Sardaukar

I, for one, is happy that you guys didn't get "raptured".. I know that sort of stuff is never going to happen to me (unless aliens want to dissect my liver to see why I am still alive), but I was bit worried about you guys..

You nailed my meaning well. I don't assume perfect operations, but I think it could have been done better and with even more aggression. This would of course run against Western idea of saving men's lives. Someone like Zhukov (or even worse example of skilled insensitive brute, Konev) would have tried it without batting an eye. I don't intend that my view is anyway correct or even plausible..but for sake of discussion, it is interesting one. Got it from Max Hasting's book "Armageddon"...so it's not even original. While I don't always agree his views (and some sneer on his books because they are made easier to read, tho he documents his sources quite well), he raises some interesting questions. Problem is, this could not be done under command of Eisenhower and Montgomery. On the other hand, I cannot see anyone else with required diplomatic skill to oversee the strategy within Anglo-American alliance starting to get way more abrasive..since it got into that even under him in Autumn 1944. Bit of Catch-22.

I think failure to close Falaise pocket was critical to later battles in autumn. The later pursuit through France was done well...but I think (even more) all-out effort in Falaise might have been worth the loss of life, limb and equipment.

Especially in Falaise. Inability to close the encirclement there allowed Germans to pull out lot of troops and continue effective resistance.

Sigh..mate..we are talking past each other. 90% of those were POW camps in making already. Lack of ability to destroy "mobile troops" fleeing towards Reich got bit worse, though.

FFS, you know what "operational envelopment" means. Any of the static garrisons had no meaning in this. Now, give me an example.

*facepalm* Give me example of *operational* encirclement. Not static garrisons, ffs.

Because it pretty much ensures total destruction of enemy force.

I think my argument is not underwhelming, it's overwhelming...

Anger anger! Now, give me example of decisive envelopment operation in West in 1944?

Except all you quoted were either garrisons, Falaise was never enveloped (with nasty consequences, I think) and..Ruhr was 1945... I iam freakin far from being German apologist, but you may see the point.

Not entirely related, but don't you find it interesting that in West, there was not a single decisive envelopment operation? Cut in and DESTROY enemy units in Falaise pocket. Aggressively pursuit and destroy remaining scraps of units. It was bad Strategic and Operational leadership that this was not done.

You are correct, again. 82nd it was. Donno how I got the 101 with that... Message from him was same, though.

It is if opponent knows if he presses things, he is in for neck-shot in Lubjanka... "Oh, my rook disappeared when I was in toilet...oh well..."

But Germans were not decisively defeated until in 1945..and I think that could have achieved with less losses and lot earlier if there had been bit more "drive". Of course there was bad management of logistics by Gen. Lee (who was often target of withering criticism from combat commanders). Then there was bad oversight by Montgomery's 21st Army Group not to clear Antwep and Schelde early, as they could have with probably lot less casualties. This allowed Germans to concentrate tens of thousands of troops and dig in, fact that cost later Canadians and Brits lot of casualties. And I don't think US troops were wise to go to Hurtgen Forest either, sacrificing their main advantages, mobility and firepower. It caused US divisions quite appalling casualties and gain was not that great. Understandably soldiers were not too eager to push forward when perceiving that end of war was near, but with 20/20 hindsight, that was wrong decision and cost more lives in longer run. E.g., MGen. Gavin, CO of 101 AB Div. gave quite nasty comments in his diary, even so late as 18 Jan 1945, about lack of aggressiveness of units his paratroopers had to fight with: "If our infantry would fight, the war would be over now. On our present front, there are two very weak German regiments holding the XVII Corps of four divisions. We all know it and admit it, and yet nothing is done about it. American infantry just simply will not fight. No-one wants to get killed... Our artillery is wonderful and our air corps not bad. But the regular infantry - terrible. Everyone want to live to ripe old age. The sight of a few Germans drives them to their holes. Instead of being imbued with an overwhelming desire to get close to the German and get him by the throat, they want to avoid him if the artillery has not knocked him flat. Of course this was one of the best US infantry commanders (along Ridgway), leading an elite division, but there is lot of truth about his statement. In West, Allies should have never allowed measured retreatment for Germans if possible, it cost lot of casualties later. Fortunately, Germans did make several bad counterattacks, most famous being the Ardennes/Battle of Bulge. My point in this is, while Allied sweep through France was fast, Germans were allowed to escape with lot of their manpower and with unit cadres available for rebuild. Thus the advance was neither annihilation nor decisive, Germans were able to regroup and put up about 6 months of organized resistance from good defensive positions. German defensive concept was rather good and was well-led even when units participating were shadow of themself. Weakness of remaining German manpower material was more profound when they tried to attack. This relates to original concept of Panther vs Sherman in a way, that I can well understand reluctance to aggressively close with enemy in those instances. In armour sense, it could be about possibility to meet something really nasty, plus abundance of Panzerfaust used by Germans. In infantry sense, it could be weapons like MG42, which as HMG setup could allow unit to "punch above it's weight" especially psychologically.

