RockinHarry

...and yet I keep waiting for ANYTHING that proofs me wrong. Must not be true "evidences", I´d at least satisfied with something that tells and convinces me about what you guys "base" your guessworks on. And if I´d quote 1000 "ancedotes" supporting my thesis, I´ve yet to wait for at least 1 that supports the "opposite" point of view. Until then, I close with what I already posted above at: http://www.battlefront.com/community/showpost.php?p=1315091&postcount=87

On previous pages here I posted 16 quoted examples, of which most did not leave space for "interpretations". It´s not up to ME finding evidence, that I´M wrong. While browsing my US sources ( I left out german ones, as some here might doubt "credibility" ), I did not find a single mentioning of close/hand to hand combat been rare on 1944 western front. So it´s rather up to you guys providing credible sources about the "hand to hand combat was rare" thesis. Good luck!

Something concrete? Maybe interviewing WW2 veterans who did not die yet or what? :confused: I´ve found enough proof for frequent hand to hand combat on US vs. germans in 1944 and did not even include other theatres (eastern front, africa, pacific), participants (UK, soviet) and war years yet. Sticking to ones point like a dogma (hand to hand combat was rare in WW2) without giving any proof about it, ain´t worth a bit either.

I´d suggest replacing any grass terrain with dirt or sand, to see if maps load in 3D again. Not for the final map, but to see if it´s also sort of texture load problem.

I need to remind on my initial post where with regard to the combat situation as shown in the YT video, I asked if anytime some sort of "hand to hand" combat (bayonetting, shovel swinging, knife stabbing, fists punching...) could be implemented in the game. It´s about to get rid of the wild west like point blank gun duels, where Pixeltroopers could also be expected to do something "different" than calmly reloading their rifles in the face of the enemy 1-2m away. Something "different" could also be instant surrender, fleeing,...dependent upon a forces morale state, experience, leader influence and random factors like battle rage i.e. It´s also not about how many soldiers actually died in close combat, which surely were many enough. There´s surely enough who got incapacitated, knocked unconsious...or fled, as well as surrendered during the hand to hand combat process. So I would not derive hand to hand combat frequency from just looking at any official losses stats, which could just tell parts of the whole story. If hand to hand combat is not implemented in CMX2 anytime soon is secondary, if it´s not for the reason that it is declared a "rare" occurance on WW2 battlefields, as it´s simply not true. "Close combat" (german term "Nahkampf") particularly is likely to occur most frequently under the follwing battlefield conditions: 1. Urban (house to house) combat 2. Combat in forests 3. Night combat 4. Combat in low visibility conditions 5. Combat for fortified positions often enough when infantry is about to break into the mids of enemy infantry and neither side is able to solve the situation with firearms, hand grenades or supporting arms alone. Speaking just for germans and their doctrine, if close combat is to be expected in attack or defense, bayonets would got fixed, whether they at last "used" it or not. Just browsed through some of the US TM from WW2 (FM 100-5, FM 22-5, FM 7-10, FM 7-20), so I assume close combat (inc. hand to hand) to be doctrinally anchored. Off course one could always say, theory (training, doctrine) is one, but practice in combat was different, but was it really so? Interestingly, while browsing through my sources, germans say about US Gi´s, they´re averse of close combat, while some US sources say the same about germans. It´s obvious that this aims at morale boosting troops and to encourage going into close combat more willingly. However, the above quoted examples already give me enough reason to believe that close (hand to hand) combat occured often enough in conditions, where neither side could apply enough fire power to root the enemy infantry from its positions. And I just stick to 1944 western front conditions for the case. And to say it again,..no it´s not a game breaker, not to have hand to hand combat yet implemented in CMX2 and I can wait until CMX3 with lots of relaxation.

Me guesses the conscript Waffengrenadiers needed to throw everything they had, incl. the famous kitchen sink, vs. the elite US para squad. ...but it´s just a movie and thus has its requirements as Slysniper pointed out nicely. Edit: Somehow the german force composition reminds me of a typical CMX1 QB selection (a bunch of Waffengrenadiers, a Tiger, a Marder, a Flak and a HMG). Are Spielberg and Hanks CM players? :eek:

or a 75mm IG18, soviet 122mm howitzer? 37mm Pak 36? ... No, that´s well known application of heavy frontline support, even anchored in the various military doctrines. Just never heard, nor seen pushing a 20mm wheeled flak offensively through city streets into close combat. I like the SPR movie alot, but wished Spielberg/Hanks did at least as much homeworks on german combat methods, machinery, tactics and the like, as they did on US. At last it´s a Hollywood movie and I neither do know any more realistically made outside Hollywood. All in all these movies carry a "message" and are less likely to be meant giving lessons on historical accuracy in all detail fields.

