Brian

As someone who is responsible for Nuclear Weapons, let me shine a little personal light on this now Off Topic thread. 1. There is no international or national law prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. All existing treaties do not speak to the USE of nuclear weapons, but to the total number of weapons and delivery systems. It would be completely legal to drop a nuke if the proper National Command Authority issued it. </font>

<snip> Snipped out the message, because Jason actually started comparing Brian's picture with his picture. (Yea, now we're getting somewhere!)</font>

Its fairly clear from the various books on the Panther that there were several factors at play in the decision to adopt the VK.3002(MAN) prototype over the VK.3002(DB) version, which was the the supposed "direct copy" of the T34. One was a desire to get a vehicle quickly into the field, another was Hitler's personal intervention (in fact he favoured the VK.3002(DB) over the MAN vehicle) and the views of the Waffenprufamt 6 who favoured a more "traditional" German approach (ie the MAN prototype). Both vehicles were ordered into production, however it was later, as Ellis and Chamberlain suggest in their Profile, Panzerkamphwagen V panther, the DB contract was "discreetly rescinded". However as Jentz and Doyle suggest in their book on the Panther, even then, the DB version of the VK.3002 had by that time been somewhat changed to come more into line with stanard German engineering ideas. It was though, not that the Germans had "missed" the simplicity of the T34, they had instead considered it and rejected it, in preference to making a virtue of technical excellence. As to which would have been of more value in the closing days of the war - the DB or the MAN version of the Panther, I'd agree that the DB version would have been easier to manufacture, which in the chaos of the end would have perhaps put more vehicles into the hands of the front-line troops but in the overall scheme of things, I suspect it wouldn't have made much difference. Germany would still have gone down. It might have taken a little bit longer and it might have allowed the use of nuclear weapons, but it would still have happened.

I think Jason's .signature is rather appropriate here, Tarqulene. Of course I did. Jason of course has chosen to overlook it in his diatribe. How surprising. I think the "sheer willpower" refers more to the idea that if a commander was aggressive enough, his troops would follow suit and despite the impossibility of actually achieving their objective would do so. In otherwords, through the transference of the commander's will, via aggressive orders, the men would not be, borrowing a term usually associate with 21 Army Grp. be "sticky" or "canny" in following (or rather not following) their orders. Of course I don't. If they had, we'd have seen Western Front styles of slaugher (although it should be pointed out that the casualty rate for 21 Army Grp. in Normandy exceeded slightly that for the Somme, but I have no idea what the US rate was, compared to WWI). Of course it is, Jason in applying his usual scattergun approach has missed it completely. [ June 14, 2002, 08:27 PM: Message edited by: Brian ]

Err, I think you'll find they didn't miss it, they deliberately ignored it, making a virtue of technical excellence over the rugged simplicity of the Russian vehicles becuase they knew they couldn't compete on a one for one basis.

The part where Brain pretended "everything else" was "Somme revisited"? I agree, sheer fantasy. </font>

Jason, I've no desire to get into a slanging match with you. Change your tone and your attitude and we might be able to talk. Until then, rail as much as you like. ps. Where did I mention the Somme, Jason? Talk about strawman!

Exactly. The AI is almost always better at selecting targets... oh, and I never interfere with my sharpshooters (they never listen anyway )</font>

Unfortunately, this is not terribly representative of how British fire discipline worked, Fionn. The TacAI does not co-ordinate a platoon's fire, as would have occurred in real life, instead it has each section firing off in all directions. In real life, the platoon commander directs his platoon's fire as much as possible, using it as a co-ordinated instrument to suppress the enemy. I also dislike the way the TacAI will set priorities - shooting at say, an AT Team its observed over 500 metres away rather than the infantry section 100 metres away or the tank 1,000 metres away.

I think possession doesn't count. The innovation of shoe-horning it into a Sherman turret does, though. But its more the "funnies", the DDs, the Crocodiles, the AVsRE and perhaps most importantly, the Kangaroos and Montgomery's creation of his "collosal cracks" doctrine (desperately trying to drag the discussion back to the original topic) which indicate that the British Army wasn't as "hidebound" as its all too often portrayed IMO. I think the failure of the US Army to put the 3in or even the 76mm into the Sherman is a good indication of what I'm suggesting, Michael. The Americans were willing to innovate, one only has to look at the relevant pages in Chamberlain and Ellis on the Sherman to see that - the problem was getting it or rather all too often, allowing it to get to the frontline troops to be used. Even the Cullin device originated in Europe, not the USA, was created down at the lowest levels of the Army and it was only allowed to be fitted because of sheer desperation IMO.

