LongLeftFlank
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Posts posted by LongLeftFlank
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And they held out in Normandy basically from mid-June to mid-July. I've had milk in my fridge that has held out longer.
LOL! That's almost sigline material!
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You notice that once the U.S. broke free of bocage country German 'tactical genius' pretty much evaporated. It soon became a matter of who could run faster, the pursued or the pursuer. What really saved them was as their logistics lines contracted ours lengthened. We ran about as far as we were able while they ran as far as they had to. Then it was back to stalemate again.
Yes, but the odds were not for the most part "even" at that point in the vast majority of engagements around the Falaise pocket, although there were certainly cases of "the biter bit", where overextended or overconfident Allied troops found themselves cut off by a cunning German counterattack and forced to surrender.
Your point about the MGs providing some very fundamental tactical options not open to the Allies was an excellent one. I'd dare to add though that in a fluid tactical situation where the Germans can't set up their customary web of MG nests, minefields and pre-registered 81mm mortar targets, the staying power of chronically undermanned German infantry formations is likely to be somewhat LESS than even beat-up Allied forces in similar situations.
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Except that 3 million or so of that 39-42 generation by now lay dead on the battlefields and many others invalid from wounds, or still in uniform but crippled psychologically. Again, not sure how much that extra experience really counted at this point in time in the line.
The awful US casualty replacement system MikeyD referred to might be a factor, making a large chunk of US squad headcount useless "wet-noses" with no motivation to perform or even show up in battle. While the Germans focused their tactics around the MGs who were either crewed by or supervised by the most experienced cadres they had.
Maybe that's a piece of the answer. But only a piece.
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Well as someone who works in a large asset-intensive company now, I can see how all that doctrine would lend itself to a well-oiled administration -- i.e. one able to get food and ammunition to the troops and fuel to the panzers in spite of horrific air attacks and other privations.
But is it, or are you, implying by extension that the German felds and gefreiters have the judgment and "intellect" to undertake actions in battle that Sergeant Rock and D-Day Dawson (his British counterpart) wouldn't?
And are Allied officers really more prone to "sudden inspiration" (i.e. execution of half baked ideas) or unable to "pursue them to logical conclusions"?
Sorry, that stuff all smacks of self-congratulatory German superiority to me, with fairly meaningless talk of "intellect" "character" and "nerve". And the disdain for "inspiration" (i.e. "clever" ideas that haven't gone through proper channels) is typical of the anti-Semitic ideology that went hand in hand with it.
Remember also, by 1944 the German junior-mid officer corps (company - regiment) that was truly steeped in the Prussian tradition and might have been able to translate some kind of intellectual jujitsu into battlefield miracles was largely dead, replaced by hastily trained former university students with little more experience than the American "Ninety Day Wonders" they opposed.
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Yes, but I'd expect that's overwhelmingly severe IED or RPG damage to the wheels and running gear requiring flatbedding followed by "extensive rebuilding" in the shop. This vulnerability wouldn't be remedied by any uparmouring program presently known to man.
I would be fairly flabbergasted to learn that 800-1000 M1s suffered hull penetrations (underbelly or other) in Iraq, although I'm not denying they did occur. My belief is that the TUSK kit was a prophylactic measure as much as urgently driven by some kind of glaring weakness in the existing design. Remember, Rumsfeld was badly stung by bipartisan criticism surrounding the "failure" to get uparmoured Humvees into the hands of the infantry fast enough. Since then, the DoD has basically erred ever since on the side of more armour sooner.
The Stryker of course is a completely different vehicle and as you say, badly vulnerable.
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You might be right about dead vehicles not blocking incoming shots against armor. I've never played CMSF, so I have no idea. But as far as aiming at the center of mass of a vehicle when only a portion of the vehicle is visible, that doesn't make sense and doesn't seem to jive with what Steve said earlier in the thread. Hopefully he can chime in and clear things up. I hope that dead vehicles aren't "invisible" to anti-armor shots. That's one thing I always hated about CMBB and was hoping that 1:1 representation would fix.
No, wrecks DO physically block shots, but I believe the shooting unit disregards them for purposes of deciding whether or not to take the shot. So the phenomenon you may get is an AFV pumping shot after shot into a wreck in a futile effort to hit a vehicle it "sees" beyond it.
