John D Salt

In other words, CM is unconsolable. Personally, I am rather bemused as to why consoles, PCs and a variety of other computing devices cannot be programmed in the same high-order language. Obviously the idea of HOLs is terribly old-fashioned and 1960s. All the best, John.

You *can't* unload a GPMG if you have a competent number two. It fires disintegrating link -- no.2 should be clipping extra lengths onto the belt as long as there is ammo available. I once had the immense pleasure of putting a thousand rounds of belted blank through a GPMG in little more than a minute. Shortly thereafter, I had the slightly less immense pleasure of cleaning the thing. All the best, John.

At the moment, the things you can purchase in CM:BO are FOs and TRPs, which are separate things; ammo is associated with an FO. There is no overt representation of the firing battery (troop, section, mortar baseplate position, whatever it is). In real life, ammunition is a property of the firing battery, and TRPs are recorded by the battery, too. The sort of scheme I would like to see is one where the off-table batteries are explicitly represented. FOs are associated with firing batteries; the same battery may have one or two FOs associated with it. If you don't have both the FOs for a battery on-table, you might find that the battery is firing a mission for the other guy somewhere else when you call for fire. Likewise, other calls on the battery's services might deplete the ammunition stocks you thought you had available. Having an overt representation of off-table batteries also means that the mechanisms for off-table and on-table indirect fire need hardly be different. Some batteries may have no FOs associated with them, but may (probabilistically) be available for reinforcing fires (US and Commonwealth artillery especially should be able to call massive reinforcing fires in a tight spot). TRPs should be associated with firing batteries, too, and a battery's FO's should be able to register additional TRPs during the course of the game. One point per battery should be the FDF task, on which the guns are laid when not firing other tasks, and for which response time is almost instant when called. A third "flavour" of TRPs -- which should include lines as well as points, so that I can plot proper barrages -- should be available for planning programmed fires. The "creeping barrage" flavour of control line should be programmable with a start time, direction, and rate of movement, and each such planned task should be parameterisable for rate of fire and fuze type used. If the gun-bunnies are asked to do too much shooting at "burst" rate, they should suffer fatigue and reduce their rate accordingly. Now, add in some rules covering the difference between different fuze types (superquick, DA, clockwork time, powder-train time) and distinguish between WP, BES and bursting smoke, and I think I'd be very happy with the artillery part of the game. All the best, John "Son of a Gunner" Salt.

This might make some sense for CM:BO, although I note that the presence of large numbers of friendly civilians didn't stop us bombing the bejasus out of Caen. However, for the Eastern front, I can't see either Uncle Joe or the Little Corporal being much fussed about incidental civilian deaths, either their own or the other side's. All the best, John.

I've just finished "Frontsoldaten", and though I have read worse, I'm glad it's not just my opinion that it's a very poor book. Not only does he use the same source several times in a row, but on occasion he quotes from the same passage only a few pages later. This produces an odd sort of "deja-lu" effect, which causes the reader to flick frantically backwards for the previous reference while temporarily doubting his sanity. The technique might perhaps appeal as a literary device to people who liked Alain Robbe-Grillet's "Dans le Labyrinthe". It's a bit bloody stupid in what's supposed to be a history book, though. Likewise, some kind of thematic arrangement of chapters might have been a better move than the apparent "stream of consciousness" the writer adopted. All the best, John.

Pulse radars use a pulsed signal. Continuous-wave radars, however, do not. I wonder if anyone would object to calling the boffinish gubbins in the head of a VT shell a "CW range-only radar"? Or will they insist on giving full value to the logical conjunction in Radio Detection And Ranging? All the best, John.

Well, not quite, at least as understood in the British Army for quite a while. Obviously, the forward things go at the front, and the rear things go at the rear -- not a terribly difficult concept to grasp, I agree -- but there is a modest distinction between a "screen" and a "guard". One of the questions often used to annoy cavalrymen is "What is the difference between a guard and a screen?"; the answer is that a guard is expected to fight, whereas a screen isn't (except in self-defence). This discussion seems to concern gaurds rather than screens, and I would guess that screens are a relative rarity in CM:BO. The other question used to annoy cavalrymen is "What is the role of cavalry in modern warfare?", to which the canonical answer is "To add tone to what would otherwise be merely a vulgar brawl". All the best, John.

