anyone else, but air power was an important factor in this rather than the sole factor. Seventh Army was destroyed by the end of Operation Cobra, but it was as a result of a combined arms offensive in which air played a vital part. This is why people have posted in such numbers to this thread, as there is a general feeling that the preponderance of air power makes combined arms redundant. I'd be happy to field your comments regarding this and my other two posts on the subject. If nothing else, your lively debating style has added a lot of spice to a very interesting thread.

Back to the mess for tea and medals I think...

I have just realised the true significance of this thread, Has anyone else noticed that we are now only a few posts away from overtaking Russ Bensing's record breaking 84-post "Game Play" thread? If we all pitch together we can win this one guys. Go thread go!

I absolutely agree with you Brian Rock. People quickly lose sight of the point of these arguments and it turns into a mighty contest to determine who will be the alpha grog. Having established their mating dominance within the forum they look around for mates and realise there's none to be had. Pity them. I felt the need to rebut husky65 at some length because the argument he was using to defend air power as it currently stands did not bear close investigation. Air power t present greatly affects the playability of the game for myself and many others who've posted here. It's been good to see so many positive suggestions in amongst the surprising amount of emotion in this thread.

I'll give the relevant quote again: "The effect on the German defenses was devastating. Of the 3,600 troops under Panzer Lehr Division's immediate control, about 1,000 were killed in the bombing attack, and at least as many wounded or severely dazed. The German communications network, which depended heavily on field telephones, was completely disrupted. The only combat effective unit available to the division by late morning was Kampfgruppe Heintz, which was stationed to the south-east outside the bomb zone. But the bombing coverage was patchy. The damage was worse in the center of the bomb zone where the heavy bombers had struck, while some defensive positions closer to the American lines - including about half the tanks - had gone unscathed." And your comment on this: "In SC terms non-combat effective means destroyed, so the division was effectively destoyed on the first day." Kampfgruppe Heintz was still combat effective, while some defensive positions and about half the tanks left to the division had gone unscathed. Panzer Lehr took a terrible kicking at the hands of the USAAF, but it still contained units able to offer some resistance to VII Corp's ground attack. Air power had destroyed much of Panzer Lehr's combat power, but not all of it. In SC terms this would translate into a greatly reduced ground unit finished off by ground attacks rather than one destroyed by air alone. VII Corps were not able to take bloodless possession of the ground in the manner which follows most SC mega air assaults. To answer your query about the number of air units involved, 1,800 heavy bombers carried out the attack on 25th July. This was a major effort. This translates into 16,200 bomber sorties to inflict similar treatment on all nine divisions of Seventh Army. This doesn't take into account the air units needed to inflict similar damage to Army assets. I'd be grateful if someone could tell me, but I doubt whether either the RAF or the USAAF ever managed that many heavy bomber sorties against a single target in one week. It would not be possible to sustain 1,800 bomber attacks regularly for a whole week. Crew and equipment fatigue, plus the ever changeable British weather would have mitigated against it. In fact the heavy bomber strike inflicted on Panzer Lehr was originally scheduled for the 24th July, but had to be cancelled due to overcast conditions over the battlefield. Some air units never received the recall in time and inflicted casualties on Panzer Lehr of about 350 men and 10 vehicles. Taking this into account the projected casualty figures for Seventh Army fall off dramatically. In two days, Panzer Lehr lost 2,350 men, which translates into 8,225 men if this was sustained for a week. 8,225 men from 30,000 would leave Seventh Army at 73% of their original manning. These are still heavy losses when coupled with the inevitable disruption of C3, but it would still leave a formation capable of offering resistance to a ground attack. Another point to consider about Panzer Lehr's immolation is that it had already taken heavy losses prior to the bombing attack. To quote Zaloga again: "Although Panzer Lehr had entered Normandy earlier in the summer fully equipped, it had taken heavy losses in men and materiel during the July fighting. By 23 July it had been reduced to 80 tanks of which only 16 Panthers and 15 PzKpfw IV tanks were operational. Under the division's command was a new battalion from the 5th Parachute Division, the battalion-strength Kampfgruppe Heintz from the reserve 275th Division, and the small Kampfgruppe Brosow from the 2nd SS Panzer Division. The combat value of Panzer Lehr Division was graded as Kampfwert III, that is suitable for defensive missions. The Panzer Lehr Division rotated its few remaining tanks in and out of front-line duty like a string of pearls between the dismounted panzer grenadier companies." The USAAF did not attack a fresh rested division, but one so worn down and stretched that Bayerlein, counter to German Army doctrine, had to put the bulk of his armour well forward just to cover the front line. Consequently, the