The same is not true of cover terrain like walls; if I understand rightly, firing ordnance will recognize that a wall is there and limit its targeting to the portion of the vehicle it can see. It may still hit the wall (or ground) with an undershoot of course.
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It seems to me that MBTs came in handy enough in Iraq as fire support to other forces. The losses of several to IEDs never resulted in the withdrawal of tank battalions from the regular force mix in Ramadi or elsewhere.
That 120mm HEAT can pretty much take apart any building and any flesh inside once you've isolated the target. I'm skeptical whether tanks would have been more handy or less vulnerable had they had MG cupolas or some other Israeli type of thing.
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Well that's valid point; if we take it as given that the Germans are defender more than 50% of the time, then they have certain advantages that inhere in that position. So by definition you'd expect a defender to win most of the time at less than textbook 3:1 odds, which by definition isn't "equal".
I guess I'm trying to figure out whether, if the situation were somehow reversed (i.e. it's Americans defending against a German attack), you'd expect the same or different results. Not to the point where you have GIs and Shermans defending the Reich -- I mean at a tactical level.
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So I'm curious what percentage of AFV losses on both sides were owing ultimately to bogging or mechanical failures on the battlefield (vs. en route). I have a feeling that a significant number of AFV kills were actually immobilized sitting ducks.
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I've decided to take this issue, which has been alluded to many times, right up front.
Basically, in mid 1944 France, would you expect the Germans to win more company-battalion scale (i.e. CM scale) fights in which the odds are roughly even?
Put in CMBN terms, if you replayed Bois de Baugin or a simpler test scenario that alternately placed equivalent (I didn't say equal) US and German forces in each others' positions, would you achieve broadly similar results on average?
BFC has said repeatedly they don't model national characteristics (e.g. the "coolness under fire" or "quicker to break / quicker to rally" stuff of ASL notoriety).
But let me make a provocative prediction: I think CMBN German regular forces will prove to hold a slight but noticeable edge in June-Sept 1944, ceteris paribus, and that is consistent with the historical reality of the time. I believe the exact reasons why will be situation-specific, but consistent. I look forward to testing this hypothesis in the game.
Oh, and I have no way of proving or disproving the historical reality decisively, and neither does anyone else. We can quote examples back and forth ad infinitum of course.
Let me add that in general I utterly detest fanbois who try to claim some kind of innate German martial superiority, i.e. that man for man, the Germans were somehow braver, tougher, more organized and smarter "on average" than their Allied counterparts -- whether we're talking about generals, captains, sergeants or privates. And that the Germans only lost battles when the odds were stacked massively against them and/or Hitler or some other scoundrel interfered with their freedom of action. Such notions are still widely believed among Germans today, and not a few others, and are quite simply rubbish, smacking of the same smug racism that lured Germany into disaster. By mid-war, the Third Reich faced civilizations: Russia, Britain and America whose inherent human talent and will to fight were demonstrably no less than its own.
But with that understood, in mid-1944, even with the German armies a shadow of their former selves (and even though too many veterans had fallen to Allied forces whose own skills had grown substantially), it seems to me the Germans continued to get better battlefield results on average out of the same or lesser resources, displaying an enviable combination of discipline (persistence) and resourcefulness (initiative). This is not to say they always came off best in any meeting engagement with equal forces; just that they seem to have better than coin-toss odds.
My hypothesis is that this performance edge is real (though not deterministic), but is also not a function of some ingrained German genius for warmaking or organization that exceeds that of the primitive Bolshevist Asiatics and bourgeois Anglo Saxons. It is instead a function of:
1. Desperation. On average, the consequences of a given tactical defeat are more dire for the Germans; if the line gives, there is nowhere safe to flee to, and few reserves to plug the breach. Also, so long as the potent German artillery remains on its grid, the situation isn't completely irretrievable. So savage counterattacks, exhausting night infiltrations and aggressive refortification of positions are all very much on the menu even against heavy odds, up until the point when the formation disintegrates.
In contrast, other than on D-Day itself, Allied troops could often afford to let tactical failure be an option, cutting their losses in the knowledge that fresh forces could take up the fight again the next day. So on average they might well be less motivated to take extraordinary measures and risks, except where their backs really were against the wall (e.g. surrounded). Exceptions abound, of course -- it isn't always so clear to soldiers on the ground that the overall situation is hopeless, and they may tip the scales of victory through their efforts. For want of a nail, all that....