Indeed he was a Major when he first thought of the idea -- when in Napoleonic mood, some of my wargaming circle can still be heard mumbling about "Major Shrapnel's spherical case". If I may raise a quibble of my own -- although the tradition that "VT" stands for "Variable Time" is now so soundly entrenched that there is no hope of moving it, it is not the origin of the designation; "VT" was merely the arbitrary (US Navy, I believe) identifier assigned as a project code. I can't at the moment put my hand on a source for this, so disbelieve me if you like, but common sense should tell you that a proximity fuze does not measure time in any way, so calling it a time fuze is a bit daft (does anyone call mechanical time fuzes "variable proximity"?) The "VT = Variable Time" convention was first told to me by no less an authority than a Petty Officer Gunnery Instructor at HMS Excellent, Whale Island, when it was still the RN's school of gunnery. Mind you, he also told me that "HE" stood for "High Effect", which it may well have done for the 4.5" Mk 6, but doesn't usually. Other famous "entrenched" back-formations that seem to have gained official sanction are the idea that "CS" (as in CS gas) stands for "Composition, Smoke" (which I've heard from a battalion NBC officer), and that "Jeep" is derived from the letters "GP", signifying "General Purpose" (a story that gets the approval of so august an authority as the Oxford English Dictionary). There are probably lots of others. All the best, John.

The RPG-1 was not a direct copy of anything. Development was started in 1944, but continued until 1948, and the weapon was not finally accepted for service. The weapon is a recoilless launcher that looks like a long, thin tube with a pistol grip, trigger assembly and sight very near the front. The tube aft of this assembly is covered with wood cladding for thermal insulation. The grenade is bulbous and bottle-nosed in appearance. Details of the weapon are as follows: Launcher calibre: 30mm Projectile calibre: 70mm Length of launcher: 1000mm Length of projectile: 425mm Mass of launcher: 2.0 Kg Mass of projectile: 1.6 Kg Initial velocity: 40 m/sec Penetration (RHA at normal): 150mm All details are taken from "Protivotankovie granatomyotnie kompleksi" ("Anti-tank launcher systems") by Lovi, Koren'kov, Bazilevich and Korablin, Vostochniy Gorizont, Moscow, 2001. All the best, John.

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I thought that this point of view had declined rather in popularity since the Nuremburg trials. All the best, John.

Mulberry and DD I will allow as British innovations (and the Mulberry was a stunningly magnificent engineering feat), but if you are going to claim the hedgerow cutter as a British invention, John, I want to see some proof. Michael</font>

I don't s'pose you know what became of the station records for RAF Thurleigh after mid-1943, do you? If you ever happen to be in the PRO and see a large, bald, ginger-bearded loon with open-toed sandals and (probably) a bright orange knitted waitcoat, try walking up to him and saying "You are John Salt and I claim my free beer" (quietly, so we don't get thrown out by those odd bods in uniform). If it's me, I'll buy you a beer at a suitable nearby hostelry. If it turns out to be someone else, I advise you to fake a bilious attack and start talking French. All the best, John.

Let's count 'em, shall we? LSTs, artificial harbours, DUKWs and DDs -- no, none of these existed in 1941, because nobody was expecting to do an amphibious invasion. But two of the four are loggy devices anyway, and so cannot reasonably be counted as featuring in the initial assault. Rocket-firing barges I'll count as a no, too. Heavy, medium and fighter-bombers, special forces and paratroops all clearly existed before the US entry into the war. That's five for the other side. Naval bombardment and bangalore torpedoes add another two. Plastic explosive I'm not sure of the dates for, but RDX was certainly around before 1941, and I understand that it is the main component of compositions C3 and C4. So the proportion of "gadgets" you list existing before the US entry into the war is less than 50%. What's more, Mulberry, Hedgerow and the DD are specifically British (well, OK, for the DD, Hungarian) inventions. At all events, there seems little doubt that Marshall and MacNair had decided that the US Army should be made up of a mass of standard, general-purpose formations, rather than employ the vast selection of "funnies" (and "private armies") that wwre to be found in British organisation (although Bill Slim in Burma also favoured this single-standard approach). Insofar as specialised "gadgets" fulfil a special, rather than a general purpose, the apparent American aversion to such gadgetry seems to me to have been a good idea. Probably the worst gadget-fiends were the Germans; the total amount of national effort wasted on teachnically excellent but operationally futile devices is incalculable. The US seems to have preferred to bet heavily only on "gadgets" of demonstrable operational worth under all circumstances -- the VT fuze, the 6x6 truck, the M-1 rifle. I don't know about "without success". While the fashion seems to be to regard "Goodwood" as less successful with every passing year, the fact remains that the Germans could hardly afford to have an entire division deleted from their orbat, mainly as a result of the airstrikes accompanying the operation. I'm not convinced about "depth of replacements", either. It is my understanding that the US infantry replacement pool was desperately over-stretched during the Normandy fighting -- and, because of the dreadful US replacement policy, replacements were incorporated into existing units less effectively than in any other army in the ETO. "Episodic armour-heavy flurries"? Sorry, that's almost as ludicrous a misrepresentation as Steve Ambrose's "The tendency was to stop to brew up a tea and ... congratulate themselves on getting ashore". The Anglo-Canadians put more armour ashore than the Americans initially, and used it more; but this is hardly surprising, given the relative suitability of the terrain for armoured warfare in their respective sectors. They were also facing almost the whole of the German armoured force in theatre. The units on the Anglo-Canadian front faced "hard pounding" throughout Perch, Epsom, Charnwood, Spring, Atlantic, Goodwood, the battles around Hill 112 and Mont Pincon, Tractable, Totalize and Bluecoat. Mike Dorosh has previously made reference to the need to create a new "double intense" daily loss rate for planning because of the intensity of the Normandy fighting. The British role in creating the breakout is very badly under-represented in the standard histories, too; the left flank of "Bluecoat" bit deeper and faster into the German lines than "Cobra" in the first few days, and pulled the critical German armoured counterattack forces onto the British front at Periers Ridge. All the best, John.