RIGHT! Stop, right there, Jason. I will not allow you to erect a strawman and attempt to run a non-existent argument of mine. Nothing pisses me off more than when someone attempts to twist things like that. No wonder Fionn is annoyed with you. I was not referring to the "invasion" as such. I was referring to ONE, I'll repeat that, one landing beach. Further, I will define "gadgetry" as being "unusual technical means of decreasing your sides' casualties by securing its objective in an innovative manner." An excellent example of that is the various "funnies" operated by 79 Armoured Division and which were largely (except for a few DD tanks which were misused anyway) eschewed at Omaha. Further, during the attempted advance inland from the beaches, into the hedgerows, US commanders were relieved at a dizzying rate in the first few weeks of the campaign because their men lacked the technical means to overcome the German defenders in the Bocage. It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI, when British commanders were relieved for the inability of their men to overcome the German defences on the Western Front, again, because they lacked the technical means to do so. If one looks at the US Army's inventory of AFVs and compares to the British Army's, one percieves a decided uniformity and a lack of innovation reaching the troops in the front line - a case of one size fits all it seems. Which rather negates the claims of a "love of gadgetry", compared to the British. Now, if you'd care to discuss what I was talking about rather than what you believe what I was talking about, we can continue this discussion.

I'm unsure as to what APP-6A is, John, but I get the general idea that its some sort of flowcharting system? While such an approach would be useful, I agree it still represents to me rather a mechanistic method representation of "doctrine", which you also note below: Information flows can be represented and I think they would be a much more useful item to be modelled (although, what I'm doing telling a modeller what to model, I have no idea ) - communication is of course a significant determinant of what is achievable. Little factors like the German use of single frequency crystals in their early radios at sub-unit level, which meant that if a reconniassance unit "discovered" something, it had to transmit that information up the chain before it could be relayed across and down again to the Panzers sitting beside it (usually they just leant out the turret and screamed it to the bloke in the Panzer turret). Thats the problem. We don't have the veterans to tell us and even if we could interest them, they are getting fewer each year and their memories are fading. However, we can discover from reading people like Jary, how engagements were conducted but we have to be careful not to assume that all engagements were conducted in an identical manner. We should though, be able to discover a set of common elements between engagements. Now, if someone was willing to take on the task, I'm sure we could do what Phil Barker claimed he did for his ancients wargames rules - attempt to apply some stats theory to how battles were conducted. It might allow us to determine if the British, as Dorosh has suggested, relied heavily upon artillery, while the Germans didn't and the Americans were in between, somewhere. Well, there's another problem to contend with. Inded, the extent to which "making it up as you go along" is acceptable is, presumably, itself part of doctrine. For bonus fun, of course, it should be obvious that TTPs, if not doctrines, change from year to year, theatre to theatre, and in lots of cases between formations or units. As an example, Patton's Third Army employed "marching fire" in preference to the official technique of fire & movement; as far as I knmow, other US armies didn't. So, for all the above reasons, I don't think it is yet possible to make any meaningful comparison between the TTPs of different forces at any level higher than literary criticism. For those who enjoy literary criticism, I suggest that the following would make a reasonable library of the basic literature: BIDWELL, S. "Artillery Tactics 1939-1945", Almark, London, 1976. BIDWELL, S. "Gunners at War", A&AP, London, 1970. </font>

An interesting claim. While I'm not North American, I've think I've come to realise that in reality, in WWII in particular, the reverse was true. All too often, American commanders preferred to rely upon the PBI to achieve their objectives, without the use of technical means to shield them from enemy fire, as in Normandy. Omaha beach was essentially treated as a frontal attack by infantry, nearly all technical "gadgetry" was eschewed - few DD tanks, no other "funnies" and so on. In the hard slog forward through the hedgerows, one reads continually of how the US commanders were attempting to force their infantry forwards, through the use of what appears to be almost pure willpower, rather than a proper understanding of the conditions facing them. If anything, its the British who show an almost childlike fascination with "gadgetry" in WWII. They created an entire armoured division to exploit the potentials offered by it and Montgomery developed an almost complete operational doctrine centred around shielding his most precious (and finite!) resource - manpower through the use of "gadgetry" to reduce casualties - his "colossal cracks" theories. Well, Paddy Griffiths would suggest that in reality, they copied the Stosstruppen from both the French and the British. Indeed, in his Infantry Tactics of the Western Front he suggests that the British, through the adoption, again of "gadgetry" and the exploitation of the opportunities offerred through the use in minor tactics, were able to create the lightning advance of the 100 days. I'd suggest that in reality you'd find them startling similar in broad outline. The difference would be in the detail. [ June 12, 2002, 11:01 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