From "Selected intelligence reports" (1st US Infantry Division) - Volume I, June 1944 to november 1944 pages 68-69: 5. None of these holding troops could be called the elite of the Wehrmacht; they were strictly defensive units and their organization was slipshod. On the other hand, when provided with fixed fortifications they were capable of putting up a stubborn and occasionally fanatical resistance. How much of this obstinacy could be laid to their fear of retaliation from behind their own lines iffthey slackened, and how much to nationalism in defense of holy German soil is debatable, but in any case their leadership was skillful enough and their training was sufficient to make the 1st Division fight for every foot of ground gained. The basic defects of the Fortress, Defense and Local Security units showed up in their lack of mobility and cohesion in counter-attack. Here again, however, there were other factors present. In speaking of the failure of the majority of the enemy counter-attacks, an officer prisoner of war remarked that too often large units, up to battalions in size, were led by junior officers, often lieutenants, who, either through inexperience or desire for a Ritterkreuz, failed to make use of all the supporting arms (except artillery) that were available to them, or to weigh the size of the objective against the capabilities of their units. An idea of the sacrificial ferocity of some of these attacks can be had from the fact that after an assault on "I" Company, 16th Infantry, had been beaten off with hand grenades and bayonet fighting, more than 250 German dead lay in front and in the company positions. page 75: The next day, at first light, the attack continued, spreading out to include "G" Company, 18th Infantry. More tanks were thrown in, but on that day visibility and the weather improved, and concentrated air attacks and artillery fire combined with obstinate infantry infighting, beat the attack to its knees. Our positions on the high ground were restored in a counter-attack with "B" and "C" Companies, 18th Infantry, in support. The fighting was extremely heavy and the enemy was only driven out by hand grenade and bayonet assault; at one time, in fact, Division artillery support was called down on our own lost positions, with casualties resulting to both sides, although by far the greater proportion were suffered by the enemy. From prisoners taken, it was learned that the attack had been made by three companies of the 29th Motorized Regiment with elements of the 8th Motorized Regiment making a holding attack on "F" Company, 18th Infantry, further west. (See Annex No 2 for composition and history of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division).

From "Selected intelligence reports" (1st US Infantry Division) - Volume II, December 1944 to may 1945 page 63: At 2045 hours, after a very heavy rocket and artillery barrage on our positions in EUDENBACH, the enemy attacked the town in strength from the northeast, east and southeast with tanks and infantry. The attack achieved some initial sucess and infiltration into the town was reported. Division artillery laid heavy concentrations on the attacking forces and compelled the follow-up troops to withdraw, pounding them heavily on the way. By 2330 hours the positions were restored after bitter hand-to-hand fighting. No indentification was made of the attacking force although it was probably from the 3d Parachute Division, elements of which had been trying to retake BRUNGSBERG for three days in order to cut the Autobahn. page 29: On 19 January four more enemy-held towns were taken in the worst weather of the battle. EIBERTINGEN, the first, was defended by a force of about 130 replacements and stragglers from the ROHR BUSCH. Entrance to the town was blocked by a large number of wooden box mines. Self-propelled guns and one tank were in the town, which faced the attacking 23d US Infantry, and it was only after heavy artillery concentrations forced the enemy to fall back into the town that infantyrmen were able to move forward and seize several houses on the northern edge. The enemy counterattacked immediately, and bitter hand-to-hand fighting resulted, but by 1400 hours the enemy troops began to pull out toward DEIDENBERG. One hundred prisoners were taken and more than 35 enemy dead were counted in the streets.