bulk of his combat power lay under the bomb carpet. If Panzer Lehr had still been at full strength his combat power would have been more dispersed and much of his reserves would probably have survived the initial air attack. I don't doubt that by the end of July 25th Bayerlein's staff were reporting Panzer Lehr as Kampfwert V (unsuitable for combat). This doesn't mean however that it was unable to fight at all. Units at Kampfwert V would be kept in the line if it were a dire necessity, with the understanding that they would be relieved as soon as it was practicable. It was a commonplace in Russia by this time, and when Cobra began 243rd Infantry division were already at Kampfwert V and still in the line on Seventh Army's left wing. To continue the SC analogy, a unit sharing Panzer Lehr's fate would begin the turn heavily depleted by four or five turns of ground combat and FGA. The heavy bomber attack would further reduce it, while a ground unit would finish the job before another unit moved in to take possession. I appreciated your comments about my suggestions as to how to remedy the problem of too much air power. 1. Requiring air fleets to have bases. Building new bases would take a turn and require the expenditure of MPPs. "would add a considerable amount of complexity to the game and surely couldn't be considered as a change for SC1" Agreed. It would require a major rewrite of the game. 2. Limiting the number of air fleets which could attack an individual ground unit per turn. "I am dead against. This is a "what-if" game. If a player wants to mass their air attacks why shouldn't they be allowed? If there is a problem with massed air attacks IRL make it a similar abstracted problem in SC, don't make it impossible." I remember similar debates regarding this kind of rule amendment in Third Reich. I have to agree with you that it does seem a bit of an arbitary limit. I do think it would make for a more enjoyable end game however. It's really down to personal taste, so perhaps it could be introduced as a variable like partisans or scorched earth which players could mutually agree on before play. 3. Limiting the total number of air fleets a country could deploy. This could be linked to the current MPP total. For example, Britain has an MPP total of 130 and is allowed to deploy an air fleet for every 30 MPP she brings in each turn. This would allow Britain to deploy four air units, with the ability to deploy more as conquests increase her MPPs. I don't know if this would work in practice though! "I realise you are suggesting changes to improve the playability of the game but even so the rules should be justifiable in some way. I can't think of any justification for this. Surely Brittain (for example) could have built nothing but air-fleets if they had wished." Germany was still cranking out masses of aircraft until the final collapse, but from Operation Bodenplatte onwards the Luftwaffe played no major part in the war. The reason for this was that due to allied bombing and the loss of Ploesti they no longer had the aviation fuel to fly them. The availability of critical resources was definitely a limiting factor on the ability to operate aircraft. To address your own suggestion: "How would people feel about this: Leave air-fleets as they are when attacking a full strength unit. But as the unit is depleted, the number of viable targets decreases and the level of dispersion increases (if only because the previous attacks left holes in the line). The fewer targets would mean that tac bombers should be less effective against depleted units and the increased dispersion would mean that strat bombing should be less effective against depleted units. You could certainly argue against the reduced effect for strat bombers so maybe its best to leave them as they are since no-one seems to have a problem with them anyway." "The net result would mean that ground units would be slightly harder to destroy, without actually changing the initial effectiveness of the air fleets. It would still be possible to destroy ground units but players would know that they can do more damage by spreading their air attacks." "Does anyone object to this *in principle*?" I agree with this in principle. It addresses the fact that massive bombardments begin to meet diminishing returns. I would be worried that players would begin to juggle unit strength levels so that they are just at the break point for air power being weakened and no more. Another approach to the problem would be to ensure that subsequent attacks become increasingly less effective. For example, ten air fleets are attacking a ground unit. The first unit inflicts damage at 100% strength, the second at 90%, the third at 80% and so on. This would still allow mega air assaults, but players would have to weigh the merits of the diminishing utility of further attacks on the same unit. It would encourage players to spread their attacks about, but it wouldn't force them to. Another suggestion that struck me for limiting air power is that of treating aircraft construction and reinforcement in the same way as naval units. As with naval units in ports, air units would only be constructed and reinforced in towns. This still allows massive attacks from units not based in towns, but, like naval units, they would find it difficult to sustain this for turn after turn in the same way as naval units do. The historical justification for this would be the difficulty in maintaining continual operations away from established repair and maintenance facilities. Again, this could be an option available before start of play. I'd be interested to try it if you want a tester Hubert!