Others have already answered most of the points raised but I'll add my oar to the mix as well. Yes, you could add your 3in Mortars to the company. While battalion commanders would be loath to dilute their firepower, allowing "penny-packetism" to creap in, they would upon occasion allow a section of mortars (two tubes) or even the whole platoon (six-eight tubes) to be assigned to individual companies. However, you'd more than likely have seen them utilised, off-map, rather than necessarily right up the front there. As to "regimented" and "by-the-book", the British Army had that reputation, founded perhaps upon peacetime training but usually in wartime, it became very flexible and willing to accept alternative ideas on how to actually conduct its operations. Drawing the other concurrent thread together on Commandos, at the raid on Vaagso, one of the Commando troops had purloined for themselves a 3in mortar and ammunition from somewhere and carried it into battle ashore. There are many pictures of its being used at maximum elevation, which must have made it interesting to watch - you wouldn't have wanted a breath of wind to deflect the rounds. There are numerous other examples of how, with experience, the British Army became more flexible than its reputation. The key there is, of course, experience. When they first embarked on the war or came ashore in Normandy, it was obviously sadly lacking and the PBI paid for their commander's inexperience. John, BTW, where's my turn?

"The Mk.VI Soviet telephone pole completely replaced the Mk.I Tsarist pole in 1938!" "But that isn't a Mk.VI Soviet telephone pole, thats a German Mk.II telephone pole, I tell ya!" "I actually understood that the little side spurs indicated that it was a lend-lease telephone pole, supplied to the Russians from the United States and then captured by the Germans and given to the Romanians for their use on the eastern front." It will make a change, I suppose.

They however saved their most valuable asset - trained manpower. While disbandment would be a possible means of representation, is this possible while in contact with the enemy?

I've just downloaded the demo. I find that I am unable, using the instructions contained therein, to evacuate the BEF from France once the Germans have defeated the French. I also note that it seems I am unable to combine attacks or stack naval units. Nor does there appear to be specific ASW assets to counter the German U-Boats. Finally, it appears to me that research is incredibly expensive. To even gain one point in research, I have to sacrifice my entire GDP as British for nearly 2 years, which seems a trifle unrealistic to me.

P51D, you made the claim you had presented a paper on this topic at a "conference in Stockholm". You did not state whether it was a private or a public function. I assumed that it was a public function as I cannot believe too many closed functions would be that interested in a minor historical note from over 50 years ago. You later amended your original comment to "at a forum in Sweden some years ago attended by military personnel & historians." Again, I somehow doubt it would have been of such interest to serving personnel that they would have slapped a security rating on it, particularly as you then went onto claim that, "My paper was not unpublished. It was published in the journals that we use everyday to keep in touch with research projects around the world in much the same way that medical journals are produced to inform those in the medical profession of health related news." Which tends to indicate that I don't have to dust off my security clearance to see a copy of it, P51D. As to the matter of Al'Quada, I admit I provided a name when you attempted to suggest, rather increduliously that this matter was so important as to be vital to, "The protection of my identity & therefore the security of myself, family & staff ...especially during the current global climate." I still believe that is merely a convenient smokescreen, P51D. Then you must realise you have no credibility here and belong along with other denizens who live beneath bridges. I believe this web page is devoted to you. [ May 31, 2002, 06:32 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

Silly you.

I'm sorry, P51D but I see your comments as being quite a cop out. I don't necessarily believe that John has been particularly nasty either. He's in fact quite a gentleman, compared to some of the other piranha which inhabit this pool. Your desire for anonymity notwithstanding but you have thrown your hat into the ring, making particular claims. Many would like to verify those claims as they do not necessarily gel with what is the accepted demise of Wittman. Personally, I don't give a toss who killed him - he died as others have suggested, because his luck simply ran out and no matter how smart or good a tank commander he was, he didn't dodge the shell or rocket which killed him in his Tiger. In the long run, his antics weren't going to win the war for the Germans, no matter how good he was. However, if you are the historian you claim to be, you'd realise that references are what historians live and die by, professionally. Refusal to provide them merely renders your comments personal opinion, nothing more. Further, I somehow doubt our knowing your name and having a reference to a paper which was given at a public history conference is going to mark you or your "company" out for special attention by Al'Quada mad terrorists. [ May 30, 2002, 10:16 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

Well, one learns something new everyday. Thanks for that. We must be talking in the tens, not the hundreds though, I suspect.