Really? I do not comment nor judge the quoted examples given and off couse everybody needs his "grain of salt handy". ...so continuing with 1944/45 western front examples, taken from US accounts that are publicly available in the net. I recommend digging CARL in example. "Lorraine Campaign" ...page 478-479: CCA, not yet abreast of CCB, likewise found itself involved in a foot-slogging infantry battle on the left flank. At Valette fighter-bombers from the 377th Squadron dropped 500-pound bombs close to the German positions. Then the 9th Armored Infantry Battalion (Britton) charged up a slippery slope with fixed bayonets and cleared the German position in a hand-to-hand fight reminiscent of warfare thirty years earlier. ...page 540: For the next two days the lead regiments of the 35th fought their way toward the Blies River in the midst of snow and bitter wind, while the 137th Infantry conducted a battle all its own in and around Sarreguemines. Here the fight went on from floor to floor, in the larger buildings, and from one air raid shelter to the next. Buildings were honeycombed with connecting passages running the length of entire blocks. Cellars were “mouseholed” in such a fashion that a BAR burst or a grenade through a window would not suffice and the enemy sniper or machine gunner had to be pried out. On 10 December F Company (Capt. J. S. Giacobello) cornered a company of German infantry in a pottery factory near the south edge of the city and killed or captured the lot in a hand-to-hand fight that raged for three hours from one kiln to the next. ...page 569: A platoon from C Company, manning a road block on the Beckingen highway, was overrun momentarily by an attack which brought the German grenadiers right into the American foxholes and trenches. In the ensuing hand-to-hand fight the American infantrymen killed or captured several of the attackers and restored the position. Elsewhere along the perimeter defended by the 1st and 2d Battalions the Germans advanced to the assault in closed ranks, suffering “extravagant losses” from small arms fire but continuing forward. These frontal assaults in daylight offered perfect targets for the American gunners and it remained for the artillery to give the quietus to each attack formation. This kind of close combat took its toll in the American ranks as well as in the German. page 575: Finally, on 10 December, resistance in Fraulautern began to crack a little. The 377th, still fairly fresh, wedged through the fourth and fifth city blocks, after capturing a large hotel whose defenders had beaten off several assaults. Characteristic of this close-quarter fighting, the battle for the hotel progressed from room to room and ended in a hand-to-hand struggle in the ballroom. Said a squad leader, “There was plenty of dancing in that ballroom today, but it sure wasn’t a slow fox trot.” ( )

One of the most ridiculous scenes from that Hollywood movie. Pushing a 2cm flak through city streets into close combat. Must be a very special Waffengrenadier assault technique me thinks.

....page 370: About 0200 the enemy guns opened up, preparatory to a last assault. The leading wave of this attack was allowed to come within three hundred yards of Landroff, and then a concentration fired by eight battalions of field artillery cut the Germans to pieces. Succeeding waves pushed the attack home, however, and reached the streets of the village. There in the darkness a melee ensued with the combatants fighting hand to hand with rifles, pistols, bazookas, trench shovels, and grenades. Slowly the Americans regained control of the southern half of the village. About 0500 a company of the 319th Infantry came in to take a hand, and the surviving Germans in the north part of the village were hunted down and captured or killed.

...page 279: The new 90th Division commander, Brig. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, ordered the 357th Infantry to take Maizières by 2 November, and Colonel Barth began to set the stage for a final assault by alternately probing and battering at the Hôtel de Ville. On 26 October K Company reached the lower floor of the building but was stopped by piles of burning mattresses in the hallways; it was then driven out by flame throwers. The next day four 1o-man assault teams tried again. This time three of the assault teams were checked by mines and barbed wire. The fourth crawled through a gap blasted in the wall by the 155-mm. selfpropelled gun and engaged in a hand-to-hand fight inside the building, in which all but one man were killed or wounded. The survivors managed to escape while the unwounded soldier held off the Germans.

...page 249: GERMAN COUNTERATTACK IN XII CORPS SECTOR Inside the forest perimeter the fight turned into a confused succession of hand-to-hand battles fought independently by companies, platoons, and squads from the 137th, the 134th, and the 320th. As the day progressed the five American battalions slowly won the upper hand, while friendly artillery and the ubiquitous fighter-bombers isolated the forest battleground.

same, page 182: Colonel Barth then ordered the 3d Battalion to move in on the right of the 1st and block toward the south while the assault was made into the gap along the road. The two battalions were organizing for this maneuver when, a little after noon, the Germans struck hard at the two companies deployed for the assault. This counterattack, made by troops of the Fahnenjunkerschule regiment, was pressed with all of the determination and savagery that characterized these elite German infantry. But the Americans stood their ground and drove off the enemy, after losing seventy-two men in a bitter hand-to-hand fight.

"Lorraine Campaign", page 150: The Germans resumed their assault on the bridgehead at 0330 on 12 Sep- tember, using troops from the 17th SS, 3d, and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions. This time they came on in a co-ordinated attack striking at all sections of the American line, close behind a heavy barrage which rolled up the hills and ridge line and over onto the rearward slopes where lay the infantry reserves. On the right of the 10th Infantry, a battalion of German infantry and a company of tanks made the attack. American artillery mowed down the first waves, but two companies managed to break into the lines of the 1st Battalion; there most of the German grenadiers were killed in a hand-to-hand fight.