Many of the various "handbooks" around, feature such diagrams for the Germans and the Russians. I think it would be quite possible to produce similar diagrams for other nationalities. </font>

Read 'em all, years ago, in the case of the WO 291 series I believe shortly after accession. You will find key points from all the above, and plenty of others, summarised by me in the WW2 effectiveness file available from http://www.britwar.co.uk/salts/ (thanks to Chris Wilson for hosting my pages at this site). J. D. Fiddlespoon (of Fiddlespoon, Grognard & Claptrap) would just like to point out, in the interests of accurate citation, that the correct piece numbers for the bracketing in tank gunnery report is WO 291/882 (973 is on the Westkapelle assault), and the report on tank battle analysis should be WO 291/975. All the best, John.

It's a rifle with a grenade discharger cup. I'm not sure what kind of grenades it actually discharges, though. Yes please. How can I get payment to you to cover your expenses? All the best, John.

Same as the Brits, I would think -- "Two up, bags of smoke". Indeed. It continued to be a standard British Army technique to carry on 100m or so past the enemy position after fighting through it up until the early 80s for just this reason. Some time around then the doctrine changed to re-orging in the captured fire trenches; presumably someone had by then tumbled to the fact that we weren't fighting the Germans any more. AFAIK it is still an SOP to search an enemy casualty to make sure he is not lying on a grenade, so presumably the news about the Japanese giving up hasn't yet penetrated to all corners of the Strategy Hutch. To be slightly more serious, there is the question of distinguishing specific tactics (or, to be modern, TTPs -- Tactics, techniques and procedures) from the more elusive and general "doctrine". I have never been at all clear exactly where the boundary lies, but have often suspected that if it helps the tactical commander decide how to fight his battle, it's TTP, not doctrine. "Doctrine" always seems to me to be more the province of people who wave their hands around and use words like "over-arching". Personally, I would take "doctrine" to mean simply "that which is taught", but I have been told, with some asperity, by a Very Senior MoD Person, that I am entirely muddle-headed and wildly wrong to thing so (as, presumably, is the Oxford Dictionary). ISTM that one of the difficulties in attempting any comparison between different national TTPs is that it is pretty hard to find any formal language (not necessarily verbal; pictures would be good) in which they can be expressed in a common form. Without expressing them in a common form, it's pretty hard to compare them. If doctrine is a more refined and abstract concept than TTPs, then presumably the difficulty there is greater still. Of course, the ability to express TTPs/doctrines in a precise (or, for that matter, neatly fuzzy; formal, anyway), executable symbolic form would have the side-benefit of enabling wargame writers to produce different national-flavoured AIs for games like CM. But I suspect that there would be a lot more benefits than just that. All the best, John.

http://www.lacim.uqam.ca/~zabrocki/nabla/ for people who enjoy terrifying themselves with incomprehensible maths. All the best, John.