2. Perhaps a dash of magical thinking, a common companion to desperation: the Fuhrer has promised us wonder weapons (little do we know they're just going to pointlessly kill more civilians in London, not GIs or Tommies). And you know, some of the ones we have now (like the 88s) are pretty damn good relative to the competition.
Your thoughts?
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Ah, of course you're right. Even though I can't issue a Target command to hit an infantry unit without being able to draw a LOS line from my shooter's "center" to the target's center, my individual squaddies out on the sides will shoot at his men on their own initiative. It works very well, actually.
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Take heart, Capt -- once again I look at this test QB map and say "North Germany" or "Poland", but not "Normandy".
For example, in Normandy those clusters of farm buildings would almost certainly have low stone walls around them at a minimum, as well as vegetation (trees, gardens), providing your hard pressed armour and infantry both a last ditch refuge and keyholing opportunities. Don't get me wrong -- you're definitely against the wall at this point no matter what, but if the farmsteads had some substance and area to them, you could at least hope to set up some reasonable defensive combined arms defensive positions and then force him to take some risks moving to flank you.
That's the Achilles Heel of all-armour forces -- they are lousy at taking and holding complex terrain. Dominating a crossroads by fire is something else of course.
As is, those random cottages (sheds?) sitting there all by themselves are death traps for infantry; the Hun can just riddle them with HE at leisure from where he is. So you're stuck with skulking on the edges of forests trying to shoot it out at range against an enemy with superior gunnery and numbers. On his terms, just as you said.
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No, nowadays in Hell's Kitchen you're more likely to find some nice sustainably farmed ceviche to enjoy with mojitos after the show in a place that until last month was a sushi bar (and still has the stainless steel decor). Oh, and the Rent is Too Damn High.
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Thanks -- that makes sense. And "1:1 basis" means the LOS is traced to the actual physical location of the vehicle or the "center" of the infantry unit (not to the individual pixeltruppen)?
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Excitement builds: I have dug out my dogeared copy of "Six Armies in Normandy" and am rereading.
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There's something I never quite fully grasped (and I may not be the only one): I always understood Spotting to be based on a grid of Action Spots (to keep the computation load finite). So how would a unit within the Action Spot actually be Spotted? Or does it have its own "Spot". Or do I have my apples and oranges all hopelessly confused?
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As for the actual surf, you'll have to use your imagination because....'Charles don't surf!'
For lulz, I once did a CMSF mashup map with grajn at one end in a 2m dip blowing in a high wind. Looked pretty good for surf even though I didn't mod the grain. I also modded the engine loop on a GAZ jeep (immob and hidden in a gully "offshore" to provide an ambient surf .wav It worked pretty well IMHO. It's at GAJ's site for those interested.
I think Steve once said a placeable sound Easter egg (continuous loop or one off) was on Charles "one of these days" list. I'd have loved to start a Ramadi scenario off with the eerie cacophony of 3 overlapping muezzin calls (adhans) wailing from different minarets. Or church bells in Europe.
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Bil, quick question, on two occasions when you have tried to reposition your units they have drawn fire, is this a coincidence or do you think movement attracts attention? Or do you think it is a case of damned if you do and damned if you don't, the units would have been shot if they moved or if they remained stationary?
Just checking, Steve, just checking and good to hear the answer! Have HQ's lost their 'seemingly' super-human powers of resilience? ...No wonder the AI leads with them in attacks, hope that curious anomaly has bitten the dust as well.
Yes, this is long gone. CMSF HQ units have no more combat effectiveness than a comparable manned fire team; less actually, as they only have rifles or pistols. And when the AI executes each Order, the HQ usually moves last (after its subunits).
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The default AI group is "Group 1" (i.e. any unit not designated as belonging to the other groups is in Group 1).
To assign units to Group 2, et al, you need to do it manually (using the F2.... F8 keys in Unit purchase editor).
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Some very nice German Normandy action footage in this
ignore the ridiculous title of the Youtube video.This terrain just looks like a god awful nightmare to fight in. Note also the heavy use of undergrowth as camouflage by both German vehicles and infantry.