I don't agree with husky65's argument that the kind of damage inflicted on Panzer Lehr on 25 July could have been repeated by the USAAF for another six days. Having said that, I thought it would be interesting to follow his argument and see whether it stood up on it's own merits. My source for the quotes and figures is Steven J Zaloga's "Operation Cobra 1944" (ISBN 84176 296 2). Talking of the USAAF combined FGA and bomber attacks on Panzer Lehr: "The effect on the German defenses was devastating. Of the 3,600 troops under Panzer Lehr Division's immediate control, about 1,000 were killed in the bombing attack, and at least as many wounded or severely dazed. The German communications network, which depended heavily on field telephones, was completely disrupted. The only combat effective unit available to the division by late morning was Kampfgruppe Heintz, which was stationed to the south-east outside the bomb zone. But the bombing coverage was patchy. The damage was worse in the center of the bomb zone where the heavy bombers had struck, while some defensive positions closer to the American lines - including about half the tanks - had gone unscathed." "The 25 July air attack repeated the problems of the previous day, with bombs again falling short into American lines, killing 111 and wounding 490 soldiers. among them was Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, head of Army Ground Forces, the highest ranking US officer to die in the war. The casualties were especially severe in the forward assault companies, causing significant problems in launching the initial attacks." Panzer Lehr's casualties on day one were 2,000 men. If this could have been repeated for seven days it would have meant Seventh Army losing 14,000 men. Seventh Army's strength at the beginning of Cobra was 30,0000 men, which would have left them at 53% of their original strength. These are terrible losses for a unit to endure, but it is also very far from destruction. It is ironic that husky65's intial criticisms hinged on a perceived misunderstanding of the game's scale. Panzer Lehr was severely mauled by the USAAF, but Panzer Lehr was only one of nine divisions in Seventh Army. No other divisions that day received the same kind of attention from the USAAF. The friendly casualties inflicted by the bombing attacks were a prime reason for the US Army not adopting the same tactic again in the war. Perhaps Hubert could patch in the possibility of casualties to adjacent friendly units when strategic bombers are attacking enemy ground units. I agree with the inital post's assertion that the mega air campaign that many games end up as is ahistorical and detrimental to playability. I seem to remember that a similar problem occurred with the 1st edition of Third Reich where London kept falling to paratroop attacks supported by overwhelming air. The solution adopted in the next edition was to limit the amount of air that could be brought to bear on ground units. Unfortunately I can't find the 3rd edition rules as I'm decorating and my library looks like it's been carpet bombed! Perhaps someone could enlighten me? Three pssible solutions to the problem of mega air fleets suggested themselves to me: 1. Requiring air fleets to have bases. Building new bases would take a turn and require the expenditure of MPPs. 2. Limiting the number of air fleets which could attack an individual ground unit per turn. 3. Limiting the total number of air fleets a country could deploy. This could be linked to the current MPP total. For example, Britain has an MPP total of 130 and is allowed to deploy an air fleet for every 30 MPP she brings in each turn. This would allow Britain to deploy four air units, with the ability to deploy more as conquests increase her MPPs. I don't know if this would work in practice though!

I played Fortress Europa about twenty years ago. While it didn't have the headache inducing complexity of Third Reich, it was a playable and challenging game. Unlike Third Reich, it only covered the Western Front from Overlord onwards. Go to http://www.aardwolfgames.com/aardmakehtml.mv?look4=1409.00000&src=DETAILS if you want a quick nostalgia fix.

A major difference between tripod and bipod mounted weapons is the tripod's recoil buffers. These keep the recoil in one plane and controllable. At longer ranges this gives a beaten zone several hundred metres long and a few metres wide. Effectively, a tripod mounted weapon can engage area targets, while a bipod mounted weapon is only fully effective against point targets. Another huge advantage of the tripod's stable platform is the ability to pre record targets. This allows the gun to accurately engage obscured targets. Fingers crossed that both this and the beaten zone will be in CMBB, as it will have a major effect on infantry tactics.