"Lorraine campaign", page 590: Estimates by the Enemy At the end of 1944 the German training staffs published a series of “Battle Experiences,” 1 containing the official enemy estimate of the American soldier, his tactics, and his weapons. For the most part this German’s-eye view is presented in the form of a “catch-all” characterization of the American troops fighting on the Western Front; in numerous instances, however, generalizations are supported by examples chosen from the Lorraine sector. Since the “Battle Experiences” were prepared for and issued to the troops, they contain much that stems from the politico-military dogmas of the Nazi party or that obviously is intended to raise the morale of the individual German soldier. Despite recognition that the individual American was a more skilled and tenacious fighter in the fall of 1944 than in the early weeks after the Normandy landings, the doctrine of the superiority of the German infantryman did not alter. Stripped of the numerous propaganda reasons put forth to support this allegation, the core of the argument is as follows: the American soldier depends upon tremendous materiel support to bring the battle to a successful conclusion; when he is denied heavy support by the combined arms the “drive” in the attack dwindles; he avoids close combat, dislikes night fighting, and surrenders readily–all symptoms of his poor quality as a soldier.

Getting back to WW2 western front anecdotes. From "The Lorraine Campaign", pages 64-65: "The 3d Battalion had greater initial success in the central crossing attempt at Pont-à-Mousson. The 305th Engineer Combat Battalion, ferrying the infantry across the Moselle in rubber assault boats, landed about four platoons of infantry from I and L Companies on the enemy bank, although casualties were heavy and thirty-eight of the sixty-four assault boats were lost. The infantry dug in about one hundred yards east of the river, and there they were held by machine gun and mortar fire as soon as day broke. The available troops of the 2d Battalion now were ordered to march to Pont-à-Mousson and reinforce the 3d, while smoke was put on the opposite bank to cover the thin American line. But before aid could be crossed the German infantry left their foxholes along the river bank and closed in with bayonets, grenades, and machine pistols. The American position was wiped out by 1100, with 160 officers and men missing.

Quite interesting article and still has its worth for WW2 conditions IMO . It basically underlines my ideas developed from common sense as given in post #46: "The brutal nature of CC also might lead to outcomes, where survivors won´t be registered for the sake of having wound stats, for whatever they´re good for. Maybe too many died in CC situations and were buried, left behind or captured, before anybody could make a useful stat." Hopefully it is in order to directly quote from the website above: A useless archaic anachronism?' One of the most commonly quoted facts about the use of the bayonet in the civil war is that according to casualty returns, only 0.4% of all casualties were inflicted by edged weapons. 6 However, this figure requires the historian to raise certain questions. Is this percentage a total of all casualties, including those that died of fever and those that died in prison camps - if so, it is hardly a fair reflection upon the number of men that died in hand to hand combat on the actual field. Also, how can this figure be comprehensive when nobody counted the cause of death of all those lying on the battlefield and interred in the mass graves? Therefore, one must be wary of such a figure, which has ultimately been plucked from some official returns and used to emphasise the deadliness of modern weapons such as rifled muskets and rifled field pieces. This argument is supported further when one examines the nature of hand to hand combat in the civil war. Almost every action in the civil war had some detail of hand to hand fighting. To take just a few obvious examples; the charge of the Black Horse Cavalry at First Manasas, the railroad cut at Second Manasas, the Angle at Gettysburg - the list is endless. When almost every action saw hand to hand fighting of some sort, then why is the number of casualties officially recorded to have been inflicted by edged weapons so low? Apart from the reasons already stated above, ultimately, when in close quarters, the blade was not the only weapon. The combatant could also call upon his musket as a club, his bare fists and also his loaded musket as means by which to defeat his foe, none of which would leave an injury that could be described as having been inflicted by an edged weapon. Therefore, although the combat was initiated by one side executing a bayonet charge - the casualties were not necessarily caused by the bayonet. On the other hand however, if the figure was taken from wounds tended in the field hospitals, then not only is the figure unreliable in terms its restricted 'pool', but also at a more basic level. It would presuppose that casualties from hand to hand combat were as likely to be carried to the rear as those who received their casualties during say, a fire-fight. In reality this would not be so. The area in which close combat would have taken place would generally have been one which was of high importance strategically (thus justifying the need for a bayonet charge) and therefore in the front line in the 'hot' action - too 'hot' for non-combatants to carry the wounded to the field hospital. Also, the ferocity and sheer deadliness of hand to hand fighting that eyewitnesses describe would probably not have left many wounded - most would be hors de combat. These reasons also help show that perhaps generally accepted figures in relation to close-quater fighting are somewhat dubious. Another reason that helps explain low casualties for edged weapons or hand to hand fighting other than the fact that the figures themselves are probably misleading - who would go around the field examining how every soldier died anyway? - is the fact that combats were often short and sweet. True melees were rare, most close quater action only lasting perhaps a matter of minutes. Far more commonly, one side would break before a true bloodbath could begin. Sam Watkins in describing the attack upon a Union battery in the action around Atlanta comments on how the presence of heavy support would often sway a charge one way or the other, ensuring that close combat was over quickly; "But being heavily supported.. The Federal lines waver, and break and fly leaving us in possession of their breast works, and the battlefield" 7 Equally so, the very force of seeing a charge coming on would sometimes be enough for one side to break, the threat of impending combat being too much for one side to bare. James 0. Bradfield of the 1st Texas pays testament to this in his description of the fighting on 2nd July at Gettysburg; "The enemy stood their ground bravely, until we were close on them, but did not await the bayonet." 8 Hence, it can be seen that figures regarding casualties inflicted by edged weapons should be treated with a certain degree of suspicion. In a very real sense the belief that the bayonet charge was an obsolete reminder of Napoleonic warfare upon the 'modem' battlefields of the civil war could well be regarded a 'civil war myth'. The unreliability of casualty figures, the intimate nature of hand to hand fighting and the fact that a bayonet charge would not always result in close combat all go someway in disproving the 'myth' that personal struggle, or even the threat of it, was rare in the civil war.