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While it's important not to overestimate the accuracy of WWII tank gunnery, don't underestimate it either. There are plenty of anecdotes of ranged weapons being used for precision shooting, from the 88mm sniper shots to that Tunisia incident where the Stuart 37mms brewed up multiple moving MkIIIs (?) by hitting them in a specific spot between the bogies (it's in that compendium BFC published around the time of CMAK). Unusual yes, rare maybe not.
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Long left Flank, have faith, for Tube Guy has heard the cries of his fellow soldiers and as we speak is racing to save the day (perhaps Tube Guy could be modded to carry a red white and blue shield!).
A simple umbrella will do (plus some grenades) -- Sgt Fury meets Mary Poppins. Oh, and about those panzerfuhrers using small arms from their turrets....
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If you read my "hear the click" answer, what you layout above is exactly what I should have done or at least shaped the battlefield in order to pull Bil towards my infantry. As it was the armoured battle was pretty much over by the time my infantry show up...ah the unsyncronicity of it all!
Able Fox Five to Able Fox. I got a target but ya gotta be patient.
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I for one appreciate it. I've spent enough time among trees, woods, and forests that I should have been more mindful of differences. Thanks for reminding me.
One thing though, certainly in Germany and perhaps in some other parts of Western Europe at the time of the war there were managed forests of trees in various stages of maturity. These had lanes or fire breaks at regular intervals that could be exploited for movement and/or to provide clear lines of fire.
Michael
What you're thinking of would be mostly pines I think; fast-growing, hardy and tolerant of thin rocky (post-Ice Age) soils. As I mentioned a while back, the dense pine forests (taiga) that dominate the northern half of the Eurasian (and North American) landmass begin in earnest east of the Meuse (the Ardennes and Vosges). Large pine belts certainly do exist in the central massifs of France and down around Bordeaux, but in Normandy the dominant native forest is deciduous white oak.
This image was taken from a road. Once you get into the woods, visibility improves some (second image). But all the same I wouldn't fancy maneuvering a Sherman through there.
So are German forces "better" on average?
in Combat Mission Battle for Normandy
Posted
I actually very much doubt the first statement is true. As NormalDude noted earlier, attacking is inherently more difficult and costly than defense, especially in close terrain. The Germans lost their marginal opportunity to drive the Allied beachhead into the sea just after D-Day partly owing to FOW and partly owing to inaction by OKW (Hitler).
After D+3, about 7 Allied divisions were ashore and destroying them was going to be pretty difficult for the German forces at hand. And by July hadn't the forces reached parity in numbers?
Of course in the absence of Allied air superiority Overlord would not have been attempted.
And I also take issue with the "better small unit tactics, leadership and motivation" bit. With no deeper analysis this segues quickly into knee-jerk Aryan superman worship -- "Duuude, the Nazis were badass -- just look at those cool weapons and uniforms." Sorry, not good enough.
1. Better small unit tactics. Fair enough. What tactics specifically? Are we talking combined arms, regiment-battalion, or company-squad, or individual? By 1944 I suspect the Western Allies had become just as good on average at many of these things.
2. Better leadership. Through 1942 I'm right there with you -- even their enemies admitted the same.
3. Better motivation. Not on board with this one at all. By 1944 a German veteran had to be pretty brainwashed not to be feeling uneasy about the future prospects of the Reich. Note that German soldiers also tended to surrender in large groups (I'm not just talking about Falaise here) when given the opportunity to do so. Allied prisoners in contrast tended to be bagged a few at a time.
As I said before, I suspect that any battlefield "motivation" edge is more a function of desperation than anything. German units found themselves in extremis more often than Allied troops and did their best for as long as they could, and then fled or surrendered when the situation became too extreme. So we admire them for that when they were merely making the best of a bad situation.
In contrast, the Allies didn't face "do or die" situations most of the time, which is why you're more likely to see 3 waves of wrecked Shermans piled up against German gun lines from attacks that first stalled and were then called off in situations where German attackers might have no alternative but to push on.
On the occasions when Allied troops did find themselves in "do or die" situations -- e.g. airborne drops, Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse, Aachen, Trois Points -- I believe that both elite and regular forces performed at least as well as Germans would have in their places. And that isn't just individual heroics; small unit leaders and the command and support structure performed too.