Call me Mr Picky but... First off, this is a superb mod and looks fantastic. I have to agree about the problems with reading the strengh of minor allied countries though . I also found my nose pressed to the screen trying to make it out. The Italian corps are also marked as armies (XXXX) rather than corps (XXX), which caused a wee bit of confusion. Now to get totally anal! Has anyone else noticed that the map in the briefing room is of 1990s Europe. Perhaps we're being tested. Similarly, the save game screens refer to the campaign of 1940, while the background graphics relate to 1944. How can this be? All mods should be perfect and without error. :mad: Seriously though, it's a terrific mod. Please please please do more!

Actually they made me a major five years ago. I've tried a quick invasion of America several times in the full game. Each time I managed to take the Americans out, and each time the Russians rolled over the top of me. The horror... As you say, it'll probably be a different story against a hu-man.

You could always try the "German Steamroller" approach. Pour all your research into anti-tank weapons and industrial technology and build as many armies as you can in the east while avoiding action in the west. Put all the Italian research effort into gun laying radar and industrial technology and give them Yugoslavia and Greece. half a dozen Italian battleships will tear most allied invasions apart, while France's garrison of Italians and German minor allies do the rest. By 1942 you'll be producing strong armies very cheaply and will be able to attrite the Russians to such an extent that they eventually buckle after 6-9 months, after which you just roll forward majestically crushing corps all over the place. Once Russia's gone, right wheel through the Caucasus and roll up the Brits in the Med from behind. well it worked for me!

Blimey that was quick! The most recent message relates to the game crashing in the course of a move: Class/Object: Game Application (01BF59C8) Routine: root's creation Nature of Exception: Segmentation violation: Operating system signal. Effect: Exit Class/Object: Game Application (01BF59C8) Routine: root's creation Nature of Exception: Routine failure. Effect: Exit The log for when the game persistently crashed on saving was as follows: Class/Object: Game Application (01BF59C8) Routine: root's creation Nature of Exception: SAVE GAME: Retrieval error. Effect: Exit Class/Object: Game Application (01BF59C8) Routine: root's creation Nature of Exception: Segmentation violation: Operating system signal. Effect: Exit Class/Object: Game Application (01BF59C8) Routine: root's creation Nature of Exception: Routine failure. Effect: Exit

Since installing patch 1.02 the game crashes whenever I try to save it. Each time a DOS window flashes up and then the program shuts down completely. Particularly galling was the fact that it also crashed at the end of September 1945 as my invasion of the USA was preparing. Has anyone else experienced this problem, or is it specific to my machine? I have a Compaq Armada 550mhz laptop with an AMD K6-2 cpu. The game worked fine before I installed the patch.