I had the good sense to move to Newcastle-upon-Tyne the week before all the trees in southern England blew over, and stay there until it was safe to move back. John D. Fiddlespoon (of Fiddlespoon, Grognard & Claptrap) stands up, sniffs, and addresses the bench: "No, M'Lud. I can be more specific if you wish." {drones on until all present relapse into slumber, and nothing can be heard but Fiddlspoon's voice and the sussuration of Lord Justice Cocklecarrot's snoring...} Total strength is 458 all ranks. The commando has a Cdo HQ, a heavy weapons troop and five numbered rifle troops. The Cdo HQ has a total strength of 89 all ranks, with duties assigned as follows: CO Lt-Col 2-i-c Major Adjutant Captain Admin officer Captain RSM, RQMS, MT Sgt Intelligence duties: Subaltern, L/Sgt, 4 Ptes Tradesmen: Clerks 1 Sgt, 1 Cpl, 1 L/Cpl, 4 Ptes Pay clerk 1 Sgt Eqpt repair 1 Pte Non-tradesmen: Batmen 5 Ptes Batmen/drivers 2 Ptes Drivers i/c Cpl, L/Cpl, 14 Ptes Motor cyclists Cpl, 8 Ptes Storemen Cpl, 4 Ptes Attached Medical MO, 1 Sgt, 2 Ptes nursing orderlies RAMC Armourers 1 Sgt 1 L/Cpl HQ weapons include 1 LMG, 1 PIAT, and 42 .45 pistols. The heavy weapons troop has a total strength of 39 all ranks, with duties assigned as follows: Tp comd Captain 2-i-c Subaltern Tp Sgt Sgt Batmen-drivers 2 Ptes Attached 1 Col RAMC nursing orderly 3" mortar section Tradesmen: Driver-mechanics 2 Ptes Non-tradesmen: Mor dets 1 Sgt, 2 Cpls, 6 Ptes Drivers i/c 3 Ptes Signallers 1 L/Cpl 1 Pte Rangetaker 1 Pte MMG section Tradesmen: Driver-mechanics 2 Ptes Non-tradesmen: MG dets 1 Sgt, 2 Cpls, 6 Ptes Drivers i/c 3 Ptes Runner Pte Rangetaker Pte Troop weapons include 3 3" mortars, 3 .303" MMGs, 17 .45 pistols and 12 signal pistols. Each rifle troop has a total strength of 66 all ranks, with duties assigned as follows: Troop HQ: Troop comd Captain CSM 2" mortarmen 2 Ptes PIAT gunners 3 Ptes Attached medical 1 L/Cpl RAMC Stretcher-bearer 1 Pte Batman 1 Pte The troop had 2 sections. Each section has a section HQ of the commander (subaltern) and a sergeant, and two sub-sections. Each sub-section has a L/Sgt, a Cpl, 2 L/Cpls and 9 Ptes. Troop weapons include 1 PIAT, 2 2" mortars, 4 LMGs, 2 EY rifles, 2 sniper's rifles, 2 silent stens, 9 Thompson SMGs, 15 .45 pistols and 3 signal pistols.

Ja, gerne, I assume it will be the usual place and the usual time? I imagine from the above that you have sent me e-mail recently. The reason I haven't replied is that British Telecom hasn't let me have it yet. Whoever it was who was asking about British broadband services not so long ago might care to note that BTOpenWorld screwed up its news server a couple of weeks ago and has still not fixed it, screwed up its e-mail service in the middle of last week and has still not fixed it, and has only just this evening let me use my browser again. The service really is carp (anag.) I expect I have about 6 e-mails from Brian demanding to knwo where his PBEM turn is... Sapristi! All the best, John.

Oh, they're different -- Commando organisation is very different, and it's IMHO a great shame that CM:BO doesn't include them. WO204/8397 gives blah, blah, rabbit, rabbit...</font>

Certainly they do. Now you know why the British Army fights all its battles in the pouring rain on the side of a hill where two maps meet. The pouring rain will soften the ground and make these vehicles bog down; and if they don't, their high C of G and inability to absorb recoil forces means they will topple gracelessly off the slope of the hill and lie stupidly on their sides. A great British tradition is explained at last as a coherent counter-Gefingerpoken tactic (or "Gefingerpokenabwehrtaktik", as the Germans would almost certainly say). Of course this doesn't explain the bit about two maps meeting. I expect that's just Sod's Law. All the best, John.