Not that easy to translate from original german description. Here´s quite a good one: http://www.wehrmacht-awards.com/war_badges/heer/close_combat_bar.htm

What is so hard to keep sticking at WW2 topic and CMBN theatre in particular? :confused: Thought this thread was about to leave the field of broad "assumptions" and knowledgable players at least would name their sources and reference materials. I´m not really interested in Frederick the great, Napoleon or Iraque war...sorry! Bayonet charges? :confused: This thread is about close combat, its frequency, methods and application. Maybe some more definition is needed. The description of german Close Combat Clasp maybe gives some: Close Combat Clasp * 1st Level (Bronze) 15 days close combat * 2nd Level (Silver) 30 days close combat * 3rd Level (Gold) 50 days close combat As "Nahkampftage" (close combat days) were to be counted: * a) all close combat days, where to be awarded fighters found opportunity, to "see the white of the eye of the enemy", with close combat weapons man against man in the fight to the last decision. * This could be given in large-scale attack, at patrol, in the defense, single messenger run, enemy patrols etc.. * c) The location - at the outposts, in advance position, in the main battle line , the artillery firing position, in the army rear area (eg, guerrilla warfare, which, however, from 4 August 1944 by order of the High Command was not to be credited anymore. See. Bandenkampfabzeichen ) or a raid on a hospital train, or a supply convoy - played no role. Every soldier who was unprotected and had to walk into any of the above situation and in doing good, fulfilled the expectation of the clasp.

From my experiences with the editor, you can create almost any style map with the means and terrain types available. It´s just up to the scenario maker, to make best use of them and sell potential players in the briefing why a map has been crafted in a particular way. I also figured low bocage to be good for modded fallen pine trees, if additionally some logs from flavor objects is added. So for basically non bocage maps, bocage could be very useful to (fake) create different terrain types.:cool:

Nice Did you figure any problems with indoor flavor objects yet? The indoor rubble is auto generated and I would assume it´s the same as found in junk flavor objects. A thing to consider is that damaging roofs, makes the story below inaccessible during game play, although you can place units in there during deployment phase. These are "dropped" to a valid floor, once the game starts.

Burning fires belong to any battlefield. Period. We´re also speaking of high summer normandy, not winter ardennes. There´s a "very dry" ground condition setting in the game. Burning fires should start actually everywhere in these conditions. Fires is one question, but then comes all the additional smoke as well. Surely a nightmare to code, with all that constantly changing LOS/LOF situations all over the map. A big frame rate drop could be expected...at least for RT game play. Would it matter much in WEGO? Do we need graphic cards with more memory (1 Gig and more)? The AI is already "overloaded" with what we have in the game now. Additional coding efforts need to go in there, in order to have the AI deal with additional, complicating battlefield situations. Yet I want burning fires and smoke. Maybe in CMX3....:confused:

Lets stick to WW2 and CMBN. Anything beyond or prior, though interesting, is secondary. The brutal nature of CC also might lead to outcomes, where survivors won´t be registered for the sake of having wound stats, for whatever they´re good for. Maybe too many died in CC situations and were buried, left behind or captured, before anybody could make a useful stat.