I've actually invaded the USA several times. It can be done against the AI, as it tends not to commit the Royal Navy to the defence of it's former colonies. I'm not sure it would work against a competent human opponent, but it'll be fun trying at least once. How I did it was to take France using only the forces available at the start of the game. I don't even build the extra air fleet I usually deem necessary for France's early demise. Once France has fallen, concentrate all your ground units around the two French atlantic ports. The aim should be to have three units immediately around each port, with another three units close by ready to form the second wave of transports. This will necessitate using the two Italian armies. Build build build carriers. Aim to have three carriers on hand for the initial move across the Atlantic with a final target of five carriers. If possible, bring your U-boat in the Atlantic back for a refit and upgrade him to full strength. Leave all the Luftwaffe with an HQ on the Channel coast to discourage the British from attacking Brest. I wouldn't advise trying to force the Channel with the remainder of the Kriegsmarine, as you'll just get into an exchange of MMPs with the Brits which will affect your ability to build carriers. As far as possible, leave the UK alone. In the Med, use the whole Italian navy to force the Straits of Gibraltar. You won't always manage it in time, but it can destroy the US Atlantic Fleet in one turn if you can make it through in time. By late September you should be ready to go. The first wave of six transports should include an HQ unit. I've never yet encountered opposition crossing the Atlantic. Within two turns you'll be off the coast of the USA waiting to land with three carriers and a sub in attendance, possibly the Italian navy, and a fourth shiny new carrier en route across the Atlantic. You don't have much choice in the initial landing, as there's very little spare room! The HQ unit's probably best deployed in the north. The Americans are surprisingly powerful, but find it difficult to leave their starting locations because it risks surrendering supply sources to the Axis. Your submarines and carriers should launch their own Pearl Harbour on the American fleet. If the Italians have turned up on time you've got it made. You'll take losses in the invasion, but with a second wave on hand you can just send in more cannon fodder and capture unguarded enemy resources. Within a few turns the Americans will struggle as their supply of MMPs decreases; expect to have them down to an income of 80 MMP after 2-3 turns. Once the Axis manage to attrite the Americans into losing a supply base the end is certain. Unfortunately the old demo always finished at the point where I'd got a resource, I can't wait till I get the full game to play this one to a conclusion. I've also tried invading Canada, which is an absolute cinch against the AI. I even got 335 MMPS after it surrendered, which was a nice bonus. Unfortunately an invasion of Canada seems to bring the USA into the war before you can launch a surprise attack. An unexpected advantage of attacking the USA is that, unlike attacking the UK, it doesn't seem to increase the chances of bringing the Russians in. This is just as well, as the whole Reich is usually defended by a few corps and minor allies while the rest of the Wehrmacht is making New Jersey safe for the herrenvolk. As I said earlier, I doubt this would be as successful against a human player. If someone did it to me I would throw the whole Royal Navy at them. A submarine screen in the Western Approaches combined with the Italians might slow them down. Hmmm.... Have to try that one...

Thanks for such a cogent analysis YankeeDog. In practice the weight of the ammunition would be much greater due to the weight of link and the ammunition liners. However from bitter personal experience I can affirm that it's quite feasible to carry 800 rounds per man in addition to the gun, tripod, sight box, barrel bag, personal weapons and radios. This was the standard load per man when I commanded a machine gun platoon. It's not fun, but then neither is running out of ammo. Given six men in a gun team, this would give 4,800 rounds per gun, or 96% of first line scales. In action all the ammunition for the task in hand would be kept dug in on the gun line rather than to the immediate rear. Guns firing the FPF at near cyclic rates have an awesome appetite, and it would be impractical to keep it to the rear. Watch "Zulu Dawn" for an excellent example of what happens when ammunition can't get to the line! A possible way of modelling large quantities of pre-dumped ammo in the game would be to link a gun's starting location to it's ammunition supply. If the gun leaves it's starting location it loses the extra ammo and is reduced to a certain amount per surviving man. The ammunition would remain there if they or another eligible friendly unit chose to return. I've no idea whether this would be feasible or not, and just offer it as a suggestion. I sense I may be getting a little too involved in all this! Another slight niggle about support weapons teams. Does anyone know if CMBB will include personal weapons for each member of the support weapons team. IRL every member carries (usually grudgingly) a personal weapon, giving a six man gun team the firepower in local defence of an understrength squad. They could even be used in the assault if it were made possible to dismount the gun. Then again I could be getting carried away again...

ICM - Unfortunately your test ignores the fact that in a well sited defence a machine gun isn't responsible for the defence of it's own frontage. This would be the responsibility of another defiladed machine gun in mutual support enfilading the expected enemy approach from beyond the reach of squad level weapons (about 600m). Given this, I think your squads would have a much harder time. From personal experience I would agree that CMBO under models sustained machine gun fire in three major aspects: 1. The machine gun's beaten zone (that area under which 90% of man sized targets should be hit) is not modelled. Rather than denying an area several hundred metres long across the enemy's advance, machine guns in CMBO can only engage targets singly. 2. Machine guns cannot pre-record targets. This denies them the ability to fire on obscured targets. 3. The ammunition supply for machine guns seem to be undervalued. As an example the first line scales for a a British Army GPMG (SF) is 5,000 rounds per gun. This is sufficient for 25 minutes rapid fire or 50 minutes at the normal rate; enough to keep a gun firing continually throughout the average CMBO battle. The Germans were especially fond of using vast amounts of ammunition, and there are many accounts of German infantry being regarded as primarily portage and local defence for the MG42.

Oops! Thanks a lot!

Has anyone else noticed that it's possible for the Germans to destroy both the wooden bridges in "All or Nothing"? Has anyone managed to win as the British despite this happening to them?