And never pushed much more, spending 4 months there. There was at least decent opportunity for war to end by Xmas 1944 if German ability to resist had been decisively crushed in France during summer. It cost loads of men and equipment from September 1944 onwards, for allowing Germans to regroup. But instead, the strategy of pushing Germans back on wide front was adopted. I don't think it was a good idea..and most recollections from vets of Autumn 1944 seem to reflect that well. Whatever one may think of German military in WW II, they were quite good to put up bitter fight if you let them time to consolidate.

Well..as I was talking about Autumn 1944 when advance slowed (for logistical reasons too) by Germans being able to redeploy. That was the time when Allied tankers were going against prepared positions and momentum was lost. There was also this small Monty thing called Market Garden, taking the focus. And you are wrong with "Germans annihilated", Allies in France never managed really decisive encirclement etc. Even Falaise Pocket was never closed, allowing large number of German troops to escape. Russians rarely made that mistake in Operation Bagration. Germans were devastated and mauled in West, but it took until 1945 for really decisive encirclements to happen. But before that, Germans were often able to withdraw, regroup and rebuild. That is not annihilation.

I think very large majority of losses were to Panzerfausts and ATGs. But when they came against German armour, many contemporary tank crew members expressed dismay. The effect really was more of psychological than operational reality, but it did make Allied tankers more cautious. And for every such encounter, there was operational and tactical successes for Allied tankers too. E.g. when Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army attacked 18 September neat Luneville. US MGen. John S. Wood and his 4th Armoured Division handed Germans such a defeat that they were not only beaten but shattered. 111th Pz Div started battle with 98 tanks and ended it 4 days later with 7 tanks and 80 men... Unusually, US casualties were only fraction of German ones. Of course MGen Wood was very outstanding tank commander, the 4th Armored led the 'race across France' and much of Patton's reputation from the 'sweep' was due to Wood's 4th Armored.

Don't know if "sweeping" is the right word, considering relatively slow rate of advance in Autumn 1944. For a tank crew, it was irrelevant to know that your side possessed 10-1 advantage, when confronted about immediate reality that if they fired at Tiger or Panther, their shell was likely to bounce off. And if it fired back, they were likely to brew up... Sherman was very efficient "war-horse" but in situations like that, could be found bit lacking. Of course, it didn't matter in big picture, but guys in combat rarely think of big picture.

Sherman was definitely better tank in operational sense...but it didn't do much good for crew confidence when having to meet Panthers or Tigers. And it influenced their combat behaviour. E.g. US 3rd Armoured Division took 232 Shermans into France, lost 648 completely destroyed and 700 that could be repaired. That is loss rate of 580%. So it might have not done good for combat morale, if sensing that your tank was very vulnerable to enemy weapons.

Why not just have unit level "switch button" in QB generator (Bn,Coy, Plt) with list of applicable organizations? Maybe in some future version. But it would be bit easier and more intuitive to Add than having to Delete. That way you could click Bn-level and get list of Bn structures to choose, e.g. PzGren Battalion, then click Plt and see list of Plts available, e.g Stug IIIG platoon. That way you could easily create for example German Kampfgruppe, e.g selecting aforementioned Bn, and adding a tank platoon...or infantry company, or whatever. LOT less clicks. One can always trim down Bn organization...but then if you want to add sub-unit from another similar organization, clicks start again. I just say that while system works, it is bit sub-optimal.

Yea, you are correct, CM was supposed to be CSL (Computer Squad Leader). Memories... http://www.gamespot.com/news/2464372.html Computer Squad Leader: RIP... Again By Alan Dunkin, GameSpot Posted Jul 15, 1998 2:40 pm PT Avalon Hill's curse of trying to create some sort of computerized product based on its popular Advanced Squad Leader board game continues. More Images (3) » Tuesday night GameSpot News was informed by Charles Moylan of Big Time Software, the developer of the anticipated Computer Squad Leader (CSL), that Big Time's relationship with Avalon Hill had suddenly ended, CSL was dead, and the game "formerly known as CSL" would now become something called - for now - Combat Mission. We've included two very preliminary screenshots taken from the game, which are very "rough" and were taken in a pre-alpha stage.

CMBO was called BSL (Beyond Squad Leader) in developement phase when Battlefront was called BigTimeSoftware.

Well, UI is quite counter-intuitive for CMx1 players. Ability to FUBAR is definitely enhanced, like me managing to Dismount my tank crews regularly when trying to order Hunt. Often bit too late to remedy as WEGO player. But while I skipped CMSF series for lack of interest, CMBN has good potential. Pity that UI is rather bad (IMHO), camera controls are mediocre and general lack of feedback about combat deducts some from the enjoyment. But still well-worth the $55 and gameplay is more intensive and immersive than in CMx1.

Thanks guys, I need to RTFM, too..even the QB Generator is confusing me now!