Oh, they're different -- Commando organisation is very different, and it's IMHO a great shame that CM:BO doesn't include them. WO204/8397 gives the war establishment as notified in ACIs on 8th September 1943. I don't know of any later WE being promulgated; that doesn't mean there wasn't one. Total authorised strength is given as 458 all ranks. The Commando is commanded by a Lt-Col; 2-ic is a Major; one Captain acts as Adjutant, another as Admin Officer. The Cdo HQ has a total strength of 89 all ranks (clerks, storemen, drivers, medics, armourers and so on). Weapons include 1 LMG, 1 PIAT, and 42 .45 pistols. The commando has one heavy weapons troop and five rifle troops. The heavy weapons troop is commanded by a Captain and has a total strength of 39 all ranks. Troop weapons include 3 3" mortars, 3 .303" MMGs, 17 .45 pistols and 12 signal pistols. Each rifle troop is commanded by a Captain and has a total strength of 66 all ranks Each troop has 2 sections. Each section has a section HQ of the commander (subaltern) and a sergeant, and two sub-sections. Each sub-section has a L/Sgt, a Cpl, 2 L/Cpls and 9 Ptes. Troop weapons include 1 PIAT, 2 2" mortars, 4 LMGs, 2 EY rifles, 2 sniper's rifles, 2 silent stens, 9 Thompson SMGs, 15 .45 pistols and 3 signal pistols. A prominent note on the overlay giving the weapons allocations to each part of the organisations reads: "THESE FIGURES ARE NORMAL WAR ESTABLISHMENTS. Troop Commanders may use their own discretion re weapons for operational purposes and obtain additonal or alternative weapons from the RESERVE POOL." "Commandos and Rangers of World War II" by James Ladd (BCA, London, 1978) gives an organisation for an RM Commando Troop in Normandy, 1944, which has each troop numbering 60 all ranks. The troop consists of two sections, each consisting of an assault sub-section, a support sub-section and a no.2 sub-section. The assault sub-sections had 11 men with 1 Bren, 2 Tommy guns and 8 rifles. The support sub-sections had 5 men with 1 2-inch mortar, 3 rifles and a sniper's rifle. The no. 2 sub-sections were organised as for the assault sub-section, but with 40 lbs of explosives distributed among the men. WO 291/955, "Attack on Wesel", says that 1 Cdo Bde relied on "a liberal issue of captured panzerfausts" for anti-tank protection, which might explain the lack of PIATs in the organisation given by Ladd. Some idea of the variability of "full" strength of a Commando can be gained from WO 291/975 on the Westkappelle assault, which gives assaulting strengths for 41, 47 and 48 RM commandos as 420, 387 and 432 all ranks respectively. Hope this helps. All the best, John.

I'll see your two cents and raise you a farthing. What you have described there is not so much a difference in the optics as a difference in the way the sights are attached to the gun tube. On my last trip to the PRO I came across a document, WO 291/92, called "The accuracy of central laying in tank gunnery with different types of central aiming mark". This distinguishes three kinds of tank gun laying: Fixed telescope - fixed graticule. The telescope is fixed solidly to the gun tube and moves with it. The graticule (which can only be moved for zeroing) is used by the gunner to aim-off in both line and elevation. This type of laying was standard in British tanks (except the 6-pounder Valentine), using a x 1.9 mag telescope, as of 1943. Central laying. The telescope or graticule moves in relation to the gun tube, so that the central aiming mark is always directly over the target in the sight picture. Semi-central laying. This uses a vertically-moving graticule, with aim-off in the horizontal plane. This is the system used in most German telescopes. I must confess that the obvious point that the sighting telescope could be fixed to the gun tube or move relative to it had never occurred to me before reading this document. It's wonderful how ignorant it is possible to be of a subject after three decades of interest in it. The report mentioned above has some things to say about the aiming marks used in central laying (maybe you'd guessed that from the title). It says that British forces in the Middle East had criticised their tank sights, which used crosswires, saying that the German inverted-V aiming mark was far superior. Trials showed that, as an aiming mark, it was not (although this says nothing about the superiority of central or semi-central laying over having to aim off in both dimensions). It was found that the order of merit for accuracy of aim for five different aiming marks was a s follows: 1st. 10-minute circle 2nd. 20-minute circle 3rd. Inverted V 4th. 3/4-minute crosswire 5th. Gapped crosswire (20-min gap) However, it stated that the overall effect of the aiming mark was negligible compared to the 90% zone of the gun. It did, however, criticise the then-current British crosswires for being too thick, and tending to obscure the target at long range. Another possible handicap to British gunnery in the early war years was the habit (which I seem to recall being mentioned in another PRO report) of aiming for the bottom of the target, instead of the centre of mass. Assuming that the projectile dispersion around the aim point follows the normal distribution, then according to my table of same it would lead to the following reductions in hit probability: 60% P(hit) reduces to 45% 50% P(hit) reduces to 41% 40% P(hit) reduces to 35% 30% P(hit) reduces to 28% I don't know what the practice was in other nations, but aiming at the centre of mass is AFAIK now universal. Not long enough. Someone tell me what kinds of sighting American, Russian, Italian, French, Japanese, Czech and Hungarian tank guns used, please? All the best, John.